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Style and its function : the poetics of argument of Plato's Phaedo

Gergel, Tania Louise

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Style and its function:
the poetics of argument
in Plato's *Phaedo*

Tania Louise Gergel

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Abstract

My thesis aims to show that detailed stylistic analysis of Plato's Greek is a key element in understanding the construction of argument in the *Phaedo*. I argue that style is integrally connected to the semantic structure of a text and that this is true for all stylistic modes. Accordingly, style allows us both to approach all parts of the dialogue on equal terms and to escape the usual compartmentalisation of the text which occurs in conventional 'literary' and 'philosophical' readings.

In Part I, I propose a definition of 'style' and a detailed methodology for stylistic analysis, which I then use to analyse six short passages, chosen to reflect the *Phaedo*'s varied stylistic modes. I consider the passages in themselves and also in terms of their stylistic affiliations to other (archaic and) classical Greek literature.

Part II comprises three 'case studies', offering interpretations of selected sections, heavily based on stylistic analysis, so revealing the significance of style for the construction of argument. My first study analyses the stylistic transition between the end of Socrates' 'apology' and the 'argument from opposites' (*Phd.* 66b1-72e2), looking at the contrasting stylistic modes and their relation to the status of the passages as philosophy. I then concentrate on allusion, exploring how Plato's allusions to Anaxagoras mount a complex critique, while also advancing Plato's own points. The third chapter deals with the 'second sailing', showing how style and language clarify Plato's position, and examining their relation to Socrates' description of the 'second sailing' as based on *logoi*.

I demonstrate that stylistic analysis allows us a fuller understanding of Plato's argument, shedding new light both on old questions and on issues which have been relatively un- or under-explored. Moreover, it points us towards a more holistic and cohesive reading of the structure of the text.

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Editions and abbreviations

Editions

Throughout the thesis, unless otherwise stated, I have used the new Oxford Classical Text of the *Phaedo*, revised by Christopher Strachan in 1995 and, for other Platonic works and Greek literature, the Oxford Classical Texts.

For those works or authors not edited within the Oxford Classical Text series I have used the following editions for citations (although, the edition will be given *ad loc.* when an author/work is cited only once or twice):

Aeschines: Dilts, 1997.

Antiphon/Andocides: Maidment, 1953.

Comic fragments: Meineke, 1847.

Demetrius *On Style*: Innes, 1995.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Usher, 1974.

Geographical fragments: Müller, 1882.

Hippocratic corpus: Littré, 1961.

Historical fragments: Jacoby, 1923-58.

Isocrates: Benseler, 1895.

Presocratics/Sophists: Diels, H. and Kranz, 1951.

Theophrastus: Wimmer, 1854.

Abbreviations

KRS = Kirk, G.S., Raven, J.E. and Schofield, M. 1983. *The Presocratic Philosophers*². Cambridge.

OCD = Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.) 1996. *Oxford Classical Dictionary*³. Oxford.

OCT = Oxford Classical Text

All abbreviations of Greek authors and works are taken from Liddell and Scott, 1940.

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Preface

Style and its function: the poetics of argument in Plato's *Phaedo*

To a mind concerned with the beauties of language, what is trivial to the logician may seem to be just what is important.¹

Neither 'style' nor 'poetics' are terms usually found in close conjunction with 'argument'.² Conventionally, the type of verbal features focused on by poetics or stylistic analysis are seen as those very features which are at best, irrelevant, at worst, harmful, to the logic of the argumentative process.³ I intend to challenge this view by showing that style plays a significant role within philosophical argument.⁴

Frege, the 'founder' of analytic philosophy,⁵ makes a classic statement of this position in his seminal paper 'Thought' (Der Gedanke), where he proposes that non-scientific language contains elements without 'assertoric force', irrelevant to its content ('thought'). He appeals to one of the most common distinctions posited between scientific (prosaic)/philosophical and poetic/literary language - the view that the former prioritises content over language, and the latter vice versa.⁶ This view is accompanied, both here and elsewhere, by a chain of related ideas. Literary/poetic language is seen as relying on the evocation of emotion and indeterminacies of language, rendering it essentially untranslatable, whereas philosophical/scientific language is felt to avoid such features and to be plain and precise. Method of expression is effectively incidental to the context, facilitating paraphrase or

¹ Frege, 1918, 331.

² Cf. Most, 1999, 332, on the 'paradox or provocation' of talking about 'the poetics of early Greek philosophy'.

³ Following the preferred choice of Preminger and Brogan, 1993, 929-30, I take 'poetics' to denote 'theory of literary discourse' which 'is framed within theory of (verbal) discourse and...specifically retains the concept of the literary'.

⁴ Throughout the thesis I will only be dealing with argument as expressed in natural language, and not with formal logic.

⁵ By 'analytic philosophy' here and throughout, I refer, very generally, to the predominant c.20 Anglo-American model of philosophy, summarised by e.g. Audi, 1995, 22: ' "Analytic philosophy" is a very general term which covers the predominant schools of English-speaking philosophers in the twentieth century and emphasises the importance of logical "philosophical analysis". Although their positions are disparate 'analytic philosophy' can perhaps be characterised by 'an implicit respect for argument and clarity, an evolving through informal agreement as to what problems are and are not tractable, and a conviction that philosophy is in some sense continuous with science'.

⁶ E.g. Frege, 1918, 331: 'What is called mood, atmosphere, illumination in a poem, what is portrayed by intonation and rhythm, does not belong to the thought'.

translation.⁷ As I will discuss in detail in my Introduction such ideas have been enormously influential, especially in philosophy. Philosophers have repeatedly aimed towards a 'scientific' style giving unambiguous access to content and free from the indeterminacies which they feel are present in more 'literary' forms of expression.

A philosophical reading of a text aims, presumably, to understand its argument. According to the 'Fregean' view such an investigation precludes the study of style. Nevertheless, working with a conception of 'argument' accepted within the analytic tradition itself, we find that there may, after all, be room to accommodate style within philosophical analysis.

In *Logical Forms* Sainsbury uses 'argument' to refer to 'any collection of propositions, one of which is singled out as the conclusion' and in which the premises provide the reasons for the conclusion.⁸ From this it can be inferred that arguments are *verbal* (constructed within language); *dynamic* (insofar as their constituent elements move towards a conclusion); and *structured* (the argument's construction depends upon the semantic structure connecting its elements). Sainsbury also adds that an argument expressed in natural language would include 'a word used to show that one has come to the conclusion which is being drawn from the previous propositions', showing that it is the verbal features of an argument

⁷ Frege, 1918, 330-1: 'An assertoric sentence often contains, over and above a thought and assertion, a third component not covered by the assertion. This is often meant to act on the feelings and mood of the hearer, or to arouse his imagination. Words like 'regrettably' [*leider*] and 'fortunately' [*gottlob*] belong here. Such constituents of sentences are more strongly prominent in poetry, but are seldom wholly absent from prose. They occur more rarely in mathematical, physical, or chemical expositions than in historical ones. What are called the humanities are closer to poetry, and are therefore less scientific, than the exact sciences, which are drier in proportion to being more exact; for exact science is directed towards truth and truth alone. Therefore all constituents of sentences not covered by the assertoric force do not belong to scientific exposition; but they are sometimes hard to avoid, even for one who sees the danger connected with them. Where the main thing is to approach by way of intimation what cannot be conceptually grasped, these constituents are fully justified. The more rigorously scientific an exposition is, the less the nationality of its author will be discernible and the easier it will be to translate. On the other hand, the constituents of language to which I here want to call attention make the translation of poetry very difficult, indeed make perfect translation almost always impossible, for it is just in what largely makes the poetic value that languages most differ'. Such views are widespread and are also found in those whose primary concern is with 'poetic/literary' language. On the content/ language distinction cf. e.g. Jakobson, 1960, 37: 'The set (*Einstellung*) towards the MESSAGE as such, focus on the message for its own sake, is the POETIC function of language'; Frye, 1957, 74. On its 'untranslatability' see Valéry, 1937, 1314. By contrast, see e.g. Lang, 1990, 12-13 on the 'neutralist' model of philosophy and its translatability.

⁸ Sainsbury, 1991, 19-20.

which reveal its logical structure. Of course, talk of ‘propositions’ or ‘premises’ and ‘conclusions’ may make us think, first and foremost, of the type of philosophical analysis found in contemporary analytic works. Nevertheless, what we actually have is a very broad conception of argument. While this points to necessary verbal and structural components, it does not prescribe a particular verbal form either for arguments or for their component premises and conclusions.⁹

Such a conception of argument suggests that analysis depends on establishing the structures of the verbal features which connect its elements. Thus it opens the way for seeing style as integral to understanding the construction of argument, since style plays, as I will show, such an important role within the verbal structure of a text. There is no real reason why even the multivocity of some stylistic phenomena, often seen as a defining feature of non-philosophical language, could not be incorporated into such a scheme, providing that we can account for the way in which the semantic alternatives fit into the wider structure.

The aim of this thesis is not to propose a radically different understanding of argument or philosophy,¹⁰ but to show that the interconnection of verbal features which constitutes the *stylistic* structure of the *Phaedo* is itself part of the dynamic conclusion-orientated structure at the heart of philosophical argument. In so doing I will be expanding the scope of ‘argument’, to include certain stylistic features conventionally treated as immaterial, and also ‘style’, so as to incorporate a much fuller range of features than the group of verbal phenomena usually viewed as ‘stylistic’.

I began this project with two main objectives: to understand the contribution of so-called ‘literary’ features to the construction of philosophical argument; and to demonstrate that a close reading of Plato’s Greek will lead to a richer understanding

⁹ This is, of course, entirely different from formal logic.

¹⁰ In other treatments of similar questions alternative models are often proposed, so as to retrieve the philosophical import from discourse written in an ‘unphilosophical’ style or to ‘save’ philosophy from style altogether. Warner, 1989a, for example suggests the idea of philosophical ‘finesse’ as a type of philosophical method to be used instead of ‘geometric’ argumentation. Davey, 1995, proposes the notion of a ‘meaningfulness’ which is non-verbal ‘philosophical awareness’ (182), attempting to save philosophy from ‘deconstruction’s attempt to reduce all philosophical statements to a body of rhetorical idioms or stylistic strategems’, which precludes philosophy because of the ‘limitless potential for variant meanings within language’ (177-8).

of his dialogues. In showing the importance of style in the *Phaedo*, now the main aim of my thesis, I address both these issues.

In the chapters which follow I investigate Platonic style and its function, showing both that its significance for the argument of the *Phaedo* is not restricted to particular types of discourse and that style is also important for establishing the holism of the dialogue. I will use stylistic analysis to look into certain old questions about the *Phaedo*, but also to consider some issues which remain relatively un- or under-explored. However, it is not my aim to offer a comprehensive reading of the dialogue, and only selected parts will be discussed.

Outline of the thesis

Following the Introduction, which briefly discusses the project in the context of current Platonic scholarship and ideas about the literature/philosophy relationship, the thesis falls into two main parts: Stylistic Analysis and Case Studies. Part I begins with a methodology for stylistic analysis, designed as suitable even for those type of stylistic features not considered within traditional methods of analysis, so that it can accommodate the whole range of the *Phaedo*'s discourse types. This methodology is then put into practice in Chapter 4 with a detailed analysis of six short passages, while Chapter 5 traces the generic affiliations of these passages' distinctive stylistic features within archaic and classical Greek texts.

Having drawn some general conclusions, in Part II I move on to three case studies, which take the earlier stylistic/generic analyses of three of the six passages and consider them in terms of their wider context. Here I explore how the distinctive stylistic features of these passages contribute to the dialogue's arguments and ways in which this might change our views on certain issues raised within scholarship on the *Phaedo*. It is through these case studies that I demonstrate the significance of style for the philosophy of the dialogue.

The selection of passages in Parts I and II

Given the limitations of space, only three of the six initial passages are considered as case studies, although these three passages do provide a fairly representative sample of the major general points about style which arose in Part I. In the case studies I look at not just the original passages, but also the larger sections of the *Phaedo* from which these passages are taken. For we need the wider context, in order to comment on the significance of the initial passages. Given that many key stylistic aspects of Part I's short passages are also relevant for their wider context we can, by comparing similarities and differences with these short passages, understand the style of the larger sections to a certain degree, even without carrying out an independent and detailed stylistic analysis.

Although three of the six passages analysed in Part I are not considered in Part II they are not in any way irrelevant. For Part I's conclusions about Platonic style provide the basis for the case studies' methodology and, for many reasons, these depend upon using a very broad sample of the *Phaedo*'s stylistic types.

Since my aim is to develop a methodology for stylistic analysis applicable to *all* styles of discourse, Part I uses a wide selection of passages, giving a representative sample of the dialogue's major stylistic types. Furthermore, in order to ascertain the distinctiveness of individual features, we need to assess them against a fairly broad background of styles. Similarly, if we wish to demonstrate Plato's stylistic variety it will be beneficial to have as broad a sample as possible.

Nevertheless, it is not simply for assessing the distinctiveness of individual sections that a broad range is useful, but also for examining common traits. By bringing together a number of disparate passages it is possible to draw some general conclusions about style and generic affiliations. The larger the number of passages discussed, the more plausible it is to posit general tendencies, which would also have been less visible if considering a smaller range of passages. Thus, in many ways, Part I establishes a fairly broad understanding of similarities and differences in the *Phaedo*'s use of style, and it is the diversity of stylistic types examined there which facilitates the approach used in the subsequent case studies of Part II.

Chapter 1

Introduction: towards a 'literary' reading of the *Phaedo*?

A project which focuses on Platonic style may well appear to fit into a contemporary trend towards 'literary' readings of Plato, given that style is more conventionally associated with literary than philosophical investigation. However, I am actually aiming to break away from this opposition and my approach differs from other 'literary' readings in ways I will explain below.

1.1 The 'literary' movement in Platonic scholarship

The past twenty years have seen a distinct trend towards 'literary' readings of Plato, so that what began as a reaction against the dominant 'philosophical' approach has now itself become an important part of mainstream Platonic scholarship.¹

1.1.1 *The motivations behind this 'literary' approach*

This 'literary' turn has been motivated primarily by a desire to depart from those 'philosophical' readings which dominated post-war Anglo-American Platonic scholarship and concentrated on establishing and assessing sequences of argumentation,² in order to explore aspects of the dialogues neglected by such

¹ On the growth of the 'literary' approach see e.g. Stokes, 1986, 1: 'There is a steadily accumulating body of writing by scholars determined to do justice to Plato's *literary* [italics mine] art no less than to the "wiry argument" of Plato's Socrates'. Cf. Rutherford, 1988, 216. Critical works include: collections of essays, e.g. Griswold, 1988 and Press, 1993; individual works on particular dialogues, e.g. Ferrari, 1987, an influential study of Plato's *Phaedrus*; and individual collections on a number of Platonic works, of which two of the more prominent recent examples are Nightingale, 1995 and Rutherford, 1995. On the *Phaedo* alone, specific works include books by e.g. Gilead, 1994; Ahrens Dorf, 1995; Bolotin, 1987. For further bibliography, see Gilead, 1994, 143-8. The general idea of taking Plato's arguments in their full literary context can also be traced back further. See e.g. Press, 1993, 5, on Schleiermacher. Many recent works, including some listed above, have also focused on Platonic dialogue form: e.g. Griswold, 1988; Gill and McCabe, 1996; Klagge and Smith, 1992.

² Cf. e.g. Stokes, 1986, 1: 'A host of philosophical papers and monographs...have illuminated the premises, inferences, and conclusions presented in Plato's dialogues; Weingartner, 1973, 3ff.; McKim in Griswold, 1988, 34; Warner, 1989a, 69, n.3. Bostock, 1986, constitutes a paradigm example of this type of reading, stating that his commentary 'concentrates entirely on the philosophical interest of the dialogue, and has nothing to say of its considerable literary merits and dramatic power'. Cf. e.g. commentaries by Gallop, 1975, and Hackforth, 1955; the comments of Warner, 1989a, 67-9, on Hackforth and Gallop; or articles by Vlastos, 1973; Keyt, 1963.

interpretations.³ In many ways it also reflects a more widespread scepticism about 'analytic' philosophy,⁴ and a growing interest in interdisciplinary approaches to literature and philosophy,⁵ for which 'hybrid' authors like Plato and Nietzsche, whose works defy easy classification into either category, provide useful examples.⁶ 'Literary' interpretations of Plato focus on such questions as the dialogues' form and unity, the function of allusion, intertextuality, metaphor, characterisation and other 'dramatic' aspects.⁷ Significantly, they often claim to avoid the segmentation of the dialogues' which they see as resulting from the philosopher's tendency to analyse individual arguments, withdrawn from their context.⁸

1.1.2 *Problems with these 'literary' readings*

Given their preoccupation with unity and opposition to compartmentalisation, it is ironic that the majority of these 'literary' readings have simply arrived at an alternative form of segmentation: avoiding those parts of the dialogue most amenable to 'philosophical' analysis and making no substantial or rigorous contribution to the questions which have motivated 'philosophical' interpretations. Rather than unity, what we have are, effectively, two discontinuous branches of Platonic scholarship, whose views have little bearing on each other.⁹

³ Cf. e.g. Gilead, 1994, 1: 'Plato's art of writing has been well acknowledged. Yet many Plato scholars have not devoted much of their efforts to a meticulous and detailed analysis of his artistic achievements and their philosophical implications'. Cf. e.g. Warner, 1989a, 67; Rutherford, 1995, ix.

⁴ Among the most influential of these attacks on analytic-philosophy are e.g. the 'deconstructive' writings of Derrida (see e.g. Derrida, 1981); and Rorty, 1980.

⁵ See e.g. the journal *Philosophy and Literature*, first published in 1976 by the University of Michigan.

⁶ Cf. e.g. Most, 1999, 360, on the alternative 'discursive modes' of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and Heidegger. For analysis of such works see e.g. Warner, 1989a; Lang, 1990, 14ff. and *passim*.

⁷ Cf. e.g. Rutherford, 1988, 217, on Ferrari, 1987; Press, 1993, 5.

⁸ Cf. e.g. Stokes, 1986, 2: 'very few philosophers indeed have undertaken the task of interpreting a dialogue from start to finish, through passages overtly philosophical and manifestly literary alike in exploration of the relation between the parts and the whole'; McCabe, *forthcoming*; Bolotin, 1987, 39. For 'unity' readings see e.g. Rutherford, 1995, *passim*; Rowe, 1991b, 159, Weingartner, 1973, 7; Press, 1993, 4-5.

⁹ Even e.g. Warner, 1989a, 85 and 4-5, who talks about the 'balance' between different types of arguments in the *Phaedo*, draws a distinction between '“regular” (geometric) and “irregular” means' of argument, and himself concentrates on the latter.

Rutherford quite explicitly dissociates himself from the 'philosophical' approach.¹⁰ Yet even those less blatant about stating such aims seem generally unconcerned with key 'philosophical' questions. On one level this is reflected in the dialogues studied, with 'literary' readings attached mainly to middle and early dialogues, whereas later works like the *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Parmenides* are left almost exclusively to 'philosophers'.¹¹ On another, with respect to individual dialogues themselves, segmentation is also very marked in the selection of passages considered within the different approaches. This is very evident from recent works on the *Phaedo*, where philosophical readings revolve mainly around the four 'main arguments' for the immortality of the soul,¹² whereas 'literary' readings branch out to consider other parts, but rarely contribute at all to philosophical debate on the four 'main arguments'.

So, typically, literary works look at so-called 'literary' aspects of the dialogues, while keeping away from philosophical rigour¹³ and the questions which traditionally provide the focus for philosophical analysis.¹⁴ By contrast, philosophers seek out

¹⁰ Rutherford, 1995, *Preface*.

¹¹ This is certainly true of some more notable recent 'literary' works. See e.g. Rutherford, 1995, who devotes only a short final chapter to some of the late dialogues; Nightingale, 1995, who avoids the late dialogues almost entirely, apart from briefly considering the *Theaetetus*' definition of the philosopher (179) and one definition of the sophist in the *Sophist* (23); Kahn, 1996, barely mentions the later dialogues; Thesleff, 1993, 28. There are also many 'literary' readings of e.g. the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. Gill and McCabe, 1996, a collection of essays discussing dialogue form in the late dialogues, is a notable exception.

¹² Except for the episodes concerning Simmias' objections to the 'affinity argument' and brief comments on the first part of the 'second sailing' most of the commentaries of e.g. Bostock, 1986, Gallop, 1975; and Bluck, 1955, focus on the four 'main arguments'. Cf. the number of articles on these sections: e.g. Rowe, 1991a and b; Fine, 1987; Frede, 1978; Gallop, 1982; Keyt, 1963; Schiller, 1967; Sedley, 1998; Vlastos, 1973; O'Brien, 1967-8; Kanayama, 2000. Cf. Warner, 1989a, 4 and 6, n.4.

¹³ By philosophical rigour I refer not solely to 'deductive' arguments (see Warner, 1989a, 17-18), but, more generally, to reason-conclusion sequences.

¹⁴ On Plato in general, cf. e.g. Nightingale, 1995. In the introduction to her fascinating study of Platonic intertextuality, she writes: 'I am not concerned then with Plato's methods and doctrines or, indeed, with his development and practice of analytic thinking'. On the *Phaedo* specifically, see e.g. Gilead, 1994, 2, who makes some interesting points about its relation to other literature but, despite claiming that 'in the *Phaedo* philosophy and poetry are harmoniously, flawlessly interwoven', concentrates on dramatic setting, motifs, and overall form, without incorporating these into arguments or ideas of any philosophical complexity. Cf. also Bolotin, 1987, whose 'dramatic' reading argues that 'Socrates' primary intention in the *Phaedo* is not to discuss the fate of the soul after death, but rather to persuade his friends that even despite the persecution of philosophers, the philosophic life remains the wisest and the best one' (43). He does little more than summarise certain parts of the *Phaedo*; simply accepts without debate others' views that the soul's immortality is not proven (46), and, without offering any substantial argumentation, discusses Socrates' justification for persuading his friends of beliefs he himself does not necessarily accept. Ahrens Dorf, 1995, 3ff., follows Bolotin and makes the same unquestioned assumptions. Cf. Warner, 1989a, who aspires to a unified

key 'arguments' and analyse them in terms of premise and conclusion. What we need, then, is an approach which shows the relevance of literary details for the philosophical analysis of argument.¹⁵ For it is only by bringing together these supposedly opposing pursuits that we can hope to arrive at a truly unified literary/philosophical reading of the dialogues, accounting for all parts and sacrificing neither philosophical rigour for literary analysis, nor vice versa.

A final point about existing 'literary' readings of Plato is that, despite claiming an interest in the style or literary features of the dialogues, they tend to pay little or no attention to the details of Plato's Greek.¹⁶ 'Close' analysis goes only so close as translation or consideration of isolated Greek words allows, and many significant

interpretation (70), but nevertheless skims over the cyclical and recollection arguments (91), and gives only the sketchiest summary of some of the 'final argument' (93). When such readings do venture into 'philosophical' territory there is little philosophical rigour. E.g. Ahrens Dorf, 1995, 63-4, says of the 'argument from opposites' that 'Socrates points to the possibility that the living and the dead are two fundamentally distinct kinds of beings', although the argument actually hinges upon the necessity of a cyclical transformation between opposite conditions taking place in a continuous underlying being.

¹⁵ Concerning the *Phaedo* in particular, the gulf between 'literary' readings and traditional philosophical concerns could not be clearer. E.g. Thesleff, 1993, 26, on 'opposites' in the *Phaedo*: 'The theme of opposites occurs throughout the dialogue but I would see here, basically, the unequal opposites of Plato's two-level model: Socrates and his partners, soul and body, life and death, even pleasure and pain, are after all no dualistic contraries'. To see these simply as analogous parallel oppositions shows complete prioritisation of literary form over philosophical oppositions and is typical of the vague impressionistic method of such works. For although these pairs may all be presented as oppositional, each has an entirely different function, which can only be understood through analysing their place within the philosophical arguments (taken in the broadest sense) of the dialogue. For an analysis of different oppositions within the *Phaedo* and their correspondence to each other see Ch.6 above, on consideration of stylistic oppositions within their full argumentative context.

¹⁶ This tendency is widespread and accepted. So e.g. Rutherford, 1995, who sees himself as concerned with 'rhetoric, irony, poetic style and imagery', still considers no more than the occasional Greek term; Nightingale, 1995, who discusses only the significance of occasional words or phrases and is more interested in motifs than stylistic parallels as such. Cf. also Belfiore, 1997, 33-4, on Rutherford. Cf. also e.g. Warner, 1989a, 67-104.

points are ignored,¹⁷ while other points take on a significance derived more from English translation than from the nuances of the original language itself.¹⁸

1.2 Style and the literature/philosophy opposition

Segmentation of the dialogues within the critical literature seems to result from the assumption, sometimes silent, sometimes voiced, of a literature/philosophy opposition, which leads literary and philosophical readings to focus on different aspects of the text and different concerns. Questions concerning the so-called literature/philosophy distinction, whether it exists and, if it does, in what it consists, have generated much interest over the last twenty or thirty years. There are various views about the grounds for this opposition, though a style-based distinction appears most significant in explaining why segmentation arises in readings of the *Phaedo*. Yet, especially when considering a work like the *Phaedo*, this oppositional formulation is problematic, no matter what its basis.

The basis and problems of the literature/philosophy opposition

In broad terms literature and philosophy are seen as oppositional on three main counts: world view; theme; style. The first implies that a 'philosophical' world view sees rationality as giving us access to an objective, supra-personal truth, to which all other human experiences are subordinated. Literature, by contrast, views such truth

¹⁷ Gilead, 1994, 66, commenting on the exchange between Socrates and Cebes at *Phd.*77d5-e8, talks of Cebes' '“Freudian” insight' and says 'Cebes employs childish language to get his emotional needs across to Socrates', while 'Socrates' amusement and irony do not affect Cebes' solemn frame of mind': 'the frightened child within Cebes is stronger than Cebes, and his fear...represents the frame of mind of the audience in a tragedy'. However, Cebes has actually responded to Socrates' first joke by laughing, καὶ ὁ Κέβης ἐπιγέλασας (77e4), and seems to be picking up on Socrates' ironic humour by asking Socrates to rid their 'inner child' of his fear of τὰ μορμολύκεια, appearing to act more through self-effacement than intense emotion. Extant usage of μορμολυκεῖον points towards possible humorous connotations, given that it only occurs three other times, all of which are in Aristophanes. Especially relevant is fr.958: ἀφ' οὗ κωμωδικὸν μορμολυκεῖον ἔγνω (Meineke). Cf. also fr.1001 and *Th.*417. Gilead does mention μορμολύκεια, but seems to see it as implying real horror.

¹⁸ E.g. Ahrens Dorf, 1995, though insisting on the dramatic context's importance (1ff.), seems to stray from the text altogether with strange and entirely unsubstantiated points like 'Cebes' doubts [i.e. about the goodness of the philosophic life] have led him to think about committing suicide' (60), which he has somehow managed to infer, presumably from Cebes' statement that he has heard suicide is unlawful (61e5-9), although there is absolutely no implication of intention on Cebes' part.

as unattainable and aims towards 'humanly apprehended reality',¹⁹ to which we have access through the whole range of human responses, as opposed to reason alone. However, this position, which can roughly be summarised in terms of philosophical rationality versus literary holism,²⁰ is based on a conception of philosophy which, though possibly plausible for the *Phaedo*, is in no way representative of philosophy in general; there are significant counter-examples in all periods.²¹

The thematic literature/philosophy distinction is no less problematic. Based on the idea that themes essential to philosophy have a purely aesthetic function when included in literature,²² it hinges upon the controversial assumption that the stimulation of reflection and thought are secondary to the aesthetic aspects of literature. Moreover, the *Phaedo* itself clearly reveals this idea's flaws in a philosophical context. For, as in so many other 'philosophical' works, the dialogue's philosophical themes are inseparable from the dramatic situation and its literary evocation, making it impossible to give a separate assessment of their relative importance for the work as a whole.

These two formulations are not only flawed, but have no obvious relevance for the *Phaedo*. By contrast, the style-based literature/philosophy distinction seems to be at the heart of much of the divide which exists between so-called 'literary' and 'philosophical' readings of the dialogue. This distinction takes us back to the idea mentioned in the Preface that philosophy is written in plain and neutral quasi-formalisable prose, as opposed to the emotive, elaborate, indeterminate, poetic style of literature. From Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's Forms as 'empty speech

¹⁹ Falck, 1989, 32.

²⁰ For a typical statement of this position see e.g. the post-post-modernist defence of literary truth in Falck, 1989, 32 ff.

²¹ From Protagoras' 'man is the measure' to Rorty's 'edificationism' (see e.g. Rorty, 1980, 373-9), there are many philosophers who see 'truth' as humanly-mediated, rather than being some external supra-personal reality. Contemporary epistemology is, like many of its predecessors, beset by scepticism about our capacity to attain any knowledge, while even Aristotle, far from being anti-holistic, attributed an important philosophical role to intuition (*NE* 1140b31ff.), emotion and imagination (see Nussbaum, 1990, 74-8).

²² E.g. Beardsmore, 1984, maintains that philosophical problems are essential to philosophy, but incidental to literature. 'Though works of literature', he says, 'may involve such problems, philosophy starts from them' (72). Cf. e.g. Olsen, 1984, 86, 91, and *passim*; Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 391.

(κενολογεῖν) and poetic metaphors (μεταφορὰς ποιητικὰς)²³ to Frege's call for scientific language in philosophy, such ideas have been extremely influential within Western thought, manifesting themselves in terms of oppositions like the literary/philosophical, poetic/prosaic, literary/scientific, personal/abstract, rhetorical/non-rhetorical.²⁴

Nussbaum describes the 'conventional style of Anglo-American philosophical prose' as:

a style correct, scientific, abstract, hygienically pallid, a style that seemed to be regarded as a kind of all-purpose solvent in which philosophical issues of any kind at all could be efficiently disentangled, any and all conclusions neatly disengaged.²⁵

On one level, this provides a fitting summary of the 'scientific prose' which many philosophers have either used or advocated as correct. Models such as Melissus and Aristotle's works or the typically dry academic prose of analytic philosophy are widespread, and the view that this type of style constitutes philosophical as opposed to literary writing has a long history, being echoed by philosophers and literary theorists alike.²⁶

In antiquity Epicurus advocated clear speech and prose rather than poetry for philosophy,²⁷ while Sprat, in the seventeenth century, condemned the 'ornaments of speech' as inimical to reason:

They are in open defiance against *Reason*; professing, not to hold much correspondence with that; but with its Slaves, the *Passions*: they give the mind a motion too changeable and bewitching, to consist with *right practice*. Who can behold, without indignation, how many mists and uncertainties, theses specious *Tropes* and *Figures* have brought on our Knowledge?²⁸

²³ Arist.*Metaph.*991a22. Cf. Arist.*Rhet.*1404a28-9, on there being ἑτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξεις and 1404b1ff., on the necessity of clarity in prose.

²⁴ On the idea of rhetorical language being seen to preclude reasoning, see e.g. Gergel, 2000, 291ff.; Lang, 1990, 2.

²⁵ Nussbaum, 1990, 19.

²⁶ Cf. e.g. Warner, 1989a, 70 on the 'separate canons of exact, rigorous, logically argued, and "non-poetic" style such as we have since learnt to associate with philosophy'.

²⁷ See e.g. Asmis, 1991, 72, who also gives the relevant references to Epicurus. Cf. also Silk, 1974, 220.

²⁸ Sprat, 1667, 112.

In calling then for 'mathematical plainness' he echoes the sentiments of 'several of the leading figures of the seventeenth century revolution in philosophy,'²⁹ such as Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who espoused a 'geometrical' model of reasoning.³⁰ Such views became very influential in Western philosophy and also occur later, for example in Kant, or the analytic movement.³¹ Scientific/philosophical language is felt to avoid the indeterminacies present in literary language and to present its statements and arguments in the clearest and most unambiguous manner possible.³² So Richards distinguishes between 'scientific' language, in which 'the connections and relations of references to one another must be of the kind which we call logical' and must not 'impede further reference', and 'emotive', for which 'logical arrangement is not necessary'.³³

However, these ideas about 'scientific', 'zero-degree', neutral, or plain style are based on a stereotype of a certain type of philosophical writing and in no way provide an accurate general picture of philosophical discourse. Counter-examples can be found, not only in 'hybrid' authors like Plato, Nietzsche, or Pascal,³⁴ but even

²⁹ Warner, 1989a, 1.

³⁰ Sprat, 1667, 113 and xxviii. On Descartes and the 'geometrical model' see e.g. Warner, 1989a, 1 and 6ff.

³¹ See e.g. Van Eck, 1995, 11; Warner, Lang, 1990, 12ff.

³² See, e.g. Rorty, 1982, 220, on analytic philosophy as 'scientific': ' "Scientific" now means something like "argumentative". The contrast between the old and the new is now no longer a contrast between an immature prescientific and a mature scientific stage of discussion of a common set of problems, but a contrast between styles – the "scientific" style and the "literary" style. The former style asks that premises be explicitly spelled out rather than guessed at, that terms be introduced by definitions rather than by allusion. The latter style may involve argumentation, but that is not essential; what is essential is telling a new story, suggesting a new language-game, in the hope of a new form of intellectual life'. See Richards, 1978, 5-6, on the 'Realm of Poetry' as 'Guessland', while 'Scientific Prose aims...at being unequivocal'. Cf. e.g. Wellek and Warren, 1963, 22-3: 'the ideal scientific language is purely "denotative": it aims at a one-to-one correspondence between sign and referent'... 'Thus scientific language tends towards such a system of signs as mathematics or symbolic logic. Its ideal is such a universal language as the *characteristica universalis* which Leibniz had begun to plan as early as the late seventeenth century. Compared to scientific language, literary language will appear in some ways deficient. It abounds in ambiguities; it is, like every other historical language, full of homonyms, arbitrary or irrational categories such as grammatical gender; it is permeated with historical accidents, memories, and associations. In a word, it is highly "connotative" '. Cf. Ricoeur, 1975, 139ff., on Cohen. Some, like Frege, 1892, 157, have even gone so far as to suggest that it is only scientific/philosophical language which can have true reference, while literary/poetic language is interested purely in the 'sense', without concern about its correspondence to an underlying 'reference': 'we are interested only in the sense of the sentences and the images and feelings thereby aroused. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the name 'Odysseus', for instance, has a *Bedeutung*, so long as we accept the poem as a work of art'. Cf. Preminger and Brogan, 1993, 1346.

³³ Richards, 1934, 113

³⁴ See e.g. Van Eck, 1995, 11-13.

in those very writers who themselves espouse the 'geometrical' or 'scientific' method.³⁵

Conclusion

Despite its obvious flaws the style-based literature/philosophy distinction, is very significant for the literature/philosophy division within scholarship on the *Phaedo*. Conventionally, 'philosophical' interest in the dialogue focuses on the four 'main' arguments for the immortality of the soul (the 'argument from opposites', 'argument from recollection', 'affinity argument', and 'second-sailing') and especially on the first, second, and fourth of these.³⁶ As I will explain in more detail below, these arguments are not only explicitly presented as 'proofs', but come closest to the so-called 'scientific' style favoured by contemporary analytic philosophers. Hence they provide rich pickings for the analytically-trained philosopher, but little scope for traditional literary interpretation. By contrast, the other aspects of the dialogue, on which literary readings tend to focus, more or less rule out conventional philosophical analysis through the 'literariness' of their style.

Underlying the whole issue are, apparently, the twin assumptions that an ostensibly literary style is incompatible with philosophy and that style is irrelevant, or even absent from, philosophical argument. Therefore, in order to escape this dichotomy, style must be shown to be present within and relevant to the construction of argument in all parts of the *Phaedo*. This requires a methodology equipped for dealing with a comprehensive range of discourse and not simply those types conventionally regarded as literary.³⁷ Even if termed 'literary' because of its preoccupation with style, such an approach will nevertheless be a legitimate tool for philosophical analysis, in no way discontinuous with its aims or methods.³⁸

³⁵ See e.g. the analysis of Descartes' style in Lang, 1990, ch.3; Van Eck, 1995, 13.

³⁶ See n.12, above.

³⁷ Cf. Lang, 1990, 2: 'the critical means that have been found relevant to more conventionally "literary" texts can be – *ought* to be – also applied to philosophical writing'. However, Lang does not go on to construct stylistic categories suitable for types of writing generally excluded from literary analysis.

³⁸ Cf. Warner, 1989a, 71.

Part I: Stylistic Analysis

Chapter 2

Style and its importance for Platonic interpretation

A comprehensive methodology for stylistic analysis will allow us to consider all parts of the *Phaedo* and may facilitate a reading without segmentation. Nevertheless, we still need to show why stylistic analysis is of interest for the investigation of argument. To a certain extent, the results of the project as a whole should serve to justify an examination of Platonic style. However, there are also specific points, about the nature of style itself, as well as the study of Platonic style in particular, which give some initial indications as to the significance of style for the analysis of Platonic argument.

In my Preface, argument was defined as a verbal and dynamic structure, whose premises provide reasons for its conclusions. Accordingly, philosophical analysis should explicate the semantic connections between the verbal elements from which an argument is constructed. Traditional accounts define style in terms of 'form' as opposed to 'content', the 'how' as distinct from the 'what'. Yet, on this view, it would be difficult to see how style could possibly impinge on the semantic structure of the text. By contrast, I will argue that style is bound up with semantic structure on a microcontextual level and therefore has clear potential significance for the construction of argument.

2.1 What is style and why is it significant for philosophical analysis?

No general consensus has ever been reached as to the meaning of 'style', in spite of extensive debate.¹ Much twentieth-century discussion challenged the conventional 'form' as opposed to 'content' notion of style. Nevertheless, in practical terms, when it comes to analysis of texts, even the staunchest opponents of the 'style as form' idea seem to drift back towards this conception. What is responsible for so much

¹ The heyday of forms stylistics was the '60s and '70s, though arguably the most productive discussions of style belong to the earlier decades of formalism and new criticism. Nevertheless, the questions about style discussed then still remain at issue. On the diversity of definitions of style see e.g. Gray, 1969, 12; Chatman, 1971, xiff.; Ohmann, 1971, 243.

confusion? Is there perhaps some truth in the traditional understanding of style after all?

2.1.1 *The 'Aristotelian' form/content distinction and its problems*

Aristotle's notion of style (λέξις) as 'how' rather than 'what' things are said has come to be probably its most widely accepted definition.² Style is understood in terms of 'form' as opposed to 'content'; manner or appearance as distinct from underlying meaning, message, or substance.³ At first glance it seems that textual analysis presupposes just such a form/content distinction, apparently depending upon extracting meaning from form or showing how the latter reflects the former.⁴

² See Arist.*Rh.*1403b6ff., although, strictly speaking, the ἄ side of the distinction also includes arrangement (τάξις), covering suitability of components and ordering of a speech. Cf. also 1404a10, where λέξις is ὡς δὲ ἢ ὡς δὲ εἰπεῖν. However, Aristotle was not the first to use this distinction. See e.g. Pl.*Rep.*601a-b where Plato talks about stripping away the adornments of poetic style (ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενα) to reveal the lack of real content underneath, and therefore appears to have the same type of distinction in mind. For further references see notes *ad loc.* in Shorey, 1937. Cf. e.g. Dover, 1997, 1: 'It is generally, though not universally, agreed that if I am asked about the style of your performance of a certain act, I am being asked not *what* you did but *how* you did it'. Also see Dover, 1997, 16, for parallel formulations in ancient critics; and Barthes, 1971, 3, who traces this opposition through various ancient and modern formulations.

³ A notion of style as deviation from a linguistic norm/s has also been important in theories of style. This is especially so in the twentieth century (see Barthes, 1971, 4), although similar ideas are also found much earlier. See e.g. Arist.*Po.*1458a21ff. on the use of ξενικός words in poetry. It has been influential for e.g.: formalism (e.g. Erlich, 1981, 172; Jakobson, 1960, 32; Shklovsky, 1917, 28) and stylistics (e.g. Widdowson, 1996, 144; Ullman, 1966, 154; Fowler, 1966, 15; Enkvist, 1971, 53-5). There are, however, many obvious objections. 'Linguistic' or 'literary' norms are not simple and stable objectively-established entities, easily obtainable for use in stylistic analysis. Theorists have criticised this notion's impracticability and irrelevance (E.g. Halliday, 1996, 65; Riffaterre, 1959, 168; Barthes, 1971, 6; Wellek and Warren, 1963, 181; Fish, 1980, 97-111). Nevertheless, as with the form/content opposition, even its staunchest opponents seem to assume some notion of 'style as deviation', so that this conception of style seems in some way an inescapable part of our reading practices (see e.g. Wellek and Warren, 1963, 181ff.) who dismiss the norm/deviation model although their descriptions of the style of particular authors or genres must depend upon establishing how their stylistic norms deviate from other literary types; Riffaterre, 1959, 167-71, who posits the 'irrelevance of the linguistic norm', but replaces it with the idea of stylistic context as a deviation from a normal linguistic context understood by the notional 'average reader'). Identification of stylistic features must always be largely based on picking out elements distinguished by their differences from features used elsewhere. However, none of these stylistic types constitute a particular norm. 'Norm' and 'deviation' are, nevertheless, of some relevance to the study of generic affiliations, which examines features in terms of similarities and differences to a notional generic norm. So, in this respect alone the norm/deviation model will be incorporated into my thesis. Yet, given that it is simply one aspect of how we identify stylistic features and not a potential definition of style itself, I will not explore it in any depth in the present section.

⁴ See even e.g. the structuralist Barthes, 1971, 4, on the form/content opposition: 'There is no doubt that it contains a certain irreducible grain of truth. The structural analysis of narrative...is based entirely on the conviction (and the practical proof) that one can transform a given text into a more schematic version, set it in a metalanguage which is no longer the language of the original text, without essentially changing its narrative character.' This assumption pervades critical

Yet, however intuitive such a notion of style might seem, it is still problematic:

If we want to distinguish style and work, form and content, structure and content, or any of the other familiar dualisms into which works of literature are divided, then we have to be able to say what the style, or the form, or the structure, as opposed to the work or the meaning is.⁵

If style is 'form' as opposed to 'content', its definition and analysis should only involve description of form and should avoid interpretation, given that this concerns meaning and content.⁶

However, a stylistic feature like metaphor reveals the limitations of this position, since its identification clearly depends on the perception of different levels of meaning. When, for example, Socrates says that wisdom (φρόνησις) is 'the only true coin' (μόνον τό νόμισμα ὀρθόν),⁷ it is essential to recognise both the 'literal' meaning of the vehicle νόμισμα and of the suppressed tenor (say, 'thing of value') if this feature is to be identified as metaphor.⁸ Therefore, even if the metaphor's contribution to its wider textual context remains unexplained the most basic analysis of this feature already involves semantics and is an interpretive act.

Yet it is not just in obvious examples like metaphor where semantics plays a necessary role, but in all stylistic features to some extent. To identify antithesis involves the recognition that components stand in a particular semantic relation. To identify pleonasm implies the recognition of synonymy, while even features like pairs and lists or parallel structures involving aural effects imply semantic connections between their elements. Even if the identification of such phenomena is

interpretations: e.g. Quinn, 1973, 422, on Catullus 85. ' "*odi et amo*". It is the emotions and the fact that he feels both together that matter; a direct object is irrelevant. Note how word order and elision transfer the emphasis to *amo*: the hating is taken for granted... '.

⁵ Gray, 1969, 61.

⁶ For a typical formulation of style as separate from meaning see e.g. Ullman, 1966, 101, who describes style as 'expressiveness': ' a wide range of linguistic features which have one thing in common: they do not directly affect the meaning of the utterance, the actual information which it conveys'.

⁷ *Phd.* 69a9-10.

⁸ Using the terms to mean 'deviant-element' (vehicle) and 'non-deviant element' (tenor). See Silk, 1996, 967, and Silk 1974, 8ff. For a more detailed analysis of the structure of metaphor see 3.4, below.

not related to their wider context, it still relies upon understanding some aspect of the text's meaning, albeit on a microcontextual level.

2.1.2 *Attacks on the form/content distinction*

It is a preoccupation with the structuring rather than referential aspects of language which motivated probably the strongest attacks on the form/content distinction in the twentieth century, ranging from the formalists' prioritisation of literature's formal activity to the post-structuralist denial of the existence of fixed content.⁹

The Russian formalists reacted against traditional literary criticism's predominant concern with content or message rather than style.¹⁰ Their attempts to define the special qualities of art or 'literariness' established new frameworks for understanding literary language, and significantly shifted the focus away from the form/content distinction.¹¹ Notwithstanding individual differences between formalist positions, the formal side to literature was prioritised while content, the object of reference, lost its given significance.¹²

⁹ See e.g. Lamarque and Olsen, 1994, 263: '...most prominent literary theories this century have assumed that the [form/content] distinction is somehow naïve and theoretically invalid...The formalist theories of the New Criticism, structuralism, and post-structuralism have had as a central tenet that in creating form, the author creates content'. I would, incidentally, question their omission of formalism. Cf. also Girard, 1989, 251.

¹⁰ Erlich, 1981, 19-32 (*passim*) and 31. Although Shklovsky and Jakobson's formalist theories do not centre explicitly on style, I think it is fair to discuss them here as relevant to the questions of style under consideration. Cf. Attridge, 1996, 37: 'Jakobson confidently defines 'poetics' as what most of us would now call 'stylistics'.

¹¹ Cf. e.g. Lodge, 1988, 31; Erlich, 1981, 172 and 186ff., although see also *ibid.* 34 and 45 on formalism's debt to symbolism and futurism respectively.

¹² The form/content distinction was, in general, replaced by a 'device/materials' distinction or interest in 'form' and 'defamiliarization' (see e.g. Erlich, 1981, 188ff.). The meaning of 'materials' was not unanimously agreed, but represented 'the raw stuff of literature' and incorporated e.g. 'content', 'ideas', 'emotions' and 'words'. 'Device' was the technique of 'making it strange', known as 'defamiliarization' and probably formalism's key term. E.g. Shklovsky, 1917, 20-27, focuses on 'defamiliarization', a technique of making the formal level strange to make us perceive afresh and extend the goal of art, perception: 'An image is not a permanent referent for those mutable complexities of life which are revealed through it; its purpose is not to make us perceive meaning, but to create a special perception of the object - *it creates a 'vision' of the object instead of serving as a means for knowing it*'. Jakobson, 1960, 35-7, concentrates on the autonomy of the literary text (see e.g. Erlich, 1981, 183-5) and sees the *poetic function*, whose prominence characterises 'poetic' or 'literary' language, as one of a complex schema of functions in language use, for which *form* ('focus on the message for its own sake') is all important. *Poetic* language is separated from *non-poetic* by the former's far greater degree of importance, so that both Shklovsky and Jakobson distinguish 'poetic' or 'literary' language from other types on the basis of qualitative formal differences and the downgrading of the referent (cf. Sturrock, 1993, 109-110). Certain formalists also seem to have anticipated structuralism by making 'content' an aspect of 'form' (Erlich, 1981, 186-7). Todorov,

Whereas the formalists acknowledge the existence of content, the referential aspect of language use, but advocate its strictly secondary importance for the analysis of literature, structuralism reduces content to form.¹³ In 'Style and Its Image', a paper characteristic of structuralism, Barthes claims:

...we can no longer see a text as a binary structure of Content and Form; the text is not double but multiple; within it there are only forms, or more exactly, the text in its entirety is only a multiplicity of forms without a content.¹⁴

For Barthes, the text is an interweaving of 'codes' (e.g. 'symbolic', 'hermeneutic' and 'actional') and forms. Stripping these away to reveal content or signified (*signifié*) continues indefinitely because the signified underneath every signifier (*signifiant*) is itself found to be a further signifier. Style, in terms of form as opposed to content becomes a 'historic concept', a code tending to 'pigeonhole' other textual codes, which gives an illusory continuity to the text's discontinuous elements through creating a false impression of 'surface'. Finally, he suggests that writing itself is always a structure of citations of preexisting, culturally acquired, modes of sentence and subsentential structure. No stage of writing or even thought precedes these. Style is then redefined as the 'layeredness' of interwoven semantic codes and citations of the preexisting structures constituting literary language, which have been called 'style'.¹⁵

Post-structuralism goes one step further, not only denying the possibility of determinate content or meaning, but also deconstructing the fixity and existence of the very underlying structures on which structuralism's understanding of discourse was based.¹⁶ In denying the possibility of the signified, post-structuralism rejects the circular process of structuralism, where the signifier reveals a signified which is in

1973, 10-12, suggests that this latter viewpoint was characteristic of formalist doctrine as a whole, citing the idea of 'form' as 'all-embracing' and as 'the totality of the work of art', and quoting Eichenbaum: 'clearly the concept of Form had become increasingly merged for us with the concept of literature as a whole and the notion of the literary event.'

¹³ Although see n. 12, above, on formalist anticipations of this doctrine.

¹⁴ Barthes, 1971, 6. Although Barthes differs from other structuralists in certain ways (see Sturrock, 1993, 130), his approach here seems broadly characteristic of structuralism.

¹⁵ Barthes, 1971, 6-10.

¹⁶ See e.g. Derrida's critique (Derrida, 1988) of Lévi-Strauss's anthropological method with its reification of underlying oppositions. Cf. Eagleton, 1983, 133.

itself always a further signifier. All discourse is therefore reduced to an endless chain of signifiers, constantly redefining themselves through differences with each other.¹⁷

Such theoretical positions may well seem rightly critical of the naïve idea of style as entirely separate from the meaning it conveys which, as we have seen, fails to provide a framework accounting for the semantic aspect of verbal structures. By broadening 'form' they stress the semantic and structural implications of style and thereby escape some of the problems inherent in the Aristotelian dichotomy. However, when it comes to the discussion and analysis of style, there are serious problems with these positions too. For if content becomes either redundant or an aspect of form then style, as Barthes suggested, becomes an outmoded 'code' of reading or an umbrella term to describe the 'layeredness' of literary structure. Thus style is either discarded or becomes the entire focus of literary analysis. Similarly, from a post-structuralist viewpoint, style must be rejected or become all-embracing so that, if we see style as language, then style is all there is.

While the notion of style as all-embracing cannot perhaps be refuted *per se*, there must surely be doubts as to its usefulness,¹⁸ and even those seeing 'form' or 'style' simply as umbrella terms for the mechanisms of a literary text actually devise further categorisations within 'style' to replace the roles which 'form' and 'content' played originally. Thus Barthes discusses 'literary language' and 'semantic levels or codes', while Eichenbaum talks about '*non-aesthetic* forms [emphasis mine]'.¹⁹

2.1.3 *Discrepancies between theory and practice*

In many ways such shifts back towards the form/content distinction, even amongst sceptics, are unsurprising. For the interpretation of texts depends upon our ability to distinguish their meaning, and there is a marked theory/practice discrepancy amongst

¹⁷ Eagleton, 1983, 128-9. See e.g. Derrida, 1988, 110: the 'rupture' of the 'concept of structure' took place at the 'moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center of origin, everything became discourse ... that is to say, a system in which the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.'

¹⁸ Cf. Erlich, 1981, 188, summarising Kridl: 'one may question... the practicability of treating "form" as a generic term for artistic creation - an interpretation so broad as to become well-nigh useless, if not misleading'.

¹⁹ Todorov, 1973, 10.

those critics who deny the significance or existence of content or meaning. It seems that, whatever the theoretical stance, textual interpretation ultimately comes down to meaning.²⁰

For example, Jakobson, discussing Poe's *The Raven*, comments on how 'salient paranomasias interconnect both emblems of this everlasting despair', clearly identifying a stylistic feature and its concomitant meaning.²¹ Similarly Barthes, demonstrating the 'symbolic code' in Balzac, says that 'the knife is a symbol of castration', thereby pointing out the verbal form's literal as well as symbolic significance - a double content, but content nevertheless.²² Even Derrida, the 'arch-denier' of stable meaning, hinges his reading of Plato's *Phaedrus* on the multiple meanings of the word *pharmakon* - many signifieds, but signifieds nevertheless.²³ Despite their denials of the importance of content, all these analyses use similar techniques of attributing meaning or content to certain aspects of style. For in order to show that structure is meaningful, it is necessary to attribute meaning to structure.

2.1.4 *Towards a working definition of style*

So style presents us with a puzzle. On the one hand, there are obvious problems with the separation of form or style from content or meaning. On the other, such separation is an underlying part of textual interpretation. However, a way out of this impasse comes from recognising two very different stages in textual interpretation which have, no matter how closely interrelated, clear qualitative distinctions. They are: the identification of a stylistic feature; and the analysis of how this fits into its wider textual context.

²⁰ See e.g. Erlich, 1981, 185: 'Indeed, as the formalist spokesmen could not help but recognize, no poetry, however non-objective, can dispense with meaning; Sturrock, 1993, 107 on the structuralist approach to *Finnegan's Wake*: 'What is "trans-sense" is never without sense'.

²¹ Jakobson, 1988, 51.

²² Barthes, 1971, 5.

²³ See e.g. Derrida, 1981, 97-98: 'when a word inscribes itself as the citation of another sense of the same word, when the textual center-stage of the word *pharmakon*, even while it means *remedy*, cites, re-cites, and makes legible that which *in the same word* signifies, in another spot and on a different level of the stage, poison (for example, since this is not the only other thing *pharmakon* means)'; and *passim*.

These two separate stages are visible in some of my earlier examples. In claiming that a single sign, *pharmakon*, stands for numerous signifieds, Derrida is identifying a stylistic feature, ambiguity. From this he infers that the description of writing as a *pharmakon* in Plato's *Phaedrus* is, at one point, positive, at another, negative, thus interpreting the feature's significance. Another example was Quinn's analysis of Catullus' famous 'odi et amo':

"odi et amo". It is the emotions and the fact that he feels both together that matter; a direct object is irrelevant. Note how word order and elision transfer the emphasis to *amo*: the hating is taken for granted...²⁴

The stylistic features identified by Quinn are the absence of direct object, and the way in which word order and elision lead to emphasis or prominence of *amo*. His comments on the irrelevance of a direct object and how 'hating is taken for granted' make sense of these stylistic features within the wider context. In both examples, we can clearly identify two distinct stages.

In identifying stylistic features one attributes some degree of semantic structure and significance to the microcontextual formal features of a text. Noticing that 'odi et amo' have no direct object, for example, suggests semantic parallelism between the two terms and establishes their intransitivity. To point out *pharmakon*'s ambiguity is to attribute alternative meanings to a single term. Neither of these examples describe purely formal aspects. Instead, they involve the semantic organisation of the text's formal components. In this way, style can be defined as *the semantic structure of the microcontextual formal features of the text*. As soon as we recognise style, we recognise content.

The second stage of textual interpretation explores the implications of style and how stylistic points fit into a more macrocontextual level of meaning. Stylistic points are thus incorporated into the analysis of meaning, and this stage could be seen as the pure explication of content. As we have seen, it is normal for textual analysis to combine these two stages. However, because of people's failure to recognise the necessary semantic aspects of style, the first is commonly seen as the identification

²⁴ Quinn, 1973, 422.

of form alone. Taken to an extreme, one might almost see the form/content distinction as stemming from such a misunderstanding.

Even Aristotle, in the very same work where he proposes the 'ὥς' as opposed to 'ἄ' notion of style, inadvertently suggests the semantic aspect of style. In his discussion of ἐνθυμήματα ('rhetorical syllogisms'), Aristotle discusses how a phrase which is not a genuine ἐνθύμημα might be considered to be one on account of its style. In 2.24.2 the fact that inferential conclusions (οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό) or antithetical and 'enthumetic' statements can appear to be genuine ἐνθυμήματα, although unsupported by valid arguments, is attributed to the appearance of their style (παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως).²⁵ For certain stylistic features are associated with ἐνθυμήματα: ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρα ἐστὶν ἐνθυμήματος. This implies that such stylistic features have a semantic force, since they are able to suggest particular logical relationships.²⁶

How something is written is integrally connected to its meaning on the most microcontextual level. From this we can infer that it is style which provides the initial components of semantic structure. If, then, philosophical argument depends upon the semantic structure between verbal elements, clearly the analysis of style must be important for understanding its construction.

²⁵ Cf. Strawson, 1952, 52-53: 'Finally, we could speak...of a statement being made in a misleading verbal form, if the sentence in which the statement is made exemplifies a certain logical formula, but the constants occurring in the sentence, as used to make that statement, do not have the logical use which is standard for that system of rules'.

²⁶ On the 'logic' of the ἐνθύμημα and what Aristotle means by calling it τις συλλογισμός see Burnyeat, 1996, 95ff.

2.2 Why discuss Plato's style?

In 1967 Thesleff wrote

Plato's mastery of style has been recognised since antiquity. It is no exaggeration to state that he makes use of a stylistic register far wider and far more subtle than any other ancient prosaist. This mastery...seems to be...reflecting shifts in his thought. Thus the structure of Plato's style can be expected to afford a clue to Plato, both as a writer and thinker... It is, however, surprising how little has been done for studying Plato's stylistic practice systematically, except for the specific purpose of establishing a chronology for his writings.²⁷

Plato's stylistic mastery and innovation is uncontroversial. Moreover, if we take style to be essential to the construction of argument on a microcontextual level, as I have argued above, the importance of stylistic analysis for interpreting the dialogues seems clear. However, in terms of scholarship, the state of affairs described by Thesleff has hardly changed. There remains a lack of work on Platonic style and, even within the so called 'literary' approaches to Plato, there is no substantial and detailed discussion of the Greek texts themselves.

2.2.1 Works on Platonic style, ancient and modern

There is little detailed analysis of Plato's style in ancient rhetorical works and much of what exists is directed at broad evaluation rather than in-depth discussion of particular features. Walsdorff outlines the main critical opinions in *Die Antiken Urteile über Platons Stil* and explains that, although views on the value of Plato's style varied dramatically,²⁸ certain key qualities were widely acknowledged, such as precision and particularity of diction; metaphor; and 'figures':

Vor allem findet die dichterische ἐκλογή, die eigentümliche Wortwahl im engeren Sinne, der Metapherngebrauch, auch die Häufung der Figuren und das dithyrambische Pathos zu mal in den rednerischen Werkern allenthalben Beachtung, von Aristoteles bis zu den Neuplatonikern.²⁹

²⁷ Thesleff, 1967, 7.

²⁸ Walsdorff, 1927, 125 claims that in antiquity there were essentially two opinions: his stylistic peculiarities were either dismissed as inappropriate or treated with sympathetic reverence.

²⁹ Walsdorff, 1927, 120.

However, antiquity's praise of Plato was mainly confined to dialogues or parts of dialogues where short questions and answers predominated, as opposed to the longer speeches of his middle period, which were more often attacked.³⁰

Interesting though these judgements may be, they are too general and vague to be of much use for analysis of individual aspects of Plato's style. Nevertheless, such is the force of antiquity's criticism that, even in the twentieth century, Norden used the chapter on Plato in his seminal *Die Antike Kunstprosa* to offer a defence of Plato's 'poeticisms'.³¹ He includes useful catalogues of Gorgianic figures, 'high poetic diction', and creative use of rhythm,³² to show that Plato's critics failed to notice that Plato employs these features mainly for parody, irony, or playfulness.³³

In general, modern works on Plato's style tend to focus on a particular type of feature and provide descriptive catalogues of instances, rather than any substantial collation, classification, or analysis of usage.³⁴ Campbell and Wilamowitz, seen by Thesleff as the 'two good characterizations of Plato's language and style in general', treat Platonic style more extensively. However, Campbell, simply lists individual examples of varied phenomena,³⁵ while Wilamowitz makes a few interesting generalisations and points out certain recurrent features.³⁶ Neither considers how these examples fit their particular contexts nor, in any depth, the development and patterns of usage. In fact, until Thesleff's *Studies in the Style of Plato*, it seems that stylistic features are only treated out of context, without any attempt at either a comprehensive analysis of a particular passage or work, or a detailed study of how Plato combines different stylistic features.

Thesleff sets out to 'study the structure and function of style in Plato's writing'.³⁷ He distinguishes five different 'types of exposition', loosely based on Greek genres,³⁸

³⁰ See e.g. D.H.Dem. 23 and See Norden, 1915, 104, for a summary of these views and references.

³¹ Norden, 1915, 104-113.

³² Norden, 1915, 106, 107, and 110 respectively.

³³ Norden, 1915, 111; although this is less often the case with 'high poetic diction'.

³⁴ See e.g. Louis, 1945 or Amman, 1953. Thesleff, 1967, 10-11, lists such works and comments that 'they only cover disparate parts of Plato's linguistic and stylistic usage. And what is more serious, the majority are purely descriptive'.

³⁵ Campbell, 1894, 165-340.

³⁶ Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, 1920, 412-29.

³⁷ Thesleff, 1967, 11.

and 'ten generic classes of style', all of which have particular 'style markers'.³⁹ However, as might be expected with such a reductive schema, his categories and 'style markers' are too broad to allow anything but a vague impression of general trends. Though dissatisfied with existing discussions of 'those linguistic phenomena which have been traditionally regarded as "stylistic", e.g. imagery, sentence construction, antithesis...',⁴⁰ he relies mainly on these as 'style markers', adding certain syntactical features. Moreover, he does not define them and gives no detailed examples to justify their classification.⁴¹

The results of Thesleff's three page stylistic synopsis of a dialogue as complex and changeable as the *Phaedo* are predictably unsatisfactory.⁴² For example, he sees both 63e-69e (Socrates' 'apology') and 70c-72d (the 'argument from opposites') as primarily composed of the 'colloquial', 'semi-literary conversational', and 'intellectual' styles, with the only main difference between sections being a slight variation in how much each style is used. However, the 'apology' and 'argument from opposites' have major stylistic differences and, in Chapter 6, I will argue that the stylistic transition between them is not only striking and deliberate, but important for the dialogue as a whole.

When Thesleff comes to make 'observations on the relation of style to content', one of the main aims of his book, the functions assigned to particular styles are vague and simplistic. For instance, the 'ceremonious style' is 'mostly used...to add loftiness to myths and visions', while the 'semi-literary conversational style' is 'used with a serious undertone from the earliest dialogues'.⁴³ Although Thesleff himself admits that 'the present work can give little aid in details' and hopes for further

³⁸ Thesleff, 1967, 35ff. For example, he claims that the 'question and reply' type is based on 'the old Greek arts of elenctic and eristic', although producing no actual textual evidence for the existence or characteristics of these literary genres.

³⁹ Thesleff, 1967, 63.

⁴⁰ Thesleff, 1967, 26.

⁴¹ See Thesleff, 1967, 81ff. What, for example, are 'climax', 'solemnity', and 'gnomic expression'? Does 'pairs' include oppositional pairs and how does it relate to 'antithesis'? How would Thesleff define 'imagery, poetical'?

⁴² Thesleff, 1967, 133-5.

⁴³ Thesleff, 1967, 165-6. His analysis of interlocutors' characters is no better. E.g. Gorgias, in *Gorg.*, is 'pompous and condescending'. He concludes with the highly unoriginal idea that 'to Plato, writing was play'. Cf. e.g. Norden, 1915, 111.

research,⁴⁴ if we wish to develop an account of how style is used within the construction of Platonic argument, it is unlikely that his generalisations and vague methodology can be of much use.⁴⁵

Along with such accounts of Platonic style, there is also stylometry, which uses statistics for instances of particular features in various Platonic texts, in order to establish their relative chronology. Without entering into a complex critique of this practice, it is worth simply pointing out that such statistics are of little use for determining the character and importance of style within a particular Platonic passage.⁴⁶

So, in general, there seems to be, as yet, no satisfactory model for investigation of Plato's style, if our aim is to understand in any depth the contribution of style to the construction of argument in individual sections. Existing studies either concentrate on particular types of features in isolation from their context and from other stylistic phenomena or, in the case of Thesleff, sacrifice accuracy and depth for illusory comprehensiveness. Although these works do contain certain valuable observations it appears that we must, essentially, start from scratch.

2.3 An alternative approach to stylistic analysis

My aim has been to establish a methodological framework allowing us to investigate how stylistic features work together within individual passages. This framework needs to be comprehensive if it is to account for the entire range of stylistic phenomena which occur in the *Phaedo*. However, I have not tried to give a full analysis of the whole dialogue, an undertaking whose success would be highly unlikely, given its stylistic diversity. My main intention has been to understand the contribution of style to individual sections, as a starting point for the use of stylistic analysis in philosophical interpretation. I have therefore opted for detail and have chosen to concentrate on six very different short passages, so facilitating a relatively

⁴⁴ Thesleff, 1967, 173.

⁴⁵ For an interesting critique of Thesleff, see Dover, 1987, 74-5, who questions how he formulates his stylistic categories and establishes their 'markers' without reference to other Greek genres.

⁴⁶ Cf. Thesleff, 1967, 8-9, especially n.1, for criticisms of stylometry and references for key stylometric texts. For more criticisms of 'statistical' methods of stylistic analysis see 3.1.1, below.

complete picture of style within these sections. In turn, my investigation also facilitates a sense of stylistic range within the dialogue and some more general thoughts on Platonic style. In Part II, three of these passages will form a basis for case studies which explore their contribution to the argument in a wider context.

2.3.1 *Selection of passages*

The six chosen passages are of sufficient length to allow a substantial account of stylistic structure within an extended section, but also short enough to permit a comprehensive study of their precise details. The six are very different and have been selected as reflecting the varied modes of discourse in the dialogue:

Passage I: 69a6-e4 - This long speech is the 'peroration' of Socrates' defence of his willingness to die.

Passage II: 81c4-82c8 - Socrates discusses with Cebes about the fate of the soul after death and the principles of reincarnation

Passage III: 97b8-98b6 - Socrates explains the disappointment he felt in his youth when reading the works of Anaxagoras.

Passage IV: 105c8-106a11 - Part of the proof that the soul is ἀθάνατος.

Passage V: 110b5-111c3 - The description of the 'true' earth from the myth.

Passage VI: 117c1-118a17 - The final moments of Socrates' life and the end of the *Phaedo*.

Chapter 3

Methodology: stylistic categories

3.1 Other works on style

The analysis of style is a major facet of classical scholarship. Along with more general works such as Denniston's *Greek Prose Style*, Dover's *The Evolution of Greek Prose Style*, and Norden's *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, there are countless studies of particular authors or features. Nevertheless, no methodological framework can be extracted from these, either singly or collectively, which covers the full range of the *Phaedo* or other Platonic dialogues' stylistic features. Many use conventional classificatory categories derived from ancient rhetoric, such as period structure, antithesis, and metaphor. However, such categories, although useful, are by no means exhaustive and may involve methodological difficulties, as well as being suited exclusively for analysis of particular types of prose.¹ Therefore a new methodology is needed, suitable for analysis of the entire dialogue. My scheme will take account of productive elements in existing studies, while offering a critique of some of their apparent weaknesses, which will help to explain the reasons for some of my own methodological choices.

3.1.1 The 'critical overview' versus 'statistical' approach

In very general terms, stylistic studies involve two main approaches, the 'critical overview' and the 'statistical', although a combination is used in some works. While both are used to classify, analyse, compare, and trace the development of style, they differ insofar as the latter relies upon statistics concerning instances of particular features as evidence for its claims. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. While a work of 'critical overview' like Denniston, 1952, provides examples of important aspects of style and makes some claims about distributions in

¹ Cf. Thesleff, 1967, 26.

different authors, it relies solely upon the author's knowledge of and ability to compare the Greek texts that are judged to be relevant.

So it is easy to understand why critics should have turned to the 'statistical' approach, aiming to depart from what they have seen as the arbitrary and impressionistic nature of 'critical overview' analysis, by counting instances of particular phenomena, and so being able to back up points with numerical data. Nevertheless, this alternative involves its own problems.² For a start, stylistic features are so varied that any system which simplifies them enough to see them as countable instances of a single phenomenon, risks compromising their distinctiveness, individuality, or development within a particular passage. In addition, 'statistical' analysis often gives broad characterisations of style in an author or group of authors based, for reasons of practicality, on the number of instances found in small, though supposedly representative, random samples of their works. Yet the majority of authors, and especially Plato, are so varied stylistically, that a general picture cannot possibly be attained from statistics based on a short sample alone. Finally, it often seems that the results obtained by the 'statistical' method could equally well be achieved through sharp observation without counting.³

However, the 'statistical' method can be useful, especially when considering distributions of clearly distinguishable features such as particular lexemes or noun-forms. My own approach combines the 'statistical' and 'critical overview'. In line with the former I will consider short passages, broadly representative of the *Phaedo*'s different stylistic modes, although I do acknowledge the speculative nature of any general conclusions about Platonic style emerging from assessment of the passages' similarities and differences. In general, however, my analysis tends towards the 'critical overview' and, allowing for obvious practical constraints, I try to give as

² Cf. e.g. p.43, below.

³ If we consider Webster, 1941, on the 'development of sentence construction between Homer and Dinarchus' the strength of these objections is clear. There are a number of difficulties in Webster's selection of passages. For example, how can the three short passages he chooses from Plato, *Rep.*401b-404d, 614b-621d, and *Leg.*624a-631b, be felt to be representative in any way of a corpus so stylistically diverse? He also fails to take account of several important works, such as the Hippocratic Corpus or any of the extant Presocratic fragments. Moreover, his final conclusion is that gradually sentences increased in length and complexity, with more sub-clauses. Yet surely that much could be gathered simply from glancing through a selection from the authors in question, rather than relying on numerical data.

broad an indication of the distinctive features and generic background of stylistic phenomena as possible. Many individual features are so diverse and inextricable from their wider stylistic context that the usefulness of reducing them to countable categories is limited. Nevertheless, I do occasionally employ statistics, especially for analysing lexis, where usage is more readily quantifiable.

3.1.2 *Some preliminaries*

- Much of my analysis relies on comparison of the passages not only with the Platonic corpus, but also with archaic and classical Greek literature in general. Accordingly, my discussions of the distribution of a particular feature will draw on extant pre-Hellenistic texts.⁴
- The relevance of my stylistic categories for the passages in question does vary. Nevertheless, given that I have tried to provide a framework for analysing as comprehensive a range of features as possible and intend my methodology to be applicable to a wide range of texts, I will explain fully the classification of even those features whose occurrence within the six passages is limited.

3.2 Unit Organisation

The classification 'unit organisation' replaces the conventional category of 'sentence structure' and incorporates aspects of style such as word order and interconnection of clauses.

⁴ In this, I follow Silk, 1974, 82: '[Evidence] will almost never be later than fourth century: Menander and Theophrastus are my effective limits. Hence 'complete' is always to be interpreted to mean 'complete as far as pre-Hellenistic Greek is concerned'; and such remarks as 'no extant parallel' mean 'no parallel sufficiently early to count'. When citing usages from a composite 'author' like Hippocrates, I shall not go into questions of authenticity or dating when the usage belongs to a work generally ascribed to the fourth century or earlier'.

3.2.1 General problems with classification of the unit

In considering the particularities of Greek unit organisation, it is useful to compare Greek to modern languages, which generally provide the framework for discussions of this topic. For convenience, I will use English in most cases, although other languages would also provide suitable models.⁵

Since there are certain differences between the organisation of phrases in Greek texts and the sentence structure of a modern language like English, it is helpful to use the term 'unit' rather than 'sentence'.⁶ In general, individual clauses within units can be distinguished, as in English sentences, on the basis of syntax. Units, however, are themselves often far more difficult to delimit than sentences. In English the written (orthographic) sentence is clearly demarcated by both grammar and punctuation,⁷ whereas classical Greek texts were written without punctuation.⁸

Furthermore there are other differences which make it impractical to understand Greek in terms of the modern sentence. In Greek the same conjunctions are used to link both whole units and parts of units. For example, whereas formal English as a

⁵ This is especially true when a certain part of speech is inflected in Greek and therefore has a more varied grammatical function than in English. See e.g. n.12 on German participles.

⁶ Cf. Dover, 1997, 28: 'I propose to replace "sentence" by "main-clause-finite-verb unit" (MCF for short)'. However, there are significant problems with Dover's schema, which I will discuss below.

⁷ Greenbaum, 1996, 322ff. In grammatical terms, there are various exceptions to this rule: e.g. orthographic sentences which contain more than one grammatical sentence, separated by a colon or dash; elliptical sentences; and sentences deliberately flouting the conventions of sentence structure.

⁸ Punctuation is generally thought to have been introduced by Aristophanes of Byzantium in the third century B.C. (see e.g. Sandys, 1921, 126ff.), although there is controversy over whether some sort of punctuation existed earlier, on the basis of Isoc. 15.59; Arist. *Rhet.* 1407b13 and 1409a21 (although see also Immerwahr, 1990, 168, on the 'sporadic use of punctuation throughout the fifth century', used 'to separate words into groups'). Pfeiffer, 1968, 178ff. cites these passages as evidence for some sort of punctuation as early as Isocrates. However, Isoc.15.59 and Arist.*Rh.*1409a21, suggest that even if the *paragraphos* was being used, punctuation, in the modern sense, was not an essential part of the written Greek text. Cf. e.g. Thompson, 1893, 69-70, and Turner, 1987, 8-10. By contrast, Wake, 1957, 334, claims that *periods* were clearly marked by a *paragraphos* representing the author's intentions. Yet, as Turner shows, it seems that the oldest papyri used the *paragraphos* only to indicate the end of major sections, changes of speaker (cf. Isoc. 15. 59), or quoted verse from surrounding prose. Cf. also e.g. Lamedica, 1992, 327, on the Derveni papyrus. Lamedica claims that the *paragraphos* functioned either to demarcate either a lemma or as the sole means of indicating quotation from other authors or works, both in the Derveni papyrus and other texts. Even the third passage, Arist.*Rh.*1407b13, provides no certain evidence for punctuation. While it uses διαστίξαι, which later comes to be understood as 'punctuate', the term is only used three times in pre-Hellenistic Greek, all within this passage, and the final usage especially (1407b18) does not appear to denote 'punctuation' in the modern sense, raising serious questions about its meaning: ἄδηλον γὰρ τὸ ἀεί, πρὸς ὁποτέρῳ διαστίξαι.

rule only uses 'and' within sentences, Greek units regularly begin with the conjunctions καί and δέ. Therefore, in terms of conjunctions as well as punctuation, Greek does not have formal markers to demarcate the division between units and individual clauses or groups of clauses within units,⁹ so that it is often difficult to identify the boundaries of an individual unit with any precision.

The peculiarity of Greek can also be seen in the role of specific parts of speech, such as participles. Verbless participial phrases or 'clauses'¹⁰ are a prevalent and multi-functional feature of Greek writing.¹¹ Greek's use of the future participle to denote purpose or a participle to express the verb in certain types of indirect speech has no counterpart in a language like English.¹² Thus, analysis of Greek must take into account such differences in the range and function of the participial clause.¹³

3.2.2 *Approaches to unit organisation, ancient and modern.*

Ancient rhetorical theories concerning the units of speech and their organisation are of limited use for my purposes, given that the extant works provide no consistent

⁹ The lack of clear division in written Greek can perhaps be seen to reflect the influence of orality on the structure of Greek prose. Cf. Greenbaum, 1996, 322ff. on the difficulties of dividing up spoken English, in which 'neither intonation nor pauses signal unequivocally the ends of speech units that might be thought to correspond to orthographic sentences'. English grammarians use the term 'clause-cluster' to denote the approximate equivalent of the orthographic sentence in spoken English, acknowledging its indeterminacy. This may be a useful notion to keep in mind when considering Greek. Cf. e.g. Chantraine, 1950, 359, who talks about a phrase in the *Republic* as 'pas de période, mais une phrase sinueuse qui reproduit le mouvement du style parlé'. On orality's influence on the structure of Greek prose, see e.g.: Demetr.*Eloc.* 1; and Arist.*Rh.* 1409b15, on breathing as a factor in determining the length of *cola* and *periods*; Parkes, 1992, 1, on punctuation as 'a phenomenon of the written language'; and Kühner-Gerth, 1955, I, 93, 353, on Greek and modern punctuation as similar in principle, but based on natural pauses as opposed to syntax respectively.

¹⁰ I follow e.g. Denniston, 1952, 69, in using the term 'participial clause'. For although 'clauses' are generally understood in e.g. English to include finite verbs, Greek participles can fulfil many functions of a finite verb. Furthermore, even in English grammar, clauses with a participle as their verb are recognised as clauses (i.e. non-finite clauses). See e.g. Quirk, 1985, 49ff.

¹¹ By comparison, the function of English participles is severely restricted. See e.g. Quirk, 1973, 311, on the 'structural deficiencies' of participial clauses. Since participles are uninflected, the subject of a verbless participle 'clause' must supposedly be the same as the subject of the main clause, although this rule is often broken in normal casual usage.

¹² Even in German, which has inflected participles and participial verbless 'clauses', participles are restricted in terms of tense and voice, and 'clauses' are rare and restricted to 'formal written registers' (Durrell, 1996, 270-5).

¹³ The particularities of Greek can also be seen e.g. in the infinitives. For more on participles and infinitives see my critique of Dover's 'MCF's', p.43, below.

and clear definitions.¹⁴ Aristotle uses the terms περίοδος and κῶλον to denote larger and smaller divisions,¹⁵ while Demetrius adds a yet smaller division, the κόμμα.¹⁶ They divide speech into λέξις εἰρομένη ('continuous' or 'strung together'),¹⁷ characteristic of the old historiographers, and λέξις καταστραμμένη, speech in *periods*. Whereas the *period* bears certain similarities to the modern period, as Dover points out, the *kolon* is clearly not equivalent to the modern syntactic clause.¹⁸ *Kolon* divisions appear to depend on a combination of syntax, semantics, and length, while the *period* was primarily delimited by completeness of sense.¹⁹ Numerous points, such as the two main types of λέξις,²⁰ Aristotle's view of *kola* as either antithetical or divided,²¹ or Demetrius' description of the three different types of period,²² are of great stylistic interest. Overall, however, the definitions of these terms are too vague and varied to use as precise terminology for stylistic categorisation.

In spite of such difficulties, the unitary organisation of Greek texts is an important aspect of Greek style and has been widely discussed. I have concentrated specifically on the detailed treatments of this topic in Denniston, 1952, and Dover, 1997, which seem broadly representative of the major trends in modern works.²³ Denniston takes into account the syntactic-stylistic differences between English and

¹⁴ Dover, 1997, 37-40, outlines the main differences between ancient theories and shows the difficulties of constructing firm definitions. See also Usher, 1973, 41, on the 'unresolved question' of period length.

¹⁵ Arist.*Rh.*1409b13ff.

¹⁶ Demetr.*Eloc.*9.

¹⁷ Although Demetrius uses the term διηρημένη.

¹⁸ See e.g. the first example at Arist.*Rh.*1409b34ff., which contains two *kola*, but would be seen as one clause, in terms of English grammar.

¹⁹ Fowler, 1982, claims that the Aristotelian *period* was defined 'logically' as opposed to 'rhythmically', arguing convincingly against almost all of the main arguments in support of the latter. However, some care must be taken over using 'logical' to describe the Aristotelian/Demetrian *period*, especially in view of passages such as Demetr.*Eloc.*32 on the differences between the *period* and the *enthumêma*. See also Usher, 1973, 41.

²⁰ Although the usefulness of this classification is limited, especially when dealing with the non-periodic style. See e.g. Fowler, 1987, 54-5, on Aristotle's discussion of λέξις εἰρομένη as 'a foil for the discussion of the periodic style'; Bakker, 1997, 36 and 38: 'it [λέξις εἰρομένη] is negatively defined with respect to the positive qualities of the periodic style'.

²¹ *Rhet.*1409b33.

²² *Eloc.*19-21.

²³ Other works include e.g. Webster, 1941; Norden, 1915, *passim*; comments in Chantraine, 1951; Des Places, 1951, and Humbert, 1953, who both concentrate only on specific aspects of 'phrase' structure in Plato.

Greek in his points about individual features like hendiadys.²⁴ Discussing unit organisation, however, he uses the terms 'sentence', 'clause', 'period' and 'kolon' without definition,²⁵ and his treatment is restricted to the categories and authors discussed in ancient rhetorical theory, as if these categories were clearly defined.²⁶ Although he makes many interesting observations, he employs the term 'period' in contexts where it is neither clearly applicable nor, if applicable, the most profitable way for a passage to be classified. A passage such as *Symposium* 182d-183c, described as a 'period...almost too straggling to be called a period',²⁷ would benefit from a different framework of reference. Furthermore, those prose 'sentences' which do not ostensibly conform to the restrictive ancient schemata find no place within his account.

Dover goes to the opposite extreme. To avoid the difficulties involved in the use of sentences and punctuation to divide the Greek text, he replaces the sentence as a unity of analysis with the 'MCF (main-clause-finite-verb unit)'.²⁸ However, while the 'MCF' avoids problems associated with certain modern terminology, it is far too dependent on modern linguistic frameworks to be an adequate way of understanding the organisation of Greek. Dover himself considers the difficulties occasioned by constructions such as μέν and δέ clauses, which comprise two 'MCFs', but cannot be seen as entirely independent clauses.²⁹ Yet many other problems are passed over in silence and his schema often seems arbitrary. For example, 'causal ἐπεί', with a finite verb, is seen as an 'MCF', while participial clauses with a definite causal force are not included amongst the list of 'MCFs'.³⁰ Thus, two semantically equivalent³¹ constructions are treated as having radically different linguistic functions, without any stated reason. Similarly, when more than one infinitive follows a verb such as φασί in indirect discourse, all but the first infinitive are said to be 'MCFs', 'in order not to posit MCFs of extreme and unrealistic complexity'.³² Rather than considering

²⁴ Denniston, 1952, 61-5.

²⁵ Cf. Webster, 1941, on Greek 'sentence-construction'.

²⁶ See Denniston, 1952, 60-75, on 'Sentence-structure and Antithesis'. See especially 66-74.

²⁷ Denniston, 1952, 70.

²⁸ Dover, 1997, 27-8.

²⁹ Dover, 1997, 30-32.

³⁰ Dover, 1996, 29.

³¹ The sense of 'equivalent' here is loose and not intended to denote absolute synonymy.

³² Dover, 1997, 29. Thus, in my Passage V, which is almost entirely in extended indirect discourse, all but the first infinitive, εἶναι (110c2/ V.6), would, apparently, be considered as 'MCFs'.

the Greek linguistic feature *per se*, different syntactic status is being accorded to verbs with an identical syntactic function, without explanation, so as to fit a schema which is in effect imposed on the actual linguistic structure of the language. Dover's methodology takes priority over the data it has been set up to analyse and, even if the 'MCFs' could be identified with certainty, it seems unlikely that a unit ill-suited to so many aspects of Greek can shed much light upon the organisation of Greek texts.³³

3.2.3 *Definition of the unit.*

It is not possible to distinguish individual units of the Greek text with absolute certainty and any system which claims to do so risks misrepresenting the structure of literary Greek. Units resemble modern sentences, insofar as they comprise a clause or clause cluster, which generally feature one or more main verb-clauses, often with additional subordinate clauses.³⁴ Furthermore, they have both completeness and independence on a formal, syntactic, and semantic level.³⁵ However, because this is not determinate, the decision as to what constitutes the unit must ultimately depend upon the level of completeness and independence in any given instance, so that there are no general criteria suitable for all cases. Thus the very identification of the unit is itself an element of stylistic analysis, dependent on the interpretation of each individual case.

The fact that a sequence of Greek words in context is sometimes difficult to divide should itself be seen as an aspect of style, so that a unit which eliminates these difficulties provides an inaccurate picture of Greek organisation. While it is perhaps desirable to have a schema more systematic and inclusive than Denniston's, this should be based around features of stylistic interest rather than spurious scientific determinacy. Significant features are likely to include the way in which clauses are

³³ Cf. p.46, below.

³⁴ Instances such as units featuring ellipse or exclamation, in which the verb is omitted, are exceptions to this.

³⁵ Although the syntax and semantics of linguistic features are heavily interdependent and often inseparable. Consider how difficult it would be to distinguish the syntactic from the semantic aspects of e.g. hypotaxis and parataxis.

connected, grouped and ordered; the extent to which discrete units can be identified; and whether both units and clauses are extended or concise.³⁶

3.2.4 *Categories for analysis*

I propose to consider unit organisation in terms of three main categories, which constitute a framework amenable to all its aspects and calculated to elucidate its significant features.

Structure

'Structure' refers to the grouping and connection of clauses and units, both the extent to which units can be seen as discrete and the way in which individual clauses are linked. The relationship between clauses is categorised mainly in terms of parataxis, between clauses of equal status, and hypotaxis, between clauses of unequal status, where one clause is subordinate to another.³⁷ Hypotactic clauses will be classified within the functional grammatical categories: nominal; adverbial; relative; and comparative; as well as their subdivisions. Those participial clauses which fulfil these functions will be included as hypotactic. Apposition will be treated as a type of parataxis.³⁸

³⁶ The categories used by Webster, 1941, for the analysis of 'Greek sentence construction', are based on such factors. However, while his overall results and many individual points are of some interest, his categories are generally too broad to be useful for detailed stylistic analysis.

³⁷ Webster, 1941, also uses these as his main categories, although he has different notions of hypotaxis and parataxis (see also n.38). For definitions see Greenbaum, 1996, 320ff. As discussed by Fowler, 1987, 55, some modern scholars extend 'parataxis' to cover the organisation of the text as a whole, as opposed to individual units. However, unless stated, I will be taking 'parataxis' strictly in its grammatical sense. Cf. Bakker, 39ff. and 62.

³⁸ Given that apposition links items of equivalent grammatical status, its syntactic function is more akin to parataxis than hypotaxis. Thus I will treat it as paratactic, *contra* Webster, 1941, 389, who calls apposition hypotactic and 'dependent on the main sentence'. See e.g. Quirk, 1985, 1301, on the resemblance of apposition to coordination.

The length of units will be assessed on two separate grounds: a) do they comprise large groups of clauses? b) are the clauses themselves concise or expanded?³⁹ For the assessment of b) we shall take into account the use of interjections, adjectives and devices such as ellipse, asyndeton, and polysyndeton.⁴⁰ I have avoided attempting to analyse unit-length statistically in terms of numbers of components for various reasons. First, the importance of precise numerical data of sentence length for stylistic analysis is questionable, since length can generally be judged adequately without counting and raw data do not in themselves distinguish between different parts of speech, as is required for understanding the composition of the sentence. Then again, even if we accept that the comparisons which such data facilitate may be of use in determining differences between certain authors or periods, existing attempts at statistical analysis have been prone to methodological problems.

The fact is that quantification depends on distinct units whose length can be compared. However, as explained above, Greek units cannot be demarcated with certainty.⁴¹ Moreover, those who claim to have isolated distinct units have introduced dubious categories of inclusion and exclusion for counting components.⁴² Dover's figures for 'MCF' lengths are only based on 'mobile tokens', so that large numbers of tokens are excluded from calculation.⁴³ Effectively there would be no distinction in terms of length between items such as a polysyndetic and an asyndetic phrase.⁴⁴ Thus, given the limitations of such methods, when considering unit length

³⁹ Here there may be some overlap with 'structure', since that also concerns the grouping of clauses. For example, des Places, 1951, talks about an 'extended' ('à rallonges') construction, comprising chains of e.g. relative clauses, and this could be seen as relevant to both length and structure.

⁴⁰ This is similar to the category 'amplification' in Webster, 1941, 388. 'Amplification' constitutes the number of elements added to a 'grammatical term' (e.g. adjectives added to a noun) and while this broad and countable category facilitates statistical analysis, it does not discriminate at all between different elements.

⁴¹ Cf. Janson, 1964, 27ff., who outlines the difficulties involved in trying to determine a certain and objective unit for analysis. He claims that the 'shortest syntactic entity' (i.e. the clause) can be used with a 'degree of objectivity', since only the quantification of pauses is controversial (31). However, even if this does give some degree of statistical legitimacy, his results would be of very limited interest, given that they would be unable to shed any light on the combination of clauses within units.

⁴² See e.g. Wake, 1957, 334, who makes the arbitrary claim that ancient *periods*, established by the authors themselves, can be identified within the text with certainty.

⁴³ Dover, 1997, 51.

⁴⁴ Cf. the criteria used by Webster, 1941, 386, which raise similar difficulties.

it is preferable to take into account not quantities alone, but a range of stylistic features.

Word order and foregrounding

Under this heading we shall consider unusual word order, hyperbaton, variation in order, and foregrounding of particular words or phrases.

3.3 Parallel structures

This category includes all types of microcontextual parallelisms within Greek writing and comprises small groups of individual words or collocations which form parallel structures on either a formal or semantic level, as well as structures such as antithesis, which affect the wider organisation of clauses or units.⁴⁵

We may distinguish four main classes: pairs and lists; repetition; pleonasm; and sound effects used as parallel structures. Each has various subdivisions, while certain examples, such as ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος (69c5/I.18), may also fit into more than one main class. For this phrase is not only a pair, but is also pleonastic and exhibits significant aural parallelism, both rhythmically and through repetition of initial and final syllables.

It could be argued that some parallels discussed in this section are too uniform and prevalent a feature of Greek texts to be noteworthy. Yet the significant variance, for example, in the number and types of pairs which appear in different passages suggests that their variety and distribution is of stylistic interest.

⁴⁵ On the distinction between these types cf. e.g. Arist.*Rh.*1409b33ff., who distinguishes between pairs of ἐναντία within clauses and ἡ ἀντικειμένη (antithetical) λέξις; and Fehling, 1969, 295 and *passim*, who distinguishes between 'Antithese' ('Gegenüberstellungen mit (mindestens) zwei Paar Akzentstellen' and 'einfache Kontraste', in which 'nur ein Begriffspaar geneinandergesetzt ist'.

3.3.1 Other views on parallel structures: ancient and modern.

Those features labelled here as ‘parallel structures’ are not generally treated as a single group by ancient or modern writers on style.⁴⁶ Although many of them were included amongst ancient rhetorical figures (with the exception of certain pleonasms, word-plays, and forms of repetition), rhetoric tended to focus on the parallel structure of *kola*, comprising figures such as *παρίσσωσις* (‘equality of *kola*’)⁴⁷ or *ἀντιστροφή* (the repetition of the same word at the close of successive *kola*).⁴⁸ Thus, while ancient rhetorical accounts provide interesting examples, they are of limited use for a more comprehensive treatment of parallel structures, and account for neither pairs and lists *per se*,⁴⁹ nor many of the types of repetition to be found in Greek texts.

Although modern analysis is not restricted to the ancient rhetorical categories, the wide-ranging types of parallel structures under consideration are, in general, treated separately. A partial exception to this is Fehling, who examines all kinds of parallel structure as ‘Wiederholungsfiguren’. He expands the usual concept of repetition (‘Wiederholung’) to include structures based on parallel meaning,⁵⁰ so that it includes antithesis⁵¹ and only discounts features such as alliteration, where he sees the words as connected purely by sound, not meaning.⁵² However, since his primary interest is rhetorical figures, the range of pairs and lists included in his account is narrower than mine and, in general, he presents features mainly as a catalogue without explaining the essential differences between particular types.

⁴⁶ Cf. Fehling, 1969, 7ff. Silk, 1974, from where I take the phrase ‘parallel structures’ and Silk, 2000, ch.3ff. are notable exceptions.

⁴⁷ Arist.*Rh.*1404a24ff.; Demetr.*Eloc.*25.

⁴⁸ Hermog.*Id.*2.36. This device was also known as *ἐπιφορά* or *conversio*. See Martin, 1974, 304.

⁴⁹ Except insofar as these coincide with e.g. *homoeoteleuton* or *polysyndeton*.

⁵⁰ Fehling, 1969, 16ff.: ‘Der Begriff der Wiederholung ist dabei aber weiter als gewöhnlich gefaßt, da er Strukturwiederholungen und damit auch die Antithese einschließt.’

⁵¹ Although his discussion of antithesis is mainly concerned with gnomic antheses alone.

⁵² However, true alliteration creates a connection of meaning through sound.

3.3.2 *Categories of Analysis.*

The four main categories of analysis are as follows. Basic figures for the incidence of each type of feature will be given at the beginning of Chapter 4, and all instances of parallel structure are listed in Appendix I.

Pairs and lists

This category includes any instance of pairs and lists, most comprising components with the same syntactic function. Further differentiation between types will be, for example, the classification of pairs as either oppositional and non-oppositional. Pairs and lists coinciding in a particular phrase will be included in both categories. Thus, a phrase like ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον (69a7/I.2) would count as three separate pairs and one long list. Similarly, in καθαρὸν καὶ οὐ καταδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι (110e3/V.23) all three terms form a list, and yet οὐ καταδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι also seems to form a significant pair because of the aural resemblance of its two halves, achieved through homoeoteleuton and identical rhythm. This unusual coincidence of lists and pairs is perhaps the most noteworthy characteristic of these two examples.⁵³

The category overall has certain similarities to Dover's 'multiples',⁵⁴ although my classification is more broadly inclusive. It includes features excluded by Dover, like 'multiples' where 'a single mobile is co-ordinated with an expression composed of two or more' or 'different forms of the same lexeme are co-ordinated'.⁵⁵ An example of the former is ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος (97c2/III.3) and, of the latter, πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα (117c7/VI.7).

⁵³ It is in cases such as this that the limitations of a purely numerical analysis are especially apparent. For numerical analysis cannot take into account all the possible combinations of e.g. lists and pairs and so can provide only general indications as opposed to detailed characterisations of specific features.

⁵⁴ Dover, 1996, 143: 'multiples...all stand in exactly the same syntactical relation to what lies outside the sequence'.

⁵⁵ Dover, 1996, 144 and 145.

This category includes any repetition of a lexeme and its cognates, including instances where the cognate provides the root of a compound lexeme. So, for example, καταλλάττεσθαι (69a8/I.3) and ἀλλαπτόμενα (69b7/I.12) are taken to be repetitions of ἀλλαγή (69a7/I.2). Four main types of repetition are distinguished which, apart from the third category, ring composition, are based not upon rhetorical figures,⁵⁶ but on the proximity of repeated words.⁵⁷

These four categories are:

- a) *Juxtaposition* (j): repeated words are either juxtaposed or separated by no more than a preposition (*vel sim.*). E.g. ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονάς (69a7/I.2) or τὰ φύόμενα φύεσθαι (110d3/V.15).
- b) *Successive clause or unit* (s): repeated words occur either in a successive clause or at least within the next unit.⁵⁸ E.g. αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσai τῆς προτέρας τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται ... (81d8-9/II.17-8).
- c) *Ring composition* (r): a unit or sequence of units features the same lexeme or lexemes at its beginning and its close. E.g. ὁρατόν 81c9/II.6 and ὁρῶνται (81d4/II.12). This category is similar to the ancient term κύκλος.⁵⁹
- d) *Key word repetition* (k):⁶⁰ a certain lexeme is repeated at various points throughout the passage or a long section of the passage. E.g. the use of βέλτιστα in Passage III.

⁵⁶ Ancient rhetoric also made distance-based distinctions between repetitions. However, these focused mainly on close repetition and repetition in significant places within *kola*. See Lausberg, 1998, 274ff.

⁵⁷ Denniston, 1952, ch.V, considers a very wide range of types of repetition, although especially at 84-90 he relies quite heavily on ancient rhetorical categories. Cf. also Fehling, 1969, 187-234.

⁵⁸ In instances where exact unit boundaries are uncertain, this category will be subject to questions of stylistic interpretation.

⁵⁹ See e.g. Denniston, 1952, 90.

⁶⁰ The term 'key-word' is taken from Denniston, 1952, 4.

Overlaps, especially between categories b) and d), are very common, when a lexeme which is repeated periodically throughout the passage is also repeated one or more times within successive clauses or units.

Pleonasm

Pleonasm or semantic repetition comprises instances where a lexeme is conjoined with a synonym or near synonym. Also known as συνωνυμία, *amplificatio*, or *disjunctio*,⁶¹ it was one of the ancient rhetorical figures, where it mainly refers to the pairing of terms of very similar meaning rather than precise synonyms, thus including examples like ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν (82c6/II.52). Although pleonasm is essentially very different from the other, formal, features classified as ‘parallel structures’, it is a phenomenon which establishes a parallelism between two or more terms, and is therefore included within this category.⁶²

Sound effects used as parallel structures

The sound effects which are included here are those which create or emphasise a sense of parallelism. These include relevant instances of word-play and assonance, with the latter comprising features such as homoeoteleuton, alliteration, and the repetition of prefixes.⁶³

3.4 Imagery⁶⁴

I will consider as imagery all tropes and figures, ‘based on analogy or similarity’,⁶⁵ or else on contiguity or association, classifying them formally⁶⁶ within five

⁶¹ Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria*, 9.3.45-47. For further references see also Martin, 1974, 306.

⁶² Moreover, examples of pleonasm almost always take the form of pairs or lists.

⁶³ On sound effects as reinforcing parallel structures, see Silk, 1996, 193: function (d).

⁶⁴ The definitions and classifications used here owe much to discussions with Michael Silk and to his treatment of imagery in Silk, 1974; 1996; and forthcoming.

⁶⁵ See Silk, 1974, 5: ‘based...refers to the logical basis’. Cf. Day Lewis, 1947, 18: an image is ‘a figure of speech expressing some similarity or analogy’; Black, 1981, 70, on the general conception of metaphor. For the inclusion of metonymy (tropes based on ‘contiguity’) within imagery, see e.g. Ullmann, 1964, 177.

categories: metaphor; metonymy; simile and comparison; analogy; and aural imagery. Metaphor, metonymy, and aural imagery are also categorisable as 'implicit' imagery, as opposed to simile, comparison, and analogy, which are 'explicit', insofar as they are designated by a formal marker.⁶⁷ To distinguish between the verbal components of imagery I use the terms 'tenor' and 'vehicle'. The 'vehicle' is the 'deviant' and 'extraneous' element, applied to the 'tenor' ('non-deviant element') in a sense which deviates from its normal usage,⁶⁸ and introduced for the purposes of comparison.⁶⁹ So, for example, in τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς καταχρῶνται (110b8-c1), δείγματα is a vehicle term, while τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα is the tenor. The types of imagery are defined as follows:

Metaphor

Those tropes based on analogy or similarity, including personification.

Metonymy

Those tropes based on contiguity or association, including synecdoche.⁷⁰

Aural Imagery

This comprises rhythmic or other sound effects⁷¹ which function like metaphor.⁷²

⁶⁶ In order to distinguish between metaphor and metonymy and to define aural imagery, however, it will be necessary to appeal to semantic and functional aspects.

⁶⁷ On the explicit/implicit distinction Ullmann, 1964, 180, quotes Eluard's 'image by analogy' and 'image by identification'. See also Silk, 1974, 13-14. Cf. Soskice, 1985, 18ff. on metaphor as having no 'particular syntactic form'; and Arist.*Rh.*1406b25ff.

⁶⁸ Definitions taken from Silk, 1996, 967.

⁶⁹ 'Tenor' and 'vehicle', introduced by Richards, 1936, 96, are widely used in discussions of metaphor. My own use of these terms follows Silk, 1974, 8-14, and *passim*, insofar as I apply them to imagery in general and resist seeing them in terms of a 'literal/ figurative' opposition.

⁷⁰ See Silk, 1996, 967. Cf. also Wellek and Warren, 1963, 194, on 'contiguity'.

⁷¹ To a certain extent sound effects used as parallel structures can be considered as aural imagery because of their 'associative function'.

⁷² See Silk, 1974, 177 n.1, on the lack of an 'adequate typology of the poetic functions of alliteration or of sound patterning generally'. He includes a detailed discussion of 'aural interaction', but is only concerned with those examples where aural effects coincide with semantic imagery.

Consider, for example, the first lines of Tennyson's *Tithonus*:

The woods decay, the woods decay and fall,
The vapours weep their burthen to the ground.

Here the falling cadence of the second line contributes to the impression of slow degeneration and melancholy decay evoked by this image and the poem as a whole. Gentle resignation is emphasised by the use of the soft archaic 'burthen' rather than burden.⁷³

Various critics have worried about this phenomenon, having mistakenly understood aural imagery as supposedly relying on the fixed or independent semantic force of phonetic elements of language. Since phonetic elements clearly do not have such a force they infer that aural imagery itself cannot exist.⁷⁴ However, given that this phenomenon obtains a semantic force in conjunction with the meaning of the words in which it occurs, it remains unaffected by such anxieties.⁷⁵ The case for aural imagery is perhaps even more cogent in a classical context, in as much as aural effects are more readily appreciated within cultures accustomed to oral delivery.⁷⁶

Aural imagery is, moreover, not limited to straightforward reinforcement of the semantic by given factors on the phonological level, but can also be significant insofar as they diverge. The 'river' metaphor of Heraclitus fr. B49a -

ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνομέν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν, εἰμέν τε
καὶ οὐκ εἶμεν.

- seems to indicate the ceaseless flux and lack of stable identity in the physical world. Yet the symmetry and regularity of the repetitive structure creates an aural

⁷³ On aural imagery in general cf. e.g. Wellek and Warren, 1963, 162, who give three levels of 'sound-imitation', the third being 'the important level of sound-symbolism or sound-metaphor', which concerns the 'expressive effects' of certain sounds and is 'a sound-symbolism far more pervasive than onomatopoeia'.

⁷⁴ E.g. Ransom, 1938, 93-4, objects to aural imagery for the reason that 'phonetic elements' have only a contingent semantic force, entirely dependent on the 'logical meanings' of the words.

⁷⁵ Cf. Wellek and Warren, 1963, 161-2; Richards, 1936, 60;

⁷⁶ Cf. Stanford, 1967, 100 and 113.

impression of order and balance, which could be taken to suggest a more fundamental underlying principle of order, beneath the apparent disorder construed from the transience of the perceived physical phenomena.

Simile and comparison

Simile and comparison are figures based on analogy or similarity, which include a formal marker such as ὥς, ὥστε, or a 'comparative adjective and a noun in the genitive case'.⁷⁷

Analogy

'Analogy' here refers to 'paratactic analogy',⁷⁸ an example being Virgil's

Triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbres,
arboribus venti, nobis Amaryllidis irae.⁷⁹

This is comparison which lacks a formal marker, but is still explicit imagery and formally distinctive, insofar as both tenor and vehicle are fully spelt out grammatically, unlike in the case of metaphor. It is important to distinguish between this '(paratactic) analogy' and 'analogy' in its broad sense, which can be defined, for example, as 'any mode of reasoning in which one object or complex of objects is likened or assimilated to another'.⁸⁰ Although analogy in the broad sense provides the logical basis for metaphor, simile, and comparison, it is itself non-verbal and distinct from 'imagery proper', having no essential association with deviant usage of terminology.

⁷⁷ Silk, 1974, 19. He also discusses the relationship between comparison and short simile.

⁷⁸ See Silk, 1974, 14.

⁷⁹ *Eclogues* 3.80-1.

⁸⁰ Lloyd, 1966, 175. Cf. Soskice, 1985, 55, on analogy as 'describing a type of relationship' which is 'non-linguistic'.

3.4.1 *Difficulties in identifying imagery*

The points that follow are only a brief introduction to the numerous and significant difficulties involved in the identification of imagery.

The formal recognition of an image depends on our perception of deviant usage.⁸¹ For example, a phrase like χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαπτόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ (69b6-7/I.11-12) is easily recognisable as imagery. σκιαγραφία is the deviant element (vehicle), since there is no sense in which virtue can really be a σκιαγραφία ('shadow-painting'). However, the case is not so clear in a phrase such as ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα (111a8/V.35), which describes how for those living on the truth earth (ἐκεῖ) air has an equivalent use to that served by water and the sea for us (i.e. the inhabitants of our earth). Whether this phrase is to be construed as imagery depends on the extent to which the role of air 'there' (ἐκεῖ) can only be understood in different terms from the role of water and sea on our earth.

Moreover, the situation is not helped by the lack of any agreed use of the term 'imagery'.⁸² It sometimes denotes not only the literary tropes or figures under discussion here, but various other categories, which frequently influence and confuse definitions of the former.⁸³ Particularly in the case of metaphor, which has always dominated discussion of imagery, there are numerous definitions, such as: the Aristotelian substitution model;⁸⁴ metaphor as generating a new meaning through the

⁸¹ See p.52, above.

⁸² On the lack of adequate definition and the difficulties involved see e.g. Furbank, 1970, 68ff. and 60: 'The trouble with "imagery" is that it appears to refer to some technical feature in literature - like "rhythm" or "stanza" or "metaphor" - yet it is hard to discover *what*'.

⁸³ These are, for example, the psychological phenomenon of mental imagery or associations with the image as presented in the visual arts. On the confusion of these ideas, see e.g. Furbank 1970, 21-3; and Ullmann, 1964, 176-7. See also Preminger and Brogan, 1993, 559-66, on 'mental imagery; figures of speech; cluster criticism; and symbol and myth;' as the four main classes of imagery as understood in the twentieth century.

⁸⁴ See e.g. Arist.*Po.*1457b6ff., although, cf. Soskice, 1985, 8-11, who claims that the 'crude' substitution view actually belongs to the 'empiricist critics' of Aristotle and Quintilian.

combination of tenor and vehicle;⁸⁵ or Davidson's definition of metaphor as belonging to the 'domain of use' and contained in a sentence understood as literally false.⁸⁶

3.4.2 'Live' and 'dead' imagery

As well as such general difficulties there is also a practical problem of identification which centers on the specific terminology used in an image, especially a metaphor. The characteristic question that arises is: can an image be considered 'live,' insofar as it represents a 'deviation from the terminological norm'?⁸⁷ For a spoken language, a sensible user's sense of usage is adequate. For a dead language, however, the question can be decided only by surveying usage of the word in extant literature.⁸⁸ For example, the use of σκοπεῖν (97d2) to suggest 'intellectual enquiry' would be taken as 'dead' metaphor since, although the earliest appearances of its root σκοπ- suggest a sense of visual observation,⁸⁹ its intellectual sense had, by Plato's time, become standard usage.⁹⁰ By contrast, to assess whether a word such as βαρύνεται (81c9/II.7) constitutes live metaphor is less straightforward. It is important to establish which authors' usage of terminology can be taken 'as operationally adequate evidence of "normal Greek"'.⁹¹ A detailed list of 'reliable' authors has been drawn up by Silk, and mainly comprises 'prosaic prose authors' of the 'classical or pre-classical period', although Homer, as a standard for later writers, is also included.⁹²

⁸⁵ Soscice, 1985, 31ff. labels these as 'incremental' theories. See e.g. Black, 1981, 79 and *passim* on 'interaction'.

⁸⁶ Davidson, 1981, 212. On theories of metaphor, cf. e.g. Soscice, 1985, ch. 3, who lists the 'substitution', 'emotive', and 'incremental' theories of metaphor; and Johnson, 1981, 24ff., on the 'substitution', 'comparison' and 'interaction' theories.

⁸⁷ See Silk, 1974, 27ff. Cf. e.g. Soscice, 1974, 83. Although there is a possibility that even a dead image may retain the force of both meanings simultaneously (see Silk, 1974, 27). It is not helpful to speak of a dead image being 'revived', *contra* Louis, 1945, 17, who talks about Plato's ability to recapture the forgotten metaphorical sense of a word. Cf. Soscice, 1974, 74ff. on ideas about dead metaphor 'shaping thought', which have become highly influential in recent discussions of cognition.

⁸⁸ Criteria should be assessed in terms of the quality, quantity, and period of usage (categories taken from Silk, 1974, 34). For chronological parameters of the survey see 3.1.2, above.

⁸⁹ E.g. Hom. *Il.* 2.792; *Od.* 4.524; *h. Hom.* 2.62.

⁹⁰ E.g. S. *Ant.* 41; Ar. *Eq.* 264; Hdt 1.32; Th. 1.1.3; Isoc. 18.38.

⁹¹ Silk, 1974, 43.

⁹² See Silk, 1974, 41-8 and *Appendix III*. The over-riding criterion for normal usage, as Silk makes clear, is an adequate *spread* of evidence, preferably across 'reliable' authors.

3.5 Lexis

My category of lexis subsumes various types of lexeme and idiom. Lexical phenomena are in many ways the easiest to analyse, given that we are dealing with discrete data which can be quantified and whose distributions can be established with the help of lexica and data bases. Nevertheless, compared to other stylistic categories, there are considerable difficulties in devising categories of analysis which will select significant phenomena from large quantities of potentially relevant data. The categories which I will use build on the systems employed in other works on this topic, but also reflect my own sense of which lexemes, idioms, or word-types are of particular stylistic interest.⁹³

3.5.1 *Approaches to lexis, ancient and modern.*

Treatment of lexis in ancient literary theory is of little use for my purposes. Though extant examples give valuable insight into ancient intuitions about word-classification and contain isolated points of interest like the loan words of Aristotle *Poetics* 22, ancient theory offers no systematic analysis of stylistic tendencies and also merges confusingly with discussion of linguistics and with quite different stylistic features such as imagery. Thus, the discussion of diction in Aristotle's *Poetics*, which Halliwell reasonably calls 'more linguistic than stylistic',⁹⁴ begins by classifying parts of speech and discussing phonology and types of statement.⁹⁵ This is followed by definition of word-types, with reference to such miscellaneous considerations as register, morphology and imagery.⁹⁶ Finally, there is a series of prescriptive stylistic points about what constitutes suitable diction, with respect to those aspects of diction dealt with in the previous chapter.⁹⁷ Similar topics are considered by Quintilian under the heading of *proprietas verborum*,⁹⁸ which covers diction, insofar as it involves aspects of register and avoidance of obsolete and

⁹³ On the value of intuition, cf. Lyons, 1963, 95.

⁹⁴ Halliwell, 1995b, 5.

⁹⁵ *Po.*1456b20ff.

⁹⁶ *Po.*1457a31ff.

⁹⁷ *Po.*1458a18. Cf. *Rh.*1405a3ff.

⁹⁸ Quintilian *Institutio Oratoria* 8.1ff.

therefore incomprehensible archaisms. Yet it is also the heading under which Quintilian recommends the avoidance of other stylistic features as diverse as excessive hyperbaton, brevity, and over-extended periods.⁹⁹

There is by contrast an enormous range of relevant modern studies, varying greatly in both scope and aims. For example: Amman, 1953, traces the usage and background of -ικός adjectives in Plato; Long, 1968, considers the distribution and function of various types of abstract nouns in Sophocles; Lyons, 1963, is an attempt to understand the meaning of various members of a certain lexical field, in terms of the linguistic relationships between them; studies such as those by Peppler, 1910, or Handley, 1953, aim to show that certain morphological forms are characteristic of particular genres of writing. Such works are enormously useful, both as collections and analyses of data, as well as indicating profitable criteria for lexical investigation.

3.5.2 *Categories of Analysis*

I will group lexical phenomena within two main categories, according to whether lexemes and idioms are analysed individually or as members of given groups.

Distinctive individual lexemes and idioms

This category consists of lexemes or idioms, whose occurrences in extant literature are either rare or limited to specific authors or genres. It is necessary to consider individual lexemes in terms of their generic background and distribution, since their distinctiveness can only be established with respect to their usage elsewhere. Thus, they will be classified according to their distribution within Greek literature, although more detailed consideration of generic affiliations follows in Chapter 5.

Lexemes are grouped according to their attestation in:

- a) particular genre(s)

⁹⁹ 8.1: 14; 19; and 17 respectively.

- b) groups of specific authors
- c) prose authors exclusively or predominantly¹⁰⁰
- d) verse
- e) a particular period

Unless otherwise stated, cognates and derivatives will not be taken into consideration.¹⁰¹ As well as classifying lexemes according to the genres in which they appear, in instances where they are rare or restricted to a very limited group of texts, usage may be further categorised in terms of: specific authors; numbers of instances in particular authors; specific works.

At various points I will outline the distribution of a particular lexeme (or idiom), listing the authors/genres in which it is found. When a lexeme is extremely rare I will list all instances, also stating the number of times it occurs in each author/genre. For more widespread lexemes, I will list authors/genres and cite a representative selection of instances. Finally, there are also several works which cannot be attributed to a particular author with absolute certainty and might come later than the period of literature I am considering. In many cases such texts only constitute a small sample of the works of an author in which a lexeme is found and have no real bearing on its spread, so that I will not comment on these specifically. However, when they contain one of only few instances of a particular lexeme I will indicate the problematic status of the text by starring and enclosing the reference within square brackets (e.g. [Arist.Col. *]).

Lexical groups and variety

This category incorporates different aspects of lexical variety and the distribution of lexemes from various formal, semantic and grammatical groups.

¹⁰⁰ Examples in comedy or possibly even in tragedy (especially e.g. Euripidean dialogue), when outweighed by a broad prose usage, are not taken necessarily to affect a lexeme's 'prose' status.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Silk, 1974, 30.

'Lexeme-token ratio'

The 'lexeme-token ratio' calculation is introduced by Dover in order to measure variety in vocabulary.¹⁰² It gives the number of different lexemes used in a passage as compared to the total number of tokens (lexemes), and is calculated by dividing the former by the latter.

Variation and integration of 'lexical fields'

'Field-theory' is an area of linguistics developed by German scholars in the 1920s and '30s and based on the idea that the totality of a language's vocabulary may be seen as a number of interrelated 'lexical fields'.¹⁰³ These are semantic groups, comprising individual lexemes which are defined and demarcated through their relationship to other members of the 'field'. In linguistics this theory is generally applied to testing diachronic, geographical, and cultural variations in language use and has been challenged on a number of grounds.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, the idea of 'lexical fields' is useful in a stylistic context, insofar as it gives us a framework for considering the extent to which an author uses clusters of lexemes from particular semantic groups; combines lexemes from different groups; or intersperses his use of certain lexical fields with alien terms.

So, for example, in Passage I, lines 69c3-d1/16-22 feature a cluster of religious-mystery terms, including lexemes such as ἀμύητος, καθαίρω, ἀτέλεστος, and τελέω. By contrast, throughout much of Passage IV, different lexical fields are combined, as with the mixture of mathematical, ethical and educational/artistic terminology in 105d13-e1/16-21: τό ἄρτιον, τὸ δίκαιον, and μουσικός respectively.

¹⁰² I have followed Dover, 1997, 133, in taking into account the following categories of lexemes: 'nouns (excluding proper nouns), adjectives (excluding pronominal adjectives, πόλυσ and πᾶς, and numerals), regular adverbs in -ως, -ῶς, εὖ, and verbs'; and excluding 'any part of the copula εἶναι...unless it comes immediately after a pause or is negated', 'the present indicative of φάναι' and 'parenthetic ἔφη'. Dover further develops the calculation, by introducing an 'index of recurrence', designed to measure repetitiveness. However, for my purposes the simple 'lexeme-token ratio' is sufficient, since investigation of repetition is dealt with in 3.3.2, and with respect of lexis, I am simply assessing variety of vocabulary.

¹⁰³ Lyons, 1977, 253ff. and 1963, 45ff.

¹⁰⁴ E.g. Ullmann, 1962, 249; Öhman, 1953; 127; Lyons, 1977, 260.

Word-forms and 'parts of speech'

This category subsumes the distribution of certain word-forms, 'parts of speech', and sub-divisions of 'parts of speech'. It involves a wide range of formal, grammatical and semantic aspects of style,¹⁰⁵ such as:

i) *Morphology* - Recurrent usage or distinctive individual examples of certain prefixes, suffixes and compound lexemes; such as the cluster of lexemes beginning with φιλ- (82b10-c8/II.46-55) or the unusual compound συνεπακολουθοῦντος (81e1/II.18).

ii) *Distribution and form of abstract nouns* - Abstract nouns are 'those generalizing nouns which denote concepts, qualities, actions etc., in contrast with nouns which refer to physical objects'.¹⁰⁶ Of primary concern are those nouns in -σις, -μα, and -μός, and nominal formations which comprise τό + neuter adjective or participle; since these are considered to be characteristic of particular periods and styles. However, notable tendencies involving other noun-endings will also be included.

c) *Quantity* - Predominance or absence of particular parts of speech, such as the absence of adjectives in Passage VI.

3.6 Final remarks

Stylistic analysis examines the microcontextual features of the text. Within this 'microcontext' the different features can be loosely separated into three different categories of scale, ranging from those which involve whole units and phrases to those which involve single words. The widest level is, of course, unit organisation, including parallel structures such as antithesis, which affect the organisation of units

¹⁰⁵ Because of their structural role, particles are not considered here, but under 'Unit Organisation' (above).

¹⁰⁶ Long, 1968, 12-13. Although, as Long points out, such a definition does have certain limitations.

as a whole. Moving down the scale, there are those features involving small collocations, such as parallel structures like pairs and lists. Finally, some features consist only of individual words or idioms. Thus, unit organisation is restricted to the first of these and lexis to the third, while parallel structures appear on both the widest and the median level. The scope of imagery can really only be decided for each individual feature, since its form and scope are so variable. As part of the analysis it will be interesting to examine the interaction of these levels, as well as discussing the separate classes, like imagery or unit organisation, by themselves.

Chapter 4

Analysis of passages

4.1 Tables of data

4.1.1 Incidence of parallel structures¹

Passage	Pairs	Lists	Rep. (j)	Rep. (s)	Rep. (k)	Rep. (r)	Pleonasm	Sound effects
I	26	5	5	12	0	3	5	16
II	16	6	1	6	3	2	4	12
III	11	3	2	6	0	6	2	4
IV	5	0	1	5	0	5	3	3
V	13	11	1	2	0	1	3	3
VI	10	1	2	2	0	2	3	4

4.1.2 Lexeme-token ratio

Passage	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Ratio	0.73	0.68	0.52	0.69	0.73	0.79

¹ I give a full list of these parallel structures, classified by type, in Appendix I.

- 69a6 ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς
ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς
λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, μείζω πρὸς
ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα
10 ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις· 5
b καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ
πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ
δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὴς ἀρετῇ, μετὰ φρονή-
σεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ
5 ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· 10
χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων
μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετὴ καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἀνδρα-
ποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχη, τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς
c τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφρο-
σύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρόνησις 15
μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ· καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς
ἡμῖν οὔτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοι τινες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ
5 ὄντι πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς
"Αἰδου ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος
τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. 20
εἰσὶν γὰρ δὴ, ὥς φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετὰς, "ναρθηκο-
d φόροι μὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι." οὔτοι δ' εἰσὶν
κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες
ὀρθῶς. ὦν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον
ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμήθην γενέσθαι· εἰ δ'
5 ὀρθῶς προθυμήθην καὶ τι ἡνύσαμεν, ἐκεῖσε ἐλθόντες τὸ
σαφὲς εἰσόμεθα, ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ὥς ἐμοὶ
δοκεῖ. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγώ, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ἀπο-
λογοῦμαι, ὥς εἰκότως ὑμᾶς τε ἀπολείπων καὶ τοὺς ἐνθάδε
e δεσπότας οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ, ἡγούμενος 30
καὶ ἐκεῖ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐνθάδε δεσπότης τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύ-
ξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις· εἴ τι οὖν ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ
ἀπολογία ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς, εὖ αὖ ἔχοι.

We can divide this passage into three stylistic sections (indicated in bold): ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία...μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ (69a7-c3/I.1-16); καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ... βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι (69c3-d1/I.16-22) and οὔτοι δ' εἰσὶν... εὖ αὖ ἔχοι (69d1-e4/I.22-33). The first two have many similarities, while the third is entirely distinct, although there is throughout a slight tendency towards prose lexis as well as many parallel structures, insofar as Passage I contains most pairs, 'juxtaposed' and 'close' repetition, pleonasm, and sound effects.

4.2.1 *The first two sections*

Parallel structures are one of the most marked features in these two initial sections, in terms of number and diversity. Repetition mainly occurs here,² with unusually high quantities of both ‘juxtaposition’ and ‘successive clause or unit’ repetition,³ like οὐδ’ ἀληθές ἔχῃ, τὸ δ’ ἀληθές or the repeated ἀρετὴ in 69a7/I.2; b3/8; and b7/12. ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι (69a7-8/I.2-3) is also noteworthy, being a striking sequence of three parallel repeated pairs with parallelism intensified by the repeated καὶ and πρὸς.

Overall this passage has more pairs than the others, with most pairs and all lists in its first two sections. Of these, all but two are reinforced by other parallel structures, ranging from the common homoeoteleuton, like ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα (69b1/I.6), to pairs such as κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος (69c6/I.19), which combine homoeoteleuton, rhythmical identity, and pleonasm.⁴ An unusually high number of the pairs are also oppositional, such as: μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω (69a8/I.3); ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα (69b1/I.6); and προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων (69b4/I.9).

Parallelism and opposition also occur on a wider structural level, the first two sections being predominantly antithetical, although with certain differences. The second section’s two antitheses, unlike the first’s, have highly symmetrical word order and form, and only the slightest syntactic variation: ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος...μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει (69c5-c7/I.18-20) and νερθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βακχοὶ δέ τε παῦροι (69c8-d1/I.21-2).⁵

By contrast the first section’s two antitheses, ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία...φρόνησις (69a6-10/I.1-5) and καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα... οὐδ’ ἀληθές ἔχῃ (69b1-8/I.6-13), are

² Apart from προθυμήθην (69d4/25; d5/26) and ὁρθῶς (69d2/I.24; d5/27).

³ Both these types of repetition are most frequent in Passage I (see Table 4.1.1), all the more significant given that these repetitions are almost entirely restricted to two thirds of the passage.

⁴ Cf. also οὐδὲν ὑγιές οὐδ’ ἀληθές (69b8/I.13) and ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος (69c5/I.18).

⁵ The second of these is a misquotation of a hexameter (πολλοὶ and νερθηκοφόροι have been reversed here): see Rowe, 1993a, 151.

unit and, to a certain degree, resembles the ancient *period*, because of antithetical structure⁶ and the strong syntactic and semantic completeness attained in their final words.⁷ Though shorter and not antithetical the final unit of the first section is also similarly complete:⁸ τὸ δ' ἀληθές...μὴ καθαρμός τις ἦ (69b8-c3/I.13-16).⁹

The first part is, as well, markedly paratactic and generally extended. Simple apposition links many clauses with, for example, the second unit comprising three participial clauses, two in 'explanatory apposition' to the subject.¹⁰ Additional and adversative particles are prevalent, like καί, δέ, ἀλλά and μέν/δέ, while there is a general absence of inferential and confirmatory particles.¹¹ This contributes to extension, along with the polysyndetic lists,¹² appositional structure, features like pleonasm,¹³ and, in one case (69a7-8/I.2-3), the striking repetition discussed above.

The most outstanding features of the passage as a whole are aspects of word order and imagery:

μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἦ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ' ἦ ἐκεῖνο

⁶ Arist.*Rh.* 1409b36ff. and Demetr.*Eloc.* 32.

⁷ E.g. Dover, 1997, 38-9, on the ancient *period* as 'ended'; and Ch.3 p.42, above.

⁸ My division of the units in this passage differs from the *OCT*, which punctuates all three units as one continuous sentence. There are, admittedly, certain difficulties in positing a clear divisions between οὐδ' ἀληθές ἔχη and τὸ δ' ἀληθές, since the δέ of the latter provides a strong formal link. Nevertheless, the μέν/δέ antithesis is complete at οὐδ' ἀληθές ἔχη; and τὸ δ' ἀληθές, although connected, introduces a new point.

⁹ This unit could perhaps be seen as an example of Aristotle's 'divided (διηρημένη) *period*' (*Rh.* 1409b33).

¹⁰ Geddes, 1863, 36, says that χωριζόμενα 'appears to be in the nominative, being in explanatory apposition to ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή': cf. ὠνούμενα above. Burnet, 1911, 42, suggests that ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα may be an interpolated scholium on καὶ μετὰ τούτου because ὠνέω is not attested significantly elsewhere in the present passive, and even when appearing in the passive in other tenses, it has an active sense. Finally, excision would also mean that 'the simile does not break down'. Yet *contra* Burnet there are examples of ὠνέω in the passive with a passive sense (e.g. Is. 11.42; D. 19.209) and its use here is in keeping with the structure of the passage, making this part of the antithesis parallel with the use of χωριζόμενα. Moreover, the tenor/vehicle discrepancies of this image are very significant within its context (see Ch.6) and should not be seen to imply its inauthenticity.

¹¹ In the first sixteen lines of this passage (up to μὴ καθαρμός τις ἦ), καί is found 21 times, as compared to 9 in Passage III, 1-16 (97b8-d7). γὰρ occurs just once, with an assertive rather than causal force, and οὖν, ἄν, εἰ, and δὴ not at all, unlike in the more hypotactic and logically connected section from Passage III (particles are classified as according to Denniston, 1950, xlvii-xlix).

¹² E.g. 69c1-2/I.14-15: καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία. Cf. 69b4-5/I.9-10.

¹³ E.g. τὸ δ' ἀληθές τῷ ὄντι.

μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι,
φρόνησις· καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ
πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἧ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη
καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθοῦς ἀρετῆς, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων
καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων
τῶν τοιούτων·

(69a6-b5/I.1-10)

There are two striking instances of foregrounding through word order, with extended clauses broken by the short clauses φρόνησις (69a10/I.5) and μετὰ φρονήσεως (69b3/I.8). φρόνησις comes at the very end of a long unit, highlighted by the prominence of its solitary positioning,¹⁴ while μετὰ φρονήσεως forms a climax, surrounded by long clauses, with its effect intensified by similarity and proximity to the first φρόνησις clause.¹⁵ Both instances of φρόνησις are also hint at aural imagery, insofar as aural isolation creates an impression of uniqueness and significance. This is especially the case with μετὰ φρονήσεως, a sharp contrast from the preceding list and subsequent clause, with its polysyndeton and mundane homoeoteleuton.

This section begins with a simile, part of an antithesis, whose vehicle term νομίσματα functions as an analogue of the idea of virtue being attained by swapping pleasures, pains, or fears. τὸ νόμισμα is retained as the vehicle in the second part of the antithesis, although there is a formal change to metaphor, continuing in the next unit, where ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα acts as a vehicle for the implicit tenor of exchanging of pleasures and emotions. The initial statement of subject in both parts is further distinguished by the assonantal phrases αὕτη ἧ ἡ ὀρθή (πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῇ) and ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν. Here the aural effect draws these two pivotal phrases together, suggesting both their importance¹⁶ and also

¹⁴ Silk, 1974, 68-9, points out that prominent positioning *per se* is not emphatic. However, here it is not just the fact that φρόνησις stands at the end of a unit, conventionally a position of prominence, but factors such as its isolation and contrast to the other clauses, as well as how it confers semantic completeness on the unit, which all ensure that it is emphatic. μετὰ φρονήσεως in the next unit is similar.

¹⁵ Another interesting example of word order, this time in the following section, is the quasi-chiasmus at the beginning and ending of...ἧ κάθαρσις τις (69c1-c3/I.14-16)...καθαρμός τις ἧ.

¹⁶ Pearson, 1975, 144ff. has suggested that hiatus was sometimes used in Attic oratory to add weight to a particular phrase. One might see αὕτη ἧ ἡ ὀρθή as an instance of such usage. Although hiatus

connectedness.¹⁷ However, such aural similarities also conflict with structure, insofar as antithesis opposes rather than likens them.¹⁸ Overall the coin image is pervaded by significant discrepancies between the tenor and the vehicle, which I will discuss more fully in Chapter 6.

Moving on to a new metaphor, Socrates expresses the suspicion that virtue, when separated from wisdom $\mu\eta$ σκιαγραφία τις ἦ (69b6/I.12). While this is the first extant literary appearance of σκιαγραφία,¹⁹ its established pre-Hellenistic usage appears to denote a form of painting.²⁰ Here it can be construed as live metaphor,²¹ with implications of illusion and false imitation.²² It may then also be tempting to see the next words as imagery, where virtue without wisdom is described as ἀνδραποδώδης. Yet, although this adjective is fairly rare, with this apparently its first extant use,²³ in the *Phaedrus* pleasures preceded by pains δικάως ἀνδραποδώδεις κέκληνται,²⁴ implying that, in an ethical context, ἀνδραποδώδης is dead metaphor,²⁵ a view confirmed by its extant spread of instances.²⁶

The presence of imagery in the second section of this passage (69d1-e4/I.22-33) is controversial and depends on whether the language of purificatory ritual which

itself is not uncommon in this part of the *Phaedo*, this example is particularly striking because of the successive hiatus and repetition of 'η'.

¹⁷ Cf. Silk, 1974, 176ff. on the 'expressive' and 'associative' functions of alliteration.

¹⁸ Cf. Ch.3, p.53, on the divergence of the phonological and semantic level in aural imagery.

¹⁹ σκιαγραφία appears only 8 times in pre-Hellenistic literature: 4 in Plato and 4 in Aristotle. Of these the *Phaedo* example is the earliest, according to conventional Platonic chronology. Its other instances are *Pl.Rep.*365c4, 602d2; *Criti.*107d1; and *Arist.* (4): *Metaph.*1024b23; [*Protr.**104.3]; *Rh.*1414a9; *Fr.*10a.

²⁰ According to e.g. Méautis, 1939, 37 and Schuhl, 1933, 9-13, the term denotes a new art form, dependent on the interplay of light and shadow, introduced by Apollodorus 'the Skiagraphe' at the end of the fifth century, although the term is only found in later sources. See also e.g. σκιαγραφία in *Arist.Rh.*1414a9.

²¹ τις might possibly indicate neologism and live metaphor. See Silk, 1974, 52.

²² Cf. Louis, 1945, 72-3.

²³ In our period there are only 26 extant examples of the adjective ἀνδραποδώδης. Dating is, once again, dependent on Platonic chronology and whether the *Phaedo* is seen as definitely prior to e.g. Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.

²⁴ *Phdr.*258e5.

²⁵ Although it may retain some degree of its original literal implications, in view of the *Phaedo*'s recurrent depiction of the soul as bound to and imprisoned by the body.

²⁶ Along with Plato, the earliest examples are in Xenophon. 3 of Xenophon's 5 usages are in the *Memorabilia* (1.1.16 and 4.2.22) describing ignorance, suggesting that this was a commonplace of Socratic ethical discussion. If so, lack of extant Socratic literature might explain why so few instances of this adjective are found in fifth and early fourth century works. Xenophon's other examples are both philosophical, *Hier.*5.2.3 and 5.2.7. Apart from *Aeschin.*2.79, it only appears in ethical philosophy: *Arist.* (14): e.g. *E.N.*1128.21; *Po.*1334a39.

The presence of imagery in the second section of this passage (69d1-e4/I.22-33) is controversial and depends on whether the language of purificatory ritual which dominates it is taken as a metaphor for the processes of philosophical enlightenment, or as an accurate representation of what these processes involve. Does the acquisition of virtue through wisdom appeal to an existing concept of 'purification' or appropriate religious language, in order to express a radically new conception? Yet the question is difficult to answer for various reasons. In a section which appears to consist largely of proverbs,²⁷ it would be plausible to claim that these proverbs themselves must be understood in a metaphorical sense,²⁸ within which *κάθαρσις* and its cognates, which already cover a wide range of related conceptions, could be accommodated.²⁹

It is also in this section that the passage's two other distinctive lexemes are found: *ναρθηκοφόρος* (69c8/I.21) and *ἀμύητος* (69c5/I.18).³⁰ Apart from this, there is little to remark on in terms of lexis. Use of abstract nouns is mainly limited to -ή, -ος, and -σύνη endings, with *φρόνησις*, *κάθαρσις*, and *καθαρμός* the only -σις and -μός nouns. The distinction drawn between *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρμός* appears to appeal to a semantic differentiation between these two endings: τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ (69b8ff/I.13ff.). Apart from τὸ σαφές,³¹ the few instances of the substantival neuter article and adjective or participle are either used adverbially, like τὸ δ'

²⁷ ὅς ἂν ἀμύητος ... μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει (69c3-5/I.18-20) and *ναρθηκοφόροι* μὲν πολλοί, *βάκχοι* δέ τε *παῦροι* (69c6-7/I.21-22).

²⁸ Any ideas as to the context or usual application of these proverbs are pure speculation, since their source cannot be identified from extant literature. It is possible that, in spite of being introduced as sayings in the passage, they are in fact Plato's own words, since Plato's attribution of ideas to nameless sources is rarely straightforward; *contra* Louis, 1945, 6, who excludes proverbs from his discussion of Plato's metaphors '...car ils n'ont, évidemment, rien de strictement platonicien'.

²⁹ The terms and its cognates used within this passage are found in many authors of various genres, within a wide range of contexts, including purification from spiritual impurities (e.g. *Hdt.*1.35; *And.*1.95; *Lys.*12.5), religious rites (e.g. *Hdt.*2.37), and medical cleansing (*Hp.VM* 14; *Int.*18). The earliest uses suggest e.g. a religious context (so *Hes.Op.*337); or simply 'empty' (e.g. *Hom.II.*23.61); while the fact that Empedocles named his poem about the cycle of reincarnation and the possibility of escaping the cycle *Καθαρμοί* places it close to the concerns of the *Phaedo*. Cf. Halliwell, 1986, 185ff. on the varied usage of the 'katharsis word-group' and, 187, on the difficulties of deciding whether its use in e.g. the *Phaedo* is metaphorical.

³⁰ Their distributions are as follows: *ναρθηκοφόρος* - *X.* (2): *Cyr.*2.3.18; *Cyr.*2.3.20. *Pl.* (1); and *ἀμύητος* - *And.* (2): 1.11; 1.12. *Lys.* (1): 6.51. *Pl.* (4): *Tht.*155e3; *Gorg.*493a7, 493b5. *Arist.* (1): *Rh.*1405a20.

³¹ Occurring in prose and verse from the fifth century onwards, though with one example in *Xenophan.*B34.

These expressions reflect the general predominance of prose terminology throughout the passage. τῷ ὄντι, for example, only occurs in prose, not before the fifth century. It is most common in Plato and Aristotle, although also found several times in, for example, Thucydides, Xenophon, Gorgias, and Demosthenes, suggesting a broad intergeneric prose usage.³² κατὰ ... τὸ δυνατόν, though less common, has a similar spread, appearing in Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes.³³ Finally, this sense of τὸ ἀληθές is more difficult to analyse, since the words are common and it is not always clear whether specific examples represent adverbial usage. As far as I can tell, adverbial usage is fairly rare, with the clearest two examples coming from oratory, with τὸ ἀληθές opposed to πρόφασιν.³⁴

Various clusters of terms from distinct lexical fields are used here. Most of the first main section (69a6-b8/I.1-13) combines lexemes of ethics and emotion like δικαιοσύνη, ἀρετή, ἡδονή, and λύπη with those concerning financial exchange, like ἀλλαγὴ, νόμισμα, and ὠνέομαι. Only the ethical terms persist in the next part of the passage (69b8/I.13ff.), now mixed with religious initiation terminology, which continues throughout the middle section (69c3-d1/I.16-22).

4.2.2 *The final section*

There is comparatively little to say about the final section's style, οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν... εἴ ἂν ἔχοι (69d1-e4/I.22-33). Most notably, it completes the transition from parataxis to hypotaxis which began in the middle section. Units and clauses are shorter, more varied and more interconnected, semantically and syntactically, so that discrete units become harder to delimit. Clause structure is dominated by hypotaxis and especially conditionals. This forges stronger logical links, augmented by the renewed use of a wider range of conjunctions and particles, including οὖν and δή. The lengthening devices used earlier are absent here, although this section is

³² E.g. Th.4.28.2; 4.126.4; X.HG 6.2.25; Mem.4.2.8; Gorg.B3; D.58.31.

³³ E.g. Th.2.89.9; D.3.6; Pl.Smp.207d1.

³⁴ Th.6.33.2 (speech of Hermocrates); Lys.13.12

punctuated and extended by short parenthetical phrases: e.g. κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν (69d2/I.23); ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (69d6/I.27); and ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ (69d6/I.27).

There are no instances of imagery, no lists, and no unusual lexemes. Although there are seven pairs, making distribution of pairs fairly even throughout the passage, the final section's pairs differ greatly from earlier ones and are not combined with other parallel structures, the only exceptions being three instances of pleonasm, for example οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ (69e1/I.30).³⁵ Furthermore, pairs in this section are also characteristically asymmetrical.

On the whole, therefore, Passage I's most distinctive stylistic aspects are concentrated in the extended 'coin' imagery of its opening section and in the parallel structures which pervade all levels of stylistic structure in the earlier part. By contrast, the final part constitutes a rather understated conclusion.

³⁵ Cf. also 69d5/I.25 and 69d3/I.24.

81c4 Ἀλλὰ διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ
5 αὐτῇ ἢ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ
συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην ἐνεποίησε σύμφυτον;

Πάνυ γε.

Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἶεσθαι χρή εἶναι καὶ
5 βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη
10 ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον
φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἰδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ
d μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ
ῥάφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται
10 αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἶδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι
ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.

5 Εἰκὸς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ὦ Κέβης· καὶ οὐ τί γε τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν
αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων, αἱ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα
15 ἀναγκάζονται πλανᾶσθαι δίκην τίνουσαι τῆς προτέρας
τροφῆς κακῆς οὔσης. καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως
e ἂν τῇ τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπι-
θυμία πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα· ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ
20 εἰκὸς, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη ὅποι' ἅττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι
τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

5 Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

Οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλο-
ποσίας μεμελετηκότας καὶ μὴ διηυλαβημένους εἰς τὰ τῶν
82a ὄνων γένη καὶ τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι. ἢ οὐκ
οἶει;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις.

Τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προ-
5 τετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἰεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων
γένη· ἢ ποῖ ἂν ἄλλοσέ φαμεν τὰς τοιαύτας ἰέναι;

Ἀμέλει, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα ἢ ἂν ἕκαστα ἴοι κατὰ
τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμιότητας τῆς μελέτης;

10 Δῆλον δὴ, ἔφη· πῶς δ' οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι, ἔφη, καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς
35 βέλτιστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν
ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἦν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε
b καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγонуῖαν ἄνευ
φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ;

Πῇ δὴ οὗτοι εὐδαιμονέστατοι;

5 Ὅτι τούτους εἰκὸς ἐστὶν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι
πολιτικὸν καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἢ· που μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ
μυρμήκων, ἢ καὶ εἰς ταυτόν γε πάλιν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος,
καὶ γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἄνδρας μετρίους.

Εἰκὸς.

10 Εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι καὶ παντελῶς
καθαρῶ ἀπιόντι οὐ θέμις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ φιλομαθεῖ.
c ἀλλὰ τούτων ἕνεκα, ὦ ἐταῖρε Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, οἱ
ὀρθῶς φιλόσοφοι ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν
ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς
5 ἑαυτούς, οὐ τι οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν φοβούμενοι,
ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι· οὐδὲ αὖ ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ
ἀδοξίαν μοχθηρίας δεδιότες, ὥσπερ οἱ φίλαρχοί τε καὶ
φιλότιμοι, ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν.

This passage comprises long units spoken by Socrates, punctuated either by occasional questions eliciting brief replies from Cebes or by Cebes' short unprompted remarks. Cebes contributes only short affirmations or requests for clarification. The bulk of the passage has some degree of stylistic homogeneity, consisting of long continuous sequences of clauses, and featuring some interesting hyperbata. This continuity is broken by a middle section whose style differs considerably from the surrounding parts: οἶον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας...ἄνδρας μετρίους (81e6-82b8/II.23-44). Its units exhibit striking parallelism and are, structurally, both shorter and simpler than those in the main section.

Some notable aspects of the passage, like certain lexical features, are common to both sections. For example, as a whole this passage contains the greatest number of distinctive lexemes. Their usage ranges between those whose extant instances are exclusive to Plato, such as οἰκοφθορία and several lexemes only appearing in prose or comedy. Many of the distinctive lexemes are compound nouns and adjectives.

Lexemes appearing in Plato alone

οἰκοφθορία - Pl. (1): *Phd.*82c5.

συνεπακολουθέω - Pl. (1): *Phd.*81e1.

φίλαρχος - Pl. (2): *Phd.*82c7; *Rep.*549a3.³⁶

Other rare lexemes

σκιοειδής - Ar. (1): *Av.*686;³⁷ Pl. (1): *Phd.*81d1; [Arist. (1): *Col.**795a33].³⁸

φιλοποσία - X.: *Mem.*1.2.22, *Mem.*2.6.1; Pl. (1); [Arist. (1): *Pr.**872a6];

Theopomp.Hist. (1): Fr.81.

³⁶ In both examples φίλαρχος is paired with the adjective φιλότιμος.

³⁷ Interestingly, there are certain similarities between the context of the Aristophanic and Platonic example.

³⁸ See Chapter 3 p.59, above.

γαστριμαργία - Pl.(3): *Phd.*81e6; *Phdr.*238b1, *Ti.*73a6, Hp. (1): *Int.*6; Arist. (1): *E.E.*1231a.19.

σωματοειδής - Pl. (9): e.g. *Phd.*81e1; *Phd.*86a2, *Rep.*532c7, *Ti.*36d9; [Arist. (1): *Pr.**936b35]; Ephor. (1): fr.31; and Anaximen.Rh. (2): *Rh.*31.3, 36.16.

Prose lexemes and idiom

γέωδης - History and philosophy: X. (1): *An.*6.5.4/ Pl. (8): e.g. *Phd.*81c9; *Ti.*66b1; Hp. (1) *VM* 24/ Arist.: e.g. *PA* 651a1, *GA* 735b36/ Theophr.: e.g. *HP* 5.9.1, *CP* 1.14.1/ Timaeus (1) Fr.164.

φιλοχρήματος - Oratory and philosophy: Is. (1): 2.21/ Pl.: e.g. *Phd.*82c6; *Rep.*485e3, *Leg.*832d2/ X. (1) *Smp.*4.45/ Andoc. (1): *Alc.*32./ Arist.: e.g. *Rh.*1389.a14; *Pol.*1315a18.

φιλομαθής - Oratory, history and philosophy: Isoc. (1): 1.18/ X. (4): e.g. *Cyr.*1.2.1, *An.*1.9.6/ Pl.: e.g. *Phd.*82c1, *Rep.*376c2, 581b9/ Arist. (1): *EN* 1175a14.

διευλαβέομαι - Oratory and philosophy: D.: (1) 19.119/ Pl. (11): e.g. *Phd.*81e7.24; *Phlb.*23c1; *Rep.*536a9/ Arist. (1): *HA* 581b14.

άνθρώπινος - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: e.g. *Hdt.*1.86/ *Th.*1.22.4/ *And.*1.139/ Hp.*VM* 7/ Pl.*Phd.*82b7, *Ap.*31b1/ Isoc.10.59, 4.60/ Ar.*V* 1179.

δημοτικός - History, oratory, philosophy and comedy, starting from the fifth century: e.g. *Th.*6.29.1/ *And.*2.26/ *Lys.*20.13/ Isoc.7.16/ Pl.*Phd.*82a12/ Arist.*Pol.*1266b22/ Ar.*Nu.*205.

πολιτικός - All prose genres, starting from the fifth century: e.g. *Hdt.*7.103/ *Th.*6.15.2/ Isoc.4.113/ Pl.*Phd.*82a12, *Ap.*22a8/ Arist.*EE* 1215a36.

μοχθηρία - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: e.g. X.*Ap.*31.1; D.19.186; Pl.*Phd.*82c7, *Leg.*655c7; Ar. *Lys.*1160; *Ra.*421.

άδοξία - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century: e.g. Isoc.1.43/ D.1.12/ X. *HG* 7.5.9/ [Hp.*Lex**1]/ Pl.82c7/ Arist.*EN* 1115a10. There is also one instance in Euripides: *Fr.*362.16 (Nauck).

ὥσπερ εἰκός - All prose genres and comedy, starting from the fifth century:

e.g. *Is.*8.16/ *X.HG* 5.4.29/ *Pl.Phd.*81e2, *Men.*70b7/ *Ar.Th.*974, *Pl.*662.

There is also one instance in Euripides: *Med.*1386.

Clearly, there is a marked tendency towards prose lexemes, while the prevalence of compound nouns and adjectives, both unusual and otherwise, also stands out and is not matched in the other passages.³⁹ These compounds have varied prefixes, although there are seven *φιλ-* compounds, with five in the final paragraph, as well as the verb *φιλοσοφείν*. While the passage's abstract nouns have a very varied range of suffixes, endings in *-ία* are most common, in accordance with the predominance of compounds.⁴⁰

The passage also incorporates terminology from a wide range of lexical fields, slipping from one field to another throughout. So, for example, in *ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἄιδου* (81c9-11/*II.*6-11) there is a sudden switch from terms associated with the physical world like *ἐμβριθές*, *γεῶδες*, and *βαρύνεται* to the vocabulary of death and the afterlife: *μνήματα*, *φαντάσματα*, and *εἶδωλα*. While 'ethical' terminology appears throughout, especially in the second half of the passage, this is then interspersed with other fields, such as animal names and political terms like *τυραννίδας* and *πολιτικὴν*. A final point is the absence of clear instances of verbal imagery.

4.3.1 *The main section*

The three longer parts of the main section; *ἐμβριθές δέ γε...διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται* (81c8-d4/*II.*5-12), *εἰκός μέντοι...τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ* (81d6-e4/*II.*14-21), and *εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος...ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν* (82b10-c8/*II.*46-54), form long, continuous, and loose sequences, not easily grouped into discrete units.⁴¹ *Ἐμβριθές δέ γε...διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται* (81c8-d4/*II.*5-12) constitutes one long unit, being a loose

³⁹ It contains 11 compound nouns and 6 adjectives.

⁴⁰ On *-ία* as a standard ending for compound nouns, see Chantraine, 1933, 79.

⁴¹ 82b10-c1 is an exception and seems to form a self-standing unit, linked more closely, formally and semantically to the preceding section than to the unit which follows.

hypotactic sequence of mainly relative clauses,⁴² without strong logical interconnection. Des Places suggests that this type of construction, which accumulates a number of clauses or phrases linked by the same device, is a common Platonic feature. He names it 'à rallonges' ('extended'),⁴³ evoking the manner in which structure, as opposed to any particularly long clauses, is responsible for a general feeling of extension. Εἰκὸς μέντοι...τύχουσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ (81d6-e4/II.14-21) is similar, though comprising a wider mixture of different paratactic and hypotactic clauses. While it could be taken as a series of three paratactic units (εἰκὸς μέντοι...κακῆς οὐσης (81d6-9/II.14-17); καὶ μέχρι...εἰς σῶμα (81d9-e2/II.17-19), and ἐνδοῦνται δέ...ἐν τῷ βίῳ, (81e2-4/II.19-21), the strong link between these makes the division less unambiguous.⁴⁴ Likewise there are no strong divisions in εἰς δέ γε θεῶν γένος...ἔπειτα ἀπέχονται αὐτῶν (82b10-c8/II.46-54).

Clear division of units comes only from Cebes' occasional remarks and from an element of ring composition, which seems to signify a conclusion in all three parts and is exclusive to this passage. ὁρατόν (81c9/II.6) is picked up by τοῦ ὁρατοῦ and ὁρῶνται (81d4/II.12) at the end of its unit. Similarly, εἰκός (81d5/II.13 and d6/14) is echoed by εἰκός (81e3/II.20), and ἀπιόντι (81c1/II.47) and ἀπέχονται (82c3/II.49) by ἀπέχονται (c8/II.54). There is, in general, a relatively large amount of repetition, found almost entirely in the main section⁴⁵ and made up predominantly of 'successive clause or unit' repetition, such as ὁρατόν (81c9/II.6 and c10/7).

Along with repetition, there are also many pairs, most of them in the main section. Over half are reinforced by full or partial homoeoteleuton,⁴⁶ while two are also combined with repetition of a prefix: ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν (82c6/I.52) and φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι (82c7/53).⁴⁷ The sole instance here of sound effects used as parallel structures (excluding homoeoteleuton) is an interesting etymology: τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἀιδου (81c11/I.8).

⁴² There are also two participial 'clauses' (81c11-d1/II.8-9 and d3-4/II.11-12), although these fulfil a relative function.

⁴³ Des Places, 1951, 365.

⁴⁴ For example, there seems to be no reason why the passage should have been punctuated with a full-stop in d9, but only a semi-colon in e2, as in the OCT.

⁴⁵ With the exception of the 'key words' εἰκός in 82a1/II.25 and b5/41 and μεμελετηκότας in 81e7/II.24.

⁴⁶ E.g. ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία (81c5/I.2) and οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν (82c5/I.51).

⁴⁷ See Denniston, 1952, 129-31.

Finally, one of the most distinctive features is a pervasive use of hyperbaton. So αὐτῇ is separated from σύμφυτον (81c5-6/II.2-3); ἐμβριθές from syntactic equivalents βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν (81c8-9/II.5-6);⁴⁸ ἐπιθυμία from its article in τῇ τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμία (81e1/II.18).

4.3.2 *The middle section*

The units of the middle section, οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας...ἄνδρας μετρίους (81e6-82b8/II.23-44), are stylistically distinct from the surrounding passage, insofar as they are shorter, have fairly simple clause organisation, and are parallel to each other in structure. τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας...καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη (82a4-6/II.28-30) replicates the structure of οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας...εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι (81e6-82a1/II.23-6),⁴⁹ and the organisation of the final passage in the middle section is once again similar: ὅτι τούτους εἰκὸς ἐστὶν...ἄνδρας μετρίους (82b5-82b8/II.41-44).⁵⁰

The parallelism of this section is intensified by four lists which, unlike the two lists in the main section,⁵¹ all exhibit full or partial homoeoteleuton: ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς (82a4/II.28); εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη (82a5-6/II.29-30); ἥ που μελιττῶν ἥ σφηκῶν ἥ μυρμήκων (82b6/II.42); and γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας (81e6/II.23).⁵² This repeated use of lists, together with polysyndeton, generates an impression of extension.

⁴⁸ Furthermore, ἐμβριθές is also foregrounded by occupying a prominent position at the beginning of its unit.

⁴⁹ Exceptions are the omission of εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι and the replacement of the collective τῶν τοιούτων θηρίων (82a1/II.25) with three kinds of animals (82a5/II.29).

⁵⁰ οὐκοῦν, ἡ δ' ὅς...καὶ νοῦ (82a11-82b3/II.35-39) is an exception and resembles parts of the main section.

⁵¹ καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν (81c8/II.5) and ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτοὺς (82c3/II.50) have little aural parallelism and, in the latter case, no ostensible formal parallelism.

⁵² The first (because of differing syllable lengths and pitch accents) and last of these examples have only partial homoeoteleuton.

To sum up, in both the main and middle sections, the passage's most striking aspects are structural, involving elements of unit organisation as well as parallel structures. Although there is a clear stylistic divide between the two sections, the passage is united by a tendency towards unusual prose lexemes, the variety of intermingled lexical fields, and devices which contribute towards evoking extension. Thus both Passages I and II, in spite of their differences, contain separate stylistic sections and are mainly characterised by repetition and other distinctive structural aspects.

97b8 Ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν ποτε ἐκ βιβλίου τινός, ὡς ἔφη, Ἀναξ-
 c αγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος, καὶ λέγοντος ὡς ἄρα νοῦς
 ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ
 ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν
 εἶναι πάντων αἷτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, 5
 5 τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι
 ταύτη ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ· εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν
 εὔρεῖν περὶ ἑκάστου ὅπῃ γίγνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι,
 τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὔρεῖν, ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ
 d εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου 10
 τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ
 αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ
 βέλτιστον. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ
 5 χεῖρον εἰδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.
 ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἠύρηκέναι ὦμην διδά- 15
 σκαλον τῆς αἰτίας περὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ νοῦν ἑμαυτῷ, τὸν
 Ἀναξαγόραν, καὶ μοι φράσειν πρῶτον μὲν πότερον ἢ γῇ
 e πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν, ἐπεκδιη-
 γήσεσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην, λέγοντα τὸ ἄμεινον
 καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴν ἄμεινον ἦν τοιαύτην εἶναι· καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ 20
 φαίη εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτὴν ἐν
 98 μέσῳ εἶναι· καὶ εἰ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμεν
 ὡς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος. καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ
 ἡλίου οὕτω παρεσκευάσμεν ὡσαύτως πευσόμενος, καὶ
 5 σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον, τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς 25
 ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων, πῇ ποτε
 ταῦτ' ἄμεινόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἢ
 πάσχει. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε αὐτὸν ὦμην, φάσκοντά γε ὑπὸ νοῦ
 αὐτὰ κεκοσμηῖσθαι, ἄλλην τινὰ αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ἐπενεγκεῖν ἢ
 ὅτι βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει· ἐκάστῳ 30
 b οὖν αὐτῶν ἀποδιδόντα τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ
 ἐκάστῳ βέλτιστον ὦμην καὶ τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν ἐπεκδιηγή-
 σεσθαι ἀγαθόν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας,
 ἀλλὰ πάνυ σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους ὡς τάχιστα οἶός τ' ἢ
 5 ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τάχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ 35
 χεῖρον.

This passage forms a stylistic continuum, especially in terms of unit organisation, with syntactic continuity conferred by the fact that it is written almost entirely within indirect discourse. It appears to fall into three major units, while further division into discrete units is difficult because of the strong logical connection and structural repetition between clauses.

The three main units are: ἄλλ' ἀκούσας μὲν...ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν (97b8/III.1-97d5/III.1-4); ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος...πάσχειν ἢ πάσχει (97d6-98a6/III.15-27);

and οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε αὐτὸν ᾧμην...καὶ τὸ χεῖρον (98a7-98b6/III.28-36). In spite of overall logical continuity, there are various reasons to posit major breaks. First, the unit transitions mark the stages at which the argument develops into significantly new points, so that there appear to be semantic pauses. In addition, it is only at the beginning of each unit that the verbs which govern the dependent clauses are explicitly restated and thereby provide an explicit formal marker for a new unit: ἡγησάμην (97c4/III.5); ᾧμην (97d6/III.15); and ᾧμην (98a7/III.28).

Throughout the passage clause structure is semantically, syntactically and formally repetitive. There is a repeated pattern of a given condition or cause followed by reasoned inference, with two γάρ clauses being the sole exception to this pattern.⁵³ As a whole the passage mainly consists of conditionals, such as εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει...βέλτιστα ἔχῃ (97c4-6/III.5-7), εἰ οὖν τις...πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν (97c6-d1/III.7-10), καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ...ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι (97e3-98a1/III.20-2), and καὶ εἰ μοι...ἄλλο εἶδος (98a1-a2/III.22-3),⁵⁴ or simple reported thought, preceded by a short phrase denoting cause: ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ ᾗσθην (97c2-3/III.3-4); ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου...τὸ βέλτιστον (97d1-d4/III.10-13); and ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος...ἢ στρογγύλη (97d6-e1/III.15-18). The way in which reason or condition precedes inference throughout the passage leads to a straightforwardly deductive and repetitive overall impression, heightened by the frequency of particles and inferential and causal conjunctions.

Along with unit organisation this passage's most striking aspect is the exceptional amount of 'key-word' repetition, with six clear instances. Moreover, three of the repeated lexemes, νοῦς, διακοσμῶν, and αἴτιος, also appear to be closely interconnected themselves. In most cases where one appears it is in close proximity to at least one of the other two terms. Often πᾶς, another lexeme of which there is 'key-word' repetition, occurs in conjunction with these terms as well. These phenomenon can be seen in the following example:

⁵³ 97d5/14 and 98a7/28ff.

⁵⁴ In addition the temporal clause and clause which follows, ἐπειδὴ δὲ φράσειεν...τοιαύτην εἶναι (97e1-3/III.18-20), function like conditionals, both syntactically and semantically.

νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος, ταύτη δὴ τῇ αἰτίᾳ
ἦσθην τε καὶ ἔδοξε μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι
πάντων αἷτιον, καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν
κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν.

(97c1/III.2- c5/6)

Apart from a reasonably large number of 'successive clause or unit' repetitions, other parallel structures are unremarkable and distributed fairly uniformly throughout. The number of pairs is average, with few sound effects or instances of pleonasm.⁵⁵ Of the four sound effects, three are homoeoteleuta. Two of these are almost identical and could perhaps be seen as examples of 'dead' alliteration,⁵⁶ since the opposition which they present was clearly a platitude by Plato's time:⁵⁷ πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν (97d1/III.10) and καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἃ πάσχει (98a6/III.26). The final sound effect is an example of word-play: Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος (97b8/III.1).

Clauses are neither exceptionally long nor short and the word order is likewise unremarkable, mainly seeming to reproduce the logical order of the train of thought. Imagery is absent and there is little unusual vocabulary, with the only distinctive lexeme being the compound verbs ἐπεκδιηγέομαι, used three times here, but appearing nowhere else in classical Greek.

The passage also contains little lexical variation, having a 'lexeme: token ratio', 0.52, noticeably lower than in the other passages.⁵⁸ Most terminology is not specific to any particular lexical field, with the exception of a series of cosmological terms. There are no compound nouns, adjectives, or adverbs, and comparatively few adjectives and adverbs altogether. The number of abstract nouns is also relatively small, amongst which the only outstanding point is eight examples of τό + χεῖρον or various degrees of ἀγαθός.

⁵⁵ There are four in total: e.g. πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν (97d1/III.10) and πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἡ στρογγύλη (97e1/III.18). This number is only exceeded by those in Passage I.

⁵⁶ See Silk, 1974, 174.

⁵⁷ See Dover, 1996, 145. Cf. e.g. Hdt.1.36; X.Cyr.7.1.43.

⁵⁸ See above, 4.1.2.

In general the lack of variation and austerity of lexis corresponds to the general character of this passage, as reflected in the repetitiveness of structure and absence of imagery and sound effects. Once again, as with the other passages, it is structure, from unit organisation down to the prevalence of a particular noun-form, which stands out as the most distinctive feature.

- 105c8 Ἀποκρίνου δὴ, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ ἄν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι ζῶν
ἔσται;
- 10 ὦν ψυχὴ, ἔφη.
d Οὐκοῦν αἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει;
Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἦ δ' ὅς. 5
Ψυχὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἄν αὐτὴ κατάσχη, αἰ ἦκει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο
φέρουσα ζωὴν;
- 5 ἦκει μέντοι, ἔφη.
Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν;
Ἔστιν, ἔφη. 10
Τί;
Θάνατος.
- 10 Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ὦ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰ οὐ μή
ποτε δέξηται, ὥς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὡμολόγηται;
Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης. 15
Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέαν τί νυνδὴ
ὠνομάζομεν;
- 15 Ἀνάρτιον, ἔφη.
Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὁ ἄν μουσικὸν μὴ
δέχεται; 20
Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.
Εἰεν· ὁ δ' ἄν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται τί καλοῦμεν;
Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη.
Οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον; 25
Οὔ.
Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ψυχὴ.
Ἀθάνατον.
Εἰεν, ἔφη· τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἀποδεδεῖχθαι φῶμεν; ἢ πῶς
δοκεῖ;
- 10 Καὶ μάλα γε ἱκανῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες. 30
Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν
106a1 ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἄν ἦν;
Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον
εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξήει ἄν ἡ χιὼν 35
οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἄν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ
5 ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἄν τὴν θερμότητα.
Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
- Ὡς δ' αὕτως οἶμαι καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν,
ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπήει, οὔποτ' ἄν ἀπεσβέννυτο 40
10 οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἄν ἀπελθὼν ὤχετο.
Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

This passage consists of short questions and answers, making analysis of organisation seemingly difficult, since it cannot be based on the same classifications of unit organisation as used for the others.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, its structural patterns and

⁵⁹ Cf. Wake, 1957, on the unsuitability of the statistical method for measuring sentence length in the analysis of dialogue.

parallelisms are still very interesting. The most striking feature is its conciseness, in part achieved through pervasive ellipse, and also reinforced by the absence of lists and of large numbers of pairs, which are characteristic of the other passages. While these types of parallel structures are missing, there is much parallelism on a wider structural level which, together with ellipse, is a key feature of the passage.

Sequences of units are varied, with some becoming increasingly elliptical: ψυχή...θάνατος (105d3-9/IV.6-12)⁶⁰ and οὐκοῦν ψυχή...ἀθάνατον (105d10-105e7/IV.14-27). Their length decreases as components of the previous units are omitted. Finally, all that remains is the solitary noun θάνατος (105d9/IV.12) or adjective ἀθάνατον (105e7/IV.27), marking the end of the sequences and foregrounded by their isolation and final position. To some degree this is similar to the way in which φρόνησις (69a10/I.5) is positioned alone in a clause and at the very end of a unit.⁶¹

This condensation of structure in the first and second units, probably the most interesting aspect of organisation in Passage IV, is not created by 'rhetorical' devices such as asyndeton, but by a subtle increase in ellipse, which works in the following way. The stages of the second sequence appear parallel and symmetrical, an impression strengthened through lexemic repetition and word order. However, first of all τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέαν (105d13/IV.16) is replaced by τὸ δίκαιον (105d16/IV.19), rather than a corresponding τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ιδέαν, and then, by μουσικόν (105d16/IV.19), which even omits the article. In addition, ἔφη accompanies all of Cebes' replies, except the final two, οὐ (105e5/IV.25) and ἀθάνατον (105e7/IV.27). Similarly, in the first sequence ἔφη occurs with every reply, apart from the final and climactic θάνατος (105d9/IV.12).

Conversely, the other long sequence of units, τί οὖν...ἀνάγκη (105e11-106a11/31-42), expands on the initial point made in the question τί οὖν...ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ᾖ (105e11-106a1/IV.31-2), so that the two units which then echo this question serve to develop the point further. There is much continuity and repetition between this first

⁶⁰ Although this sequence could be seen as a continuation of earlier points.

⁶¹ See above, p67.

question and the next two main units, οὐκοῦν εἰ...τὴν θερμότητα (106a3-6/IV.34-7) and ὥς δ' αὕτως...ἂν ἀπελθὼν ὥχετο (106a8-10/IV.39-40), on all levels. Notwithstanding different subjects and other minor omissions or syntactic differences, the first clause of each of these units, a conditional protasis, is almost identical. Structural and lexemic repetition persist throughout the second and, to a lesser degree, the final clauses of the two longer units, while parallelism is also enhanced by the repeated ἀ-privatives:

Τί οὖν, ἡ δ' ὅς, ὦ Κέβης; εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, ἄλλο τι τὰ τρία ἢ ἀνώλεθρα ἂν ἦν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν εἰ καὶ τὸ ἄθερμον ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ὁπότε τις ἐπὶ χιόνα θερμὸν ἐπάγοι, ὑπεξήει ἂν ἡ χιὼν οὔσα σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀπώλετό γε, οὐδ' αὖ ὑπομένουσα ἐδέξατο ἂν τὴν θερμότητα.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ὡς δ' αὕτως οἶμαι καὶ εἰ τὸ ἄψυκτον ἀνώλεθρον ἦν, ὁπότε ἐπὶ τὸ πῦρ ψυχρόν τι ἐπήει, οὔποτ' ἂν ἀπесβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο, ἀλλὰ σῶν ἂν ἀπελθὼν ὥχετο.

(105e11-106a10/IV.31-41)

In other parts of the passage there are, with one exception,⁶² no sound effects or pleonasm. Here by contrast, as well as α-privatives, there are also three pleonastic phrases, the second of which comprises a pair sharing a common prefix and homoeoteleuton: σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος (106a5/IV.36); οὔποτ' ἂν ἀπесβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο (106a9/IV.40); and ἀπελθὼν ὥχετο (106a10/IV.41).

In addition to these clusters of α-privatives there is an abundance of α-privative nouns and adjectives throughout the passage, making this noun-form the most distinctive lexical feature. While almost all the terminology appears fairly standard and generically widespread, a few of the α-privatives are very rare, some found only in Plato:

⁶² ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον (105e1/IV.21).

ἄψυκτος - Pl. (1): *Phd.*106a8.

ἀνάρπιος - Pl. (4), all in *Phd.*: 106a1, 104.e.5, 105d15, 106c3.

ἄθερμος - Pl. (1): *Phd.*106a3.

ἀνώλεθρος - Parm. (1): B.8/ Pl. (15)⁶³ /Arist. (2): *Ph.*203b.14,⁶⁴
[*Mu.**396a.31]/ Theophr. (3): *HP* 3.12., 12.9, 15.4.

Concordant with its tight internal unit parallelism, the passage is highly repetitive throughout. There is significant repetition of only a few lexemes, ψυχή, θάνατος, δέχομαι, and ἀνώλεθρος, all four of which appear a number of times throughout and function as both 'successive clause or unit' and 'key-word' repetition. For example, while there are scattered occurrences of ψυχή in the earlier part (105c10/TV.3; d3/6; d10/13), it then appears twice in close succession at the climax of a unit:

Οὐκοῦν ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;

Οὔ.

Ἄθνατον ἄρα ψυχή.

(105e4/TV.24-e6/26)

Similarly, ἀνώλεθρος, as shown above, appears three times in close proximity in 106a1-3/TV.32-4 and is repeated once again in 106a8/TV. 39.

Another point about unit organisation is that the vast majority of clauses are conditional,⁶⁵ such as those in the sequence just discussed. However, there are occasional breaks from the conditional, notably in the middle sequence, where there is a final change to a definite sense in the climax of the sequence: οὐκοῦν ψυχή οὐ δέχεται θάνατον (105e4/TV.24).

⁶³ Of which 12 are in the *Phd.*, with 10 found in 106a1-107a1. The others are *Ti.*52a2; *Leg.*904a8; [*Epin.**981e7]

⁶⁴ Although *Phys.*203b14 attributes this term to Anaximander it is generally acknowledged that only Anaximan.B1 is genuine. See e.g. Kahn, 1960, 11; *KRS*, 117.

⁶⁵ In fact, other types of subordinate clause are absent from this passage.

Finally, there are two other distinctive aspects of lexis: large numbers of varied neuter substantives comprising τό + an adjective or participle,⁶⁶ and a mixture of distinct lexical fields, as in 105d13-e1/IV.16-21 -

Τί οὖν; τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον τὴν τοῦ ἀρτίου ιδέαν τί νυνδὴ
ὠνομάζομεν;

Ἄνάρτιον, ἔφη.

Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ
δέχεται;

Ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.

- which combines mathematical, educational/cultural and ethical lexemes. Similarly, in 106e9-106a6/IV.31-37, while the structure of the question is repeated, there is a transition from mathematical terms like τῷ ἀνάρτιῳ and τὰ τρία to those describing physical properties, such as τὸ ἄθερμον and θερμότητα.

Repeated structure emerges once again as the key stylistic feature in this passage, with the conciseness and lexemic and structural repetition causing the structure itself to be foregrounded.

⁶⁶ This passage contains 7, as opposed to Passages I, II, V and VI, which contain 4, 3, 1 and 0 examples respectively.

- 110b5 Λέγεται τοίνυν, ἔφη, ὦ ἑταῖρε, πρῶτον μὲν εἶναι τοιαύτη
 ἡ γῆ αὐτὴ ἰδεῖν, εἴ τις ἄνωθεν θεῶτο, ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκά-
 σκυτοι σφαῖραι, ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη, ὣν καὶ
 τὰ ἐνθάδε εἶναι χρώματα ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ
 c γραφῆς καταχρῶνται. ἐκεῖ δὲ πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐκ τοιούτων 5
 εἶναι, καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἢ
 τούτων· τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργῇ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστήν τὸ
 κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῇ, τὴν δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ
 5 χιόνος λευκοτέραν, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων συγκει-
 μένην ὡσαύτως, καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων ἢ ὅσα 10
 ἡμεῖς ἐωράκαμεν. καὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ ταῦτα τὰ κοῖλα αὐτῆς,
 ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος ἑκπλεα ὄντα, χρώματός τι εἶδος
 d παρέχεσθαι στίλβοντα ἐν τῇ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ποι-
 κιλίᾳ, ὥστε ἐν τι αὐτῆς εἶδος συνεχές ποικίλον φαντάζεσ-
 θαι. ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὕσῃ τοιαύτῃ ἀνὰ λόγον τὰ φυόμενα 15
 φύεσθαι, δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς· καὶ αὐτὰ
 5 ὄρη ὡσαύτως καὶ τοὺς λίθους ἔχειν ἀνὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον
 τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάνειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλ-
 λίω· ὣν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε λιθίδια εἶναι ταῦτα τὰ ἀγαπώμενα
 μόρια, σάρδια τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα 20
 e τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐκεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι
 τούτων καλλίω. τὸ δ' αἷτιον τούτου εἶναι ὅτι ἐκεῖνοι οἱ
 λίθοι εἰσὶ καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμέ-
 νοι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε ὑπὸ σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης ὑπὸ τῶν
 5 δεῦρο συνερρηκότων, ἃ καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 25
 ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς αἷσχη τε καὶ νόσους παρέχει. τὴν δὲ
 γῆν αὐτὴν κεκοσμηθῆναι τούτοις τε ἅπασιν καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε
 111a1 καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτοῖς τοιούτοις. ἐκφανῇ γὰρ
 αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, ὄντα πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ παν-
 ταχοῦ τῆς γῆς, ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν εἶναι θέαμα εὐδαιμόνων 30
 θεατῶν. ζῶα δ' ἐπ' αὐτῇ εἶναι ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώ-
 5 πους, τοὺς μὲν ἐν μεσογαίᾳ οἰκοῦντας, τοὺς δὲ περὶ τὸν
 ἀέρα ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς περὶ τὴν θάλατταν, τοὺς δ' ἐν νήσοις ἃς
 περιρρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα πρὸς τῇ ἡπείρῳ οὕσας· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ,
 ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμε- 35
 b τέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις
 τὸν αἰθέρα. τὰς δὲ ὥρας αὐτοῖς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην ὥστε
 ἐκείνους ἀνόσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον τε ζῆν πολὺ πλείω τῶν
 ἐνθάδε, καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοι-
 5 οῦτοις ἡμῶν ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἥπερ ἀήρ τε 40
 ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ αἰθήρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. καὶ
 δὴ καὶ θεῶν ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερὰ αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἐν οἷς τῷ ὄντι
 οἰκητὰς θεοὺς εἶναι, καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθή-
 σεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας συνουσίας γίνεσθαι αὐτοῖς
 c πρὸς αὐτούς· καὶ τὸν γε ἥλιον καὶ σέληνην καὶ ἄστρα ὁρᾶ- 45
 σθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν οἷα τυγχάνει ὄντα, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην εὐδαιμο-
 νίαν τούτων ἀκόλουθον εἶναι.

This passage is in extended indirect discourse,⁶⁷ within which the organisation is fairly loose and broadly descriptive as opposed to explanatory. This effect is strengthened by the slightly arbitrary connections between the main units. As a whole, the composition of the passage could perhaps best be characterised as a catalogue and is loosely paratactic, emphasised by a general absence of particles other than δέ, τε and the prevalent καί,⁶⁸ and also reflected in its other stylistic features. As in Passage III, it is possible to identify individual groups of clauses which appear to form units, such as τὰς δὲ ὥρας...πρὸς καθαρότητα (111b2-6/V.37-41), but which cannot always be clearly divided from preceding and subsequent units.⁶⁹

Within the indirect discourse construction, the syntax of the passage is fairly simple, and mainly involves coordination, apposition such as δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς (110d4/V.16) and σάρδιά τε καὶ λάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα (110d8/V.20), and relative clauses, although there are several consecutive clauses: ὥστε ἔν τι...φαντάζεσθαι (110d2/V.14); ὥστε αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν...θεατῶν (111a3-4/V.30-3); and ὥστε ἐκείνους...τῶν ἐνθάδε (111b2-4/V.37-39). Simplicity is also reflected in the word order, which is straightforward and unremarkable. The presence of a large number of lists, together with the mainly paratactic structure, also creates a certain feeling of extension. καὶ ὄψη καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις (111b4/V.39) is a good example of polysyndeton,⁷⁰ while the prevalence of καί, together with the lists, makes the passage generally polysyndetic, notwithstanding one notable asyndeton at 110b7/V.3.

Numerous lists,⁷¹ along with very little repetition, enhance the impression of this passage as catalogue and description. There is also a comparative lack of pleonasm and sound effects, which seems to be in keeping with the simple paratactic

⁶⁷ See Tarrant, 1955.

⁶⁸ Cf. Des Places, 1951, 365.

⁶⁹ For example, although the OCT has punctuated with only a colon after ἡ τούτων (110c2/V.7), but a full-stop after ἡμεῖς ἐωράκαμεν (110c7/V.11), there seems to be no clear reason for advocating a different length of pause. Cf. e.g. 110e2, where it is not entirely clear that a full-stop is needed after τούτων καλλίω.

⁷⁰ Cf. Des Places, 1951, on the accumulated καί's in 111b4-c4.

⁷¹ There are 11 lists; almost double the largest number in any of the other passages. See Table 4.1.1, above.

arrangement of the units as a whole. For example, there is a marked absence of homoeoteleuton amongst the pairs and lists. Only three of the twelve pairs show this feature: λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων (110c2/V.6); κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι (110e3/V.23); and χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ (110e7/V.27).⁷² The single homoeoteleuton amongst the ten lists is only partial, since the phrase καὶ λίθοις ...καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς (110e5/V.25) is interrupted by the discordant γῇ and also includes different final pitches. This is very different to lists in other passages. In Passage I, for example, three out of four lists have homoeoteleuta; in Passage II, four out of six.

Lexis also varies widely, with no particular outstanding features. Most lexemes have a very wide usage, although a few can be narrowed down to certain author groups, mostly in fifth and fourth century prose:

διαφάνεια - Pl. (1): *Phd.*110d6.

χρυσοειδής - X. (1): *Cyr* 7.1.2/ Pl. (1): *Phd.*110c4/ Arist. (4): *HA* 627a2, [Col.*793a13; 793a16; 793a26]/ Theophr. (4): *HP* 6.3.5, 9.11.1, 9.11.1, 9.19.3, *Sens.*76.3.

μεσόγαια - Various historians: e.g. *Hdt.*1.175/ 4.101; *X.HG* 7.1.8/ *Scyl.*98/ and Pl. (1): 111a5.

σηπεδών - Technical prose and philosophy: e.g. *Hp.Ep.*3.3, *Prorrh.*2.13⁷³/ *Pl.Rep.*609a2, *Phd.*96b2, 110e4/ Arist.*Ph.*193a13/ Theophr.*CP* 6.1.5.

καθαρότης - Technical prose and philosophy: e.g. *Hp.Morb.Sacr.*1/ *X.Mem.*2.1.22/ Pl.*Phd.*111b6/ Theophr.*CP* 4.16.2.

στίλβω - Verse and philosophy: Epic: e.g. *Hom.II.*3.392, *Od.*6.237, *h.Hom.*32.5/ Lyric: e.g. *Bacch.*18.55 (Snell)/ Tragedy: e.g. *E.Phdr.*194/ Comedy: e.g. *Ar.Av.*697; Philosophy: e.g. Pl.*Phd.*110d1/ Arist.*APo.*78a.34/ Theophr.*Sens.*26.3.

The range of compound nouns and adjectives is varied, as is the large range of abstract nouns. Apart from a small cluster of four -σις nouns in the lines 110b2-

⁷² Homoeoteleuton in this last example is only partial, because of the different pitch accents.

⁷³ Jouanna, 1997, 407, on the authenticity and fifth century composition of *Hp.Prorrh.*

5/V.37-40, there are no prominent morphological forms. There is also a diverse mixture of lexical fields, with a number of terms from fields concerning physical features and appearance; such as colour, geography, and cosmology.

A general absence of logical connections, such as causal or inferential, between the units also deepens the 'catalogue' impression. However, another prominent aspect, an emphasis on contrast (of the 'true' earth to our own), adds some degree of structure and is achieved in a variety of ways, like parallel structures. In 110b8-c1/V.3-5, 110d7-e1/V.19-21, and 110e2-e4/V.22-24, for example, there is a loosely structured ἐκεῖ/ἐνθάδε antithesis,⁷⁴ of which the first two are combined with similarly structured relative clauses expressing comparison (ὥν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε... and ὥν καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε...). A further double instance of antithesis sets up a similar contrast: καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, ὅπερ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν ἡμετέραν χρεῖαν, τοῦτο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἀέρα, ὃ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀήρ, ἐκεῖνοις τὸν αἰθέρα (111a7-b2/V.34-37). Its parallelism is, however, the exception within this passage, in which antithesis is in general loosely structured and where there is a lack of the pairs and symmetry characteristic of the other passages.⁷⁵ In addition, comparison using comparatives and ἤ is found in the two similarly structured phrases καὶ πολὺ ἔτι ἐκ λαμπροτέρων... (110c2/V.6) and καὶ ἔτι πλειόνων... (110c6/V.10).

Imagery also contributes to this effect, with ὥσπερ expressing comparison in 110b6/V.2 and 110b8/V.4. In these two short similes, the true earth is said to be ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι, while its colours are described as ὥσπερ δείγματα, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφεῖς καταχρῶνται, in which δείγματα and γραφεῖς are usually translated as 'samples' and 'painters' respectively. The second of these similes requires a little discussion. Instances of δείγμα in classical prose and verse are quite common and usually convey the idea of 'accurate representation', 'testimony', or 'outline', within a variety of contexts.⁷⁶ Here, however, unlike its other usages, the context dictates that δείγματα must indicate some type of 'sketch'

⁷⁴ The last of these is actually expressed as an ἐκεῖνοι οἱ/οἱ ἐνθάδε antithesis, although the semantic force of the contrast is still the same.

⁷⁵ The only striking exception is found within one clause, οὐ καταδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι (110e3), where there is a great degree of phonological, formal, and rhythmical resemblance between the two parts.

⁷⁶ E.g. *E.Supp.*354; *Isoc.*1.11; *Ar.Ach.*988; *Arist.Rh.*1415a12.

used by γραφής, and the image as a whole implies that our earth is a pale imitation of the true earth, conveying a fundamental idea of inadequacy.⁷⁷

The comparison τὴν [πᾶσαν γῆν] δὲ ὅση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν (110c4-5/V.8-9) also seems to be another example of imagery, fitting in with the general tendency towards comparison of the true earth to our own. However, it is uncertain whether the comparison could be seen to constitute live imagery, given that examples in both early verse and prose, such as Homer's description of Rhesus' horses as λευκότεροι χιόνος, suggest that this 'imagery' is clichéd.⁷⁸ There are no similar instances of γύψος found in conjunction with λευκός, so that it is possible that this is 'live'. Yet, neither this comparison nor the preceding similes are particularly striking, and seem to do little more than help to stress the contrast between the 'true' earth and our own.

The difference between the true earth and our own is also expressed by an analogy:

καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις ἡμῶν
ἀφεστάναι τῇ αὐτῇ ἀποστάσει ἥπερ αἴρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν καὶ
αἰθὴρ ἀέρος πρὸς καθαρότητα. (111b4-6/V.39-41)

Here, in order to convey the difference in 'purity' between the faculties of those on the true earth and ourselves, an analogy is drawn with the respective differences between air and water and aether and air. While these terms function as a vehicle and are, in that sense, extraneous to their immediate context, such boundaries are blurred by their role in the part which precedes this analogy. Here the uses of air and aether for the true earth dwellers are compared to those of water and air for ourselves (111a8-b2/V.35-7).

As a general comment this passage could be called an extended description, in which structure is fairly loose, but with a clear tendency to (almost exclusively asymmetrical) features expressing contrast.

⁷⁷ It may be of interest when compared to other similar uses of 'art' imagery in Plato. Cf. on σκιαγραφία, p.68 above, and Louis, 1945, 27-3.

⁷⁸ *Il.* 10.437 and see Lloyd, 1966, 184, on other 'white as' expressions. Cf. e.g. *S.Ant.* 114; *A.Fr.* 193c (Mette).

4.7 Passage VI: 117c1-118a17

117c3		Καὶ	
5	ἄμ' εἰπὼν ταῦτα ἐπισχόμενος καὶ μάλα εὐχερῶς καὶ εὐκόλως ἐξέπειν. καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ τέως μὲν ἐπιεικῶς οἰοί τε ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν, ὥς δὲ εἶδομεν		
	πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα, οὐκέτι, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ γε βία καὶ	5	
d	αὐτοῦ ἀστακτὶ ἐχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαυτόν- οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνόν γε, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ τύχην, οἴου ἀνδρὸς ἐταίρου ἐστερημένος εἶην. ὁ δὲ Κρίτων ἔτι πρότερος ἐμοῦ, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα, ἐξανέστη. Ἀπολλόδωρος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ	10	
5	ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ἐπαύετο δακρύων, καὶ δὴ καὶ τότε ἀναβρυχησάμενος κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν οὐδένα ὄντινα οὐ κατέκλασε τῶν παρόντων πλήν γε αὐτοῦ Σωκράτους.		
	Ἐκεῖνος δέ, Οἴα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐχ ἦκιστα τούτου ἔνεκα τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπέπεμψα, ἵνα μὴ	15	
e	τοιαῦτα πλημμελοῖεν· καὶ γὰρ ἀκήκοα ὅτι ἐν εὐφημία χρῆ τελευτᾶν. ἀλλ' ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτερεῖτε.		
5	Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσχύνθημὲν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν. ὁ δὲ περιελθὼν, ἐπειδὴ οἱ βαρύνεσθαι ἔφη τὰ σκέλη, κατεκλίνη ὑπτίος- οὕτω γὰρ ἐκέλευεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος- καὶ ἅμα ἐφαπτόμενος αὐτοῦ οὗτος ὁ δοῦς τὸ	20	
118	φάρμακον, διαλιπὼν χρόνον ἐπεσκόπει τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη, κᾶπειτα σφόδρα πῖεσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο εἰ αἰσθάνοιτο· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἔφη. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖθις τὰς κινήμας· καὶ ἐπαινῶν οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο ὅτι ψύχοιτό τε καὶ	25	
5	πήγνυτο. καὶ αὐτὸς ἤπτετο καὶ εἶπεν ὅτι, ἐπειδὴν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται αὐτῷ, τότε οἰχήσεται.		
	Ἦδη οὖν σχεδὸν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἦτρον ψυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος- ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ- εἶπεν- ὁ δὴ τελευταῖον ἐφθέγγετο- ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη, τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ	30	
10	ὀφείλομεν ἀλεκτρυόνα· ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε.		
	Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα, ἔφη, ἔσται, ὁ Κρίτων· ἀλλ' ὄρα εἴ τι ἄλλο λέγεις.		
	Ταῦτα ἐρομένου αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀλλ' ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν ἐκινήθη τε καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐξεκάλυψεν αὐτόν, καὶ ὅς τὰ ὄμματα ἔστησεν· ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς οφθαλμούς.	35	
15	Ἦδε ἡ τελευτή, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες, τοῦ ἐταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὥς ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν ἄν, τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.	40	

One of the passage's most noteworthy characteristics is actually the absence of outstanding features. For example, there are no instances of imagery and there is a moderately, though not exceptionally, low incidence of sounds effects and pleonasm. With the possible exception of the final words, φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου (118a17/VI.40), the three other sound effects used as parallel structures are fairly

weak homoeoteleuta such as ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο (118a2/VI.25). The passage also differs from others insofar as it contains no compound nouns or adjectives and an exceptionally low number of adjectives and adverbs.

Most of the passage is narrative, although this is interspersed with three short passages of direct speech. The narrative parts form a loose continuum, in which there is temporal sequentiality, but no strong logical connection between clauses, nor any sense of enclosing structure. In general, they seem close to the ancient definitions of the ‘continuous’ or ‘strung-together’ style, λέξις εἰρομένη, which Aristotle describes as ‘united by connecting particles’ and having ‘no end in itself’.⁷⁹ The passage presents Phaedo’s narration of the final events of Socrates’ life and, through its structure, seems almost to achieve a ‘stream of consciousness’ effect, in which narration is apparently artless and takes its form from the way in which the recollections stream into the narrator’s mind.

Although the passage could be divided into units, throughout the narrative sections a strong degree of continuity between phrases on all levels makes any strong divisions debatable.⁸⁰ Links between clauses are mostly paratactic and even examples of hypotaxis are loose in terms of logical connection. Moreover, there is a marked absence of genitive absolutes and complex constructions such as conditionals, while many of those hypotactic clauses which are present appear to function as explanatory parentheses: e.g. ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὅλος τ’ ἦν κατέχειν τὰ δάκρυα (117d2/VI.9). Parentheses themselves are common,⁸¹ as are ‘interrupting quotatives’; words or phrases which interrupt a phrase to indicate the use of direct quotation.⁸²

Individual clauses provide a minimal account of events, and are stark and concise, with a striking absence of adverbs and adjectives in much of the narrative, apart from occasional temporal descriptions. There is a small cluster of adverbs in 117c4-

⁷⁹ Arist.*Rh.* 1409a24ff.

⁸⁰ E.g. the OCT has punctuated with a full-stop after ἐστερημένος εἶην (117 d1/VI.8) and ἐξάνεστη (117d3/VI.10). However, for syntactic, semantic, and formal reasons the phrases which follow these points could easily be seen as part of the unit beginning καὶ ἡμῶν οἱ πολλοὶ (117c5/VI.3).

⁸¹ E.g. 117c8/VI.6ff.; 118a6/VI.29ff.

⁸² Bers, 1997, 193.

adjectives are in the final line: ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου.

Apart from the slightly emphatic positioning of the final sequence of adjectives, ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου and hyperbaton with ἀνδρός (118a15/VI.38-40), the word order is unremarkable. One point of slight interest is the repetitive way in which a finite verb is so often preceded by a nominative participle, in instances such as καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀκούσαντες ἡσχύνημεν (117e3/VI.18); ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἑμαυτόν (117c8/VI.6); πῆσας αὐτοῦ τὸν πόδα ἤρετο (117e8/VI.23); καὶ ἐπανιών οὕτως ἡμῖν ἐπεδείκνυτο (118a2/VI.25) and ἴδων δὲ ὁ Κρίτων συνέλαβε τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς (118a13-14/VI.36-7).⁸³

Only two main lexical fields are explored here. The first of these involves terms concerning mourning and lamentation and ends abruptly with the words ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν (117e3/VI.18). Subsequently, terminology to do with body parts and bodily reactions predominates until the final words at 118a15/VI.38, with no mixing of fields. This is different from the way in which several lexical fields, often overlapping, enter into the other passages.

Repetition is rare and fairly unremarkable, with δακρύειν (117c6/VI.4 c8/6; d4/11; e4/19) constituting the only really noticeable ‘key-word’ repetition. The passage’s vocabulary is also the least repetitive, having the highest ‘lexeme-token’ ratio, 0.79. There are, however, two examples of ‘juxtaposed’ repetition, both of some interest. ἐκκαλυψάμενος-ἐνεκεκάλυπτο (118a6/VI.29) is one of only two instances of pure juxtaposition in the passages,⁸⁴ while πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα (117c7/VI.5) stands out as the unusual juxtapositional pairing of two parts of the same verb.⁸⁵

Finally, some distinctive lexical points are an unusually high number of compound verbs and, with the exception of ἀστακτί, found only here and twice in Sophocles’

⁸³ Cf. also 117c4/VI.2; 117d5/VI.12; 117e6ff./VI.21; 118a6/VI.29; and 118a12/VI.30.

⁸⁴ Along with τὰ φύόμενα φύεσθαι (110d3/V.13).

⁸⁵ A possible comparison is κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (97c5/III.6).

Oedipus at Colonus,⁸⁶ a number of distinctive lexemes found only in prose or comedy dating from the fifth century onwards:

ἀναβρυχάομαι - Plato (1): 117d5.

εὐκόλως - All prose genres and comedy: e.g. X.*Mem.*4.8.2/ Hp.*Morb.*1.21/ Isoc.12.31/ Lys.4.9/ Anaxandr.3.196/ Arist.*EN* 1100b31.

εὐχερώς - All prose genres: e.g. Hp.*Fract.*30/ Aeschin.*Tim.*179.10/ Pl.*Phd.*117c4, *Rep.*364a7/ Arist.*EE* 1231b12, *EN* 1121b8/ Menandr.*Mon.*1.707.

ἐπικρικῶς - All prose genres and comedy: e.g. Is.6.18/ Isoc.10.5/ X.*HG* 5.4.50/ Scyl.65/ Hp.*Coac.*91, *Morb.*2.38/ Pl.*Phd.*117c5, *Crito* 43a10/ Arist.*EN* 1180a8/ Theophr.*HP* 3.17.1/ Menandr.*Dysc.*8, *Aspis* 24.

On the whole, the temporal sequentiality, combined with an absence of logical sequence and of any pervasive structural features apart from parenthesis, contributes to a 'stream of consciousness' effect, reflecting the thought-patterns of the speaker in this context.

4.8 Conclusion

From the analysis of these six passages we can clearly see the enormous variance between them and their distinct stylistic construction, which extends to all three levels of scale discussed at the end of the last chapter: unit organisation; small collocations; and individual words or idioms.

With the exception of a feature like Passage I's νόμισμα imagery, it is, by and large, the cumulation of repeated stylistic features within the passages which constitutes their distinctive stylistic character and separates them clearly from other sections of the work. These key stylistic features are repeated throughout each passage, or, in the case of those passages which themselves contain distinct stylistic sections, throughout these individual sections.

⁸⁶ S.*OC* 1251, 1646.

Repetition is found on all three levels, from the use of large numbers of α -privative terms in Passage VI or $\phi\lambda$ -compounds in II, to, in terms of broad organisation, the repeated conditionals of III or the predominant parataxis in V. Nevertheless, what seems to stand out most from each passage singly and therefore also from them collectively is repeated patterns of unit organisation which determine the general stylistic structure.

We have also seen that in some of the passages there is a certain degree of correspondence between features on the three different levels of scale within the text. For example, in Passage I, the predominance of parallelism and antithetically structured units is accompanied, on a more microcontextual level, by large numbers of pairs, many of which are oppositional. In Passage III stylistic continuity and repetition is enhanced by features like the structural repetition of unit organisation, key-word repetition of significant terms throughout the passage, and a lack of lexical variation. A final example is Passage VI, where syntactic simplicity of unit organisation seems to match the stark conciseness of some individual clauses, achieved through features like the comparative absence of adjectives and adverbs.

The main stylistic traits which have emerged from the analysis at this stage therefore seem to be repetition of structure, distinctiveness of individual sections and, in some passages, a degree of correspondence between different types and levels of stylistic features. The structure of the individual passages (or sections of these passages) therefore attains a degree of prominence through internal repetition as well as contrast to other parts of the text, and may also be enhanced through internal correspondence on different stylistic levels.

One point I emphasised, when explaining the framework and rationale of my methodology, was the necessity of taking into account several stylistic features which either do not appear or are covered only partially in conventional stylistic analysis. Interestingly, several of these features, most notably certain aspects of unit organisation and parallel structure, not only occur within the six passages, but can in many cases be seen to constitute their most striking features.

The clear and distinct traits within the different sections will provide a useful starting point for tracing the generic affiliations of each passage's style. In addition, the ways in which stylistic analysis can be integrated into analysis of the arguments is also becoming more evident. In the Preface I proposed to show the contribution of verbal features to the semantics of the argument. For this purpose the recurrent structural patterns which have emerged from this chapter provide a clear and substantial structural basis to be assessed in terms of its contribution to the process of argumentation.

Chapter 5

Generic Affiliations and Innovation

In this chapter I trace the generic affiliations of the distinctive stylistic features identified in the previous chapter. Such affiliations range from usage of features most commonly associated with a particular genre or author to specific allusions.¹ Along with those features which have stylistic models, I will point out those which appear to be Platonic innovations and have no clear generic background. Evidence for usage of stylistic features will be limited to examples within extant pre-Hellenistic texts.²

5.1 Genre

For practical purposes I assume the following broad genres:

Verse - Epic; lyric; drama, divided into comedy, tragedy, and satyr play.³

Prose- Historiography (including geographical texts); philosophy; oratory; technical prose (esp.) medicine.⁴

Nevertheless, it is important to be aware, especially from a stylistic point of view, that there are many problems involved in assuming such generic categories, however useful and indeed indispensable they may be.

¹ On types of allusion see e.g. Nightingale, 1995, 8, although her interests are not primarily stylistic.

² See 3.1.2, below.

³ The familiar modern versions of a tripartite epic/lyric/drama distinction date back to the sixteenth century (but were institutionalised in the nineteenth), although generic distinctions between classes such as tragedy, comedy, elegy, epos, lyric, threnos, idyll, pastoral, and satire had been posited (but without clarity: see Conte, 1996, 630-1) in antiquity from the Alexandrian period onwards. Explicit distinction between literary types is also, of course, made in Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Poetics*, although not in the sense of more modern genres (see e.g. Conte, 1996, 630-1; Preminger and Brogan, 1993, 457-8).

⁴ There is no clear model for the division of prose into generic categories, since, especially in the case of ancient genre, theories are usually concerned solely with verse or oratory. I have divided prose into four main groups. However, given the huge variation within individual genres and the overlap between genres, together with the lack of clear formal markers like verse form, these categories must be treated with caution. For discussion of more specific difficulties see below.

5.1.1 *Brief analysis of the problems:*

While the problematisation of genre itself in modern literary theory is not very relevant to my project,⁵ I will briefly introduce a number of problems specific to the study of Greek genres. There are numerous difficulties in attributing stylistic features in Greek literature to particular genres of writing, many stemming from the stylistic heterogeneity of some Greek genres as well as the tendency of stylistic features to be inter-generic. Generic heterogeneity may be perceptible between particular authors, such as Aristophanes and Menander; between works by the same author, as is the case with Plato's middle and late dialogues; and even within the same works, as occurs in the *Phaedo* or in the contrast between the rhetorical and narrative parts of Thucydides.⁶

Among the specific difficulties, relevant to particular authors or genres, one might note the following:

- Many of the key features of artistic prose, sophistic, or Gorgianic prose, are widely and plausibly taken to be a development of verse features,⁷ which often makes it difficult to establish to what extent particular stylistic phenomena can be seen as a prose innovation or derivative from a verse background.
- There are a number of overlaps between technical and philosophical writing.
- As well as dividing drama into tragedy and comedy, a distinction between song and dialogue (or even, song, recitative, and dialogue)⁸ would also be

⁵ Genre has become a major area of interest in modern literary theory. Genres are arguably retrospective categories used to classify literary works, while they themselves and generic markers are entirely based upon the features of the existing works themselves. Yet, in using them for classification and evaluation of literary works, some critics have treated them as if they were fixed and self-standing. This has, in turn, led other critics, most notably in the twentieth century, to object to the reification of genres, and to call for their abolition, or even suggest their non-existence. See e.g. Preminger and Brogan, 1993, 458; Conte, 1996, 630-1. Certain Greek genres were definable through performative context - the epithalium implies a wedding etc. Yet, as this example shows, these genres are not necessarily the same as those we focus on today within Greek literature. Cf. Silk, 2000, 64-70.

⁶ See e.g. Finley, 1942, 256.

⁷ See e.g. Norden, 1915, 63ff. and *passim*.

⁸ See e.g. Silk, 2000, 104ff.

very relevant to stylistic analysis, since there is often such a discrepancy between the style used in these two (or three) sections.

- Philosophical texts include both verse (e.g. Parmenides), prose (e.g. Aristotle), and writing which seems to lie between poetry and prose (e.g. Heraclitus)
- In oratory, there is often a marked discrepancy between the style used within the different parts of a speech, as also between different kinds of speech (forensic/epideictic etc.) and between different orators ('plain' Lysias, 'ornate' Gorgias).⁹
- Even in works traditionally seen as having a certain stylistic character (e.g. early historiography is renowned for being plain and paratactic) there is often a great deal of variation.¹⁰
- Socratic dialogues. Even though these are treated by Aristotle,¹¹ for example, as a whole genre, so little survives that it is difficult to say which features are Platonic and which are Socratic.¹²

5.2 Passage I.

This speech is presented as the 'peroration' to Socrates' 'defence' of the philosopher's willingness to die.¹³ At the very beginning of the 'defence' Socrates explicitly likens his apology to one given in a law-court,¹⁴ and the 'peroration' certainly shows a stylistic affinity to oratory, with many of its features most closely affiliated to this broad category.

As shown in Chapter 4, Passage I can be divided into three distinct stylistic sections, of which the first two have much in common: ὦ μακάριε Συμμία...μὴ καθαυμός

⁹ The staple of ancient (discussions of) rhetoric. See e.g. Russell, 1981, ch.9.

¹⁰ See e.g. Lilja, 1968, 132-5.

¹¹ Arist.*Po.*1447b4.

¹² Apart from Plato and Xenophon, there are no surviving texts which provide generic evidence of the Socratic writers, with the exception of some short fragments of Aeschines, which are certainly not substantial enough to establish any firm impression of his style. See e.g. Vander Waerdt, 1994, 2, Nightingale, 1995, 4; and Giannantoni, 1990.

¹³ Cf. Rowe, 1993a, 149.

¹⁴ *Phd.*63b1-5. Cf. 63d2-3 and e8-9.

τις ἦ (69a7-c3/I.1-16); καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ... βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι (69c3-d1/I.16-22) and οὔτοι δ' εἰσὶν... εὖ αὖ ἔχοι (69d1-e4/I.22-33).

In structural terms it is parallelism and opposition which dominate the first and second sections, with antitheses and large numbers of pairs reinforced by other types of parallelism. The first two units of the initial section, ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία...φρόνησις (69a6-10/I.1-5); καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα...οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχη (69b1-8/I.6-13), are reminiscent of the long periodic and asymmetrical antitheses found in much Attic oratory.¹⁵ Although not exclusive to any particular author/s, such periods are probably most characteristic of Isocrates, the principal mode involving μὲν/δέ or οὐκ/ἀλλά antitheses,¹⁶ the types used in these two *Phaedo* examples.

Nevertheless certain differences also distinguish the *Phaedo* examples from such 'Isocratean' periods. While both types are characterised by their length,¹⁷ the latter derives extension from inclusion of subordinate clauses,¹⁸ whereas the former attains it mainly through paratactic structures, such as apposition. Combined with the prevalence of copulative or adversative particles, like καί, δέ, ἀλλά and μὲν/δέ, as well as a general absence of other inferential and confirmatory particles,¹⁹ the structure of Passage I brings it closer to Gorgianic works. In the *Epitaphios* for example, with the exception of initial and final units, there are no particles and the unit organisation is almost exclusively paratactic.²⁰

Moreover, this passage resembles Gorgias in a number of other respects, such as its exceptionally large number of pairs, all reinforced (in the first two sections) by other parallel structures like homoeoteleuton or pleonasm. Amplification through pairs, especially in conjunction with sound effects, is common to many writers. Used to excess, however, it is viewed as a Gorgianic/sophistic feature,²¹ so that its frequent

¹⁵ Cf. Denniston, 1952, 73. See e.g. Th.2.35.1.

¹⁶ See Mathieu, 1924, 54ff. Cf. e.g. Usher, 1973, 43, on 'parallelism, antithesis...' as 'characteristic features of the Isocratean period'.

¹⁷ Usher, 1973, 40 and 43.

¹⁸ See e.g. Mathieu, 1924, 54ff.

¹⁹ See Denniston, 1950, xlvii-xlix, for classifications.

²⁰ Gorg.B6. Cf. the beginning of Gorg.B11.

²¹ On the difficulties concerning categorisation as 'Gorgianic' or 'sophistic' see above, p.100.

occurrence in, for example, certain early Hippocratic treatises has been taken as evidence of sophistic tendencies.²²

The first section also stands out for its use of repetition, the most striking example being a sequence of three pairs of repeated words: ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον (69a7-8/I.2-3). The closest parallels for this are found in Hesiod, Empedocles, Gorgias and the Hippocratic *Ancient Medicine*:

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ αἰδὸς αἰδῶ.

ὑβρίζονται εἰς τοὺς ὑβριστάς, κόσμιοι εἰς τοὺς κοσμίους, ἀφοβοὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀφόβους, δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς.²³

Admittedly, these lines, unlike the *Phaedo* example, feature repetition of a different form of the lexeme or cognate and include four pairs rather than three. Nevertheless the distribution of examples suggests that the use of multiple pairs of repeated words, with parallel syntactic functions between pairs, was one of those poetic features adopted by certain prose writers which could be characterised as Gorgianic/sophistic.

The striking foregrounding of φρόνησις (69a10/I.5) and μετὰ φρονήσεως (69b3/I.8) appears to have similar generic affinities. Positions of prominence, such as the beginning and end of lines of verse, clauses, or periods in prose, are frequently used for foregrounding in Greek literature.²⁴ Highlighted by their solitary emphatic positioning the *Phaedo* examples are perhaps similar to foregrounded and thus isolated runover words, when used for emphasis in enjambed lines of verse. So, for example, Edwards cites Homer *Iliad* 9.330-41, in which runover words end clauses

²² See Appendix II p.281. Cf. Earp, 1944, 102, who sees the large number of 'doublets' in Sophocles' early work as indicative of sophistic influence.

²³ Hes.*Op.*25-6 and Gorg.B6. Cf. also Emp.B.90; Hp.*VM* 14 (and Xenophan.B15.3, although there we find only two pairs of repeated lexemes).

²⁴ Cf. e.g. Denniston, 1952, 44-7, for examples in Greek prose; Silk, 1974, 68, on positions of prominence being those 'that are preceded or followed by a pause' and on the ancient sources for these views.

and are ‘carrying heavy emphasis’.²⁵ In prose too such features occur and, once again, it is Gorgias who provides one of the most pronounced examples, when κόσμος and its opposed derivative ἀκοσμία begin and end the first period of his *Helen*: κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἀκοσμία.²⁶ Here κόσμος and ἀκοσμία are highlighted, not only through position, but also by contrast to the long sequence of repetitive pairs between them. Nevertheless, the cumulation of features surrounding the foregrounding of φρόνησις and μετὰ φρονήσεως still makes the *Phaedo* example exceptional.²⁷ Moreover, given the thematic importance of φρόνησις, the effects here seem far more striking than those associated with many of its possible stylistic models.

Another interesting aspect of word order is the chiasmus in τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι ἢ κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων· καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία, καὶ αὕτη ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρμός τις ἢ (69b8-c3/I.13-16). While chiasmus is common in oratory,²⁸ examples like this, where the two parts are separated by an entire unit, are rare. In some ways it is perhaps closer to the combination of *husteron-proteron* and ring composition associated with early ‘paratactic’ verse.²⁹

Thus, in terms of unit organisation and parallel structures, this part of Passage I appears to combine features closely associated with oratory, with others most commonly found in early verse. The use of verse features in prose is often linked to Gorgianic/sophistic writing, and many features here recall that stylistic tradition. However, unlike Gorgianic rhetoric, where their use is often excessive, the *Phaedo* passage mixes them with elements like the loose antithesis that is more common in later orators.

²⁵ Edwards, 1991, 42.

²⁶ Gorg.B.11.1.

²⁷ Denniston, 1952, 69, cites other Platonic examples of ‘emphatic’ single words or short clauses. None of these, however, is so important or striking, as the *Phaedo* examples.

²⁸ Lausberg, 1998, 355ff.. E.g. And.1.147: οὐδ' ἡμάρτηται οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡμῖν εἰς ὑμᾶς οὔτε ὑμῖν εἰς ἡμᾶς; Lys.1.18; 12.57; and 30.2. On chiasmus in early prose, see, e.g. Lilja, 1968, 133.

²⁹ Thalmann, 1984, 9ff. Cf. e.g. Hom.*Od.*392-465, quoted in Van Groningen, 1960.

Plato continues both to combine aspects of various genres and add distinctive elements throughout the passage, not least at its most striking moments. This is true not only of the foregrounding of φρόνησις, but also of the section of extended imagery which surrounds it. This ‘coin’ imagery appears to synthesise certain aspects of the extended similes characteristic of early verse and philosophical writers with those of the extended metaphor, particularly associated with such poets as Aeschylus and Pindar.³⁰ It switches from simile to metaphor and occupies much of the first two units, presenting virtue in terms of monetary exchange:

μη γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι, μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα, ἀλλ’ ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι, φρόνησις· καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα τῷ ὄντι ἢ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθοῦς ἀρετῆς, μετὰ φρονήσεως, καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων (69a6-b5/I.1-10)

A number of this image’s key features can be traced individually in terms of generic affiliations: the clear similarities between tenor and vehicle; extended metaphor; thematic allusion of the vehicle to other parts of the text; exploitation of contrary associations of the vehicle, with possible ironic implications;³¹ and the combination of different formal categories of imagery.

The first of these, a clear and direct tenor/vehicle correspondence, is most frequently associated with the developed ‘explicit’ comparison of similes in epic and early philosophical texts. Their function is to clarify particular situations or processes,³²

³⁰ Thus Plato’s imagery here appears to have elements of all the main types of imagery in Greek literature (see further below). For, as Silk, 1996, 967, says, ‘the significant use of imagery is in poetry and poetic prose’. In other genres imagery is rarer. On the scarcity of live imagery in some orators like Lysias see e.g. Edwards, 1999, 7; and Carey, 1989, 7 (and 85 on ἀθλα). On oratory in general, cf. Silk, 1996, 967. Among the orators, live imagery is most common in Gorgias: see e.g. B11.8.

³¹ Cf. Silk, 1996, 967.

³² Cf. Silk, 1996, 967, function no. 1; and Silk, forthcoming. Cf. also Lloyd 1986, 183ff. on the explanatory function of the Homeric simile.

and suggested tenor/vehicle parallelisms are often quite elaborate.³³ While Homer's similes have diverse roles, the straightforward diagrammatic function is especially prominent in Presocratic similes.³⁴ On the whole, 'live' imagery in extant Presocratic texts is fairly rare and, with the exception of the more Pindaric/Aeschylean metaphors in Heraclitus,³⁵ the notable surviving examples are Empedoclean, arising in connection with physiological processes, as in his image of the eye as a lantern.³⁶ These involve Homeric-type similes 'in an explanation of an extremely obscure and complex phenomenon' and emphasise tenor/vehicle similarities, while discrepancies in correspondence are incidental.³⁷ Similar is the comparison at Hp.*Flat*.8 of the steam and condensation produced by boiling water with the yawning and sweating coming from a fever.³⁸ In the Platonic image there is clearly some direct correspondence, especially at first, where exchange of items in

³³ Lloyd, 1966, 191ff.: 'What is interesting and important here from the point of view of the later history of analogy in Greek philosophy, is the fact that already in Homer we find some quite elaborate comparisons in which the correspondences in form and content between the two parts have clearly been worked out in considerable detail. As we shall see later, detailed points of similarity between the two parts of a comparison are a feature, and an important one, of their use in Greek philosophers, and these similarities are sometimes stressed, as in Homer, by the repetition of key words and phrases'.

³⁴ A passage like Ar.*Nu*.96-7, ...ἀναπείθουσιν ὡς ἔστιν πνιγεύς,/ κἄστιν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὗτος, ἡμεῖς δ' ἄνθρωποι, which seems to satirise the philosophers' tendency to express physical and cosmological principles in terms of comparison to everyday objects, suggests a trend towards imagery in such writers. Yet, even though the importance of comparison and analogy in early philosophical writers is widely acknowledged, and is also indicated by ancient commentators on the Presocratics (see Lloyd, 1996, e.g. 306, 309), analysis in the secondary literature tends to focus on analogy in its broad, logical sense (see ch.3 p.54), as opposed to imagery proper (see e.g. many examples given by Lloyd, 1966, 341ff; Adrados, 1992, 37, on comparison in Socratic writings. Cf.e.g. X.*Mem*.1.2.37 or *Smp*.5.5; Hussey, 1896, 331.

³⁵ E.g. Heraclit.B52. The question of whether certain terms such as Empedocles' Νεῖκος or Parmenides' Δίκη involve genuine imagery (i.e. personification) is more vexed and can only be determined by a detailed study of prior and contemporary usage. The anthropomorphized Δίκη, for example, is already familiar from e.g. Hes.*Op*.220-4, and seems to reflect an archaic tendency to take personified virtues as deities, rather than the type of personification which constitutes 'live' imagery. Cf. Padel, 1992, 157. At the very least it seems that such works have clearly naturalised the idea of Δίκη as a personified agent before Parmenides. Although Lloyd, 1966, 211-2, acknowledges the difficulties in determining 'whether or in what sense the Presocratics recognised the political and social notions which they used in their cosmologies as *images*', he supposes that their status depends upon their function within the various contexts rather than on distributions of usage, and proceeds to consider them as imagery without allowing that it is unlikely that many constituted 'live' imagery within the works he describes.

³⁶ Emp.B84. Cf. B100 on the comparison of respiration to a clepsydra and the 'painter' simile in B23.

³⁷ Lloyd, 1996, 326, 327 and 331.

³⁸ Cf. Hp.*VM* 9 and see Lloyd, 1996, 346. This extended simile is exceptional in the Hippocratics, in whom imagery is generally restricted to 'short explanatory comparisons' (cf. Silk, 1996, 967). Lloyd, 1966, 241ff., also discusses analogy in Herodotus. Yet none of his examples (e.g. Hdt.4.36 or 2.33) actually constitute imagery proper.

financial transaction provides, for example, a parallel for how the so-called self-controlled simply forego one pleasure for another.³⁹

Yet this is just one level of the many-layered image in question. In the lines which follow it switches from simile to metaphor (69a9/I.4) and incorporates certain features of the characteristically Aeschylean/Pindaric extended metaphor, exemplified by Aeschylus' image of the fleet subjected to a storm as 'cattle':

...αἱ δὲ κεροτυπούμεναι βία
χειμῶνι τυφῶ σὺν ζάλῃ τ' ὀμβροκτύπῳ
ῥχοντ' ἄφαντοι ποιμένος κακοῦ στρόβῳ.⁴⁰

In Plato, as in Aeschylus, the vehicle term is not restricted to a single word or phrase, but extends throughout the first part of the following unit with the terms of buying and selling, ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα. Another point reminiscent of Aeschylean metaphor is the vehicle's thematic allusion to ideas prominent elsewhere in the text.⁴¹ In the *Phaedo* money itself has already been an explicit topic of discussion in a passage shortly before the present one.⁴²

This leads to a further point shared by the *Phaedo* example, Homeric similes, and Aeschylean/Pindaric metaphors: the exploitation of tenor/vehicle discrepancies, as well as correspondences. A number of discontinuities between the two notions of exchange described in the *Phaedo* image serve to highlight the exceptional value of φρόνησις itself and take the image beyond straightforward parallelism.⁴³ A

³⁹ See *Phd.* 68e2-69a4.

⁴⁰ *A.Ag.* 655-7. See Stanford, 1942, 95; Fraenkel, 1950, II.324. On the Aeschylean tendency to sustain a metaphor, see e.g. Headlam, 1902, 436: 'it was the particular habit of Aeschylus to sustain his figures. Other poets are content with transitory metaphors...; no one but Aeschylus has his habitual practices - no one, perhaps, but Pindar had his power of pursuing a similitude, of carrying a figure through'; cf. Stoneman, 1981, 134 Stanford, 1942, 94. Cf. also Steiner, 1986, 24, on Pindar: '[a single metaphoric motif] may dominate an entire ode'. Such extended images are not, of course, exclusive to these two authors. See e.g. *E.Or.* 698ff.

⁴¹ Headlam, 1902, 438: 'in Aeschylus a [figurative] conception will run through a whole play'. As an example he gives the legal imagery in *A.Ag.* e.g. 41; 58 etc. On this, cf. Silk, 1996, 967: 'the implication that the Trojan war is somehow a legal event prefigures the way the whole cycle of conflict is eventually resolved in *Eumenides*'. Cf. e.g. the painter simile at *Pl.Rep.* 377e, and the importance of art as a theme elsewhere in the *Republic*.

⁴² See below, n.46.

⁴³ The tenor/vehicle discrepancies of this image will be discussed in greater detail in 6.2.3, below.

paradigmatic example of such discrepancies in poetry is the famous Homeric simile which compares the slain Gorgythion to a poppy weighed down by fruit and rain, and presents a 'poignant contrast of death with life and growth'.⁴⁴ Similar implications arise from A. *Ag.* 658ff., where the Aegean sea is pictured as '*flowering* with the corpses of Achaean men' (ἀνθοῦν πέλαγος Αἰγαῖον νεκροῖς/ἀνδρῶν Ἀχαιῶν).⁴⁵ In both these images there is an ironic or subversive tenor/vehicle contrast, just as the Platonic image derives irony from contrasting virtue with coinage, since money itself has already been named as the object whose desire makes us turn away from the pursuit of wisdom.⁴⁶ Moreover, this contrast also appeals to a notion of money as in some way amoral or immoral, found within other Platonic works as well as certain previous and contemporary literature.⁴⁷

In the *Phaedo* imagery there is also a formal change from simile to metaphor,⁴⁸ a phenomenon with parallels elsewhere in Plato and in Xenophon.⁴⁹ In Plato's *Euthyphro*, for example, Socrates' description of Meletus changes from a simile (ὥσπερ γεωργόν) to a metaphor: καὶ δὴ καὶ Μέλητος ἴσως πρῶτον μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐκκαθαίρει τοὺς τῶν νέων τὰς βλάστας διαφθείροντας, ὥς φησιν (2d4ff.). The suggestion that Socrates actually harms the young is, of course, heavily ironic and irony is also found in other composite images of this kind.⁵⁰

⁴⁴ Silk, 1996, 967, on Hom. *Il.* 8.306ff.; and 1974, 161-7 in general. Cf. Edwards, 1991, 27.

⁴⁵ Cf. Silk, 1974, 162 and 161-6, in general, on 'imagery geared...to explicit antithesis'; Silk, forthcoming, on Heraclit. B.52 and 'the paradox that "life" (and the Greek αἰών has clear connotations of life-*span*, i.e. *age*) should be a "boy" '.

⁴⁶ *Phd.* 66c6ff.: καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τούτου ἐπιθυμίαι. διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσιν πάντες οἱ πόλεμοι γίνονται, τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἀναγκαζόμεθα κτᾶσθαι διὰ τὸ σῶμα, δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου θεραπείᾳ· καὶ ἐκ τούτου ἀσχολίαν ἄγομεν φιλοσοφίας πέρι διὰ πάντα ταῦτα. Cf. *Rep.* 484c, where a simile presents painters as those εἰς τὸ ἀηθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες, in spite of Book X's famous view of art as working at a third remove from reality.

⁴⁷ Cf. e.g. *Smp.* 173c. Cf. e.g. *Democr.* B40; 50; *E.El.* 371-2; *S.Ant.* 295-301; and, on this idea in general, see Seaford, 1998.

⁴⁸ Contrast the phenomenon of 'mixed metaphor', most commonly associated with Aeschylus and Pindar, in which it is the vehicle that changes ('to take arms against a sea of troubles'), as opposed to a switch between different formal categories of imagery. Cf. e.g. *A.PV* 174-7; Stanford, 1942, 95; Dornseiff, 1921, 66-8; and *Pl.Rep.* 365cff., which Shorey, 1982, 167, describes as 'a Pindaric mixture of metaphors'. Cf. also the succession of similes at *Rep.* 495cff.

⁴⁹ For Xenophon see e.g. *Mem.* 1.3.12-13, with its combination of analogy, comparison, and metaphor. Given the lack of extant Socratic writing, it is uncertain whether such a feature was particular to Socratic dialogues or a Platonic feature adopted by Xenophon.

⁵⁰ In *X.Mem.* 1.3.12-12 (referred to above) Socrates uses imagery to draw an ironic analogy between looking at a beautiful person, conventionally a pleasant experience, and being bitten by a scorpion.

Finally, the imagery's prominence is ensured through striking aural effects. The repeated vowels of αὕτη ἧ ἡ ὀρθή (πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ) and of the antithetical ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν are extremely unusual, and the phrases are also foregrounded by their being positioned at the beginning of the first unit's two opposed parts. Assonance adds to imagery already striking in its complexity, which is certainly unusual. Overall, it is the conjunction of so many distinct stylistic features, associated with a range of genres, which makes this image exceptional, even within a Platonic context.⁵¹

As the passage progresses, virtue separated from wisdom is dismissed as illusory in the second metaphor: χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαπτόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἧ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή... (69b6-7/I.11-12). The terminology of finance thus gives way to that of painting, though hardly in the manner of the shifting vehicle so often found in Aeschylus and Pindar.

A final point about this part of Passage I is the pervasive μή + subjunctive rather than the indicative, which is apparently a characteristically Platonic construction signifying 'doubtful' or 'cautious assertion'.⁵² The grammarian Smyth suggested that it is often used 'with a touch of irony', and many examples do indeed suggest irony or caution.⁵³ However, such an analysis seems unsuited to this particular passage, given that here the idiom articulates essential points in Socrates' case, strengthened through other forms of emphasis. In addition, here the construction also spreads over a number of successive units, unlike many instances where irony is apparent. A parallel is perhaps *Crito* 48c2-d3, where the idiom is used to dismiss unworthy considerations and state the genuine values on which Socrates' moral

⁵¹ Berg, 1904, 1-14, outlines the major tendencies in Plato's use of metaphor. He suggests that its frequency increases over time, so that, with the exception of *Prm.* and *Leg.*, the greatest number of instances are found in the later dialogues. He also claims that the most striking examples occur in the middle dialogues, owing to the dictates of subject matter. However, Berg's account has limitations for the analysis of Plato's imagery because of a lack of detail and his failure to distinguish between 'live' and 'dead' imagery. Cf. also Pender, 2000, an interesting study of the imagery Plato uses to describe the gods and soul. However she, like Berg, does not distinguish 'live' and 'dead' imagery.

⁵² Cf. 67b2 and Rowe, 1993a, 144. The terms are those used by Smyth, 1920, 404, and Goodwin, 1889, 92, respectively.

⁵³ E.g. *Ap.* 39a6: ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτ' ἧ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν. Although this construction is mainly found in Plato, Goodwin does give a couple of examples from other authors where it is used (*D.* 1.26; *Arist. NE* 2.4). In these cases it also has an ironic sense.

deliberation must be based. The fact that both these passages appear to assert points central to Socrates' main argument suggests that this construction may, for Plato, have an alternative function of emphasis rather than irony or caution. It is perhaps similar to Plato's common use of questions to introduce key points, as with ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγὴν;⁵⁴

In the middle section, from καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ το βᾶκχοι δέ τε παῦροι (69c3-d1/I.16-22), the most distinctive features are two pairs of antithetical clauses, reminiscent of the gnomic antitheses associated with such authors as Hesiod, Theognis, Heraclitus, and Democritus,⁵⁵ because of symmetry and aural parallelism between their two halves. Moreover, both pairs of clauses here are linked by more than one pair of corresponding terms, a key feature of gnomic antithesis.⁵⁶

The existence of a parallel antithesis in Sophocles which, like the *Phaedo* examples, describes the comparative fates of the initiated and uninitiated in the afterlife suggests that such structures might be a common trait of language to do with the mysteries:⁵⁷

...ὥς τρισόλβιοι
 κείνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
 μόλωσ' ἐς "Αἰδου. τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
 ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.⁵⁸

Furthermore, since Plato's alleged quotation, ναρθηκοφόροι μὲν πολλοί, βᾶκχοι δέ τε παῦροι (69c8-d1/I.21-2) is, as I noted in Chapter 4, a misquotation of a hexameter, it is possible, even likely, that it is either a direct quotation or Platonic parody of a religious verse.

⁵⁴ *Phd.* 64c4-5. Cf. e.g. 64c6-8; *Crito* 49b2-5; 48c2-d3.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Föhling, 1969, 94, on the significant role of gnomic antithesis in Greek literature and gnomic antithesis as a Hesiodic innovation. Some examples are: *Hes.Op.* 311: ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος; 342; *Thgn.* 17; *Heraclit.* B61; 53; 111; *Democr.* B 40; 86. For more examples see Föhling, 1969, 297-8.

⁵⁶ Föhling, 1969, 296.

⁵⁷ If this is the case, the association has perhaps influenced the description of Sophocles at *Ar.Ra.* 82: ὁ δ' εὐκόλος μὲν ἐνθαδε εὐκόλος δ' ἐκεῖ.

⁵⁸ S.fr.753 (Radt.). Cf. *h.Hom.* 2.480-2 and Richardson, 1974, 313-4.

The final section, from οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν...(69d1/I.22) to the end, is entirely different stylistically from the earlier parts of this passage, insofar as it includes neither striking parallel structures nor imagery, and is predominantly hypotactic rather than paratactic. In some ways it resembles the less periodic parts of Lysias.⁵⁹ Yet, it is especially unusual, given that it represents the very end of a speech. For it is this part which, even in 'plainer' oratory, characteristically incorporates, for example, varying types of parallelism, in order to give weight to the conclusion.⁶⁰

Of all my passages it is Passage I's first two parts which show the strongest tendency towards the stylistic features conventionally treated within rhetoric or poetics (ancient and modern). It is no surprise then that its generic affinities seem to be with verse and oratory, and especially Gorgianic/sophistic oratory, known for its inclusion of poetic features within prose writing. Yet it is also clear that Plato's 'imitation' of such genres is not straightforward, but combines and builds on a mixture of different stylistic sources, producing effects which are often distinctive *per se*.

5.3 Passage II

Passage II, including its stylistically distinct middle section, οἷον τοὺς μὲν γαστριμαργίας...ἄνδρας μετρίους (81e6-82b8/II.23-44), is most notable for its unit organisation and, to a certain extent, its parallel structures. Although many individual features have strong affiliations with other genres, their use here and combination with other more novel features make this passage's style distinctive in many respects.

The lexis of the main and middle sections shows common features. There is lexical variety, in terms of both the range of lexical fields and many distinctive lexemes. The distribution of these lexemes is limited, almost exclusively, to prose and

⁵⁹ See e.g. Kennedy, 1963, 135; Demetr.*Eloc.*190.

⁶⁰ E.g. Lys.1.45 and 48: κίνδυνον ἐκινδύνευον and ζημίαις ζημιώσουσι; 3.47: ὑπὲρ ἧς ἐγὼ πολλοὺς κινδύνους κεκινδύνευκα καὶ πολλὰς λητουργίας λελητούργηκα; 4.20: ἱκετεύω ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀντιβολῶ; 6.55: ἀντιβολήσῃ καὶ ἱκετεύσῃ ὑμᾶς· μὴ ἐλεεῖτε. οὐ γὰρ οἱ δικαίως ἀποθνήσκοντες ἀλλ' οἱ ἀδίκως ἀξιοὶ εἰσιν ἐλεεῖσθαι; 12.100: ἀκηκόατε, ἐοράκατε, πεπόνθατε, ἔχετε· δικάζετε. Usher, 1999, 117 remarks that a 'quiet ending seems to have been characteristic of most Greek oratory', but appears to be referring to the absence of pathos as opposed to particular stylistic effects.

Aristophanes. Most often they stem from technical, historical, and philosophical writing, although a number are also found in oratory. Lexemic variety itself is probably most closely associated with Aristophanes, who tends to combine terms from many different genres and registers.⁶¹

Most of these distinctive lexemes are also compounds, especially *φιλ*-compounds. There are two instances of *hapax legomena*, *οἰκοφθορία συνεπακολουθέω*, while the word *φίλαρχος* only appears here and in one other Platonic passage. Compound nouns and adjectives, including those with non-prepositional stems, are common in Greek literature.⁶² Aeschylus, in particular, tends to use such compounds and they abound in his plays, either singly, or in matching pairs⁶³. Yet, even in Aeschylus, clusters are rare,⁶⁴ and the most significant clusters of *φιλ*-compounds seem to be found in Plato alone.⁶⁵ A notable exception comes in Aristophanes' *Wasps*,⁶⁶ where a group of *φιλ*-compounds are playfully proposed as possible illnesses afflicting Philocleon.

5.3.1 *The main section*

In very broad terms, the style of the main section seems close to what Denniston describes as the 'loose texture' of Platonic periods, comprising a long 'string of loosely connected clauses', unlike the 'Demosthenic period'.⁶⁷ The looseness of logical sequentiality between clauses has certain similarities to the narrative parataxis (*λέξις εἰρομένη*) of early logographers or the loose Thucydidean period.⁶⁸ Yet, there are also considerable differences, since these styles are typified, respectively, by simple coordination and temporal sequentiality or by a preponderance of

⁶¹ See e.g. Dover, 1987, 224-36.

⁶² See e.g. the tonal range of compounds in *Ar.Pax* 788ff. and 810ff. and the discussion in Silk, 2000, 113-6; Earp, 1948, 6. *φιλ*-compounds are also common throughout all genres, with pairs especially common in oratory (e.g. the clichéd *φιλανθρωπία* and *φιλοτιμία* at D.8.71 or the more unusual *φιλαίτιος ὤν*, *βαρὺ γάρ*, *μηδὲ φιλεπιτιμητῆς* at *Isoc.Ad Dem.*31.10).

⁶³ E.g. *φιλοσπόνδου* (*A.Ch.*292); *φιλόμαστος* (*A.Ag.*719); *θηλυκτόνω* and *θηλύσπορος* (*A.PV* 855 and 860); *παναιτίου* and *πανεργέτα* (*A.Ag.*1486).

⁶⁴ See the lists of compounds in Earp, 1948, 18-38.

⁶⁵ E.g. *Phd.*68c1; *Parm.*128d7; *Phdr.*248d3; *Alc.*1.122c7; *Lys.*212d.

⁶⁶ *Ar.V* 75ff.

⁶⁷ Denniston, 1952, 68ff.

⁶⁸ See e.g. Denniston, 1952, 66-7

participial clauses.⁶⁹ By contrast, the Platonic units here are long and mainly hypotactic, including a variety of subordinate, and especially relative, clauses. As I have mentioned in Chapter 4, their style seems close to the characteristically Platonic 'à rallonges' ('extended') phrase, named by Des Places to evoke the impression of extension generated by its structure.⁷⁰

This style has no clear parallels. There is perhaps a certain likeness in the long verse-invocations at the beginnings of archaic hymns, which consist of a similar mixture of short and loosely connected subordinate or participial clauses.⁷¹ The appearance of such clauses, especially those connected by relative pronouns, is widely discussed in the secondary literature.⁷²

Although hyperbaton, another key element of Passage II's style, is very common in oratory and verse,⁷³ especially in its milder forms, the pervasive hyperbaton in 81c5-e1/II. 5-18, is unusual for various reasons. Hyperbaton is often used for emphasis,⁷⁴ but examples are usually isolated, unlike the clustering in this passage. Moreover, some of the individual examples here are also unusual, such as the (comparatively rare) separation of article and substantive in τῇ τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμία (81e1/II.18),⁷⁵ or the (highly unusual) interposition of a long phrase between αὐτῇ and σύμφυτον (81c5-6/II.2-3). Regarding the latter,

⁶⁹ Cf. Denniston, 1952, 67.

⁷⁰ Des Places, 1951, 365, who, however, discusses only those units whose clauses are, unlike those in this passage, connected throughout by the same conjunctions or different forms of the same part of speech. So Pl.Leg.699c1-d2, which Des Places, 1950, 364, calls 'le meilleur exemple de phrase "à rallonges"', contains a series of five relative clauses, all of which begin with the relative pronoun. Although this is striking in itself, it can be clearly differentiated from the present *Phaedo* example, in which there is a greater syntactic complexity and variety of connectives. Cf. Denniston, 1952, 70ff.

⁷¹ E.g. *h.Hom.*2.1-10; *h.Hom.*5.1-6 (also has ring composition with repetition of ἔργα. See Porter, 1949, 252); *h.Hom.*16; *h.Hom.*17; *Ar.Eq.*581-90; although the examples from Aristophanes and the Homeric hymn to Aphrodite (*h.Hom.*5) differ slightly, insofar as the same grammatical subject is retained throughout all the clauses.

⁷² See e.g. Davies, 1991, 78, on 'relative style' in hymnic invocations; Race, 1990, 86, on participles, apposition, and relatives as a form of expansion in hymns; and 18, on hymn openings.

⁷³ Gagarin, 1997: 29: 'mild hyperbaton, where only a word or two intervenes... is quite common in classical Greek'. Cf. e.g. Stevens, 1953, 203, on Pindar and lyric; Fraenkel, 1950, 94 and 687, on common types of hyperbaton; Usher, 1993, 23; Denniston, 1952, 52; Lausberg, 1998, 319. There are also numerous examples, especially in verse, of longer separation between elements. See e.g. Fraenkel, 1950, 13; Denniston, 1952, 52ff; and Breitenbach, 1934, 243, for statistics for instances of hyperbaton in Euripides, classified according to the number of intervening words.

⁷⁴ See e.g. Denniston, 1952, 58-9; Fraenkel, 1950, 13; Usher, 1993, 24.

⁷⁵ See e.g. Denniston, 1952, 52ff. A very similar example occurs at *Phd.*83e1, another phrase describing the associations of the soul: τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.

even though 'interlacing' is particularly frequent in Plato,⁷⁶ it is very rare to separate a substantive from a prepositional compound on which it depends. The closest Platonic parallel seems to be the separation of αὐτῇ and περιπέφυκεν in:

ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ ἄτε γῆν ἐστιωμένη γερὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια
περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἐστιάσεων.⁷⁷

Interestingly, just as in the *Phaedo* example, this phrase describes the corruption of the soul by its association with the body.

Another of the main section's distinctive features is recurrent ring composition. Ring composition, an important feature of early verse and prose,⁷⁸ was used to mark off a short section of text by repetition of the same words at the beginning and end.⁷⁹ Certain differences distinguish its use in these early texts from the *Phaedo* passage. In the former, ring composition often encloses very long sections, which may constitute digressions from the main narrative,⁸⁰ while in Passage II it is the individual main paragraphs which are enclosed in such a way. More importantly, as with hyperbaton, probably the most distinctive feature of ring composition here is its recurrence. Rather than having one isolated example, as is normal in other genres, it is used in all three of the longer units.

In the main section of this passage, Plato therefore seems to combine distinctively Platonic features of unit organisation with those associated predominantly with early verse and artistic prose. Moreover, in spite of their generic affiliations, the accumulation and, to a certain extent, structure of these features differentiates their use here from their models.

⁷⁶ I.e. the separation of logically cohering words, without affecting the order of the other words. See Denniston, 1952, 54ff.

⁷⁷ Pl.Rep.612a1ff.

⁷⁸ See e.g. Edwards, 1991, 44-8, on importance and frequency of ring composition in the *Iliad*; Fowler, 1987, 62; Van Otterlo, 1944, 2, (following Fränkel) on ring composition as characteristic of epic poetry and λέξις εἰρομένη. For examples, see Van Otterlo, 1944. Cf. also Van Groningen, 1960, 51ff.

⁷⁹ This can be distinguished from the rhetorical figures in which a word is repeated either at the beginning and end of a period (see e.g. D.25.88; Lys.34.11; Adams, 1905, 355; Denniston, 1952, 90) at the beginning and end of a text (see e.g. Carey, 1989, 85, on Lysias); and also from structural ring composition, in which a certain theme or episode recurs after a long intermediary section (see e.g. Edwards, 1991, 47, on Homer).

⁸⁰ See Van Groningen, 1960, 55.

5.3.2 *The middle section*

Describing the process by which souls are reincarnated into animals corresponding to their behaviour throughout life, the middle section's main units provide parallel examples of how this process affects different types of people. In keeping with this, its distinctive feature is the high degree of parallelism between all the units.⁸¹

'Parallelism of structure' in Plato

Close parallelism between units is a pervasive element of Platonic stylistic structure and recurs throughout the dialogues with no clear generic affiliations.

Unit-parallelism in Plato often occurs when a speaker enumerates examples or provides analogies for a general thesis,⁸² and frequently involves a repetitive structure, in contrast to other genres, where such close unit-parallelism is rare.⁸³

⁸¹ οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονέστατοι...φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; (82a11-b3/II.35-9) is a possible exception.

⁸² More common, however, is the structure of argument where each unit adds a new step or explanation, rather than outlining cases analogous to the previous unit. This is especially true of the long speeches in the middle and later dialogues such as the *Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, and *Philebus*, where sequences of analogous examples are much rarer (it is also true for the *Sophist*, although the early sections, where the 'method of division' distinguishes between two opposed parallel cases, include many groups of two analogous units or two parallel clauses: e.g. 222a5-11; 220b4-8, ΞΕ. καὶ τοῦ πτηνοῦ μὴν γένους πᾶσα ἡμῖν ἢ θήρα λέγεται πού τις ὀρνιθευτική./ΘΕΑΙ. λέγεται γὰρ οὖν./ΞΕ. τοῦ δὲ ἐνύδρου σχεδὸν τὸ σύνολον ἀλιευτική.). Nevertheless, even this type of structure often involves a certain degree of verbal or structural repetition (e.g. *Tht.*189a6-b5).

⁸³ The closest example is a passage like the comparison of ship's captains to doctors in *Hp.VM* 9, where the two examples given have some degree of structural similarity and are of roughly similar length (cf. *VM* 16). As Lloyd, 1966, 385ff., has shown, analogical arguments can be found throughout early Greek literature. However, those he cites from Homer generally focus on a particular case, as opposed to general principles, with emphasis falling on the example for which the analogous case is adduced by way of explication (Lloyd, 1966, 385ff.). Other examples in early verse and historiography are mainly very similar. Some examples in later verse include more general cases, and unit length between parallel cases is sometimes close (e.g. *S.Ant.*715ff.; *E.Andr.*479ff.). In addition there are instances of symmetry within individual lines or between symmetrical lines (see e.g. Föhling, 1969, 295ff.), as well as some examples of very close parallelism between strophe and antistrophe (e.g. *A.Ag.*763). However, often in these cases formal parallelism derives from a direct contrast, rather than from analogy. In oratory, rather than parallel units with corresponding clauses, parallelism is more common within an individual period/unit and between clauses, especially antithetical ones (see e.g. Denniston, 1952, 71-3, on symmetrical antitheses and cf. Gagarin, 1997, 30). The most striking type is *parisosis* or *isocolon* (see e.g. *Arist.Rh.*1210a22ff.; Lausberg, 1998, 320ff.), which comprises two balanced *kola* which contain a near or exactly equal number of syllables. This feature, employed mainly by orators, is often combined with parallel structures such as repetition or rhyme (see e.g. Adams, 1905, 353-4, on παρομοίωσις and ὁμοιοτέλετον), and is used to excess by Gorgias

Given the amount of such parallelism in Xenophon's Socratic dialogues,⁸⁴ it is, however, possible that it was typical of the Socratic dialogue *per se*,⁸⁵ although the paucity of surviving evidence means that this cannot be established with any certainty.⁸⁶

In Plato, parallel units are normally punctuated by short replies from the interlocutor, as in this passage. Apart from this common feature, the patterns of parallelism are extremely diverse in terms of unit length; amount of ellipse; repetition; and the number of parallel units in each instance. So, for example, a sequence at *Charmides* 167c8-168b3, comprises nine short parallel units, all of very similar length and structure.⁸⁷ Similarly, *Republic* 335c9-d10 features seven short units, extremely alike in these respects, although comprising two stages, with three analogous examples followed by a group of four. Both passages include very strong structural and verbal repetition.⁸⁸ Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum are passages like *Ion* 538b7ff., which contains two longer parallel examples, with significant verbal variation.⁸⁹

Notwithstanding this variety, certain key features in this part of Passage II can still be isolated as characteristic of parallel unit structure in Plato and, to a certain extent, in Xenophon's Socratic dialogues. These are:

in phrases such as εἰπεῖν δυναίμην ἃ βούλομαι, βουλοίμην δ' ἃ δεῖ, λαθὼν μὲν τὴν θεῖαν νέμεσιν, φυγῶν δὲ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον φθόνον (*Gorg.*B6).

⁸⁴ E.g. *X.Mem.* 2.1.3; 2.3.11-13; 2.9.2;.

⁸⁵ *X.Mem.* 1.5.1-3, seems to suggest that such stylistic parallelism in analogical arguments was a typical part of Socratic ethical discourse, even though the example he proceeds to give is contained within the form of a continuous speech rather than dialogue.

⁸⁶ The only really substantial fragments of other Socratic dialogues are frs. 9 and 12 of *Aeschin.Socr.*, in Giannantoni, 1990, II.607 and 609 (cf. p.101, above). However, these both involve an extended speech and, though fr.12 contains an example of antithesis (610), offer no noticeable stylistic parallelism.

⁸⁷ Although the first unit is longer than those which follow.

⁸⁸ Cf. e.g. *Lach.* 185c5ff.

⁸⁹ ΣΩ. τί δὲ δῆ, ὅταν Ὅμηρος λέγῃ, ὡς τετρωμένῳ τῷ Μαχάονι Ἑκαμήδη ἢ Νέστορος παλλακὴ κυκεῶνα πίνειν δίδωσι; καὶ λέγει πως οὕτως...ταῦτα εἴτε ὀρθῶς λέγει Ὅμηρος εἴτε μή, πότερον ἰατρικῆς ἐστὶ διαγνῶναι καλῶς ἢ ῥαψωδικῆς; / ΙΩΝ. ἰατρικῆς; / ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὅταν λέγῃ Ὅμηρος...ταῦτα πότερον φῶμεν ἀλιευτικῆς εἶναι τέχνης μᾶλλον κρίναι ἢ ῥαψωδικῆς. ἅττα λέγει καὶ εἴτε καλῶς εἴτε μή; Cf. e.g. *Men.* 72d4-e8; *Rep.* 444d3-11.

- i) The parallel structure of units, enhanced by verbal repetition of terminology common to all examples, such as εἰς τὰ ...γένη.⁹⁰
- ii) A certain degree of ellipse and variation, such as the fact that εἰκὸς ἐνδύεσθαι (82a1/II.25) is not repeated in the second of the three units (82a4-6/II.28-30) and is replaced by εἰκὸς ἐστὶν ... ἀφικνεῖσθαι in the third (82b5/II.41).⁹¹
- iii) The punctuation of parallel units by short answers from the interlocutor, restricted to brief words of affirmation or denial, or short questions, like τὰ ποῖα δὴ ταῦτα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; (81e5/II.22); πάνυ μὲν οὖν εἰκὸς λέγεις (82a3/II.27); or simply εἰκός (82b9/II.45).⁹²
- iv) Some variation in length of units, so that the key unit is either significantly longer or shorter than the others.⁹³ This passage differs slightly from the majority of examples, in which analogous cases are adduced in order to validate a point made in the central unit. Here, parallel cases do not provide analogies, but all illustrate different parts of the same process. Nevertheless, as Socrates moves on to describe the metempsychosis of the more virtuous souls, the unit (82b5-8/II.41-4) is slightly longer and is also preceded by an additional and formally distinct paragraph (82a11-b3/II.35-9), which seems to suggest its special significance.
- v) Often a unit in the middle of the sequence outlines the general principle, and especially when preceding the unit which contains the key point.⁹⁴ Here, however, the general principle is described at the outset and is only slightly similar in form to the parallel units which follow: ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἦθη ὅποι' ἄττ' ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι τύχῳσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ (81e2-4/II.19-21).

⁹⁰ *Phd.* 81e7-82a1/II.24-5; 82a5-6/II.29-30; and, with γένος in the singular, 82b5/II.41-2; 82b7/II.43. Cf. the repetition of τίσι τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη in *Rep.* 332c5-d3 or of ἕτερος in *Chrm.* 166a9-b6. Cf. also e.g. the repetition of εἰ δὲ βούλοιο, τί ἂν ποιήης, δῆλον ὅτι; or of ὅποτε in *X.Mem.* 2.3.11-3 and *Mem.* 4.2.10, although the repetition in each of these passages is a little more uniform than is usual in Plato.

⁹¹ Cf. e.g. *Rep.* 410e10-a3. Cf. the alternation between βούλει and ἐπιθυμείς in *X.Mem.* 4.2.10. For ellipse see on Passage IV, n.125, below.

⁹² See p.123, below.

⁹³ Cf. e.g. *Gorg.* 460b1-5. Cf. also Thesleff, 1967, 38, on Plato's expansion of a question in order to make an important point.

⁹⁴ E.g. *Phd.* 82a9.

Finally, in spite of the many similarities, the main feature which differentiates this passage from the usual structure of such passages in Plato is that much of its parallelism derives from lists, whereas other types of repetitive structure and/or the use of polyptoton are far more normal.⁹⁵

This conjunction of tripartite lists with pervasive homoeoteleuton is extremely unusual, though certain aspects could be seen to stem from particular genres. Sound effects used together with tripartite lists are perhaps most closely associated with oratory, but do also appear in verse and other types of prose.⁹⁶ Tripartite lists, albeit more usually unaccompanied by sound effects, are also very common in Old Comedy, and the clustering of this feature in Passage II might perhaps be slightly reminiscent of the Aristophanic tendency towards such clusters.⁹⁷

Overall, this passage is also notable for lexical variety, both in the range and fluidity of lexical fields, as well as its many distinctive lexemes. These lexemes have an almost exclusively prose and Aristophanic background, especially technical, historical, and philosophical writing. Lexemic variety is itself probably most closely associated with Aristophanes, who is known for his tendency to combine terms from various different genres and registers.⁹⁸

5.4 Passage III

Passage III uses extended *oratio obliqua*, a distinctively Platonic construction, although one which more usually governs longer sections.⁹⁹ In addition, all three main units begin by stating a verb governing the dependent clauses: ἡγησάμην (97c4/III.5); ᾤμην (97d6/III.15); and ᾤμην (98a7/III.28). Yet it is rare for Plato to restate the introductory verb, especially in such a regular and systematic way, and elsewhere in Plato the syntax of this construction is in general far more fluid.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ E.g. *Chrm.* 167c9ff.; *Tht.* 188e11-189a11.

⁹⁶ See Appendix II p.282.

⁹⁷ See Appendix II p.283, below.

⁹⁸ Cf. n.61, above.

⁹⁹ Cf. e.g. Tarrant, 1955, whose examples of 'extended *oratio obliqua*' in Plato only include longer passages or entire dialogues.

¹⁰⁰ On the inconsistency of structure in Plato's use of *oratio obliqua*, see e.g. Thesleff, 1967, 50.

The passage describes Socrates' expectations when reading Anaxagoras and its most striking stylistic feature is clear stylistic allusion to Anaxagoras himself and, to a certain extent, to other Presocratic physicists.¹⁰¹ However, despite the presence of numerous features found in these authors, together with the passage's explicit concern with Anaxagoras, the Anaxagorean or 'Presocratic' quality of the writing has not been noted by commentators.

The most outstanding features of the passage as a whole are: extensive key-word repetition; systematic structural repetitiveness of unit organisation; and lack of lexemic variation. The use of key-word repetition is subtly reminiscent of Anaxagoras' own style, in which it is widely acknowledged as a pervasive characteristic. For example, Denniston comments on Anaxagoras B12:

One notices how certain key-words, νοῦς, περιχωρεῖν, ἀποκρίνεσθαι, and their cognates, run through the passage with a recurrent emphasis. Their repetitions flood and permeate, rather than strike, the ear.¹⁰²

As outlined in the previous chapter, notable examples in the *Phaedo* passage are: νοῦς; κοσμέω and its compound διακοσμέω; πᾶς; αἴτιος and its cognates; and βέλτιστος/ἀμείνων.¹⁰³ Of these, all but αἴτιος and its cognates and βέλτιστος/ἀμείνων are also key terms in Anaxagoras. νοῦς, κοσμέω, and πᾶς are all repeated a great deal in the extant fragments of Anaxagoras,¹⁰⁴ while διακοσμέω occurs only once, but in the programmatic πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς.¹⁰⁵ In the *Phaedo* passage it appears shortly after Anaxagoras is named, in a phrase bearing many similarities to the Anaxagorean exemplar: νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος (97c1-2/III.2-3).

¹⁰¹ As the passage progresses, more general allusion to Presocratic physicists becomes apparent.

¹⁰² Denniston, 1952, 4. Cf. also e.g. Deichgräber, 1933, 351-2; and Schofield, 1980, 6-9.

¹⁰³ Although some instances, such as the repetition of νοῦς in 97c1, 3, and 5, also provide examples of 'successive clause or unit' repetition, it is the way in which they are repeated *throughout* the passage that makes them exceptional.

¹⁰⁴ See especially Anaxag. B12.

¹⁰⁵ Anaxag. B12.

As well as the 'Prädikationsstil', which incorporates 'key-word' repetition and which is linked to hymnic style,¹⁰⁶ Deichgräber also identifies the 'Argumentationsstil' as one of three key styles in Anaxagoras' writing.¹⁰⁷ This seems close to what Thesleff describes as 'the scientific style' in early Greek prose, found in Anaxagoras and other Presocratic prose, and many features of this 'Argumentationsstil' or 'scientific style' also appear in the *Phaedo* passage.

First, the organisation of the Platonic passage is reminiscent of this writing. Hypotaxis prevails; clauses are neither exceptionally long nor short; while the word order is likewise unremarkable and seems largely to reproduce the order of the train of thought. These features comply with what Thesleff calls the 'systematic structure of exposition'. Moreover, the passage is differentiated both from the simple narrative sequentiality of historical prose narratives by its syntactic complexity, and from the periodic structure of Attic oratory by its repetitiveness, its overall continuity, and a lack of, for example, antithesis and sound effects. In combination, these aspects of Passage III surely evoke the Presocratic prose of Anaxagoras, and others.

Thesleff claims that a key feature of the 'scientific style' typical of such writing is 'explicit argumentation', dependent not on formal logic, but on recurrent 'explicit patterns'.¹⁰⁸ Many of these can be found in the *Phaedo* passage. As we have seen, its prevalent pattern of argumentation is conditionals, interspersed with a couple of explanatory γάρ clauses. Such structures, introduced by εἰ, ἐάν, or ἥν, used widely for theorising, appear to be the main tool of systematic explanation and argumentation within the Presocratic prose tradition.¹⁰⁹ Notwithstanding specific details of individual arguments, certain broad formal/semantic patterns are recurrent.¹¹⁰ For example, Melissus B8.2 begins with a condition followed by a necessary inference (εἰ γὰρ ἥν πολλά, τοιαῦτα χρὴ αὐτὰ εἶναι) and then

¹⁰⁶ Porter, 1949, 257, on thematic repetition as an 'integral part of the technique of the hymn style'.

¹⁰⁷ Deichgräber, 1933, 353. The third, the 'purely descriptive style' ('rein beschreibenden Stil'), is not really relevant here.

¹⁰⁸ Listed in Thesleff, 1966, 89, n.1.

¹⁰⁹ My analysis here is not concerned with the specific logical form of individual arguments used in this tradition, but simply with the very broad formal/semantic classification of certain types of conditionals.

¹¹⁰ See Thesleff, 1966, 89, n.1 and 93.

repeats a similar pattern. The end features a similar construction,¹¹¹ as do several of his other fragments.¹¹² Such patterns are even more pronounced throughout Zeno B1-3,¹¹³ and are present, though to a lesser extent, in Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia.¹¹⁴ Diogenes' καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, εἴ τις βούλεται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὕρισκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα ὡς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα...,¹¹⁵ offers a very close parallel to εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο... in *Phd.* 97c6, verbally and in terms of general context (insofar as both sequences state the necessity of discovering the best disposition). Of course, conditionals are an important element of many other kinds of writing. Yet in oratory, for example, which uses conditionals a great deal, the prevalent types and patterns are different from those within the sequential argumentation of philosophical prose, not only in context and subject matter, but also in structure.¹¹⁶ Moreover, within the 'Anaxagoras episode' the conditionals are also accompanied by other features recalling this tradition.

Other common types of argumentation in the Presocratics and this passage are appeals to necessity, such as ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι...(97d4),¹¹⁷ and phrases which give explicit indication of the reasoning process.¹¹⁸ For example, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει (97c4) is paralleled in Anaxagoras' τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων,¹¹⁹ while the

¹¹¹ Meliss.B8.5-6.

¹¹² Meliss.B6, 9, and 7.1-2.

¹¹³ In spite of the controversies surrounding its authenticity Gorgias' *Περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος* provides some interesting parallels for such a style. While it is doubtful whether either of the two surviving versions, *Sext.adv. math.* VII. 65ff. (B3) and *About Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias* (Buchheim, 1989), preserve the exact wording (Wardy, 1996, 9), it nevertheless seems probable that the argumentative method they embody is authentic, since throughout both texts, the argument progresses by stating a condition in the protasis, followed by the inference from this in the apodosis: e.g. ὥστ' εἰ αἰδίων ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστὶν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἔστιν. (Gorg.B3.70).

¹¹⁴ Anaxag.B12, εἰ μὴ γάρ...; Diog.Apoll.B2 contains a sequence of conditionals, while there are other single examples in 3 and 4.

¹¹⁵ Diog.Apoll.3.

¹¹⁶ Even where sequences of conditionals are found in oratory and elsewhere these are most often antithetical conditionals: e.g. the two pairs of antithetical conditionals in *Lys.* 13.75-6; *D.* 22.28; *Hp.Aër.* 10; *Hdt.* 3.62.4; or single pairs of antithetical conditionals in *Antipho.Tir.* 3.2.6; *Lys.* 15.8. Another common type is the use of a counterfactual past conditional, followed by a statement of the true state of affairs (see Usher, 1997, 17, 19 and *passim*, on 'hypothetical inversion') which, in spite of certain similarities to the counterfactuals used by the Presocratics, can in fact be distinguished from these by their formal qualities as well as context. In addition, there is also the common pattern of condition given in the protasis with an order, suggestion, or request in the apodosis (e.g. *Lys.* 13.92; *Gorg.* 11.6; *S.El.* 585; *S.Aj.* 187; *E.Med.* 355; and see Wakker, 1994, 263ff.).

¹¹⁷ Cf. ZenoB1 and 3; Meliss.B7.2 and 7.10.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Thesleff, 1966, 92ff.

¹¹⁹ Anaxag.B4.

use of λόγος in phrases such as καὶ περὶ τοῦ προυχοντος ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος¹²⁰ might be compared with ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου...(97d1).

As characteristic of the 'scientific style' Thesleff also identifies stylistic austerity, 'consistent terminology', and 'abstractness of expression' such as 'wide use of abstract nouns',¹²¹ all of which are prominent in Passage II. It contains no imagery, no elaborate antitheses or periods, no rare diction, and a comparatively sparse range of vocabulary, reflected in its exceptionally small 'lexeme-token ratio' of 0.52. With respect to word forms and 'parts of speech', there are very few adjectives or adverbs and an absence of compound nouns, adjectives, or adverbs.

While abstract nouns in general are obviously not restricted to such prose, the particular form which consists of the definite article and neuter adjective is noticeably common in Anaxagoras himself,¹²² and others. For example, Anaxagoras talks about τὸ σμικρόν and τὸ μέγα, and τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ.¹²³ This noun-form has been labelled as particularly Platonic.¹²⁴ Yet its frequency still varies and, in this passage, it occurs far more than on average in the dialogue, although all examples are either τό + (various degrees of) ἀγαθόν or + χεῖρον.

Overall, the conjunction of distinctive stylistic features is reminiscent in many ways of the type of writing associated with Anaxagoras and, more generally, with Presocratic prose. In this way it is a good example of the scope and variety of Plato's allusiveness.

¹²⁰ Zeno B1. Cf. also Meliss.B7.6.

¹²¹ See Thesleff, 1966, 89.

¹²² Webster, 1952-3, 24, claims that, 'in its full development' this noun-form is found in 'the early Hippocratic writings, Anaxagoras, and Thucydides'. Cf. e.g. Hp.Aēr12; Other scholars, e.g. Kühner and Gerth, 1955, 267-8 and Denniston, 1952, 36-7, note the preponderance of such nouns formed from adjectives in Plato and from participles in Thucydides, but do not include the Presocratics. Cf. e.g. Finley, 1942, 262.

¹²³ Anaxag. frs.B3 and 4 respectively.

¹²⁴ Cf. Long, 1968, 14.

5.5 Passage IV

The general stylistic character of this passage is peculiarly Platonic, with no strong affiliations to any particular genre or author, apart from limited similarities with Xenophon's Socratic dialogues. In certain respects, the passage is even exceptional within the context of Plato's own style.

The two key features are increasing ellipse in the first part, together with the structural parallelism associated with the last two main units. Ellipse and parallelism, often in combination, are, as discussed above, characteristic of many passages of short questions and answers in Plato¹²⁵ and, to a certain extent, in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*.¹²⁶ However, for a number of reasons the first parts of Passage IV stand out among such parallels.

The structure of the ellipse is much tighter here than elsewhere, subtly increasing within the first two sequences, and culminating in the final, single word responses, θάνατος and ἀθάνατον, respectively. This prominence through isolation slightly resembles the foregrounding of φρόνησις in Passage I (69a10/l.5).¹²⁷ Yet, even though the prominence of φρόνησις there is exceptionally striking, it is also accompanied by a number of features associated with the types of verse and prose in which similar foregrounding is usual, so that its occurrence fits into a broad generic affiliation. By contrast, outside Plato, one cannot find even a vague parallel for the occurrence of this phenomenon in a passage like IV.

In addition, the interlocutor's answers here are also exceptional, differing from other Platonic dialogues, where the short responses of the interlocutors in such sections are usually restricted to a choice of brief and often formulaic words of affirmation or denial, or short questions.¹²⁸ This is true throughout Platonic dialogues of all three periods and, even in the *Philebus*, in which Protarchus' role is fairly active, his

¹²⁵ Found in all periods: e.g. *Euthphr.* 10a10-e9; 13a5ff.; *Chrm.* 174b1-10; *Lys.* 213b5ff.; *Gorg.* 460a5ff.; *Rep.* 410e10-a3; *Phdr.* 261c4ff.; *Tht.* 189a2-6. *Cra.* 387b5ff.

¹²⁶ E.g. *X.Mem.* 2.7.5; 3.8.3; 3.9.4; 4.2.14.

¹²⁷ See p.103ff., above.

¹²⁸ Cf. Thesleff, 1967: 'Plato employs a wide register of brief confirmative and negative formulae and other types of reply'.

answers are rarely more than *ναί* or *ἀνάγκη*.¹²⁹ These short formulaic responses may well be a feature of Socratic dialogues in general, given that similar patterns are found in Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, where Socrates' interlocutors often respond with phrases such as *καὶ μάλα* or *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*.¹³⁰ By contrast, in this *Phaedo* passage, the interlocutor's answers, though short, depart from the stock phrases of response and form a vital part of the argumentation and its content.¹³¹

At the end of this passage the point made at 105e11-106a1/IV.31-2 is expanded into two units, with marked parallelism on semantic, syntactic, and formal levels. Between these two units there is repetition both of structure and of the lexemes *ἀπόλλυμι* (106a5 /IV.36 and 106a10/IV.41) and *ἀνώλεθρος* (106a3 /IV.34 and 106a8/IV.39). Together with the elliptical omission of *ἀναγκαῖον* (106a3 /IV.34) in the second unit, the composition of these two units resembles typical Platonic parallelism, outlined in my description of Passage II.¹³²

The two distinctive features of lexis here are the large numbers of nouns formed from *τό* + adjectives or participles and of *α*-privative nouns and adjectives. The first of these features is, of course, also prevalent in Passage III, and appears to have a broad technical or philosophical prose background, associated as it is with reflective passages in Thucydides, the Hippocratic Corpus, and the writings of Presocratics like Anaxagoras and Melissus.

The generic background for the *α*-privative compounds is more difficult to trace, since this noun form is an important feature of Greek, common to all genres. Clusters of *α*-privative compounds are found in varied contexts, such as the rhetorical display used to conclude Socrates' outline of the five lives at *Rep.*580a

¹²⁹ E.g. *Phlb.*21a3ff. Cf. *Rep.*583c1ff.

¹³⁰ See e.g. *X.Mem.*3.3.12ff. and 3.10.7ff. However, in the *Mem.* there is also more of a tendency for the interlocutors to mix these responses with longer answers (e.g. 1.2.44; 1.3.9; 3.6.6; and 3.10.2) or solely to give longer answers (e.g. 1.4.7ff; 2.2.7 and ff.). Moreover, it is also common for the interlocutor to repeat the same response in successive sequences (e.g. 2.1.2ff.; 2.2.12; 3.2.1-2; and 3.2.6-7), which hardly ever occurs in Plato.

¹³¹ There is, of course, the famous episode in which Socrates questions the slave at *Meno* 82bff. Yet even here the majority of answers are simply phrases of affirmation such as *ναί* or *πάνυ γε*, occasionally interspersed with numerical answers.

¹³² See 116, above.

(ἀπίστω, ἀδίκω, ἀφίλω, ἀνοσίω),¹³³ or Aeschylus' ἄμαχον ἀδάματον ἀπόλεμον.¹³⁴ Yet one such cluster seems particularly relevant here, from Parmenides:

...ταύτη, δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι
πολλὰ μάλ', ὥς ἀγέννητον ἔδν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον¹³⁵.

This programmatic Parmenidean passage involves not only a group of α-privatives, but also the first extant usage of ἀνώλεθρος, a word then used a small number of times, exclusively by Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus.

In keeping with the general distinctiveness of the passage, three of the α-privatives also appear to be neologisms: ἄψυκτος, ἄθερμος, and ἀνάρτιος. Moreover, within extant classical and pre-classical Greek texts ἄψυκτος and ἄθερμος are instances of *hapax legomena*, while ἀνάρτιος appears only four times, all in the *Phaedo*, twice within this passage (106a1/IV.31 and 105d15/IV.18) and twice in close proximity (104e5 and 106c3).

5.6 Passage V

The composition of this passage is, on the whole, loosely paratactic, emphasised by a general absence of particles other than δέ, τε, and the prevalent καί. Thus it has certain similarities with historical prose,¹³⁶ although there structure is usually associated with narrative sequentiality, whereas both temporal and logical sequentiality are generally absent from this passage.

¹³³ Cf. Pl.*Prt.*321c, in Protagoras' speech: καὶ ἀνυπόδητον καὶ ἄστρωτον καὶ ἄοπλον.

¹³⁴ A.*Ch.*55. Cf. Heraclit.B50.

¹³⁵ Parm.B8.2-4. Although the text of this fragment is controversial, and ἀτέλεστον has been questioned, there does seem to be general agreement over the inclusion of ἀνώλεθρον, ἀγέννητον, and ἀτρεμές. Cf. e.g. KRS, 248.

¹³⁶ Although it bears more of a resemblance to Herodotus or Xenophon than Thucydides.

Des Places picks out 111b4-c4 as an example of characteristically Platonic ‘à rallonges’ phrasing.¹³⁷ He mentions the proliferation of καί and compares it to certain other Platonic passages, although these feature sequences of relative clauses. While the looseness of logical connection in his cited passages is comparable, our passage’s striking parataxis is a crucial aspect of its composition and puts it at odds with these other passages, which share its looseness, but are, nevertheless, predominantly hypotactic.¹³⁸

In this passage’s elaborate ‘geographical’ description varied parallel structures, used to contrast the ‘true’ earth to our own, represent (with the exception of parataxis), the only recurrent aspect of unit organisation. It also contains an exceptionally large number of lists, and these are not reinforced by other parallel structures. In relation to both Plato and extant Greek literature in general, the passage presents a highly unusual appearance, with no clear stylistic parallels.¹³⁹

In part this may be due to the loss of early geographical texts. Of Hecateus, the ‘father of geography’,¹⁴⁰ the extant geographical fragments comprise little more than a few groups of names,¹⁴¹ while the extensive works of many other key geographers are lost entirely.¹⁴² However, some idea of common stylistic traits and how these compare to the *Phaedo* passage can be derived from what does survive.

Extant early geography is perhaps best represented by certain passages of Herodotus, although a work such as the Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* may also be useful. In addition to this, the *Periplus* of Pseudo-Scylax,¹⁴³ thought to have been written between 360 and 347 BC, also provides evidence for the stylistic features of these

¹³⁷ Des Places, 1950, 365.

¹³⁸ Cf. 5.3.1, above.

¹³⁹ Kingsley, 1995, chs.7-8, suggests that the myth’s geography is based on that of Sicily, though he does not focus on style. He points out aspects of the *Phaedo* myth which are common to later geographical works, but the correspondences are not stylistic and the attested writers, Diodorus Siculus and Strabo, are much later than our period. Furthermore no primary sources survive to validate his proposal that the ‘mythical material’ has Pythagorean origins, so that, apart from a slight verbal echo of Empedocles (86), there is no earlier or contemporary verbal evidence for the tradition to which the *Phaedo* myth is ascribed.

¹⁴⁰ Tozer, 1935, 75.

¹⁴¹ E.g. Hecat.frs.271; 274; 276. See Warmington, 1934, xxxviii; Tozer, 1935, 71.

¹⁴² Warmington, 1934, xlvii..

¹⁴³ Müller, 1882, I.15-95.

early topographical works.¹⁴⁴ The structure of the sections on geography in Herodotus is mainly paratactic and often very simple, although occasional moments, where certain places, peoples, or geographical features are contrasted with each other, might seem comparable to the *Phaedo* passage.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, on the whole, Herodotean geography is very plain and lacking in detailed description, parallel structures, imagery, distinctive lexis, or structural complexity,¹⁴⁶ and many passages comprise simple catalogues of location or distance.¹⁴⁷ The style of Pseudo-Scylax's *Periplus* is even plainer, with short clauses linked by simple and highly repetitive coordination, and a pervasive cataloguing of locations and names.¹⁴⁸

There is a certain degree of similarity between this descriptive tradition and the *Phaedo* passage, insofar as both are predominantly paratactic, and share, for example, an absence of the same particles and the predominance of δέ, τε, and (especially) καί. Nevertheless, Passage V has complexity and variety absent from the geographers, in its use of imagery and parallelism and its diverse stylistic modes of contrast. The Hippocratic *Airs, Waters, Places* perhaps provides a closer model, in that it offers a detailed geographical account of Asia and Europe,¹⁴⁹ including some parallel structures and comparatives used to show the contrasts between the two continents. Parataxis is predominant, but is accompanied by a certain amount of loose hypotaxis, so that, as in Passage V, there is no logical or temporal sequentiality interconnecting the units, but also not the same repetitive simplicity as found in the other geographical texts.

¹⁴⁴ As well as Pseudo-Scylax, there is also the *periplus* of Hanno the Carthaginian, a work translated from the original Punic inscription, which is said to date some time around 480-470 BC (Tozer, 1935, 104; *OCD* 1996, 666). The style is similar to that of Pseudo-Scylax, although with more elements of simple hypotaxis. However, it would be risky to use this as evidence, since the dating and background of the surviving translation is uncertain.

¹⁴⁵ E.g. 2.10 and 4.50, in which the phrase describing the balance of complementary processes, which keeps the height of the Danube constant, arguably bears a very slight resemblance to Passage V: τοῦ μὲν χειμῶνος ἐστὶ ὅσος περ ἐστὶ, ὀλίγω τε μέζων τῆς ἐωυτοῦ φύσιος γίνεται· ὕεται γὰρ ἡ γῆ αὕτη τοῦ χειμῶνος πάμπαν ὀλίγω, νιφετῷ δὲ πάντα χρᾶται. τοῦ δὲ θέρεος ἡ χιῶν ἡ ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι πεσοῦσα, ἐοῦσα ἀμφιλαφῆς, τηκομένη πάντοθεν ἐσδιδόει ἐς τὸν Ἰστρον...

¹⁴⁶ The most descriptive detail occurs at e.g. 4.47: ἡ τε γὰρ γῆ ἐοῦσα πεδιάς αὕτη ποιῶδης τε καὶ εὐυδρὸς ἐστὶ, ποταμοὶ τε δι' αὐτῆς ῥέουσι οὐ πολλῷ τεῷ ἀριθμὸν ἐλάσσονες τῶν ἐν Αἰγύτῳ δωρύχων. Cf. 4.185 or 2.7.

¹⁴⁷ E.g. 4.85: τοῦ τὸ μὲν μῆκος στάδια εἰσι ἑκατὸν καὶ χίλιοι καὶ μύριοι, τὸ δὲ εὖρος, τῇ εὐρύτατος αὐτὸς ἐωυτοῦ, στάδιοι τριηκόσιοι καὶ τρισχίλιοι. Cf. 2.6ff; 4.36ff.

¹⁴⁸ A typical passage is e.g. 46: εἰσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ πόλεις Λακεδαιμόνιων. ἐν μεσογείᾳ δ' ἐστὶ Σπάρτη καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαί. παράπλους δὲ τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων χώρας ἡμερῶν τριῶν.

¹⁴⁹ *Hp.Aër.* 12ff.

Various aspects of *Airs, Waters, Places* bear similarities to Passage V. The Hippocratic treatise has, for instance, a certain leaning towards comparison,¹⁵⁰ juxtaposed repetition, and other parallel structures, as in:

πολὺ γὰρ καλλίονα καὶ μέζονα πάντα γίνεται ἐν τῇ Ασίῃ· ἢ τε χώρα τῆς χώρας ἡμερωτέρη καὶ τὰ ἥθεα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡπιώτερα καὶ εὐοργητότερα.¹⁵¹

As in Passage V, unit organisation is loose and predominantly paratactic, but nevertheless includes a variety of clauses, especially relative. A comparison of Asia to the spring-

εἰκός τε τὴν χώραν ταύτην τοῦ ἡρος ἐγγύτατα εἶναι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὴν μετριότητα τῶν ὥρέων.

- is interestingly similar to some of the analogies drawn in Passage V. The *Phaedo* passage draws an analogy between the relationship of, on the one hand, air and water and, on the other, aether and air. Although this reads like imagery, the boundaries are confused by the fact that air, aether, and water are themselves explicit subjects of discussion elsewhere in the passage. The analogy is preceded by another which compares the function of air and aether for those who live on the true earth with the function of water and air on our 'earth'.¹⁵² Likewise, the *Airs, Waters, Places* comparison of a region to a season raises the question of whether to take it as imagery, with spring as the vehicle, when the seasons themselves constitute an explicit topic in the treatise.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Formal devices of comparison, however, do not feature widely in the Hippocratic work: significantly its description of Asia is simply followed by that of Europe, with no point by point contrast.

¹⁵¹ Hp.*Aēr.* 12.

¹⁵² See ch.4 p.92, above.

¹⁵³ See e.g. Hp.*Aēr.* 1. Moreover, one of the treatise's key premises is that the nature of a people assimilates itself to the geography of its country, so that, against this background of correspondences between different natural phenomena, it is conceivable that there might also be actual correspondence between season and geography.

Finally, the emphasis on contrast in Passage V recalls a short Anaxagorean fragment, B4, which appears to discuss the existence of another parallel world. Although Anaxagoras, unlike Plato, is emphasising the absolute correspondence, both passages nevertheless list features of another earth, using phrases like ὥσπερ παρ' ἡμῖν, in the former, and ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς and ὥσπερ οἱ ἐνθάδε, in the latter.

One feature that serves to distinguish our passage from other extant geographical descriptions is imagery, the clearest example being the painting simile at 110b8-c1/V.4-5. As stated above,¹⁵⁴ the meaning of the vehicle term δείγματα here appears to be different from its usage elsewhere. Furthermore the simile is also extended by a relative clause, οἷς δὴ οἱ γραφῆς καταχρῶνται. In all pre-Hellenistic literature there seem to be only three other images involving γραφῆς, two of them in the *Republic*, and the third and perhaps the closest in Empedocles.¹⁵⁵ As in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic* examples are concerned with accuracy,¹⁵⁶ although the accuracy at issue in the two *Republic* passages is poetic and epistemological respectively, whereas the *Phaedo* simile belongs to a discussion of geographical phenomena. It is, in this respect, much closer to the Empedoclean example, which compares the coming into being of all the earth's creatures to the act of artistic creation and the mixing of colours:

ὥς δ' ὅποταν γραφῆες ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν
 ἄνδρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε,
 οὔτ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,
 ἀρμονίῃ μείξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω,
 ἐκ τῶν εἶδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι,
 δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἄνδρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας
 θῆρας τ' οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὕδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς
 καὶ τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμησι φερίστους·

¹⁵⁴ See Ch.4 p.91, above.

¹⁵⁵ Emp.B23.

¹⁵⁶ Rep.377e and 484c.

It is therefore possible that the *Phaedo* simile involves a direct allusion to Empedocles.¹⁵⁷ This may be of particular interest if, as Kingsley argues, the *Phaedo* 'myth' is in some way connected to Empedoclean ideas.¹⁵⁸

5.7 Passage VI: 117c3-118a17

Passage VI exhibits no outstanding uses of parallel structures, no particular patterns of unit organisation, and no imagery. Its vocabulary is differentiated from the other passages by containing no compound nouns or adjectives; a much greater number of compound verbs; and a marked lack of adjectives and adverbs. The structure of the passage is based on simple temporal sequentiality, so that it has a vivid, almost 'stream of consciousness' effect.

In very general terms, then, Passage VI appears to be most clearly affiliated to historiographical narratives and the most simple of the first person narratives in Lysianic oratory, with distinct likenesses, for example, to certain aspects of Euphiletus' speech in *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*.¹⁵⁹ Common to all these works is a narrative sequentiality, while they are also characterised by an absence of periodic unit organisation and a clear lack of all but temporal and spatial adjectives and adverbs.¹⁶⁰

The passage also has certain similarities to verse narratives, although these tend to be far more descriptive, with copious qualitative adjectives and adverbs as well as imagery. This is true both of epic narrative and of passages like messengers' speeches in tragedy. So, for example, Homeric narratives have a simple temporal structure,¹⁶¹ but do contain numerous descriptive terms and similes.¹⁶² Euripidean

¹⁵⁷ This might be supported by a possible echo in Empedocles' ποικίλλωσιν in the *Phaedo*'s ποικίλη (110b7/V.3).

¹⁵⁸ Kingsley, 1995, 112ff.

¹⁵⁹ Lys. 1.6-28. See e.g. Edwards, 1999, 7, on simple sentences in Lysianic narratives (and 58ff. on the possible relation between simplicity and the simple character of Euphiletus).

¹⁶⁰ On the plain style of e.g. early historiographers, see D.H.Th. 5 and 23, although, as Lilja, 1968, 132 and *passim*, has shown, there is significant variance between such authors, and their style may have been more elaborate than generally assumed.

¹⁶¹ Cf. especially those Homeric narratives of the the greatest intensity, e.g. *Il.* 24.468-479.

narrative sometimes shows slight similarities to the Plato passage,¹⁶³ with temporal sequentiality¹⁶⁴ and a lack of the complex subordinate clauses associated, for example, with Sophoclean narrative.¹⁶⁵ Yet, Euripides still has a greater diversity of word order and supplements the action with far more descriptive terms and imagery.¹⁶⁶

Returning to prose narratives, we may note, in Passage VI, its marked absence of genitive absolutes. It shares this feature with the 'vivid' parataxis found in early historical narratives.¹⁶⁷ In later historiography, especially Thucydides, narrative passages abound in genitive absolutes and other participial clauses, which often convey elements of the main action. Herodotus and Xenophon use these constructions similarly, albeit to a slightly lesser extent.¹⁶⁸ Like Passage VI, Lysias' simpler narratives, such as Euphiletus' narrative, also contain few genitive absolutes and, when these do occur, they usually only give general surrounding circumstances for the main stages of events.¹⁶⁹

Passage VI's most repetitive structural feature is clauses beginning with a finite verb preceded by a nominative participle. This pattern is common in prose narratives, and, when repeated, seems characteristic of earlier writing, like vivid narratives in

¹⁶² E.g. in the narrative at *Il.*15.358-9ff., the length of the pathway cleared by Apollo is said to be ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ δουρὸς ἔρωή/ γίγνεται, ὅπποτ' ἀνὴρ σθένεος πειρώμενος ἦσι. Cf. *Il.*17.262-5 and 281-3.

¹⁶³ Cf. Barlow, 1971, 73 on the 'leanness and economy of Euripides' narrative'.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Barlow, 1971, 61

¹⁶⁵ See e.g. *E.El.*74 and *Iph.T.* 260. Cf. *S.Tr.*899 and *OT* 1237ff.

¹⁶⁶ E.g. *E.Bacch.*1066-7 and *Hipp.*1198. See Barlow, 1971, on the 'descriptive imagery' and other 'devices' in Euripidean messenger speeches.

¹⁶⁷ Russell, 1991, 74 n.24 and 114. Cf. Lilja, 1968, whose findings suggest that the lack of genitive absolutes is characteristic of the earliest narrative prose, with none in Hecateus or Charon (76, 85), and only an occasional 'temporal' genitive absolute in the other early historiographers (82, 88).

¹⁶⁸ E.g. *Th.* 2.67.4: ἀφικομένων δὲ αὐτῶν δείσαντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὸν Ἀριστέα μὴ αὐτοῖς σφᾶς ἔτι πλείω κακουργῇ διαφυγῶν, ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τούτων τὰ τῆς Ποτειδαίας καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ θράκης πάντα ἐφαίνετο πράξας, ἀκρίτους καὶ βουλομένους ἔστιν ἃ εἰπεῖν αὐθημερὸν ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγα ἐσέβαλον, δικαιοῦντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀμύνεσθαι ὡς περ καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπῆρξαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἐν ὁλκάσι περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλέοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. Cf. e.g. *Hdt.*1.82 and *X.HG* 2.2.9-10.

¹⁶⁹ E.g. *Lys.*1.15: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες, χρόνου μεταξὺ διαγενομένου καὶ ἐμοῦ πολὺ ἀπολελειμμένου τῶν ἐμαυτοῦ κακῶν. Cf. also e.g. *Lys.*3.5-14, in which there is only one, circumstantial, genitive absolute (at 6: ἔνδον οὓσων τῆς τε ἀδελφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς καὶ τῶν ἀδελφιδῶν); and the account of the actions of Andocides in 6.21-30. The same is even true of the more 'sophisticated' narrative in *Lys.*12.4-22.

Herodotus and the early historians. Once again, it also appears in the 'simple' narrative of such orators as Lysias.¹⁷⁰

Other narrative features here appear to have similar affinities. For example, there are the formal aspects of the introduction of direct speech into the main account. While direct speech is common within most types of narrative, there is great variation in the formal markers used to distinguish it from the main narrative.¹⁷¹ In Passage VI both sequences of direct speech are indicated by what Bers calls 'interrupting quotatives', a word or phrase indicating direct quotation: for example ἐκεῖνος δέ, οἷα, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε ὦ θαυμάσιοι...(117d7/VI.14). Although 'needless iteration of quotatives is a familiar feature of naïve narration',¹⁷² it seems that interrupting quotatives like those used here are a later innovation, found in narrative passages of Andocides, Lysias, Isaeus, and Aeschines.¹⁷³ In earlier oratory, such as Antiphon, direct speech itself is avoided.¹⁷⁴ While Xenophon features a mixture of quotatives which interrupt and which precede direct speech,¹⁷⁵ neither Herodotus nor Thucydides use the former, and both keep to introductory phrases such as Herodotus' ὃ δὲ εἶπε or Thucydides' λέγων ὧδε. As support for the view that interrupting quotatives are associated with 'plainer' or more colloquial style, we might note that they are used in comic verse, with occasional examples in Aristophanes and a large number in Menander.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ E.g. Hdt. 1.115: ἀκούσας δὲ καὶ ἰδὼν Ἀστυάγης, θέλων τιμωρῆσαι τῷ παιδί τιμῆς τῆς Ἀρτεμβάρους εἵνεκα, μετεπέμπετο τὸν τε βουκόλον καὶ τὸν παῖδα. ἐπεῖτε δὲ παρῆσαν ἀμφοτέρω, βλέψας πρὸς τὸν Κῦρον ὁ Ἀστυάγης ἔφη.... Cf. e.g. 3.89 A number of such constructions are to be found in the lists of participial constructions in e.g. Pherecydes and Hellanicus, given by Lilja, 1968, 82 and 88. For oratory cf. e.g. Lys.6.27: ἀποδρᾶς δὲ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ κινδύνου κατέπλευσεν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων. <τοσαύτην γὰρ ὁ> θεὸς λήθην ἔδωκεν, ὥστε εἰς τοὺς ἡδικομένους αὐτοὺς ἐπεθύμησεν ἀφικέσθαι. ἀφικόμενος δὲ ἐδέθη δὲ καὶ ἡκίσθη, ἀπώλετο δὲ οὐχί, ἀλλ' ἐλύθη. καὶ ἀδίκησας εἴρχθη. ἀποδρᾶς δὲ...; 1.18; And.*Mysteries* 38.

¹⁷¹ Direct speech is found within narratives in most genres. Bers, 1997, proposes that: the language used by Homer in direct speech is different from his other language (10); that in both epic and lyric, poets alert audiences to the boundaries between third person narrative and direct speech (15); and that in non-comic verse there is always an explicit verbal introduction (116).

¹⁷² Bers, 1997, 193. There is also an example of direct speech without introduction in Hecat.fr.30 See also e.g. Russell, 1991, 4, and Lilja, 1968, 70 and 100, n.15.

¹⁷³ E.g. Lys.1.16; And.*Mysteries* 131-2. See Bers, 1997, 182 and 193.

¹⁷⁴ Bers, 1997, 131-2.

¹⁷⁵ It seems that Xenophon uses these with shorter (e.g. 1.7.6; 5.4.32; 6.1.11) and longer (e.g. 1.7.16ff.) passages of direct speech respectively.

¹⁷⁶ E.g. Ar.*Pax*.76-7 (see Bers, 1997, 116) and Menand.*Samia* 242.

Another feature of Passage VI associated with oratorical and also historical narratives is explanatory parenthesis. These occur a number of times in this passage, ranging from those like ὥστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἑμαυτόν - οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκεῖνόν γε...(117c8/VI.6ff.), where the parenthesis is inserted at the end of a phrase and a pause seems fairly natural, to καὶ ἐκκαλυψάμενος - ἐνεκεκάλυπτο γάρ - εἶπεν - ὃ δὴ τελευταῖον εφθέγγετο - ὦ Κρίτων, ἔφη... (118a6/VI.29ff.), in which the inserted clause divides two closely cohering elements, and is then immediately followed by another parenthetical phrase. The majority of writers tend towards the first type of parenthesis, using it at fairly natural unit divisions and, although it is difficult to establish absolute patterns, the more usual type of parenthesis appears to be found, for example, between the two parts of a μέν/δέ sequence.¹⁷⁷ More drastic divisions, like Xenophon's οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι κρήτες, ἀλίσκεσθαι γὰρ ἔφασαν τῷ δρόμῳ, ἐκπεσόντες...,¹⁷⁸ are less common and usually occur as a feature of 'vivid' narration within the 'plainer' styles of narrative in writers such as Lysias, Xenophon, the early historians, and Andocides.¹⁷⁹

Finally, a few elements of this passage could perhaps be seen as reminiscent of Homer or tragedy. δακρύειν and its cognates (117c6/VI.6 c8/8; d4/13; e4/21), the only noticeable example of key-word repetition here, is, as might be expected, a term much repeated in (though not confined to) such works.¹⁸⁰ More specifically, however, Phaedo's final description of Socrates, ἀνδρός...τῶν τότε ὧν ἐπειράθημεν ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου (118a16-7/VI.39-41), evokes an Iliadic or tragic *topos* of posthumous praise and bears certain similarities to phrases similar to the *Iliad*'s πέφαται δ' ὄριστος Ἀχαιῶν,¹⁸¹ like the *Trachiniae*'s description of Heracles just after his death: πάντων ἄριστον ἄνδρα τῶν ἐπὶ χθονὶ/..., ὅποῖον ἄλλον οὐκ ὄψηποτέ.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁷ E.g. D.*Ol.*2.18. See McQueen, 1986, 42, on this and similar examples. Cf. Aeschin.3.172; X.*An.* 5.2; Lys.1.19; Pl.*Rep.*615a; Antipho*Herodes*21.

¹⁷⁸ X.*An.* 5.2.31.

¹⁷⁹ See e.g. Lys.3.10; 12.15; And.1.111; Aeschin.3.148. On the informality of the narrative in And. *Mysteries* see Usher, 1999, 48 and 56ff. on the simplicity of the narrative in e.g. Lys.1.

¹⁸⁰ E.g. H.*Il.*6.455, 459, 484, 496; E.*El.*181: δάκρυσι νυχεύω, δακρύων δέ μοι μέλει. Cf. e.g. S.*Tr.*848-52.

¹⁸¹ Hom.*Il.*17.689. Cf. e.g. Nagy, 1979, 26-33.

¹⁸² S.*Tr.*811-2. Cf. e.g. E.*Helen*1686-7.

Notwithstanding these few points, it seems that the style of passage VI is most similar to the plain narratives found in historiographical and rhetorical prose, with perhaps the closest parallel being the first-person narratives of Lysias.

5.8 Summary

From the analysis of these short passages alone, it is clear that Plato's reputation as an extraordinary stylistic innovator is well deserved. Not only does he create unusual combinations of elements taken from a full range of genres, so as to create unusual elements within his discourse, but he also innovates beyond these in apparently unprecedented ways, producing various stylistic effects which seem unique to Platonic discourse.

The stylistic analysis in the previous chapter not only revealed enormous variety, but indicated that every passage had its own distinctive stylistic character. Correspondingly, in terms of generic affiliation, prominent stylistic features are taken from a very wide variety of generic backgrounds, while individual passages each have entirely different generic characters.

As a whole, Platonic style appears to represent a diverse fusion of all Greek genres.¹⁸³ While some sections, such as Passage III, are tied to one particular genre, most actually combine different generic features to produce distinctive stylistic structures. One might say their typological distinctiveness (apparent from the analysis in Chapter 4) is enhanced by the diversity of their generic affinities, as well as the uniqueness of some items.

For example, Passage II combines: loose hypotaxis, for which hymnic invocations provide something of a model; ring composition, a phenomenon most closely associated with early verse and prose; and a large number of instances of hyperbaton, which is most commonly found in classical verse and oratory, although the Platonic examples are distinctive, both individually and for appearing in clusters.

¹⁸³ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* 14. Cf. Nightingale, 1995, 2.

Furthermore, the main section is interrupted by a sequence whose units share none of these stylistic features, but have an entirely different stylistic character of their own, with separate generic affiliations. On this evidence, Plato's style appears to involve a mixture of generic affiliation and innovation, which uses and combines generic features in unusual ways and adds stylistic elements with no clear generic background. The latter is most obvious in Passage IV, which lacks stylistic models on all levels, from the parallelism and ellipse of the unit organisation, to the number of distinctive α -privative terms.

By contrast, the stylistic affiliations of Passage III are so clear and specific that it is clearly allusive. The text alludes both to Anaxagoras and, more widely, to Presocratic prose. This is apparent on all levels of textual organisation, from the structure of units to the prevalence of lexemes with a particular noun-form.

All six passages can be broadly categorised in terms of affiliation and innovation. While III is the most allusive, V and VI also have fairly clear generic models, evident on all levels of stylistic structure, from the selection of individual lexemes to the types of unit organisation. At the other end of the spectrum comes IV, differentiated from the other passages by its lack of generic affiliations. The remaining two passages fall somewhere in between these two groups. Passage I is perhaps closer to the first group, innovating within a framework of clear generic models, while Passage II, with its unusual and distinctively Platonic unit organisation, tends slightly more towards Passage IV.

5.8.1 *Selection of passages for case studies*

The passages selected for the case studies in the chapters that follow include one from each of these three groups. III, the most allusive of the passages, exemplifies a stylistic mode with clear generic affiliations; IV is representative of a distinctive style lacking obvious models; while I lies midway between these types. In the case studies I will put these passages back into their wider contexts to explain the significance of their stylistic character, as it has emerged from the last two chapters.

I have also selected these three partly because they can be taken to represent different questions and attitudes within scholarship on the *Phaedo*. Passage IV comes from what is known as the 'final argument'. Of all parts of the *Phaedo* this is the section which has received probably the most critical attention, especially within those readings characteristic of the twentieth-century 'analytical' approach. By contrast, Passage I, the 'peroration' of Socrates' 'apology' has had little comment, and is not, as a rule, incorporated in any substantial way into modern philosophical discussions. Finally, there is Passage III, the part of Socrates' 'intellectual autobiography', in which he describes his reactions to reading Anaxagoras. The standard interpretation of this passage reduces it to a single point, while critics have puzzled over how its demands for a teleological account of causation can be reconciled with the rest of the dialogue. This is a passage whose significance is sometimes recognised, but never fully explored.

Thus, in terms of their style, their generic affiliation, and their critical reception, these three passages provide a varied and representative basis on which to examine how style contributes to argument and can affect our interpretation of the dialogue.

Part II: Case Studies

Chapter 6

Stylistic transition: from Socrates 'apology' to the 'argument from opposites'

Stylistic analysis, according to my definition of style in Chapter 2, has revealed the 'semantic structure of the microcontextual formal features of the text'. We can now consider its role within the argument and how it affects philosophical interpretation. This chapter is the first of three case studies exploring such questions by examining the function of distinctive stylistic traits in argumentation. Each study focuses on one of the earlier six passages, broadening the discussion to incorporate aspects of its wider context.

6.1 Introduction

I concentrate here on the end of Socrates' 'apology' (my earlier Passage I, 69a6-e4),¹ whose style, like the 'apology' in general, makes it by modern standards an unlikely vehicle for philosophical analysis. Thus, despite the current consensus that all the dialogue's parts are philosophically relevant, it is still difficult to develop an interpretation of any complexity or substance. There is very little detailed critical literature on the 'apology', the main exception being the imagery in 69a6-c3, discussed by several commentators. Nevertheless, they still fail to follow through the full implications of its stylistic structure, as I will show below.

Best described as 'expanded explanation', style in the 'apology' mixes clear generic affiliations with innovation. By explaining how its elements move towards a number of reasoned conclusions I aim to demonstrate that it is an argument, albeit one whose style differs substantially from conventional philosophical modes. I will discuss the 'peroration' (Passage I) together with some other parts of the stylistically similar 'apology', looking at key stylistic features and their generic affiliations.

¹ Socrates' 'apology' refers to *Phd.* 63c8-69e4. Cf. Hackforth, 1955, 57, on this section as Socrates' "defence", his second *Apology*.

I shall consider the ‘apology’ both by itself and in relation to the subsequent ‘argument from opposites’ (70c4-72e2). The transition between them constitutes one of the most dramatic stylistic changes within the *Phaedo* and draws attention to their contrasting features. In Chapters 4 and 5 we saw that the stylistic distinctiveness of individual sections is a prominent characteristic of the *Phaedo*. These two juxtaposed and very different passages provide an interesting forum for investigating key aspects and possible motivations for this distinctiveness.

Not only is style in the ‘argument from opposites’ radically different from the ‘apology’ but, unlike the much neglected ‘apology’, it has been the focus of much critical discussion.² By contrast to the ‘apology’, its style, as with the other three ‘main arguments’, can be assimilated to some degree to modern models of ‘philosophical argument’,³ laying out premises and conclusions fairly clearly and unambiguously, and therefore lending themselves easily to philosophical interpretation and critique.

This transition between sections is therefore also a good focal point for comparison of, in modern terms, (ostensibly) ‘non-philosophical’ and ‘philosophical’ styles and for discussion of what constitutes ‘philosophical style’ within a Platonic context, with reference to its difference from, or correspondence with, modern paradigms. To answer these questions I will conclude by examining: whether the differing stylistic constructions affect the role of argument in either of these sections; their relationship with each other and other parts of the dialogue; and finally, whether distinctions between them might signify some difference in evaluative status.

6.1.1 *From Socrates’ ‘apology’ to the ‘argument from opposites’: a moment of transition.*

The move from Socrates’ ‘apology’ to the ‘argument from opposites’ marks a fundamental shift between stages of the dialogue, which is accompanied by a striking stylistic transition. There is a dramatic change from the ‘peroration’, a long speech

² Cf. Introduction, p.15, above.

³ With the possible exception of the ‘affinity argument’.

speech with many traits of elevated rhetorical discourse and verse, to short repetitively structured questions and answers in the 'argument from opposites'. My aim is not a comprehensive analysis of either of these sections, but rather to point out and classify their most prominent features, examining their contribution to the formation of argument.

Structure and value: some key differences

The 'argument from opposites' exhibits clear logical sequentiality in moving between individual units and sections and this is reinforced by large numbers of inferential particles. It is divided into distinct steps by its short question and answer format and the main sections comprise individual units with highly repetitive organisation and vocabulary, all of which helps to establish firmly the processes being described and makes it relatively easy to distinguish and paraphrase the argument's main stages. I will refer to these predominant structural features as 'verbal minimalism', borrowing 'minimalism' from a musical context. This term applies to pieces developing through repeated structural elements and very slight variation, so that structure is foregrounded and changes within individual stages are minimal.⁴

By contrast, the 'apology' mainly contains long speeches which, though connected, do not have similar logical sequentiality to the 'argument from opposites'. In Chapter 4, I explained how most of the 'peroration' (69a-e5) can be seen as 'expanded explanation' through: predominant parataxis with much apposition; prevalent copulative and adversative particles, combined with a general absence of inferential and confirmatory ones; repetitively structured lists with polysyndeton; extended imagery; many pleonastic pairs; and distinct lexemic as opposed to structural repetition. Although most pronounced in the 'peroration', many of these

⁴ Schwartz, 1996, 9: 'Minimalist music is based on the notion of reduction, the paring down to a minimum of the materials that a composer will use in a given work. In the classic minimalist compositions of the 1960s, practically every musical element - harmony, rhythm, dynamics, instrumentation - remains fixed for the duration of the work, or changes very slowly. And the chief structural technique is unceasing repetition'. Cf. 11, on Reich: 'Reich emphasized that the structure of the music...must be audible to the listener'. 'Minimalism' may be a useful term here. However, it is important not to push the musical analogy too far, since the structure of the argument here is directed at establishing certain principles and conclusions. By contrast, in music the 'structure', to a great extent, simply *is* the music (see Schwartz, 1996, 9).

features also occur elsewhere within the ‘apology’. So, for example, we find polysyndetic lists and pleonasm at 66c2-3 and 66c5-6. Moreover, the long speeches throughout have an absence of inferential particles like οὖν and ἄρα.⁵

Traditional methods of philosophical analysis make it difficult to establish any stages of ‘argument’ here, beyond paraphrasing its main claims. Yet even if most of the passage does not lay out clear patterns of inference, we can still isolate connections between particular individual words, phrases, or structures which, both individually and cumulatively, come together to form an argument. This proceeds by exploiting a variety of verbal associations, which extend both backwards and forwards on all levels of the text and can be called, collectively, a ‘nexus of associations’. The phrases ‘nexus of associations’ and ‘verbal minimalism’ encapsulate some predominant stylistic tendencies, but are not comprehensive characterisations. Their meanings and appropriateness will become more apparent through detailed analysis of the distinct parts and features of the two sections.

The passages also differ greatly in respect of evaluative language. Whereas the ‘apology’ is very rich in such language and uses it to forge links between the evaluative status of its components, the terminology of the ‘argument from opposites’ is, by contrast, almost exclusively neutral, with explicit normativity only in occasional evaluations of the argument, like Cebes’ μοι δοκεῖς παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ λέγειν (72d4-5).

6.2 The end of Socrates’ ‘apology’ (66b1-69e5): argument and value through a ‘nexus of associations’.

In the ‘apology’ Socrates offers a defence of the philosopher’s willingness to die and confidence that a philosophical life will lead to the greatest goods in the afterlife (e.g. 63e8-64b9), claiming that death and the philosophical life which aspires to be like death will bring the individual closest to truth. He justifies his views by arguing that

⁵ They are, however, found within the occasional shorter speeches, such as 67b7-c3 or 68b8-c3. Moreover, they are very common in 68c5-69a5 which, I argue below, p.168, is a stylistic anomaly within this section. On the general uses of ἄρα and οὖν in argument, see Sicking and Ophuijsen, 1993, 102ff. and 96ff.

the philosophical life itself attains value through emulation of death, while also leading to better conditions after death itself.

Accordingly, his explanation of what constitutes the philosophical life is inextricably intertwined with a demonstration of its value. Yet this involves a radical redefinition of the very way in which value itself is conceived and he must distinguish this carefully from its conventional conception. Throughout the ‘apology’ he achieves this by using conventional techniques which invest phenomena with value, while often undercutting their very basis. In doing so he constructs a value system and simultaneously depicts the faults of the alternative system, despite relying heavily on its language. The following sections concern the main techniques used in the arguments for, and explanation of, a φρόνησις-based morality.

6.2.1 *The value of φρόνησις and a φρόνησις-based system*

The ‘apology’ culminates in the description of φρόνησις, claiming its central importance for the philosophical life with striking metaphor, simile, aural imagery, and other devices, the cumulation of which all seem to suggest its extraordinary value. In this way it addresses the speech’s initial aims, to justify both the philosopher’s confidence when dying and hope of attaining the greatest benefits after death: μέγιστα οἶσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὴν τελευτήσῃ (64a1-2). For in the ‘apology’ Socrates presents φρόνησις as the philosopher’s aim in life which he acquires fully after death,⁶ while the ‘peroration’ itself stresses its value.

To support such claims Socrates must establish the value of φρόνησις. Yet, what reasons are given for its value? It is not enough simply to agree that philosophers strive towards this. For this shows *that* philosophers value φρόνησις, but not *why*. According to traditional readings, which appeal to the conventional ‘Socratic’ wisdom/virtue connection, φρόνησις’ normativity appears to derive from its relation to virtue. What I intend to show is that, rather than simply *stating* the value of φρόνησις, either in itself or through its connection with virtue, the ‘apology’ actually

⁶ E.g. 66e2ff. and *passim*.

uses the 'nexus of associations' which constitutes its stylistic structure to provide a number of *reasons* for the intrinsic value of φρόνησις.⁷

Unraveling these associations is by no means simple, given a number of clear difficulties. Yet both their problematic and straightforward implications lead to further understanding of the character of φρόνησις, as well as of the reasons for its normativity and for rejecting the alternative value system. In this way, a full interpretation depends on uncovering the steps of what can be seen as argument, despite its unconventional appearance.

6.2.2 *Value through direct association*

One way in which Socrates explains and argues for φρόνησις' value is by using style to suggest a number of characteristics which, taken together, seem to imply its normativity, so that value derives straightforwardly from different stylistic features. For example, φρόνησις is called μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν (69a9-10). First and foremost an immediate sense of value comes from the idea of financial wealth implicit in this metaphor's vehicle, coinage.⁸ This positive evaluation of φρόνησις accords with its earlier depiction in the 'apology' and is furthered here by other stylistic features which suggest points which could be taken as reasons for normativity.

Briefly to recapitulate and add to my earlier analyses, the initial antithesis of the image, comparing the false exchange of pleasures to the 'true coin', φρόνησις, marks the contrast between them, and this is further highlighted by the two corresponding and striking phrases of vocalic repetition: (οὐχ) αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ (69a6-7) and ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν (69a9-10). In addition φρόνησις is twice foregrounded through word order, standing alone in a clause surrounded by longer clauses. This reinforces its unique importance, heightened in the first instance by its final positioning in the unit (69a10), and in the second perhaps even more so by the surrounding lists (69b3), lengthy and repetitive with

⁷ See section 6.2.4, below.

⁸ Cf. Louis, 1945, 27; Bluck, 1952, 5.

homoeoteleuton and polysyndeton. In particular the mundane homoeoteleuton and aural regularity of καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων (69b4-5) reflect the comparatively meaningless flux of emotions, and are in stark contrast to the preceding short isolated clause, μετὰ φρονήσεως. Moreover, a precedent has already been set by a very similar occurrence of φρόνησις, a couple of pages earlier:

...καὶ τότε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡμῖν ἔσται οὗ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φαμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως, ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσωμεν, ὡς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει, ζῶσιν δὲ οὐ (66e1ff.).

There is also the repetition of πᾶς (69a10; b1; b5), which helps to clarify the idea *every* type of ‘transaction’ within our lives, concerning all emotions, must be governed by φρόνησις. Finally, and more generally, the very introduction of these distinctive stylistic features, especially such strikingly complex and elaborate imagery, might itself be thought to draw the passage into prominence.⁹

Thus the stylistic depiction of φρόνησις seems to suggest certain key characteristics. These are: its *uniqueness*, deriving from μόνον, its solitary positioning, and also the switch from νομίσματα to νόμισμα; its *separateness* or *distinctness* from the emotions, through word order and overall prominence; its *continuity* by contrast with the flux of emotions (καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων); its *comprehensiveness*, from the repeated πᾶς along with the dominance of φρόνησις over the whole passage; and finally, its relation to *truth*, through the antithetical repetition of ὀρθός, first negated and then, in conjunction with φρόνησις, positive. These characteristics can all be normative but, with the possible exception of ὀρθός, are not so *per se*. However, when attributed to φρόνησις within a passage claiming its value, their cumulation can be seen to appeal to their positive sense and give reasons for its value.

In addition, the metaphor’s extension gives further explanation of the normative characteristics of φρόνησις through direct tenor/vehicle correspondences. For all

⁹ Cf. e.g. Edwards, 1991, 39, on the function of similes.

things can be bought with φρόνησις and, given that a coin's importance lies in its buying power,¹⁰ nothing could be more valuable than a coin for which such power is comprehensive.

Conversely, repetition and aural imagery also highlight and expand upon the negative features of the competing and false common conception of ἀρετή which Socrates has already attacked. Here he describes this 'pseudo-virtue' as ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα (69a7-8). Previously he criticised its spuriousness because it relies on opposites causing opposites: τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρείοι εἶσι...(68d11).¹¹ In these instances, however, repetition and symmetry suggest processes whose outcomes are not significantly different from their starting point. So stylistic structure provides a new reason for negative evaluation, by implying the *futility* and *worthlessness* of the result.

This 'pseudo-virtue' is said to be an exchange ὥσπερ νομίσματα. In this simile, contrary to the associations of coinage and φρόνησις in the subsequent metaphor, the vehicle, 'coins', seems to imply notions of falsehood and worthlessness, perhaps appealing to a conception of coins as exchanged back and forth without achieving anything, with no real value in themselves. This impression is enhanced by the final μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα. For the usual point of exchange involving coins is that items can be exchanged for other items of equivalent value, not greater for lesser or vice versa. This incongruity might suggest that although, according to common perception, the exchange of e.g. fears swaps greater for lesser, such fears are so intrinsically valueless that exchange actually results in no substantial alteration,¹² an idea supported by the inclusion of coins and the striking repetition.

¹⁰ Greek coinage had some intrinsic value, but much less than its value as currency. See Weiss, 1987, 66, n.33.

¹¹ οἱ πολλοί's understanding of ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη are described as ἄτοπος (68d3), ἄλογον (68d12), and ἀδύνατον (68e3).

¹² Cf. Weiss, 1987, 58: 'pleasures, pains, and fears have no genuine value, thus no sum of them can possibly amount to *aretê*'.

6.2.3 *The exploitation of multivalent associations and tenor/vehicle discrepancies*

In the previous examples value derives straightforwardly from the style: foregrounding suggests uniqueness, coins evoke worth, symmetry implies lack of true productivity, and so on; providing reasons for a φρόνησις-based system. Yet both here and in other parts of the passage, there are several features whose significance can only be fully understood through recognising their multiple and often conflicting layers of associations.

The clearest example is, once again, the coin imagery. This exploits both the direct positive and negative associations of coinage, first invoking the futility and worthlessness of νόμισματa, and then the value of νόμισμα. Evidently coins are not seen as unequivocally valuable and Plato's choice of coinage as vehicle for suggesting φρόνησις' value therefore seems surprising. Moreover, whereas the implications of the coinage terminology in each part of the antithesis are fairly straightforward individually, its double use seems strange, because it establishes one thing's value with the very same term which just conveyed the worthlessness of others.

Such strangeness does not end with the clash between these direct tenor/vehicle correspondences, but is picked up and intensified in a number of tenor/vehicle discrepancies. Some of the most marked discrepancies remain unnoticed in the secondary literature and even those which have been spotted are usually seen as problems to be eradicated, rather than as containing a viewpoint to be incorporated into Socrates' account. Accordingly, critics try to explain them away or dismiss them as immaterial or even muddled. For example, commenting on difficulties resulting from the vehicle, coinage, being both differentiated from (69a6-9) and likened to φρόνησις (69a9-10), Annas calls the passage 'tangled' and says:

Phaedo 69A-D. The passage has caused much trouble, partly because of the fact that coinage serves, *rather ineptly* [emphasis mine], as the metaphor both for the inferior attitude (weighing up pleasures and pains) and for the better attitude (turning to wisdom and ignoring the relevance of pleasures and pains).¹³

¹³ Annas, 1999, 61 n.26.

If, however, we look closely at these inconsistencies, beyond any initial appearance of confusion, they actually appear to present further arguments for conclusions about the nature of the φρόνησις-based and opposing systems. Surely then it is far more likely that such clear and deliberate discrepancies have some significance, rather than merely being the result of carelessness or confusion.

At 69a9 νομίσματα represent the false exchange of emotions and sensations. In the very next line νόμισμα is φρόνησις itself, the aim and means of the true exchange for virtue. As we have seen above, the latter stresses the value of φρόνησις and the former the worthlessness of an opposing value-system.

Admittedly, the description of false exchange as ὥσπερ νομίσματα involves a short and simple simile, overshadowed by the subsequent extended metaphor, so that the latter might seem to override the earlier negative sense and detract from its possible significance. Yet, even if this were the case, there is still an earlier passage which heightens the idea of coinage as a false and worthless conception of virtue and strengthens the case for seeing the incongruities as deliberate and significant, rather than muddled or immaterial. In a connection unnoticed by commentators, only a few pages prior to this section the need for money or material possessions in order to satisfy bodily desires is depicted as the cause of numerous evils and, especially, as an impediment to the acquisition of φρόνησις itself (*Phd.* 66c6ff.). Thus the initial νομίσματα in the 'peroration' accords with the pejorative status of wealth in the earlier passage, while μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν which then depicts φρόνησις as the genuine principle and goal of all actions seems even stranger, given that up to this point money is clearly viewed as having a negative status and deleterious effect on philosophy.¹⁴

So although φρόνησις certainly seems to retain the positive value gained from the coin imagery, coinage's negative dimension is also evident here. Moreover, these conflicting valuations of νομίσματα, arising from its consecutive oppositional uses, are then joined by further tenor/vehicle discrepancies. At the same time as financial

¹⁴ Moreover, as I have suggested in Chapter 5, a formal change from simile to metaphor, as occurs within the antithesis, is often associated with ironic implications.

exchange terminology stresses φρόνησις' value, Plato fills the passage with incongruities, revealing their differences and drawing attention to the unsuitability of transaction as a model for φρόνησις.

In financial exchange coins are exchanged for other coins or item/s of equivalent value.¹⁵ On this understanding we have already seen how likening the exchange of supposedly lesser for greater pleasures etc. to coins (μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω ὥσπερ νομίσματα) suggests that such pleasures are actually of equal worth(lessness), as is consistent with the repetition of, for example, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς.

This idea of equivalent exchange is in every way inconsistent with φρόνησις here, as indicated by various tenor/vehicle incompatibilities. First, there is the singularity of φρόνησις, highlighted by the shift from plural, νομίσματα, to the φρόνησις metaphor's singular τὸ νόμισμα. True virtue is then said to be attained when φρόνησις is that '*for* which and *with* which all things are bought and sold'.¹⁶ τούτου (69b1), like ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι (69a10), implies that φρόνησις is not yet present, but must be aimed for in true virtue; while μετὰ τούτου (69b1) suggests that it must already be present. Moreover, with φρόνησις as the only true coin, how can transaction exist at all? So if we resist the attempt to iron out these difficulties, we can see how these inconsistencies imply that φρόνησις defies the notion of coinage and is incompatible with the principles of currency.

With φρόνησις as an overridingly valuable and powerful single coin, underpinning all transactions, the exchange of pleasures etc. associated with the ordinary conception of value evidently cannot have any genuine worth. Furthermore, with the discrepancies within the exchange imagery Plato argues that the value of φρόνησις does not derive from what it is used to attain, but is intrinsic.¹⁷ Clearly, φρόνησις is not valuable because it can attain pleasures, pains, or fears, since their presence or absence makes no difference (69b4-5). Moreover, any consequentialist connotations

¹⁵ See Sandywell, 1996, 112ff., on the importance of 'monetary exchange' for the formulation of Greek thought. Cf. Arist. NE 1133a19ff.

¹⁶ For this translation cf. e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 55: 'if all our buying and selling is done *for* intelligence and *with* its aid'.

¹⁷ Cf. Gallop, 1975, 102: 'In treating wisdom as the only 'right coin' (a9-10), Plato assigns to it an intrinsic worth that he denies to pleasure', although Gallop's overall interpretation of this passage differs from my own.

in ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα are undercut by the fact that φρόνησις is not just the means, but the result, implying that φρόνησις' value cannot be seen simply to lie in its product. In these ways Plato can be seen to argue through the stylistic structure against conventional consequentialist ethics, and therefore, for an anti-consequentialist model of φρόνησις.¹⁸

To reinforce the norms of his own radical vision Plato appeals to the value system he himself dismisses. Invoking the conventional worth of coinage, the imagery ascribes value to φρόνησις with the language of a morality simultaneously undercut and discredited by recalling the earlier explicit rejection of wealth-orientated system. Yet it is also discrepancies between vehicle, financial exchange, and tenor, φρόνησις, revealed by the stylistic structure, which provide reasons for a φρόνησις-based system to supplant one which holds coinage valuable. Points like the double use of νομίσμα and the switch from plural to singular indicate that φρόνησις' value is intrinsic, unlike that of coinage or pleasures etc. Thus the tenor appropriates the vehicle's value, but also exploits its contrary associations to provide reasons for its own value and for the rejection of the vehicle model.

Finally, there is the relationship of φρόνησις to virtue, the question which dominates the secondary literature. Here, in his 'apology', Socrates is trying to justify the philosopher's 'love', 'desire', and confidence in φρόνησις. Accordingly, it might seem strange if his justification lay not in the value of acquiring φρόνησις itself, but indirectly, in its leading to something else, virtue. If, instead of thinking in terms of the wider Platonic/Socratic debate and assuming virtue's key importance, one concentrates more on the immediate context, one may well arrive at a surprising and somewhat unconventional reading of this section.

¹⁸ A number of passages in Plato suggest the idea of a consequentialist ethics, in which a thing's goodness is assessed in terms of the state of affairs it brings about, rather than intrinsically. Most notable is the *Protagoras*' idea of knowledge as a 'measuring art' (*Prot.* 351bff.), according to which there is nothing stronger than knowledge, since this leads men to make the correct choice about pleasure and pain. The *Phaedo*'s rejection of exchanging pleasures for pleasures etc. seems clearly to recall parts of the *Protagoras*, such as lines which actually advocate this type of exchange: ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα πρὸς ἡδέα ἴσῃς, τὰ μείζω ἀεὶ καὶ πλείω ληπτέα· ἐὰν δὲ λυπηρὰ πρὸς λυπηρὰ, τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ μικρότερα (*Prot.* 356b). Because of the *Phaedo*'s anti-consequentialism, this passage can be seen not only to attack the value accorded to pleasure in the *Protagoras*, but also the very structure of the 'measuring art' itself. Cf. McCabe, forthcoming, on the way in which *Euthyd.* 281b-e makes us question the idea of consequentialism in *Meno* 87e6-88d3.

Socrates' idea of *φρόνησις* dominates the 'apology'. The virtues, by contrast, appear to slip in almost incidentally towards the end, when Socrates claims that the common conception of, for example, bravery, is most fitted to philosophers, who genuinely lack the fear of death.¹⁹ Others, by contrast, only face their fears to escape greater ones (68c5-13). Given the prominence of *φρόνησις* compared to virtue it seems unlikely that the conclusion would give the latter priority over the former. Furthermore, the 'peroration' can be seen to imply that virtue, far from being the reason for *φρόνησις*' normativity, itself depends on this for its positive evaluative status.

'Buying and selling all things for this and with this (i.e. *φρόνησις*) is, in truth, bravery, self-control, justice, and all true virtue' (69b1-2) implies that virtue consists of using as well as aiming for *φρόνησις* in all actions. This suggests that virtue in fact has an instrumental role in procuring *φρόνησις*, rather than vice versa. Virtue, then, becomes that which the philosopher, having attained some degree of *φρόνησις*, uses in his continuing search for *φρόνησις*.

The view of the virtues as instrumental is corroborated in 69c1 where they are called *κάθαρσις τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων*, while *φρόνησις* itself is called *καθαρμός τις*.²⁰ Clearly this draws a distinction between *φρόνησις* and virtue by the contrasting *-μός* and *-σις* suffixes. Although usage of these suffixes was slightly flexible in meaning and both forms sometimes denoted either process or product, two such nouns, derived from the same verb, were frequently used in contradistinction within the classical period, with *-σις* denoting process and *-μός* resultant state.²¹ Accordingly, as in the transaction imagery, the virtues appear to represent a process

¹⁹ This is not to suggest that Socrates shares such common conceptions. For they imply that acceptance or avoidance of particular fears etc. has some merit in itself, whilst Socrates clearly states that their presence or absence makes no difference (e.g. 69b4-5).

²⁰ The use of *κάθαρσις* and *καθαρμός* here is usually described as a 'medical' or 'purification' metaphor in which e.g. 'medical language is used with religious overtones' (Gooch, 1974, 154). However, as I have argued above, religious or spiritual purification appears to be a well enough established sense of *κάθαρσις* to preclude seeing it as live metaphor. See Ch.4 n.29, above.

²¹ Long, 1968, 18-19; Browning, 1958, 70. Moreover, this seems to fit in with other uses of these terms (e.g. 67c5) and even with 82d6 which e.g. Weiss, 1987, n.65, (following Burnet) has seen as providing evidence for the contrary viewpoint.

leading to φρόνησις and this makes sense if we understand these lines as showing what virtue would be in a φρόνησις-based ethics.

So it seems that in the 'apology' Socrates justifies the normativity of φρόνησις by its own characteristics and the failings of its rival value system. Unlike a conventional reading of this section, where φρόνησις' connection with virtue guarantees its normativity, this normativity actually appears to derive neither from pleasure nor material benefits, nor even from virtue. On the contrary, virtue itself has instrumental goodness because it leads to φρόνησις, while φρόνησις is only instrumental insofar as it leads to virtuous actions which procure more φρόνησις.

If this is the case, the implications of this section constitute a very surprising departure from the conventional account of Platonic/Socratic ethics, in which the value of wisdom seems clearly to stem either from its identification with, or role in procuring, virtue. Nevertheless, it does seem that the passage can be read in this way and, furthermore, that such a reading is not inconsistent with its immediate context.

In section 6.2.6 I shall outline some more reasons given by Socrates for the normativity of the φρόνησις-based system. Before doing so, however, I shall briefly examine the secondary literature on this passage to show how interpretations differ when certain stylistic aspects are missed or dismissed.

6.2.4 *'Ironing out' a metaphor: critical readings of this passage*

Considerable critical debate has focused on *Phaedo* 69a6-c3. When reading this passage, commentators appear to bring in issues and views from the *Meno*, *Protagoras*, and other dialogues explicitly concerned with virtue's relationship to wisdom, but overlook the immediate context.²² They take virtue as self-evidently normative,²³ while φρόνησις' normativity remains to be proved. Moreover, although certain attention is paid to the imagery, this only goes so far, with many

²² In spite of claims like Gooch, 1974, 155: 'the larger context of this passage must be kept in mind'.

²³ Cf. e.g. Burnet, 1911, 68-9, who actually uses the term 'goodness' rather than 'virtue' here.

points neglected because of what seems to be a desire for the imagery to 'work' neatly.

For the commentators the primary concern is whether the passage is concordant with the 'Socratic paradox' that virtue is knowledge, which would make φρόνησις intrinsically good, or whether φρόνησις is in fact instrumentally good, insofar as it leads to virtue.²⁴ Virtue's normativity is simply assumed, and the question at issue is felt to be how this normativity impinges on φρόνησις.²⁵

Commentators do notice a number of discrepancies in the 'coinage' imagery, or 'economic metaphor' as they call it,²⁶ and discuss and attempt to 'solve' various aspects of these difficulties.²⁷ They focus on two key points, the first being the incongruous simile and metaphor in which νομίσματα evokes both the exchange of pleasures constituting 'pseudo-virtue' and then φρόνησις itself.²⁸ Rather than question the evaluative status of coins *per se*, they see pleasures, pains, and fears as false coins, simply accepting the value of coins themselves.²⁹ Without any idea of a possible negative sense of coinage they see no reason to be suspicious of coinage itself and do not notice points like the relevance of earlier material or the νομίσματα/νόμισμα switch. The difficulties of μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω are not

²⁴ So e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 193, says that, ultimately, it is the 'the conception of φρόνησις as a *means...to* virtue' which 'prevails'; Luce, 1944, equates the two; Gooch, 1974, comes to the conclusion that φρόνησις is both instrumentally good, insofar as it leads to virtue, but also intrinsically, since it is itself one of the virtues; Weiss, 1987, claims that virtue is achieved through φρόνησις when φρόνησις is the aim, so that somebody can be virtuous in life, even if their goal, φρόνησις, is only attainable after death. To a certain degree, Weiss' position is similar to my own, since virtue aims for wisdom. However, unlike me, she still sees virtue as intrinsically normative and attainable without wisdom, and wisdom as instrumental (even though only through being an aim and not actually present) to the acquisition of virtue. For arguments against specific points see below.

²⁵ E.g. Hackforth, 1955, 192-3; Luce, 1944, 62; Gooch, 1974, 153; Weiss: 1987, 57.

²⁶ The fact that the imagery in 69a6-b8 is generally known as the 'economic *metaphor* [emphasis mine]', in spite of including both simile and metaphor seems symptomatic of the inattention to detail which pervades critical readings.

²⁷ Although cf. e.g. Bluck, 1952, 5, who suggests that the issue throughout 'is purely a question of values - what one regards as of sterling worth, and therefore tries to obtain in everything one does. As for the discrepancies, he adds that 'there is no need to press the metaphor so far'; Louis, 1945, 27, who simply cites this passage as example of Plato's tendency to assimilate things of value to 'monnaie de bon aloi'.

²⁸ Cf. Annas, 1999, 61 n.26, quoted above, p.147.

²⁹ E.g. Weiss, 1987, 59 on the 'popular misconception' that 'pleasures, pains, and fears have real value (as coins do)'; Gooch, 1974, 156. Luce, 1944, 62, does suggest the antithesis actually contrasts barter and the more sophisticated and therefore more valuable coinage. However, as Bluck, 1952, 5, rightly objects, the terminology clearly indicates that coinage is depicted in both antithetical phrases, and there is no evidence to support Luce's position.

interpreted, but avoided by the addition of various supplements such as Weiss' explanatory parenthesis '[in the case of pain and fear]' or Gooch's expanded: 'but this is not the right exchange for virtue, to exchange one small pleasure like a coin for a larger one, or larger pains and fears like coins for smaller pains and fears'.³⁰

The main difficulty is generally acknowledged to be in καὶ τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετὰ τούτου ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα (69b1-2), where they feel that τούτου ('for this') implies the idea of φρόνησις' identification with virtue and intrinsic goodness, whereas μετὰ τούτου suggests that φρόνησις is instrumental in acquiring virtue.³¹ Commentators worry about apparent inconsistencies arising from the same thing being both instrument and product of a process, and also about the idea that using φρόνησις in transactions suggests a depletion of stock.³² Consequently, often by adding, removing, or changing the sense of certain elements, they so interpret the lines as to eliminate any difficulties.³³

Another point taken as clear justification for seeing an intrinsic/instrumental divide between virtue and φρόνησις is, strangely enough, the very same κάθαρσις/καθαρμός distinction which I interpret as evidence for the opposite. In calling the virtues κάθαρσις τίς and φρόνησις καθαρμός τις it is usually assumed that Plato invokes a product/process distinction. This view of φρόνησις as instrument and the virtues as product then informs and determines most critical

³⁰ Weiss, 1987, 58; Gooch, 1974, 158.

³¹ See e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 193: 'This running together of the two ideas is...the chief source of difficulty both in this particular sentence and in the passage as a whole'.

³² See e.g. Gooch, 1974, 155; Hackforth, 1955, 193.

³³ E.g. Burnet, 1911, 67-8, dismisses τούτου μὲν πάντα, along with ὠνούμενά τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα, as interpolated, partially on linguistic grounds (see Ch.4 n.10, above), but also to prevent the 'simile' from 'break[ing] down'. Weiss understands μετὰ τούτου at 69b1 as 'with *phronêsis* [as one's value, aim, or concern]' (59), supposedly making it consistent with the earlier τούτου. She gives *Ap.* 32b8-c1 as a parallel for this use of μετὰ (65 n.18), despite a lack of evidence that μετὰ there definitely means 'for the sake of' as opposed to 'with'. Moreover, in *Ap.* 32b9 μετὰ is clearly in opposition to μετὰ in 32c1, where 'for the sake of' would not make sense. Gallop, 1975, 14, translates the τούτου and μετὰ τούτου as 'for that, or rather with that'. However, the text gives no evidence for seeing μετὰ τούτου as correcting rather than complementing the earlier τούτου. Cf. also Rowe, 1993a, 150, who also makes a similar move. Bluck, 1952, 5, ignores the difficulties (see n.27, above). Gooch, 1974, 157-9, seems to be the only commentator who accepts straightforwardly both 'with' and 'for' φρόνησις here. Nevertheless, he then explains φρόνησις as intrinsically good because it is one of the virtues, even though the passage as a whole, together with specific points such as the κάθαρσις/καθαρμός distinction, argues against such a reading.

readings of the earlier ‘coin’ imagery.³⁴ According to my reading based on classical Greek usage, the distinction is reversed, with *κάθαρσις/καθαρός* as process and product respectively. Accordingly, it gives no reason for taking virtue as goal and we can arrive at a reciprocal understanding of the ‘coin’ imagery and *κάθαρσις/καθαρός* distinction, rather than using the latter as a guide for eradicating the difficulties of the former.

In conclusion, commentators often seem to sacrifice close attention to the full range and significance of tenor/vehicle discrepancies and other nuances of the passage, in order to reach neat solutions which avoid, iron out, or misinterpret key elements. Their approaches appear largely motivated by both a desire to make Plato comfortably and easily consistent, and the urge to see this passage as simply making claims which relate to preoccupations of other Platonic works rather than arguing for a different and context-dependent viewpoint.

6.2.5 *Further multivalent associations and tenor-vehicle discrepancies*

The νόμισμα imagery’s significance lies in its negative and positive connotations, the discrepancies between them, and difficulties of reconciling vehicle with tenor, φρόνησις.³⁵ Other less extended imagery can be similarly analysed, most notably perhaps two instances which present the body as imprisonment or slavery: ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος (67d1) and δουλεύοντες τῇ τούτου [i.e. τοῦ σώματος] θεραπείᾳ (66d1-2). These contribute to the *Phaedo*’s portrayal of death as releasing soul from body and are echoed later, when Socrates calls those having led a righteous life ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ δεσμητῶν (114b8-c1).³⁶

³⁴ See e.g. Weiss, 1987, 61, on ‘the purification-metaphor’s assertion that *phronêsis* is but means to the end, the end being *aretê*’. Cf. also e.g. Gooch, 1974, 154, for this viewpoint and references to other adherents; Annas, 1999, 61.

³⁵ In some ways this is similar to Empson’s fourth type of ‘ambiguity’ in which ‘two or more meanings of a statement do not agree among themselves but combine to make clear a more complicated state of mind in the author’ (Empson, 1953, 136ff.).

³⁶ See Rowe, 1993, 288, for this and other examples of this image.

The vehicle's (release from chains) positive value ascribed to tenor (soul's release from body) derives from a conventional negative conception of chains caused, no doubt, because they restrict physical freedom,³⁷ and therefore stems from a body-orientated system. Immediate tenor/vehicle discrepancies arise, given the vehicle's dependence on valuing physical comfort, whereas the tenor's value comes from a soul-orientated system, where physical concerns are immaterial.³⁸ However, there are also larger discrepancies. As I said, the chain's capacity to restrict freedom must constitute the vehicle's negative aspect. Yet the body itself is responsible for restricting the soul's freedom, so that the imagery presents a reason why the body is bad, even though the vehicle (release from chains) depends upon seeing the body as valuable. In this way, Plato suggests not simply the worth of the unrestricted soul, but also creates a tension between two value systems and pushes us to assess their relative values and see them as oppositional. Just as with the coin imagery, tenor appropriates the value of vehicle, but also uses the vehicle's associations contrary to itself to justify its own value in terms which simultaneously reveal why the vehicle model must be rejected. Specifically, the consequence is that value is conferred on the soul's freedom (i.e. on incorporeality) in contradistinction to the body's so-called freedom.

Likewise there are the terms 'loves' and 'desires', ἐρώτων δὲ καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν (66c2), although these introduce a contrast not through imagery and tenor/vehicle discrepancies, but by including the same terms within two different contexts, one conventional and pejorative, one unconventional and positive. First, they describe yearnings caused by the body for material things conventionally regarded as valuable. For Socrates, these 'loves' and 'desires' hinder our quest for knowledge.³⁹ Then, shortly afterwards, with cognates of the very same two words, he says our purified soul will, after death, obtain the wisdom which we 'desire' and 'claim' to love: ἡμῖν ἔσται οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ φάμεν ἐρασταὶ εἶναι, φρονήσεως (66e2-3).⁴⁰ Like the coin imagery, the first instance devalues these terms, whereas

³⁷ Cf. Rowe, 1993, on λύουσι 59e6: 'i.e. from his chains, for the sentence to be carried out (but that will 'free' him in another sense: cf. 62b, 67d; also e.g. A.PV 97 and Hdt.3.145.

³⁸ Cf. e.g. 69b4-5 or Socrates' almost flippant attitude to chains, imprisonment, the poison, and, in general, to physical discomfort: e.g. 63e3ff.

³⁹ Cf. *Phd.* 68c9.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Phd.* 66b7.

the second appropriates their usual sense of 'aiming towards' something considered to be 'valuable' in order to outline an alternative value-system.⁴¹

Socrates' vision of philosophy here is often criticised for its sterility and absolute rejection of pleasures which we 'love' and 'desire', as well as for failing to account for the possible 'pleasure' of philosophy itself.⁴² By using these very same terms to depict the feelings which the philosopher will have for φρόνησις, Socrates suggests that philosophy will not replace conventional pleasures with a pleasureless alternative. Instead it will engender the same depths of feeling within us, the difference being their true worth as opposed to the valuelessness of those rejected emotions.

6.2.6 *Normative terms and their effect on other terminology*

I have proposed that Plato uses the 'apology' to argue for φρόνησις' normativity, and this can be corroborated by the role of normative terminology throughout the 'apology'. The quantity and variety of such terminology is one of the most prominent features and it describes different aspects of either the philosophical or conventional viewpoint. For example, the body is called an evil: ἕως ἂν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾗ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ (66b5-6). Conversely, in the 'peroration' Socrates claims that pursuing the philosophical life to his best abilities will lead him to δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἑταίροις (69e2) in the afterlife.

Terminology denoting truth or genuineness is also common, such as ὡς ἀληθῶς, τῷ ὄντι, and to a lesser extent ὀρθῶς. While this 'key-word' repetition is most striking in the 'peroration' it also appears throughout the 'apology'. Often these terms are in close conjunction and, in a couple of places, even appear as pleonasm, the two

⁴¹ The same terminology soon recurs with similar implications when Socrates says: philosophers αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν (67e7-8); even normal lovers are willing to enter Hades in order to see again the ones ὧν ἐπεθύμουν (68a6); and φρονήσεως δὲ ἄρα τις τῷ ὄντι ἐρῶν (68a7) should not grieve at death.

⁴² E.g. Gallop, 1975, 102-3, on 'this stark and misleading opposition between wisdom and pleasure'. Cf. e.g. Bostock, 1986, 32ff.

‘equivalent’ terms being juxtaposed: ὡς ἀληθῶς τῷ ὄντι (66c4) and τὸ δ’ ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι (69b8).

A very notable example is the repetition of φιλόσοφος, φιλοσοφία, or φιλοσοφέω, combined with various adjectives or adverbs signifying truth or genuineness. First, in the introduction to the ‘apology’, Socrates associates true philosophy with seeing death as good:

ὥς μοι φαίνεται εἰκότως ἀνὴρ τῷ ὄντι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίψας τὸν βίον θαρρεῖν μέλλων ἀποθανεῖσθαι καὶ εὐελπὶς εἶναι ἐκεῖ μέγιστα οἴσεσθαι ἀγαθὰ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ (63e9-10).

The dialogue contains many similar collocations.⁴³ In the ‘apology’ we find: τοῖς γνησίως φιλοσόφοις (66b2); πάντας τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς (67b4); οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς (67d8); τῷ ὄντι...οἱ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνήσκουσιν μελετῶσι (67e5-6); οἴεσθαι γε χρή, ἐὰν τῷ ὄντι γε ᾗ...φιλόσοφος (68b2) and οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς (69d2). Moreover, no examples of ‘philosophy’ terms are unaccompanied by ‘truth’ terms within this passage.

Near the beginning of the *Phaedo* Socrates offers a radical redefinition of philosophers as those orientating their life around practising for death. This distinguishes them not only from those not claiming to be philosophers, but also from people like Euenus who, though purporting to be a philosopher, would be unwilling to die and therefore has no legitimate claim to philosophy.⁴⁴ Thus the continual collocation of philosophy and truth terms recalls and emphasises that the ‘Socratic’ notion of philosophy, a preparation and willingness for death, is at issue here. This notion is referred to explicitly several times,⁴⁵ so much so, that even where it is omitted, this understanding of true philosophy still appears to be implicit.

Thus, repetition contributes to clarifying the *Phaedo*’s reconceptualisation of philosophy. Furthermore, this repetitive stylistic structure quite clearly suggests and

⁴³ *Phd.* 64a4-5; 64e2; 80e6; 82c2-3.

⁴⁴ *Phd.* 61b7-c9.

⁴⁵ E.g. 63e9-64a2; 67d7-10; e4-5; 68b1-3.

draws our attention to the idea that the Socratic notion of philosophy is genuine. This being so, a claim of philosophy's normativity comes from the inherent normativity of terms like ὀρθῶς and τῷ ὄντι in this context. Nevertheless, simple repetition of these terms in conjunction with philosophy terms foregrounds and implies a connection, but does not actually give reasons for accepting this conception of philosophy to be true.

A reason lies in those phrases describing φρόνησις' object with truth terms and so immediately implying links between these objects and the philosophy which seeks them.⁴⁶ It is this connection which gives reasons for Socratic philosophy's claims of truthfulness: namely, that the object towards which it aims is truth itself. For how could an activity which examines truth itself be anything but a genuine search for wisdom? This connection also works the other way, with the descriptions of philosophy providing reasons for taking truth, the object of knowledge, as normative. From the usage of, for example, ὀρθῶς and τῷ ὄντι, it is clear that they are seen here as inherently good, so that predicating truthfulness or genuineness of something confers normative status. Given that truth is then intrinsically good, the terminological connection shows why knowledge's object, truth, can be seen as good.

The case is similar for qualities such as simplicity, singularity, distinctness, and uniqueness which, as we have seen, are all associated with φρόνησις. Although none are unequivocally normative, in their cumulative usage in the 'peroration' they clearly seem to be viewed as conferring value. So, they not only provide reasons for φρόνησις' normativity, but in doing so produce reason for their own.

Such ideas are also supported by the association of distinctness and truth arising from, for example, how the soul which retreats into itself as much as possible comes closest to reality (e.g. 65c5-10).⁴⁷ This suggests a further connection between

⁴⁶ The disembodied soul is able to grasp 'truth' or 'reality'. See e.g. *Phd.* 66b5-7: ἕως ἄν τὸ σῶμα ἔχωμεν καὶ συμπεφυρμένη ᾗ ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ μετὰ τοιούτου κακοῦ, οὐ μὴ ποτε κτησώμεθα ἱκανῶς οὐ ἐπιθυμοῦμεν· φαμέν δὲ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ ἀληθές; 65b9; 66d7. The objects of knowledge are also described as τὰ ὄντα, recalling the recurrent τῷ ὄντι, at e.g. 65c3; c9; 66c2;

⁴⁷ Cf. e.g. 64c7-8: ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν.

φρόνησις, the soul, and the objects of knowledge, the Forms, which are described by phrases like αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐλίκρινες ἕκαστον...τῶν ὄντων (66a2-3).

The case is similar for purity, as seen from ἐλίκρινής in ἀλλ' αὐτῇ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐλίκρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ χρώμενος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐλίκρινες ἕκαστον ἐπιχειροῖ θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων (66a2-3). Similarly, καθαρῶς describes the knowledge attained by souls free from the body (e.g. 66d8 and e5) because pure and unadulterated,⁴⁸ while the 'peroration' presents virtue as κάθαρσις τις and φρόνησις as καθαρμός τις (69c1-3), so that κάθαρσις and its cognates make a connection between intelligence and its objects.⁴⁹

Conversely, terms denoting mixture or plurality, such as συμπεφυρμένη (66b5) or παντοδαπῶν (66c3), are linked to bodily evils and their concomitant needs, so that they acquire a negative sense. This is perhaps enhanced by two tripartite pleonastic phrases describing the adverse effects of body on soul: καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας... (66c6-7) and παραπίπτειν θόρυβον παρέχει καὶ ταραχὴν καὶ ἐκπλήττει (66d5-6). This semantic repetition might also be seen to evoke the plurality bound up with the body.

Other features here create a similar impression. The body causes the soul μυρίας ἀσχολίας (66b8) and φλυαρίας...πολλῆς (66c3-4), while the noun θόρυβος (66d6), describing the body's effect on intellectual inquiries, could have certain connotations of plurality from its usual association with the clamour of a crowd. Even the phrase σύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος (66a5) might indicate the body's composite nature, given that σύμπας implies a whole composed of parts. Within the later 'argument from affinity' the body's composite nature is one of the primary reasons given for its destruction after death, unlike the simple and incomposite soul (78c1ff.). So here plurality and complexity seem to substantiate the body's negative status, implying therefore that they are being understood as pejorative *per se*.

⁴⁸ Cf. καθαρῶτα at 65e6.

⁴⁹ Cf. Scharnagl, 1994, 118. Although primarily interested in mystery terminology, she says that the association of καθαρῶτα and διάνοια at 65e creates a connection between κάθαρσις and reason.

6.2.7 *Drawing these associations together*

Although the patterns of association emerging from the ‘apology’ appear to be of great importance, most are bypassed by conventional philosophical readings of the dialogue. I have suggested that this is largely because the mode of expression here does not conform to modern paradigms of philosophical argumentation. In fact, the only part of the ‘apology’ whose style is at all close to this conception of ‘philosophical argument’,⁵⁰ the section where Socrates attacks the ordinary conception of virtue, is also the only part of the ‘apology’ which receives substantial comment, apart from the beginning of the ‘peroration’.⁵¹

The ‘apology’ does not proceed in ordered steps that clearly lay out the reasoning process. Instead its stylistic structure makes certain elements prominent and reveals interconnections between them, even if their purpose is not immediately evident. Consequently, a ‘nexus of association’ emerges between elements which can be seen to signify through interconnectedness, fitting together to form arguments. These depend not simply on tracing a linear progress of argumentation, but on a series of additional moves. Effectively the reader is drawn into a type of dialectic with the text and forced to move backwards and forwards, bringing together the associated elements in order to understand the prominence of particular features as well as apparent incongruities or multivocality.⁵²

From these interconnected associations within the ‘apology’ other significant points emerge which complement, challenge, or augment standard accounts. The ‘apology’ constructs and argues for a φρόνησις-based value system, based upon its opposition to the conventional values which it both appeals to and then displaces, by revealing

⁵⁰ See below, p.168.

⁵¹ See e.g. Gallop, 1975, 98-102 and Hackforth, 1955, 56-7. There is also some discussion of: the concept of death as release of soul from body at (e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 49); the question of how far terms like [τὸ] δίκαιον and [τὸ] καλόν (65d7) introduce the ‘Theory of Forms (discussing 65d4-e5, Gallop, 1975, comments that ‘the so-called Theory of Forms’ is introduced at this point’, and launches into a detailed discussion of the ‘Theory’. However, cf. Rowe, 1993a, 141); the devaluation of pleasure (see n.42) and how the absolute withdrawal from the sensible world squares with, for example, the later ‘theory of recollection’ (e.g. Rowe, 1993a, 139; Hackforth, 1955, 49; Gallop, 1975, 91-2).

⁵² Cf. Prier, 1976, 151 on ‘archaic logic’: ‘archaic logic does not move from a to b but from a to a or a to A through a series of symbols or words that appear both different and the same’.

their inadequacies. Plato introduces normativity through terms that possess a conventional or intrinsically normative sense, and gradually links these to other more neutral terms, so that the former confer an evaluative status on the latter. The final result is a group of entities, processes, and qualities which are all interrelated by sharing common attributes and values.

Thus, Plato constructs much of the value system by appropriating conventional evaluative terminology. As was the case with the coin or chain images the new tenor retains the value associated with particular features or terminology partly by discrediting their conventional evaluative status. Moreover, as well as individual features, it seems possible to draw the passage together into a basic opposition between the *φρόνησις*-based and body-orientated value systems, the former comprising qualities such as purity, simplicity, singularity, intrinsic goodness, virtue, uniqueness, comprehensiveness, truth; and the latter, their opposites. This reflects an underlying dualistic metaphysics, insofar as the *φρόνησις*-based system depends on the Forms, entirely different ontologically from the sensibles towards which the body is orientated.

6.2.8 *Generic affiliations*

I have already argued that innovation and expansion of stylistic models evokes the distinctiveness of *φρόνησις*. However, certain similarities between some features and their generic models are also significant here. Several examples combine likenesses with discrepancies between the style and function of Plato's usage and that of their generic models. As with other stylistic features in the 'apology', in many of these cases Plato appears to appropriate a particular phenomenon's evaluative dimension, while discrediting the rest of its conventional usage.

So, for example, the 'apology' is presented as a defence speech, a characteristically normative type of discourse, in which the defendant relies on the alleged truth of his claims and morality of his actions. This evaluative dimension is clearly used here to set up the normativity of the *φρόνησις*-based system. Yet Plato simultaneously

shows the illegitimacy of the values appealed to when such features are used in their normal generic context.

For instance, there is antithesis which, like the examples in the ‘peroration’, juxtaposes a false or immoral view with a true or moral one, making clear each view’s distinct characteristics, while also emphasising the discrepancy between them. This is especially familiar from forensic oratory, like Lysias 12, where the speaker contrasts the murder of innocent men without trial with the lawful trial of those accused of having committed this crime:

καὶ οὗτοι μὲν τοὺς οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντας ἀκρίτους ἀπέκτειναν, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοὺς ἀπολέσαντας τὴν πόλιν κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀξιοῦτε κρίνειν, παρ’ ὧν οὐδ’ ἂν παρανόμως βουλόμενοι δίκην λαμβάνειν ἀξίαν τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὧν τὴν πόλιν ἡδικήμασι λάβοιτε.⁵³

Likewise, in the *Phaedo*’s ‘peroration’, false exchange of pleasures is contrasted to φρόνησις’ genuineness; while similarly, the second antithesis differentiates true virtue acquired with φρόνησις from virtue which lacks this and is therefore illusory.

Yet there are also significant differences between the *Phaedo*’s use of antithesis and others. For, from the viewpoint of the ‘peroration’, only those antitheses appealing to a φρόνησις-based value system for their conception of moral truth could have legitimate claims to establishing a genuine right/wrong opposition. Separated from φρόνησις, justice and virtue are mere illusions, so that the conventional antitheses of oratory would simply be seen to present two opposing viewpoints within the same body-orientated value system, and therefore to lack the necessary elements for a genuine moral/immoral opposition.⁵⁴

This becomes clearer if we compare the ‘peroration’ antitheses to those used earlier to explain the common conception of self-control (σωφροσύνη): φοβούμενοι γὰρ ἐτέρων ἡδονῶν στερηθῆναι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἐκείνων, ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ’

⁵³ Lys.12.82.

⁵⁴ Cf. Nightingale, 1995, 3 on genres as ‘forms of thought’; 7, on Platonic ‘parody’; and 91, ‘Plato criticizes his model even as he imitates its themes and structures’.

ἄλλων κτρατούμενοι (68e5ff.). Here, individuals refrain from certain pleasures only because overpowered by desire for others and fear of not acquiring them. This notion of self-control in fact amounts to the very same submission to pleasures which is supposedly its opposite, implying the falsity of the common virtue/vice distinction, with respect to virtues like self-control.⁵⁵ By contrast, only the Platonic virtue/pseudo-virtue antitheses of the 'peroration' present a genuine true/false opposition.

Likewise, other patterns of argument are imitated within the 'apology', once again with clear differences between originals and their Platonic imitations. For example, crucial to the structure of associative connections in the 'apology' was an oppositional scheme. The importance of oppositions within early Greek argument has been discussed extensively, most notably in Lloyd's *Polarity and Analogy*, which presents them as one of two main principles of argument.⁵⁶ Even Hesiod's genealogy in the *Theogony* is centred around corresponding oppositional groups,⁵⁷ and many Presocratics depict the physical world or what is perceived as the physical world in terms of oppositions.⁵⁸ As well as this, in Presocratic discourse oppositions are not only appealed to between different entities or processes, but also between true and false opinion or reality and appearance.⁵⁹ Both of these contrasts motivate the oppositions within the 'apology' and *Phaedo* as a whole. Nevertheless, in all the other cases, oppositions concern only one ontological level and, whatever their focus, they arise from oppositions between elements on this level. Conversely, in presenting a dualistic ontology,⁶⁰ just as with other features, Plato appropriates oppositional argumentation, but presents it as a genuine and distinct opposition, unlike those found in his predecessors.

⁵⁵ Cf. 68d11-12 on 'bravery'.

⁵⁶ Lloyd, 1966. Cf. e.g. Havelock, 1983, 34-5; and also Prier, 1976, who talks repeatedly about the use of oppositions within 'archaic logic' in writers like Hesiod, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although he also posits the use of a 'third term', which imposes unity, e.g. Heraclitus' *logos* (75-7).

⁵⁷ See e.g. Prier, 1976, 40.

⁵⁸ E.g. Parm.B8.53-61; Heraclit.B88; Meliss.B8; Cf. Lloyd, 1966, 26-7 and *passim*.

⁵⁹ E.g. Heraclit.B1 and 2; Parm.B6.

⁶⁰ Lloyd, 1966, 23-4, on how Plato's Being/Becoming or Forms/particulars oppositions differ from Presocratic and Hippocratic oppositions: 'This is, then, a different type of opposition, one between two distinct worlds, not between members of a single world of reality'.

As we have seen, the 'apology' frequently draws upon the conventional value of certain features or terminology to establish new values which displace them, just as financial terminology evokes the value of a φρόνησις-based system completely detached from economic concerns. Outside Plato there are numerous parallels where, as with the *Phaedo*'s νόμισμα, the evaluative ambiguity of particular terms represents a conflict between competing moral claims. For example, in Aeschylus' *Choephoroi* the term νίκη in Orestes' ἄζηλα νίκης τῆσδ' ἔχων μιάσματα reflects the 'triumph' of avenging his father, but also has ironic implications since the very same act brought the μιάσματα of matricide.⁶¹ Thus the ambiguity within νίκη represents the clash between two conflicting moral imperatives, the prohibition of killing one's parent, as opposed to the necessity of avenging them, and one could interpret much of the play's other 'justice' terminology in the same way.⁶² Moral terminology within the *Antigone* has a similar ambiguity, this time reflecting the competing demands of loyalty to the *polis* and to one's blood relatives. According to the former, terms like κακά and δική, describing respectively Antigone's actions and Creon's decrees,⁶³ carry their conventional values. Yet, if some element of justice is also attributed to Antigone's actions, the evaluative status of these terms is problematised.

However, these examples still represent opposing imperatives within conventional morality, while the *Phaedo* sets out to replace this entire system. Consequently, the clashing 'philosophical' and conventional understanding of evaluative terminology in the 'apology' represents not a simple conflict between two aspects of the same value-system, but the opposition of two alternative systems, the genuine and false, and the absolute displacement of the latter by the former.⁶⁴

Although not strictly relevant to 'generic affiliations', interesting parallels for this Platonic manoeuvre are found in philosophical writers of various periods, who try to displace a conception of morality by language in which that conception is

⁶¹ A.Ch.1017.

⁶² Cf. e.g. A.Ch.1027 and similar examples in E.El: e.g. 1189.

⁶³ E.g. S.Ant.495 and 854.

⁶⁴ Cf. Nightingale, 1995, 191, who says that, while Plato appropriates comedy's 'voice of criticism', 'the writers of Old Comedy...speak from within the Athenian democracy' and accept its structure, whereas 'Plato's philosopher is an outsider who is disembedded from the social and political economy of the city' and speaks a truth which is independent of the democratic system.

conventionally expressed. For example, Lucretius describes Epicurus, the very man who freed mankind from a belief in religion, as a god: 'deus ille fuit'.⁶⁵ Epicurus is pronounced worthy of being counted amongst the gods, and Lucretius talks of his 'divina reperta'.⁶⁶ Thus Lucretius employs evaluative terminology associated with conventional religious beliefs to emphasise the values of an opposing system.⁶⁷ Similar strategies are used, for instance, in the modern era by Nietzsche, as with his description of *Also sprach Zarathustra* as an 'inexhaustible well' of 'gold and goodness' ('Gold und Güte'),⁶⁸ although this work represents an absolute challenge to the conventional understanding of goodness.

In all of the *Phaedo* examples, Plato relies on similarities in order to appropriate an evaluative dimension or strategy of argumentation, while also drawing attention to the differences. The reader must work through the passage's structure in order to understand where the differences and similarities lie, and it is the very structure leading us through these stages which can be seen as argument.

6.2.9 *The ramifications of these points for the dialogue as a whole*

One of the key points in the 'apology' for the *Phaedo* as a whole is the importance of oppositional systems. I have already suggested that the opposition between a φρόνησις-based and body-orientated value system can be seen to reflect the underlying dualistic metaphysics of the entire work. Pairs of qualities associated with the different sides of the opposition, like simplicity/complexity or singularity/plurality will also play crucial roles in the subsequent 'affinity argument', while oppositions in general pervade much of the dialogue's argumentation.⁶⁹ Already, in the 'apology', we are given some idea of how these pairs can be understood in terms of a hierarchical structure, rather than symmetrical opposition,

⁶⁵ Luc.DRN 5.8. Cf. Epicur.Ep.Menoeceus 135.

⁶⁶ Luc.DRN 5.51 and 6.8.

⁶⁷ Cf. Gale, 1994, 191-207 and 192: 'This is ironically inverted by Epicurus, for Lucretius makes his denial of divine intervention in the world (5.52-4) the basis of his divinity.

⁶⁸ Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, Foreward, 4.

⁶⁹ See e.g. the 'argument from opposites' (throughout); the 'affinity argument' (especially 74a9ff.); and the 'second sailing' (102d5ff.)

and the way in which the different pairs fit into a wider system will become clearer as the dialogue progresses.

The normativity of particular qualities, argued for in this passage, will also be relevant elsewhere in the dialogue, particularly in the later stages. Connections drawn here between Forms, soul, and *φρόνησις*, in terms of attributes like simplicity and distinctness, imply a qualitative link between the Forms and wisdom. Forms are described with terms evoking purity, distinctness, uniqueness, and truth, while it is also the attribution of these characteristics to *φρόνησις* which are fundamental in establishing its normativity. Given the connections which they therefore appear to forge between epistemological method, object, and value, these particular qualities appear to be presented as valuable for intellectual inquiry in themselves. One might therefore understand the ‘apology’ as laying down, indirectly, certain criteria for desired features in philosophical argumentation. These can then help in understanding what constitutes correct philosophical method, a question hanging over the whole dialogue both implicitly and explicitly in, for example, sections of the ‘intellectual autobiography’. More generally, it also suggests the philosophical significance of different types of affinity between qualities of entities and/or processes, a point which will be very important in the later ‘affinity argument’.

6.3 The ‘argument from opposites’ (70c4-72e3): ‘verbal minimalism’

The style of the ‘argument from opposites’ is very different from the ‘apology’, comprising clear steps with an easily traceable logical progression. Many of its stylistic aspects make it far more readily assimilated to modern conventions of philosophical discourse than the ‘apology’ and it is, unlike the ‘apology’, discussed extensively in the secondary literature.⁷⁰ In this section, I now examine precisely how its construction differs from that of the ‘apology’, and then move on to consider the significance of these differences and whether the ‘argument from opposites’ is presented as a more ‘philosophical’ or ‘better’ argument.

⁷⁰ E.g. Bostock, 1986, 42-59; Gallop, 1982; Rowe, 1991b; and, in general, the attention paid to this argument in commentaries and other works on the *Phd.*

6.3.1 *Stylistic features and the construction of the argument*

In contrast to the ‘apology’, the ‘argument from opposites’ is dominated by repetitive structures and can be said to be characterised by ‘verbal minimalism’. This phrase indicates a stylistic construction featuring significant structural repetition between individual units or clusters of units and usually involving a strong degree of lexemic repetition along with a tendency towards ellipse. Characteristically, certain other features are involved, including short question and answer format and an absence of imagery and extended description, the latter enhancing the impression of conciseness and helping to foreground the structure.⁷¹

Whereas the ‘apology’, especially in its final stages, could be seen as higher order reflection on the nature and status of philosophy itself, the ‘argument from opposites’ constitutes a lower order argument to prove the immortality of the soul, containing no self-conscious reflection on its own method. Interestingly, however, the one section in the last part of the ‘apology’ that provides a slight stylistic precedent for the ‘argument from opposites’ and stands out stylistically from its immediate context, is also an example of lower order reflection where Socrates argues against the common conception of courage and self-control (68d2-69a4). This short passage has features such as structural and heavy lexemic repetition: e.g. τῷ δεδιέναι ἄρα καὶ δέει ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσι πάντες πλὴν οἱ φιλόσοφοι· καίτοι ἄλογόν γε δέει τινὰ καὶ δειλὴν ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι (68d11-13). Its first half (68d2-e1) is also written in the short question and answer format common to passages of ‘verbal minimalism’, but very uncharacteristic of the later sections of the ‘apology’. The second part (68e2-9a5), even though a continuous speech, is still divided into short units which largely follow the structure of the first. One can see this example as lower order reflection within the higher-order ‘apology’, establishing the inconsistency of the ‘pseudo-virtues’ because they violate the principle that opposites cannot cause their own opposites.⁷² With this linked by order, as well as style, to the

⁷¹ In view of these features it has many similarities with parts of Passages II and especially IV of the ‘Stylistic Analysis’ chapters, with many features classified above as particularly Platonic (Socratic) ways of establishing parallelism (see ch.5 p.116ff., above).

⁷² Cf. Sedley, 1998, 121.

'argument from opposites', it seems that Plato is inclined to connect particular styles with their degree of reflectiveness.

Unlike the 'apology' which outlined points like the particularities of φρόνησις, the relation of body and soul, and a conception of philosophy, the 'argument from opposites' posits a general principle of generation of opposites from opposites, which holds for an entire group of different subjects, including the soul. Clearly it is seen as a comprehensive principle, applicable to all generated things without exception⁷³ and, as the argument's final stage makes clear, it is also an unceasing process (72a11-d5).

The 'argument from opposites' itself, unlike the 'apology', is explicitly presented as an argument and its main principle, the generation of opposites from opposites, is introduced as a ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον that souls exist in Hades: καὶ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον τοῦ ταῦτ' εἶναι (70d2). This phrase is also echoed within the argument's conclusion: τούτου δὲ ὄντος ἱκανόν που ἐδόκει τεκμήριον εἶναι...(72a6).

Division into steps

The argument's division into clearly demarcated steps is very different from the long speeches of the 'apology' and emphasises logical sequentiality. It is achieved through various means, most markedly the short question and answer format, which predominates in all but the last section. As is typical of this stylistic mode in Plato, questions are separated by the interlocutor's short formulaic answers, restricted mainly to brief words of affirmation and denial or short questions, like ναί, πάνυ γε, and πῶς γὰρ οὔ.

Although I would not deny the importance of Cebes' presence as an interlocutor and of his responses, these responses could also be seen to function as punctuation, given that they contribute no new substantive information. For example:

⁷³ E.g. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν ἂρ' οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα (70d7-e1) and πάντα οὕτως γίγνεται, ἐξ ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα (71a10).

λέγε δὴ μοι καὶ σύ, ἔφη, οὕτω περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου. οὐκ
 ἐναντίον μὲν φησὶ τῷ ζῆν τὸ τεθνάναι εἶναι;
 ἔγωγε(71d5-7).⁷⁴

Even when, later in the argument, Cebes actually provides information, rather than simple affirmation, one might still argue that his responses are entirely conditioned by Socrates. So, for instance, having established with Cebes' acceptance that the two opposite processes, τὸ ζῆν and τὸ τεθνάναι, come about from each other (71d8-9), Socrates then asks what comes about from the living and what from the dead. Cebes' two answers, τὸ τεθνηκός and ἀναγκαῖον...ὁμολογεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῶν (71d10-13), simply cite the opposite processes fully articulated by Socrates in order to supply the answer the question already suggests. Cebes' acceptance of Socrates' assumptions leaves him with little scope for personalised content, so that the primary purpose of his replies can perhaps be seen to be division of the argument into short steps.

In contrast to the 'apology', again, there are also large numbers of particles at the beginning of individual points. These aid the division of the argument into sequential steps and provide an initial suggestion of how each particular point fits into the argument's progress. So, for example, τί δέ can suggest that the point shares the previous point's principle,⁷⁵ while often ἄρα accompanies the conclusion of a section.⁷⁶

Parallelism, repetition, and ellipse.

Socrates mainly argues by induction in this passage, using the applicability of certain processes to various pairs of generated opposites as a basis for establishing a general principle from which to argue that these processes are equally applicable to life and

⁷⁴ Although the question of why Socrates is concerned about what Cebes 'says' may be of some interest.

⁷⁵ E.g. 71a6 and d12. Cf. Denniston, 1950, 175-6, although he also points out that this is not its commonest use.

⁷⁶ E.g. 71e2 and 72a4. Cf. Sicking and Ophuijsen, 1993, 103ff.

death. Parallelism of points and units within individual sections is evoked by lexemic and structural repetition, often combined with ellipse.

The first stage of the argument, showing that things come to be from their opposites, provides the best example. A stylistic pattern is established at the end of Socrates' short introductory speech, where he claims that this principle applies to all living things and gives the example of the larger coming to be from the smaller: *οἷον ὅταν μείζον τι γίγνεται, ἀνάγκη που ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίγνεσθαι* (70e6-8). A series of questions then follows, sharing a very similar structure and developing the principle within a group of parallel cases. First, Socrates asks whether the inverse of the 'larger from smaller' idea also holds: *οὐκοῦν καὶ ἔλαττον γίγνηται, ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται;* (70e10-71a1). The question retains the basic pattern of neuter nominative adjective + the verb *γίγνομαι*, followed by *ἐκ* + a neuter genitive comparative + *γίγνομαι*. In addition, the process's first stage is still described as *πρότερον*, although the equivalent *ὕστερον* replaces the *ἔπειτα* of the preceding question. As well as very slight differences between syntax and conjunctions in the two units, the second omits certain elements, dropping the *τι* in the first clause and, more significantly, the *ἀνάγκη που*, implying that necessity is now simply assumed.

As the passage progresses, the ellipse increases and much of the original unit structure is omitted:

καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἰσχυροτέρου γε τὸ ἀσθενέστερον καὶ ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ
θᾶπτον;
πάνυ γε.
(71a3-5).

Here, Socrates asks about two analogous pairs of processes, using little but two pairs of adjectives together with *ἐκ*. He mentions only one side to each process and not its inverse, although the two stated examples 'from the stronger, the weaker' and 'from the slower, the faster' are perhaps in some way 'inverse', insofar as the first depicts a change from more to less powerful while the latter reverses this.

After Cebes' reply, Socrates introduces two more paired processes, also elliptical. Once again, he gives only one side to each process, with the first going from positive to negative and the second vice versa. The original particle ἄν reappears, with τι and γίγνηται stated in the first case and assumed in the second:

τί δέ; ἄν τι χεῖρον γίγνηται, οὐκ ἐξ ἀμείνονος, καὶ ἄν δικαιότερον, ἐξ ἀδικωτέρου; (71a6-7).

Although the omitted aspects are clearly implicit, the structure has essentially been reduced to its most significant components, so that the principle is effectively encapsulated by the ἐκ + neuter genitive comparative, followed by the nominative neuter adjective which represents the process' result. The adjectives change from general to physical to evaluative/ethical. Finally, the general principle is reiterated (71a9-10).⁷⁷ Meanwhile, the key elements of the structure remain, giving an impression of an invariable principle, no matter what its subject.

With its mixture of parallelism and ellipse, one might therefore see the argument's structure as mirroring the structure of inductive reasoning itself, insofar as each step, in which the content of the principle changes, increases its scope and so its cogency. Furthermore, it also has a dialectical role, increasing our understanding of how the process works, by causing the reader to supply its missing aspects, ensuring that the full principle is absorbed and comprehended. As I outlined above, the first instance omits ἀνάγκη που. While it is clearly essential to the principle that necessity remains a factor, its explicit omission causes us tacitly to supply it, thereby bringing it into our minds as an aspect of the principle to contemplate and perhaps even question. The same process could also be seen to occur when Socrates, after spelling out explicitly the two way process of μείζον' ἐξ ἐλάττονος and its reversal, states only a uni-directional process of change between subsequent pairs of opposites. As the argument progresses the necessity for change to be two-directional becomes a

⁷⁷ Cf. the reiteration of 71a13-b2 at c6-7.

crucial point.⁷⁸ Finally, the omission of the temporal qualifiers πρότερον/ἔπειτα and πρότερον/ὑστερον after 71a1 can be seen as part of this same dialectical move.⁷⁹

Although these features are most pronounced in short isolated units, similar instances are also present within longer units. For example, in the next stage of the argument a long and fully elaborated example illustrates the principle that transformation between opposites is effected by a complementary pairs of processes: μείζονος μὲν πράγματος καὶ ἐλάττονος μεταξὺ αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, καὶ καλοῦμεν οὕτω τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐξάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φθίνειν; (71b2-4). Once Cebes has assented to this proposal, however, Socrates gives two more examples, which omit all but the verbs which name the processes: οὐκοῦν καὶ διακρίνεσθαι καὶ συγκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ψύχεσθαι καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι, καὶ πάντα οὕτω (71b6-7). Once more the elliptical structure highlights the aspect of the process most central to this stage of the argument, but also necessitates the reader's active involvement in the argument's progress.

Another variation on this pattern comes in 71c9-72a2, where the initial short continuous speech (71c9-d3) lays out a principle in the case of 'sleeping' and 'waking-up', developed in successive clauses within one long continuous unit (71c9-d3). Socrates then expands and breaks this down into a series of short questions dealing with the parallel cases of 'dying' and 'coming back to life' (71d5-72a3). Once again, these feature a great deal of repetition and ellipse, and this could be seen as a dialectical mode which shows how to break down an argument and assess it in terms of short individual steps.

The repetition throughout this section features a number of 'key' terms, such as γίγνομαι and its cognates, while short sections also contain repeated terminology like the many occurrences of τὸ τεθνάναι and related terms in 71d5-15. Although clearly important, these terms are repeated so intensively throughout so long a stretch of argument that they seem to be simply an element of the repetitive structure itself,

⁷⁸ See 71e8ff.

⁷⁹ On the importance of the temporal dimension of this argument, see Gallop, 1982, 211, summarising Barnes.

rather than having the independent prominence of less frequent 'key-word' repetition.

6.3.2 *Generic affiliations*

The theme of transition between opposites connects this section to a major area of Presocratic thought, which is reflected in affiliations to elements of Presocratic, especially prose, style. In very general terms, aspects such as tight logical sequentiality between short units, enhanced by connectives and particles; the repetition of key terms and patterns; and the prominence of particular noun-types, link this passage to certain Presocratic writings. Barnes, for example, taking Melissus as a 'paradigm' of 'the argumentative [as opposed to aphoristic] *style* of some of the Presocratic writings' talks of his 'clear and articulate prose' which 'forms a systematically articulated body of doctrine' and 'is regularly pointed with the linguistic marks of reasoning'. These are the 'inferential connectives and particles' such as '*for*', '*since*', '*because*', '*therefore*', and '*necessarily*', which also abound in the 'argument from opposites'.⁸⁰ There is also a general absence of normative terms, characteristic of much Presocratic writing, especially the works of Melissus, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes of Apollonia.

More specifically, the argument features pairs of opposite abstract nouns, many of which are formed from τό + a neuter adjective or participle, such as τὸ ἀσθενέστερον (71a3) or τὸ τεθννηκός (71d11). This noun-form, especially to denote pairs of opposites, is very common in Presocratics such as Anaxagoras and Melissus,⁸¹ while groups of other forms of oppositional pairs are also frequent, for example, in Heraclitus.⁸²

The 'argument from opposites' recalls the views of various thinkers. For example, the idea of change depending on necessary, ceaseless, and circular transition between opposites is highly reminiscent of Heraclitus and Empedocles, for whom the

⁸⁰ Barnes, 1983, 94-5.

⁸¹ For examples, see Ch.5 p.122, above.

⁸² E.g. Heraclit.B67 and B111.

balanced and continuous reciprocal change between opposites is essential.⁸³ Conversely, the passage could also be seen as a counter-argument to Melissus' denial of the existence of plurality, the text which provides the closest stylistic parallel.

Melissus claims that, because of perception, men believe in both the existence of unchanging things and a process of universal change between opposites. He uses their incompatibility to show the impossibility of plurality, and presents transition between opposites as a false belief attained through perception.⁸⁴ His language bears many similarities to the idiom of the *Phaedo*, in terms of noun-form and pairs of opposites connected by γίγνεσθαι: δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίγνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν μαλακὸν καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν σκληρὸν. Moreover the final example of change between opposites is that the living become the dead and vice versa (καὶ τὸ ζῶον ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ ἐκ μὴ ζῶντος γίγνεσθαι), the very process whose existence is established within the Platonic 'argument from opposites', uses the same ἐκ + neuter genitive + γίγνομαι structure.⁸⁵

Equally, one might also see the passage as alluding to a close parallel in Heraclitus, which describes the unity of opposites: ταῦτό τ' ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ [τὸ] ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κακεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.⁸⁶ As Hackforth points out, Heraclitus' examples of change between opposites include '“waking and sleeping” alongside of “living and dead”', two of the key pairs in the 'argument from opposites'.⁸⁷ Another close analogue is found in Anaxagoras: πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρίξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός;⁸⁸ Here he argues against generation from opposites, once again using pairs of opposites and similar

⁸³ See e.g. Heraclit.B88, B10, and B67 (on interconnected opposite processes); B51 (on balance); B80 and B53 (on the necessity and continuity of change) and cf. Gallop, 1975, 110: 'The examples of complementary processes have a Heraclitean ring about them'. Cf. e.g. Emped.B17 (on the changeless cycle of birth into death).

⁸⁴ See Meliss.B8.

⁸⁵ E.g. *Phd.*72a4-6: ὁμολογεῖται ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ ταύτῃ τοὺς ζῶντας ἐκ τῶν τεθνεώτων γεγονέναι οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ τοὺς τεθνεώτας ἐκ τῶν ζώντων.

⁸⁶ Heraclit.B88.

⁸⁷ Hackforth, 1955, 63-4.

⁸⁸ Anaxag. B10.

terminology. In general, Plato therefore seems to incorporate elements of Presocratic style to challenge and supplant their ideas on change between opposites.

The case is similar with Plato's γίγνομαι which departs from a conventional notion of γίγνομαι as 'coming-into-being' from nothing. In the 'argument from opposites' γίγνομαι represents a process of transition between opposites in entities such as animals, plants, and the soul, and the argument relies upon the existence of a continuous underlying entity in which these changes take place. Empedocles has likewise used γίγνομαι to describe cyclical change between opposites, making clear that nothing ever comes into being to join the opposites, and that the opposites never perish.⁸⁹

It is Empedocles' novel usage of γίγνεσθαι to which the *Phaedo* example comes closest. Nevertheless, despite apparent similarities, especially between Empedocles' theory of change and the 'argument from opposites', Plato goes on to show that change between opposites is limited to particulars and that for change to take place an entirely different ontological category is necessary: the Forms, which could never undergo such a process. This, then, bears similarities to the appropriation and rejection of generic models in the 'apology', although here one needs to go beyond the immediate context (i.e. the 'argument from opposites') to understand the reasons for rejection of the model.

6.3.3 *Ramifications for the dialogue as a whole*

In terms of its wider context, the 'argument from opposites' is clearly important. Not only does it explicitly introduce the theme of opposites which will be significant throughout the dialogue,⁹⁰ but it is depicted as just one stage of the proof of the soul's immortality, together with the recollection argument and others.⁹¹ In addition,

⁸⁹ Emp.B17.27-35. He also attacks man's belief in generation from nothing or absolute destruction, using and even criticising the conventional use of γίγνεσθαι, καταβήσκειν, and ἐξόλλυσθαι: Emp.B11 and B9. Cf. B8, where he claims that there is no birth (φύσις) or death (θάνατος), although, as *KRS*, 292, points out, he uses cognates of these terms, e.g. in B17, to describe change resulting from the coming together and separation of the elements. Cf. also Anaxag.B17.

⁹⁰ To a certain extent, this picks up on its implicit introduction as a theme in the 'apology' and perhaps even earlier. See e.g. 60b3-c7.

⁹¹ See e.g. 77c6-d5, which explicitly links the arguments 'from opposites' and 'from recollection'.

it furthers the conception of death established in the 'apology' by presenting life and death as opposite transitional processes of 'embodiment' and 'disembodiment'.

In structural/stylistic terms the 'argument from opposites' can be seen to start a progression of arguments. It deals with transition between opposites in sensibles, reflected in the even reciprocity of the ἐξ ἐλάττονος ὄντος πρότερον ἔπειτα μείζον γίνεσθαι and ἐκ μείζονος ὄντος πρότερον ὕστερον ἔλαττον γενήσεται structures. Nevertheless, the case of the soul suggests that existence is not limited to the sensible world and, as the dialogue continues, it emerges that there is a higher ontological category, amongst which such transitions could never take place. A proper formulation of the relation between two levels is essential to proving the immortality of the soul and this is gradually provided in stages within the four arguments.

Hence the 'recollection' argument clearly shows that there is a type of being distinct from sensibles,⁹² towards which the imperfect sensibles aspire and in comparison with which they are deficient. The evaluative language describing the relationship between sensibles and Forms, consisting of terms like ἐνδεεστέρας (74e4, 75a3 etc.) and φαυλότερος (74e1, 75b8 etc.), establishes an ontological hierarchy and stresses the Forms' priority. In the 'affinity' argument, differences between the two levels are clarified, with detailed descriptions of the contrasting qualities inherent in the two types of 'being'. Finally, the 'second sailing' brings together all these aspects to show how the qualities of the Forms allow them to cause the process of change on the level of particulars. Thus, one could see the 'argument from opposites' as a necessary step in an argumentative process leading up to a clearer understanding of the two ontological levels, their respective characteristics, their relationship with each other, and how the soul fits into this scheme.⁹³

⁹² On the importance of Forms in the 'recollection' argument for the dialogue as a whole, cf. Rowe, 1991b, 174.

⁹³ Rowe, 1991b, also sketches the connections between these arguments. For Rowe the connection hinges primarily on their being a demonstration of philosophy in practice. Contrary to my reading, he sees the 'second sailing' as the only truly important/correct argument, whereas the argument 'from opposites' and 'from affinity' are taken as deliberately flawed, so that, in terms of content, only the 'recollection argument', actually makes any *constructive contribution*.

6.4 The relationship of the ‘apology and argument from opposites’

6.4.1 *Stylistic differences between the two passages*

Many of the specific differences between the ‘apology’ and ‘argument from opposites’ are clear from the foregoing analyses,⁹⁴ and can be summed up by their classification in terms (respectively) of ‘nexus of associations’ and ‘verbal minimalism’. Along with this there is the widespread use of normative terms in the former as compared to the latter, where they are restricted to very occasional words describing the status of a particular point, such as *ἀδίκως* (72a11), or the use of *χείρων/ἀμείνων* and *δικαιότερος/ἀδικώτερος* as oppositional pairs to exemplify the principle of generation of opposites. The differing quantity of normative terms also enhances the impression that the style of the ‘apology’ draws attention to certain qualities, while the ‘argument from opposites’ focuses on process and structure, as opposed to the characteristics of entities undergoing this process.

This difference is encapsulated in their claims to comprehensive applicability. In the ‘apology’ the frequently repeated *πᾶς* shows that *φρόνησις* should govern and be the goal of *all* actions, as well as contributing a further reason for its normativity. In this way, it is used to establish a characteristic of a central single phenomenon. By contrast, the ‘argument from opposites’ derives an impression of comprehensiveness explicitly from the repetition of *πᾶς* in *περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν ἄρ’ οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα* (70d9-e1), as well as from the broad range and scope of examples given to demonstrate the principle of generation of ‘opposites from opposites’. So the latter describes a principle applicable to all entities of a certain kind, as opposed to the former’s single phenomenon with universal value.

⁹⁴ Rowe, 1993b, 159ff. minimises the differences between these two sections, claiming the distinction between them is not ‘hard and fast’ but simply constituted by the different proportions in the mixed ‘logic and rhetoric’ which they contain. Yet, as I have shown, the very considerable stylistic differences between them outweigh any similarities and should not be overlooked. Moreover, conventional terms like ‘rhetorical’ or ‘logical’, though useful in some respects, are too limited and laden with presuppositions to explain fully the function of style within the argumentative structure of these passages. Cf. Rowe, 1991b, 170. Here, discussing the same passage, he suggests that Socrates, Simmias, and Cebes, clearly do not see the ‘apology’ as ‘rhetorical rather than philosophical’ because it ‘*merges seamlessly* [italics mine] into, and provides the starting-point for, the arguments for immortality that follow’.

6.4.2 *The status of the arguments*

'Philosophical' style?

Without a doubt the 'argument from opposites' comes far closer to the conventional style of modern 'analytic' philosophical writing which I discussed in my Introduction and which, stereotypically, tends towards the type of simple, 'neutral',⁹⁵ prose favoured by the sciences. Points are set out in clearly demarcated steps, accompanied by an absence of variation combined with repetition of structure and language, almost leading to technicalisation. In addition a wide variety of different spheres are reduced to one common process.⁹⁶ The impression of neutrality is furthered by the absence of normative terminology, except insofar as it is applied to method, resembling the way modern philosophical writing reflects a drive towards scientific objectivity.⁹⁷

Up to a point, such practices can be traced back to Aristotle, both in terms of his formalisation of argument and the style of his extant writings, and they present a marked contrast with the stylistic features of the 'apology'. Prior's contrast between Aristotle's philosophy and the 'symbolic' method of certain Presocratics can perhaps be seen to reflect some of these differences:

The progressive or directional relationships by which the former [i.e. Aristotle] defines his world stand out in sharp contrast to the essentially symbolic and structural "premises" the earlier period observed at all levels of experience. The difference in "method", of course, is the most striking. Aristotle created his own and forced it upon language, elevating particularly sympathetic patterns to the level of "reality" and suppressing, or more often discounting, vast areas of experience as untenable. The pre-Socratics, on the other hand, came to language and its natural symbolic functions in a much more direct and comprehensive manner'.⁹⁸

While this above account presents far too restrictive a picture of Aristotelian philosophy, it is interesting in its depiction of the historical development of

⁹⁵ Although the idea that any writing can have neutrality is, of course, highly controversial.

⁹⁶ E.g. ethical and physical: δικαιοτέρος (71a7) and βραδύτερος (71a4). Cf. Nussbaum, 1990, 19. Cf. e.g. Rorty, 1979, 8: 'analytic philosophy is still committed to the construction of a permanent, neutral framework for inquiry, and thus for all culture'.

⁹⁷ On the drive towards objectivity and scientism in philosophy see e.g. Nagel, 1986, 3-8.

⁹⁸ Prior, 1976, 149.

'philosophical style'. Yet, *pace* Prier,⁹⁹ it seems that such features were already emerging in some Presocratics, so that even before Plato, they were clear characteristics of 'philosophical' style. Barnes talks about Melissus B7, for example, as 'a subtle and intricate piece of prose' which 'hangs together as a continuous logical progression' and employs many of the features classified above as typical of 'verbal minimalism'. Deichgräber identifies similar traits in Anaxagoras' 'Argumentationsstil' and Thesleff discusses the 'scientific style' in early Greek prose, found in certain Presocratic prose.¹⁰⁰ Not only does the 'argument from opposites' engage with such thinkers on a broad thematic level, but also has very strong generic affiliations to their style of writing.

Margolis, discussing Plato's place in the 'emergence of philosophy' says that, although the dialogues contain 'no syllogisms' they nevertheless exhibit:

...a clear sense of an order of formal argument that Socrates guards that is on its way to syllogistic form, that is entirely accessible to a largely pre-literate but intelligent audience. It is a form of argument that schematizes and regularizes the very form of conversational argument, without disturbing its spontaneity at all.¹⁰¹

This suggests that Plato's dialogue form creates quasi-formalisable argument, an idea fitting in with my earlier comments about the suitability of the 'short question and answer' mode for dividing a passage into clearly demarcated logical steps.

Margolis' characterisation seems an apt description of the 'argument from opposites', and would allow us to see Plato as a final transitional stage in the historical development of Aristotelian syllogistic and 'philosophical style'.¹⁰² Many see this as a more or less teleological progression towards a language suitable for

⁹⁹ Prier, 1976, 149: 'The "pre-Socratics" represent a culmination and reflection of language that must be traced back into the roots of Greek and not ahead into the narrowly linear and causal modes of Aristotle'.

¹⁰⁰ Deichgräber, 1933, 353; Thesleff, 1966. Cf. Matson, 1983, on Presocratic writing as 'impersonal and objective', although he is not making a specifically stylistic characterisation.

¹⁰¹ Margolis, 1983, 240-1.

¹⁰² Cf. e.g. Havelock, 1983, 62, on *phthora* and *genesis*: 'but the abstraction *phthora*, 'destruction', used philosophically in antithesis to *genesis*, is Platonic, and as such became naturalized...within the Aristotelian vocabulary'.

'conceptual analysis'.¹⁰³ For example, in his discussion of Melissus, whom he views as a key innovator in the development of such a style, Barnes states:

Whatever the philosophical merits of Melissus' arguments may be, his linguistic achievement is surely noteworthy: Parmenides' verses are indeed as rigorously articulated as anything Melissus wrote; but, for all that, the lines of his thought often remain dark and obscure; Melissus freed Eleatic metaphysics from the straitjacket of bad verse, and in doing so he invented a prose style uniquely adapted to the ends of logical and philosophical thought.¹⁰⁴

Such a progression, as I have said, is often seen as culminating in Aristotelian style. Yet it is difficult to assign a place to Plato, given passages such as the 'argument from opposites', which apparently fit into this account, and those like the 'apology' which are clearly very different.

6.4.3 *How 'good' is the 'argument from opposites'?*

If we accept the idea of the teleological development of an 'ideal' philosophical style, the 'argument from opposites' may seem of more philosophical value than the 'apology', a view no doubt reflected in the greater attention it receives in contemporary philosophical accounts of the dialogue. So can the 'argument from opposites' be seen to fit into this stylistic movement and do its differences from the 'apology' reflect a higher value?

The 'argument from opposites' is never explicitly criticised or rejected within the dialogue and, as I have indicated above, plays an important role in the dialogue as a whole.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, it is usually regarded as weak, so much so that it has been taken as an intentional example of flawed argumentation.¹⁰⁶ Most significantly, it is

¹⁰³ See e.g. Havelock, 1983, *passim* and 29, on the development of 'linguistic counters' such as verbalised concepts of matter, body, and change etc., which are 'shared by all philosophers'. From their 'original Homeric, imagistic reference and their original narrativistic context' these moved 'into the thought world of conceptual science' with the Presocratics, although: 'in their philosophical or conceptual sense, none of them occurs in Greek literature before the end of the fifth century B.C. and some of them come into existence only in definitions supplied by Plato before being used by Aristotle'. Cf. also e.g. Margolis, 1983.

¹⁰⁴ Barnes, 1983, 96.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. e.g. Gallop, 1982, 219, who concedes 'nor is the Argument [i.e. 'from opposites'] ever directly attacked', even though he suggests that certain of the interlocutors' comments imply its unsatisfactoriness.

¹⁰⁶ See e.g. Rowe, 1991b, 172: 'that he [i.e. Plato] knew there was something wrong with it [i.e. 'the argument from opposites'] is...reasonably well established. It is here, perhaps, as a deliberately

accused of confusing contraries with contradictories and mistakenly assuming that the former are necessarily subject to the same processes as the latter.¹⁰⁷ For it seems that the principle of generation of opposites from opposites is only true for contradictories; for contraries, generation could take place from something else (from some *tertium quid*). Socrates, however, presents the principle as applicable to being alive and being dead which, commentators claim, are only contraries.¹⁰⁸

Yet, instances of things which can be neither dead nor alive, given by commentators as counter-examples to Socrates' point, actually raise no serious difficulties for the argument. Bostock, for example, suggests that entities such as stones and his 'first grandchild' are neither dead nor alive.¹⁰⁹ Yet, neither of these examples are relevant to the 'argument from opposites'. Firstly, it is clearly not involved with inanimate objects such as stones; its scope is explicit: καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν ἄρ' οὕτως γίνεται πάντα (70d9-e1).¹¹⁰ Moreover, the hypothetical unborn grandchild either does not exist and so is not an individual who ἔχει γένεσιν, for whom this argument would be applicable, or is a soul, awaiting reincarnation (τὸ ἀναβιώσκεσθαι) in the form of Bostock's grandchild, and therefore in a state of being dead.

If we see the terms 'life' and 'death' as states which occur in the soul, and correspond to the soul being inside or outside of the body, there is no in-between state. The soul will either be in or out of a body and it seems that 'life' and 'death' are, unproblematically, both 'mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive', thus satisfying the criteria required of a contradictory.¹¹¹ So even if the 'argument from

unsatisfactory first attempt, which will call for replacement'; Gallop, 1982, 217, who says that 'its weakness will emerge in the ensuing discussion', although it is not 'trivial'.

¹⁰⁷ E.g. Bostock, 1986, 52ff.; Rowe, 1993a, 156; Gallop, 1975, 107ff.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. e.g. Bostock, 1986, 52: 'The most obvious fault with this argument is that its second premise is false. We have noted that if the first premise is to be true, then the relevant kind of opposites must be properties that are contradictories of one another, and the properties of being alive and dead are not contradictories: some things are neither alive nor dead'.

¹⁰⁹ Bostock, 1986, 52.

¹¹⁰ At this point in the argument alone, it seems that γένεσις is being used in the conventional sense to refer to 'birth', since the examples given of those things which have γένεσις are men, animals, and plants. One might argue that this does not, strictly speaking, include the soul, since the argument itself presents the soul as having permanent existence, and the cyclical point implies that this must always have been the case. Nevertheless the soul can, in a certain sense, be said to have 'birth' insofar as it enters the human body at the time of birth.

¹¹¹ For this definition of contradictories, see Gallop, 1982, 213.

opposites' does not provide conclusive or comprehensive proof of the soul's immortality, as long as we take account of its explicitly restricted scope it can be defended against accusations of fallaciousness through confusing contraries with contradictories.¹¹²

The kinds of criticism detailed above have usually come about because the notion of things like life, death, properties, particulars, and the soul, appealed to within the argument are not yet clearly established.¹¹³ Yet this in itself indicates an important point about the argument's omissions. For, in order for the argument to be both properly understood and defended, it is necessary to have a detailed understanding of the ontology and qualities of the entities involved in the process it describes. A way in which this is suggested is the 'anonymous objection' within the second sailing, where an unnamed interlocutor questions Socrates' assertion that opposites 'in us' can never become their opposites, thinking that it contravenes the 'argument from opposites' (102e6-103a10). Socrates responds by pointing out that this earlier argument concerned opposite πράγματα, whereas his new principle applies to Forms (103b1-c4). However the 'argument from opposites' simply specified that all generated things come to be from opposites, and it is only when taken together with the rest of the dialogue, which describes the different ontological levels and their qualities, that the type of entities to which the 'opposites from opposites' principle applies is made clear and justified.

So it seems that, while the 'argument from opposites' is not fallacious, it cannot be clearly understood or defended in isolation, but only against the background of distinct ontological categories, their qualities and values, which is built up

¹¹² One could argue that this still does not exempt the earlier examples, such as 'larger/smaller' and 'stronger/weaker' from the accusation that they are relations rather than properties (see e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 64) and that, even if we take them to be the properties 'large' and 'small', it is certainly possible for something to have neither of these qualities. However, if we look ahead to Socrates' analysis of 'larger' and 'smaller' at 102b3ff., we can see that these are viewed in terms of one of a pair of contradictory property-instances being present in the individual. For, if Simmias is larger than Socrates, this is because he has largeness in him. If Socrates were to become larger than Simmias, we can assume that smallness would then enter Simmias, meaning that largeness could no longer remain. It seems that either one or other of these property-instances must be present in the individual and, as I will argue below, in Ch.7, they do not vary by degree. On this analysis, being 'larger' and 'smaller' can be seen as contradictories. Of course, one might see the restriction of scope as, in itself, leading to further questions about the principle's applicability to soul.

¹¹³ Cf. e.g. Gallop, 1975, 107: 'The scope of "all things subject to coming-to-be" (d9) is not very clear...'

throughout the dialogue, as well as the definition of death as the 'separation of the soul from the body' established in the 'apology'. Arguments such as the 'apology', the 'affinity argument' (usually judged to be the weakest argument in the *Phaedo*),¹¹⁴ and the 'second sailing', all contribute to the understanding of distinctions between Forms and particulars, their inherent qualities, evaluative status, and relationship to each other, as well as the place of soul within this opposition.

By contrast, in its style of 'verbal minimalism', the 'argument from opposites' foregrounded the structure of a process, but gave no clear description of the type of entities to which it is applicable, apart from specifying all 'generated things'. Even though its style makes it closer to ideals of 'philosophical argument' and suggests comprehensiveness, in order to be understood fully it depends upon other arguments such as the 'apology' or 'affinity argument', so as to clarify its processes and possible problems.

6.5 Conclusion

Plato's outline of the process of 'opposites from opposites' imitates certain aspects of Presocratic style which can be seen to be part of a stylistic movement towards Aristotelian style. These kinds of features are now treated as paradigmatic of philosophical argument. However, far from suggesting that such a style occupies some privileged philosophical status, the rest of the dialogue shows that it does not consider the nature of the entities involved and therefore cannot be fully understood independently.

Both the 'apology' and the 'argument from opposites' can be seen to make important contributions to the dialogue. The latter contains insights into particular processes, attained through 'verbal minimalism', but is dependent on the antecedent 'apology'

¹¹⁴ See e.g. Rowe, 1991b, 163 [the affinity argument] 'is by common consent, one of the weakest'. Elton, 1997, argues that the 'affinity argument' is intended to show 'the pitfalls of analogical argument' (316) and that Simmias' later criticisms of his own 'harmony' analogy (92c11ff.) are intended to imply Plato's dissatisfaction with this type of argument (314ff.). However, Socrates' response to Simmias shows that Simmias' argument fails because it does not account for the qualities and values of soul, the very points on which the 'affinity argument' is based. Cf. Bostock, 1986, 119-121.

and the understanding of qualities and values which is built up within its 'nexus of associations'. Moreover, far from the 'apology' being less important than the 'argument from opposites', the latter actually appears to fall within the scope of the former. For the 'apology' is a higher-order argument concerning the nature of philosophy itself, while the 'argument from opposites' is a lower order enquiry into a particular philosophical principle. In addition, the 'apology' clearly sets out an opposition between the different levels of being, and shows how philosophy fits into this view, while the argument from opposites implicitly relies on this ontological divide, but does not discuss it.

This therefore suggests not only the importance of both these sections, but also the need for a holistic reading of the dialogue which accounts for their relationship to each other and to the other parts of the text. In conclusion, it seems that the transition to the stylistic mode of the 'argument from opposites' does not suggest that the style of the latter is more valuable and 'philosophical'. Instead, it presents a movement between two necessary and complementary types of philosophical discourse.

Chapter 7

'Reading' Anaxagoras

7.1 Introduction

νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος (*Phd.* 97c1-2).

Little is ever made of the detailed critique which follows these words, and it seems that for most readers these lines represent the limit of Anaxagoras' particular importance in the *Phaedo*.¹ Seen as just another physicist whose material causes fail to explain causation, his special significance here is felt to stem from his conception, albeit fallacious, of causal νοῦς which, in the context of causation, can be usefully appropriated and reinterpreted by Plato. By contrast, I aim to show that Anaxagoras' presence and importance in the *Phaedo* is far greater and more complex than has been noticed, and extends beyond sections where it is clearly and explicitly signposted.

In the previous chapter we saw how the generic background of particular features can be bound up with certain arguments or points of view. For example, antitheses in oratory often oppose true to false or moral to immoral, while ambiguous terms sometimes represent alternative moral conceptions. By including these features in a system incompatible with their usual underlying viewpoint, Plato appropriates aspects of their function, while simultaneously challenging and replacing the beliefs with which they are conventionally associated.

In this chapter I return to my earlier Passage III in order to explore Plato's strategy for using generic affiliations in a more detailed, complex, and specific context. That passage had the clearest generic affiliations of those discussed, with a varied range of allusions to Anaxagoras and Presocratic prose writers, which pass without comment in the secondary literature. I suggest that by appropriating Anaxagorean language

¹ Although there are some notable exceptions: e.g. Sedley, 1989, who shows that there is a point by point correspondence between the aspects of cosmology dealt with in and the features of the 'true earth' in the *Phaedo* myth; and Ooms Renard, 1999, 113ff., who takes the details of this passage as being central to the Platonic theory of explanation.

through allusion, sometimes clear, sometimes subtle, Plato mounts a far more complex and extensive attack against Anaxagoras than has been acknowledged in interpretations of the dialogue. Moreover, the purpose of such attacks is not only to dismantle, but also to displace his opponent's system, and so provide Plato with a basis on which to formulate and establish central features of his own philosophy.

In the first section of this chapter I shall consider the use of the Anaxagorean quotation in the 'argument from opposites' and how this sets the scene for the *Phaedo*'s ongoing concern with his ideas. I then move onto the famous passage in Socrates' intellectual autobiography where he recounts his expectations and ensuing disappointment when reading Anaxagoras. This passage, 97b8-99d2, is the central focus of this chapter, and will from now on be referred to as the 'Anaxagoras episode'. The normal interpretation of the passage is that Socrates' expectation of finding normativity in Anaxagorean cosmology stems from Anaxagoras' inclusion of the term $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, together with Socrates' belief in the integral connection between goodness and the intellect.² Lennox, for example, states that Socrates' 'presupposition' depends on 'the conceptual link in his thinking between intelligent agency and the explanatory effect of goodness'.³ Accordingly, allusion to Anaxagoras' view of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ as an ordering cosmological force allows Plato a fortuitous opportunity to connect physics with the intellect and thereby introduce the notion of teleological causation, while Anaxagoras himself is rejected simply because he fails to recognise and take into account the normativity of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.

Given that, as we have seen, the *Phaedo*'s idea of the intellect as moral is usually felt to stem from an unargued claim of its association with virtue made in the 'apology', the traditional reading of the 'Anaxagoras episode' is unsurprising. If this reading is correct, the Anaxagorean catchphrase is used merely to extend this unproven assumption, and the morality of $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ paves the way for a notion of teleological causation which itself seems problematically detached from the rest of the dialogue's argument. Contrary to such an interpretation I shall argue that the source of the normativity which Socrates attributes to Anaxagoras' principle actually derives from

² Cf. 6.2.4, above.

³ Lennox, 1985, 198. Cf. Bostock, 1986, 143; Rowe, 1993, 234.

the idea of universal order, ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος, rather than νοῦς. By then presenting νοῦς as the structure which orders the cosmos and showing why this is so, Plato is not just relying on νοῦς' normativity but, as with φρόνησις in the 'apology', actually mounting an argument for its normativity which could be seen as an attempt to validate the desired connection of epistemology, ethics, physics, and metaphysics, posited throughout the dialogue. Following this, I outline the significance of the rest of the 'Anaxagoras episode', explaining the detail and importance of stylistic allusion both to Anaxagoras himself and to Presocratic prose in general.

The final section argues that there is an underlying engagement with Anaxagoras in the sections of the dialogue before and after the 'Anaxagoras episode', offering a way to overcome the puzzling discontinuity which this episode apparently creates.⁴ I suggest that, even after this episode, Anaxagoras' ideas are still at issue and that their absolute rejection only comes with Socrates' ultimate denial that pure opposites can ever tolerate each other's presence.

7.1.1 *What is the relevance of Anaxagoras for the Phaedo?*

As a preliminary to the more detailed account to follow, I shall briefly outline some of the reasons why Anaxagoras might be singled out as especially relevant to ideas discussed in the *Phaedo*. The first of these, as shown by the 'Anaxagoras episode', must surely be his view of νοῦς as the primary cause of universal order. Indeed, how could such a notion fail to be attractive to the *Phaedo*'s Socrates, a philosopher who claims that the best life is attained through the pure rationality of the soul free from bodily disturbances? It is in his role as the innovative proponent of the intelligent universe, that Anaxagoras is also referred to elsewhere in Plato.⁵

Also of relevance are Anaxagoras' views on the opposites. For, despite their centrality to much Presocratic physics, it is Anaxagoras himself who explicitly states

⁴ This will be discussed further below, 194ff. and *passim*. Cf. also Lennox, 1985, 197 and 200.

⁵ *Laws* 967bff. Cf. *Phlb.* 30d.

their inseparability.⁶ This idea bears some superficial similarities to the *Phaedo*'s 'compresence of opposites' in sensible particulars: that is, that 'some properties, notably relations and values, always occur in an individual particular along with their opposites'.⁷ However, Anaxagoras is not simply talking about the compresence of qualified opposites in particulars, but opposites in themselves, and this is directly opposed to the *Phaedo*'s conception of mutually exclusive pure and distinct opposites.

Furthermore, Anaxagoras also proposed 'like into like' generation, a distinctive viewpoint, given that even his fellow believers in change, such as Heraclitus and Empedocles, saw generation as preceding from opposites to opposites. Yet, notwithstanding superficial similarities to the 'like into like' notion of causation in the *Phaedo*'s 'final argument', for Socrates causation actually depends on a notion which contradicts a fundamental Anaxagorean principle, the absolute separateness of true opposites.

The way in which Anaxagoras' positions are both similar and oppositional to those of the *Phaedo*'s Socrates is indicative of his role in this dialogue: on the one hand, a thinker whose ideas are in certain ways attractive to Socrates; on the other, one whose foundational principles seem to be at odds with the basic premises on which Socrates' arguments depend.

In keeping with this characterisation is the way Anaxagorean physics appears to tend towards a mind/matter duality, in which the primary entity, νοῦς, is distinguished by its absolute purity,⁸ so that it seems to anticipate the *Phaedo*'s metaphysical dualism of Forms and particulars.⁹ Nevertheless, with both νοῦς and matter corporeal,

⁶ Anaxag.B6. Vlastos, 1974, 473, says that, although the belief in the 'commixture' of opposites was the 'traditional assumption', it was Anaxagoras who stated it explicitly. He suggests that Anaxagoras was responding to Empedocles' direct challenge of this belief. However, cf. Lloyd, 1966, 81, for the opposite viewpoint.

⁷ See e.g. *Phd.*74b7-9 and 102b3ff. This formulation is taken from McCabe, 1994, 25, and the term 'compresence' is often used within Platonic studies to denote the simultaneous presence of opposites within a particular. Cf. e.g. Owen, 1957, 175 and 177; Irwin, 1977, 9.

⁸ Anaxag.B12.

⁹ His description of what appears to be another parallel world in B4 might be seen to set a precedent for the other societies depicted in the *Phaedo*'s myth, which live on the earth, although outside of what we understand as the world.

Anaxagoras posits only one metaphysical level,¹⁰ while his principle of ὁμοῦ πάντα also seems incompatible with dualism.¹¹

So, in spite of any apparent similarities, there is always Anaxagoras' fundamental ὁμοῦ πάντα, a notion which Socrates could never accept and with which I shall begin my analysis.

7.2 Anaxagoras in the 'argument from opposites'

One of Socrates' arguments supporting the 'argument from opposites' is the view that one-way generation, which has no corresponding reversal, is impossible, since it would eventually result in all things reaching a certain state from which no chance of change existed. If the living were not generated from the dead, just as we see that the dead are generated from the living, Socrates says, then generation would cease.¹² For further clarification he adds two parallel arguments, one being a direct reference to Anaxagoras which includes the very opening words of his book:

κἂν εἰ συγκρίνοιτο μὲν πάντα, διακρίνοιτο δὲ μή, ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, “Ὅμοῦ πάντα χρήματα.” (*Phd.* 72c3-5)¹³

Like the later 'Anaxagoras episode', Socrates' 'argument from opposites' is, as we saw in Chapter 6, suggestive of the views of a number of thinkers. Given the centrality of opposites in so much Presocratic physics this is unsurprising. Nevertheless, it is only Anaxagoras who is named and cited directly, establishing him as an important figure in the *Phaedo*. This is just one of a series of connected allusions to Anaxagoras, both implicit and explicit, and yet the significance and connectedness of these allusions is, as far as I am aware, unnoticed within the critical literature on the dialogue.

¹⁰ Cf. *KRS*, 365.

¹¹ Anaxag.B6. See Sven-Tage, 1982, 68.

¹² *Phd.* 72a11-b6.

¹³ Apart from the reversal of πάντα and χρήματα and the omission of ἦν, this is a direct quotation of Anaxag. B1 which, on the testimony of Simplicius, is generally assumed to be the opening of Anaxagoras' book. See e.g. Sider, 1981, 43.

How does Plato use Anaxagoras' words here and what further relevance does this have? As elsewhere, in his treatment of other thinkers, Plato takes a short programmatic statement detached from its original context as representative of Anaxagoras' views.¹⁴ He then inserts this representative statement into an argument based on the very impossibility of what Anaxagoras takes to be a self-evident and foundational metaphysical truth.¹⁵ For Anaxagoras, the phrase ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν describes the primordial state, from which physical entities came into being,¹⁶ while ὁμοῦ πάντα is also used to describe the present state of the universe.¹⁷ In Plato the ἦν has been dropped and ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα is the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional, whose self-evident impossibility is used to imply that the process which would lead to such a state, the unidirectional change of opposites, is also impossible. From this it can then be inferred that transition between opposites must be a two-way process.

To some degree Plato seems to be using not only Anaxagoras' words, but also his argumentative strategy, given that Plato's omission of ἦν from Anaxagoras' programmatic statement is very similar to Anaxagoras' own treatment of Parmenides. By changing ἔστιν to ἦν in Parmenides' νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν ...,¹⁸ Anaxagoras appears to have given his cosmos an origin in the past whose existence Parmenides has just denied (οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται).¹⁹ For Plato the removal of ἦν is one way of challenging Anaxagoras' claim that ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα was a prior and original state and of criticising the temporal order of his cosmology. This is a good example of how Plato employs Anaxagoras' own verbal techniques to criticise him, while also constructing a new viewpoint.

So, although at first glance the fact that Socrates uses Anaxagoras' words to argue for his own case might seem to suggest some degree of support for Anaxagorean physics, the more closely the context is examined, the more evident it becomes that

¹⁴ Cf. *Thl.*152a2-4; *Soph.*237a8-9.

¹⁵ Schofield, 1980, 33.

¹⁶ Anaxag.B1.

¹⁷ Anaxag.B6: ἀλλ' ὅπωςπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι, καὶ νῦν πάντα ὁμοῦ.

¹⁸ Parm.B8.5-6.

¹⁹ In addition, Anaxagoras' substitution of the plural for Parmenides' singular also suggests a commitment to pluralism rather than monism. On Anaxagoras' use of Parmenides B8.5-6, see e.g. Schofield, 1980, 64; and Sider, 1981, 44.

these doctrines are in fact being seriously undermined. This is certainly the case with the συγκρίνοιτο/ διακρίνοιτο opposition here which, especially given the context, is extremely reminiscent of Anaxagorean terminology.²⁰ Socrates follows Anaxagoras' view of συγκρίνειν and διακρίνειν as complementary processes, when proposing that συγκρίνειν must be accompanied by the corresponding διακρίνειν. However, for Socrates, the result of pure συγκρίνειν would be ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα, since everything would be συγκρινόμενα. This is impossible, since nothing could arise from such a state. The argument represents a serious departure from Anaxagoras on two counts. First, for Anaxagoras ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα was the original state of the universe, while τὸ συγκρίνειν only came later, once νοῦς had initiated the first motion (περιχωρήσαι or κινεῖν), from which the initial separation (τὸ ἀποκρίνειν) began.²¹ Yet the difference between Socrates and Anaxagoras concerns not only temporal priority, but also change. For Socrates, if all things were συγκρινόμενα the resultant condition would be ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα, which would preclude change, whereas for Anaxagoras ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα is the original state from which all change proceeds.

Not only was ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα the precursor to change in Anaxagorean physics, but ὁμοῦ πάντα also represents a present within which opposites are not separate and change occurs from 'like into like'.²² There is then a sharp irony both in Plato's use of ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα as the impossible state which precludes change, but also in the fact that this occurs within an argument to prove that in the process of generation opposites turn into opposites. For conversely, Anaxagorean generation proceeds from ὁμοῦ πάντα and revolves around a principle of 'like into like' and 'predominance'.²³

Clearly ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα is incompatible with the *Phaedo*'s 'argument from opposites' (70c4-72e2). Moreover, because of the centrality of opposites, the

²⁰ *Phd.*72c3-4. Amongst the extant fragments of the Presocratics the verbs διακρίνω and συγκρίνω and their cognates are used only by Anaxagoras.

²¹ See Anaxag.B4; 12; and 13; and Sider, 1981, 103.

²² See Anaxag.B6; 8; and 10 respectively.

²³ See Anaxag.B12 and Sven-Tage, 1982, 22.

‘argument from opposites’ also prefigures the later analysis of causation,²⁴ which will show why the falsity of ὁμοῦ πάντα is so important and has ramifications beyond this particular passage.²⁵ As is clear from Anaxagoras B1 and elsewhere, he is concerned with a comprehensive physics, capable of explaining all generation and destruction. Likewise Plato’s Socrates aims in the *Phaedo* at a comprehensive account of causation, with the Forms.²⁶ Causation occurs through the presence of a Form, itself a pure, real, and distinct entity which cannot, under any circumstances, tolerate the presence of its opposite. Thus, for Socrates, separability is essential in order to have πάντα, rather than an indiscriminate and unchangeable mass, so that Anaxagoras’ foundational premise can be seen as a paradox which posits the existence of πάντα, while precluding their essential distinctness by using ὁμοῦ.²⁷ In this way, when Plato cites Anaxagoras in the former argument, he is also laying the groundwork for the later theories which will reveal why Anaxagoras’ ὁμοῦ is so fundamentally false.

7.3 The ‘Anaxagoras episode’

7.3.1 *Conventional treatments of this passage*

I now move on to the ‘Anaxagoras episode’ within Socrates’ intellectual ‘autobiography’, in which he recounts his expectations of and reactions to reading Anaxagoras (97b8-99d2). As well as being an important part of the transition into the final arguments for the immortality of the soul it shows Socrates’ retrospective reflection on his own intellectual development. Although Socrates often presents the views of others, giving either specific or vague sources,²⁸ it is only here and in the *Apology* that he comments directly on his own development.

²⁴ The importance of this connection is highlighted by the anonymous question at *Phd.*103a4-10, which leads Socrates to an explicit comparison between opposite qualities in particulars (as in ‘the argument from opposites’) and the pure opposites themselves (*Phd.*103a11-c2).

²⁵ NB the recurrence of this phrase at *Phd.*101e5 which, I will argue below, 7.5.2, is once again a specific allusion to Anaxagoras.

²⁶ See n.97.

²⁷ Cf. e.g. Anaxag.B8 on the absolute inseparability of opposites.

²⁸ E.g. *Phd.*61d9; *Tht.*201d8; *Gorg.*507e6.

According to its standard interpretation the passage could be summarised as demonstrating Plato's aspirations to a teleological account of causation and his frustration with physicists like Anaxagoras, who explain phenomena in terms of physical prerequisites, but without reference to the value and so to the real cause of the occurrence. Although the importance of this passage is recognised, there has been little discussion of its details,²⁹ and most of the debate surrounding it focuses on the question of whether Socrates' teleological aspirations are relevant to the theories of the 'final argument'.³⁰ Thus, Lennox says that although these two sections share the theme of explanation, they nevertheless present 'two radically different accounts of explanation', so that 'commentators have tended to polarize around two extreme positions' by suggesting that the 'teleological parenthesis is of no significance' or that 'teleological explanations' are actually concealed with the '*deuteros plous*'.³¹

The detailed commentaries on the 'Anaxagoras episode' itself are mainly concerned with identifying which Anaxagorean fragments contain the specific doctrines at issue or pointing out other possible sources, although their significance is not discussed.³² Neither this approach, nor assessments of its relevance for the 'final argument', do justice to the elaborate detail and complexity of this passage,³³ which seem oddly superfluous if one follows the traditional interpretation. The challenge remains to account for the significance of its individual details.

Moreover, in addition to traditional questions about this passage's relationship to the 'final' argument, there is also a puzzling discontinuity within its more immediate context. For although Socrates' insistence on the importance of soul and rationality

²⁹ Lennox, 1985, is an exception; along with certain others. See n.1, above.

³⁰ Vlastos, 1973, for example, in his important and controversial article 'Reasons and causes in the *Phaedo*', rejects a teleological interpretation of the final argument and suggests that it describes relationships of logical entailment as opposed to causation. These ideas have been heavily contested, for example by Wiggins, 1986, who denies that the Forms themselves are causes, but supports a teleological view. Although everything is caused by the Good, this is not intelligible to mortals and can only be understood to a degree through its 'intelligible determinations', the Forms. Finally, in a recent article of 1998, Sedley restates the case for seeing the Forms as causes and as an ontological rather than epistemological category, having suggested in a 1989 article that the desired teleology actually manifests itself to a certain degree in the *Phd.*'s myth.

³¹ Lennox, 1985, 201-2. Although Lennox disputes both positions, he does present his own ideas as to why we should assume the relevance of teleology for the *deuteros plous*.

³² E.g. Rowe, 1993, 237-8; Burnet, 1911, 98; Geddes, 1863, 113f.; Loriaux, 1975, 82 and 85.

³³ Cf. Ooms Renard, 1999, 115, who comments on the 'pseudo-explanation' at 98c5-d6: 'Notice the extraordinary sophistication of this account, usually hurriedly summarised as "material".'

would be likely to make a theory of causation based on *νοῦς* seem significant and attractive, the ‘Anaxagoras episode’ is effectively sandwiched between two closely cohering sections, without obvious relevance to them. Lennox calls it ‘an apparently parenthetical discussion of Anaxagoras’ and says ‘the radical discontinuity between the Anaxagorean excursus and the rest of the exploration of the *aitia* of generation and destruction is clear, and clearly self-conscious’.³⁴ Immediately preceding this ‘Anaxagoras episode’ Socrates begins his autobiography with a discussion of various physical and mathematical theories, some of which might be associated with figures such as Empedocles and Alcmaeon, as well as Anaxagoras.³⁵ This is followed by the ‘Anaxagoras episode’ which then leads into what Socrates calls his ‘second-sailing’. Beginning with the rejection of colour and shape as causes of beauty (100c10-e3), the ‘second-sailing’ then moves on to examples (100e8-101b8)³⁶ which all relate back to first part of the autobiography (96d8-e4).³⁷

In this way, the Anaxagoras episode ostensibly stands apart from both its immediate and wider context, and seems to challenge its readers to uncover its place within the dialogue as a whole as well as the significance of its own argumentation.

7.3.2 *The significance of νοῦς*

I propose that the key to much of the episode’s importance lies in fully understanding its concept of *νοῦς*. Until the closing moments the focus on *νοῦς* draws the parts of this passage together, with all the varying causal explanations presented as correctly or incorrectly attributed to *νοῦς*. Moreover, *νοῦς* also suggests a link with the rational soul, which has been such an important concept earlier in the dialogue.

We would do best to begin by pointing out and clarifying *νοῦς*’s various roles here. The first can be seen within Socrates’ statement of Anaxagoras’ views: *νοῦς ἐστὶν*

³⁴ Lennox, 1985, 197, and 200 respectively.

³⁵ See e.g. Rowe, 1993, 230ff.

³⁶ Namely: the idea that a head could be the cause of one man being greater than another; that two causes ten to be greater than eight; or that a half causes a two-cubit rule to be longer than a one-cubit one.

³⁷ Lennox, 1985, 197 n.6, cites this along with three other ‘pieces of evidence that indicate that the sense of intrusion of the Anaxagorean discussion is intentional’.

ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος (97c1-2). Yet νοῦς is not simply the cause of cosmological order, but has other important dimensions, which are revealed through the explanations themselves, as well as the puns on this term within the passage.

Socrates claims that his inference that a cosmic νοῦς would work towards what is best led him to believe that he had found a teacher about the cause of realities κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ (97d7). Despite Burnet's view that such a pun would be 'frigid',³⁸ the way Socrates states his approval for Anaxagoras is usually taken to involve a pun on the Anaxagorean νοῦς. Another very similar pun is then found when Socrates criticises Anaxagoras for positing spurious causes such as air and aether for the ordering of πράγματα: ὁρῶ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον (98b8).³⁹ Even commentators who acknowledge these puns do not explain their significance. Yet such puns imply that Socrates is concerned with both the cosmic and individual human νοῦς and is suggesting a possible link between them.

Correspondence between the cosmic and personal νοῦς is an idea explored in a number of Platonic dialogues,⁴⁰ and Plato's inclusion of both in the discussion here also emerges when Socrates considers what constitutes the correct explanation for remaining in prison, beginning ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις λέγων ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει νῷ πράττει...(98c4). This shows that νοῦς is to be seen as the instrument of moral judgement and also strengthens the connection between νοῦς, representing individual rationality, and soul.

A further point, of crucial significance, comes from these ideas of νοῦς as personal intellect. When Socrates uses νοῦς in contexts such as those above, he suggests that it plays a part in the individual's reasoning and decision making. By saying ταῦτα δὴ λογιζόμενος ἄσμενος ἠύρηκέναι ὥμην διδάσκαλον...κατὰ νοῦν ἐμαυτῷ

³⁸ Burnet, 1911, 104.

³⁹ See e.g. Gallop, 1975, 174, who notices both puns and claims, *contra* Burnet, that they are 'in keeping with Socrates' ironical treatment of Anaxagoras. Cf. Sprague, 1994, 53; Rowe, 1993, 235; Geddes, 1863, 112.

⁴⁰ E.g. *Ti.*47b: ἵνα τὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ κατιδόντες τοῦ νοῦ περιόδους χρησαίμεθα ἐπὶ τὰς περιφορὰς τὰς τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν διανοήσεως, συγγενεῖς ἐκείναις οὐσας.... Cf. e.g. *Ti.*30b; *Phlb.*28d-30d, and Harte, 1999, 394, on this passage: 'Socrate établit un parallèle entre l'intelligence humaine, couronnement du corps humain animé, et l'intelligence divine, couronnement encore plus glorieux du corps cosmique animé'.

(97d6) he implies that the points he makes here are consistent with what he himself feels to be rational.⁴¹ Thus, if *νοῦς* is a term describing Socrates' personal reasoning, it should be manifest within the very process of reasoning in the passage as a whole, and can be further understood from analysing the composition of the argument. To put it another way, *νοῦς* is seen as that which motivates individual decisions and as that which confers order on the universe. How it does so is partially to be understood through analysing the content of Socrates' examples of *νοῦς*-based explanation. Yet, since *νοῦς* represents not only Socrates' topic of discussion, but also his thought processes, a clearer understanding of how it fulfills its causal role is also to be found within the way in which his argument is structured.

7.4 Style and *νοῦς*-based reasoning

Taking both content and structure of argument in this passage as being an indication of what *νοῦς* does or does not involve, we can now move on to trace the particular contributions of the main types of argument. This is largely bound up with examining how Plato imitates his predecessors' style to demonstrate his criticisms and also to construct his own position. At some points the allusions and criticism are specifically aimed at Anaxagoras, while at others the style evokes a more general impression of the type of writing found in Presocratic prose. There are three main parts to my discussion, dealing with: repetition of key terms; repetition of certain syntactical, semantic, and lexical structures; and the possible allusiveness of Socrates' 'sitting' example (98c5-d6).

7.4.1 *Key-word repetition*

My first comments are on key-word repetition, which constitutes one element of Plato's argumentation. Such repetition is subtly reminiscent of Anaxagoras' own style and a related aspect of his argumentation (see Chapter 5). Much of his argument progresses through the restatement of key words along with the assertion

⁴¹ Cf. White, 1989, 160: 'The dimension of mind that arranges and causes all things is in some sense consonant with the mind of Socrates himself'. Apart from this point, White's arguments have little in common with mine.

of further characteristics and points, rather than using what we might recognise as patterns of inference and proof characteristic of argumentation.⁴² The nature and power of Anaxagoras' νοῦς is given as a self-evident assertion, then supported and strengthened through incantatory repetition.⁴³

As in Anaxagoras, the large amount of 'key-word' repetition in the *Phaedo* passage contributes to the emphasis and expansion of what Socrates himself presents as a self-evident truth: namely the integral connection of νοῦς, universal order, and the good. This is especially the case in the first part of the 'Anaxagoras episode', in which Socrates outlines his expectations of Anaxagoras' book (97b8-98b6). When compared to other parts of the *Phaedo*, the amount of 'key-word' repetition is exceptionally high, meaning that a few significant lexemes are repeated at numerous points throughout. Moreover, the general repetitiveness of the passage is further enhanced by the relatively small vocabulary used here.⁴⁴

The notable examples of key-word repetition in this passage are: νοῦς; κοσμέω and its compound διακοσμέω; πᾶς; αἴτιος and its cognates; and βέλτιστος/ ἀμείνων. νοῦς, κοσμέω, αἴτιος, and πᾶς are also interconnected and all used in close conjunction.⁴⁵

Plato, like Anaxagoras, uses a nexus of significant words to transmit his ideas and includes certain Anaxagorean key-words along with some of his own. Although three of the repeated lexemes, νοῦς, κοσμέω, and πᾶς, are also prominent in Anaxagoras, the terms αἴτιος and its cognates along with βέλτιστος/ ἀμείνων are a Platonic addition. Just like Anaxagoras, Socrates seems to rely on repetition of key-terms to make his central point.

The question of what legitimises the attribution of normative structure to νοῦς as a cause can be answered with reference to the very connection of νοῦς, κοσμέω, and

⁴² Cf. e.g. Schofield, 1980, 4-6.

⁴³ E.g. Deichgräber, 1933, 353 and *passim*.

⁴⁴ This passage's 'lexeme-token ratio' is 0.52 (see 4.1.2), significantly lower than in the others (four of the remaining passages have ratios ranging from 0.69-0.73, while the final ratio was 0.79), and indicates a lesser degree of lexemic variation.

⁴⁵ E.g. 97c1-5.

πᾶς, which is so central to this passage and recalls Anaxagoras' own πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς.⁴⁶ κόσμος, for the Greeks, appears to have been a normative term, suggesting good order. A clear testimony to such usage is the beginning of Gorgias' famous *Encomium of Helen*, where the term signifies something like 'the good appropriate to each thing':

κόσμος πόλει μὲν εὐανδρία, σώματι δὲ κάλλος, ψυχῇ δὲ σοφία, πράγματι δὲ ἀρετή, λόγῳ δὲ ἀλήθεια· τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τούτων ἀκοσμία.⁴⁷

For Plato κόσμος has a similar normative sense,⁴⁸ representing a whole whose elements are arranged in the best possible way.⁴⁹ For example, at *Philebus* 64b, having enumerated all the necessary elements for the mixture which constitutes the best life, Socrates call this κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος. According to Harte, the use of κόσμος here confirms 'le parallèle implicite entre l'ordre cosmique et l'ordonnement de la bonne âme humaine'.⁵⁰ This suggests that, just as there was an association of cosmological and personal νοῦς in the *Phaedo* passage,⁵¹ so the use of κόσμος here might also be seen to evoke a connection which Plato sees between cosmological and human order.

⁴⁶ Anaxag.B12. Cf. Harte, 1999, 385, and *passim* on the normativity of universal structure and its essential connection with intelligence in the *Phlb*.

⁴⁷ Gorg.B.11.1.

⁴⁸ Cf. McCabe, 1994, 68: 'The [Socrates'] objective then is what we might call cosmic teleology - the thesis that the whole cosmos is tied together in a single *structure*; because it is structured, it is good'. The normativity of *kosmein* is also noted by Menn, 1995, 2: 'to put things in order is to put each of them where it is best for it to be'. However, although not perfectly clear, Menn still seems to see νοῦς' normativity as responsible for its ordering role, rather than vice versa, since he (2) says that 'to know that *S* is *P* because of *nous* depends on knowing that it is best for *S* to be *P*, and indeed this dependence is analytic. Moreover, he later suggests (17) that Socrates' reason for expecting Anaxagoras to give explanations in terms of the best is because (given the connection between *nous*, *sophia*, and *phronesis*): 'from the beginning, when Plato considered the possibility of explanation through *nous*, he had intended *nous* as a virtue. This is presupposed in the *Phaedo*, in Socrates' disappointment with Anaxagoras'.

There are some very rare instances in which the verb κοσμέω or the noun κόσμος in the plural seems to have a pejorative sense, denoting unnecessary material adornments: e.g. *Phd*.114e2; *Phdr*.239d1. However, as with e.g. the word 'finery', the ironic pejorative implications appear to depend on the primary normative sense of their word-group.

⁴⁹ Cf. Harte, 1999, 385 and *passim*; and Lennox, 1985, 217, on the *Timaeus*.

⁵⁰ Harte, 1999, 399. Cf. *Phlb*.30c6 on νοῦς and cosmological order. See also Menn, 1995, 3.

⁵¹ This goes against e.g. Lennox, 1985, 198-204, who sees normativity as stemming solely from νοῦς, while κόσμος is neutral, with the result that he talks about 'a good κόσμος', rather than simply κόσμος.

At other points, the normativity of κόσμος is retained, although its cosmological aspects are not mentioned. So, at *Gorgias* 506d-e, as part of the argument to prove that the temperate soul is good, Socrates claims that it is the κόσμος appropriate to each thing, which makes it good.⁵² Here the focus is the soul, although implements, bodies, and all living things are also mentioned as entities for which this principle is true.⁵³ Similarly, at *Republic* 443e, achieving order (κοσμέω) within the self is presented as one of the necessary steps towards becoming just.⁵⁴

Furthermore, the κόσμος which νοῦς confers is not localised, but universal, as is established and emphasised through the repetition of πᾶς in conjunction with κόσμος and νοῦς. Thus νοῦς brings universal normativity, and its essential connection with normativity extends throughout its complete sphere of activity. As the passage progresses, what it means for νοῦς to play such a role will be clarified, which forms an important reason for νοῦς' suitability as an ordering principle in itself.

So, if it is universal order which implies normativity, perhaps we can offer a retranslation of the crucial, but ambiguous phrase τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ (97c5-6), which is usually translated as something like 'the mind in arranging things arranges everything and establishes each thing as it is best for it to be'.⁵⁵ In this case the repetition of κοσμέω seems puzzlingly tautological. If, however, we take the participle as causal, and the καὶ as epexegetic, this would then give us 'mind, since it orders *all* things,⁵⁶ orders insofar as it arranges *each* thing in whichever way would

⁵² *Gorg.*506e: κόσμος τις ἄρα ἐγγενόμενος ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὁ ἐκάστου οἰκείος ἀγαθὸν παρέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων. Cf. 504a2ff.

⁵³ *Gorg.*506d.

⁵⁴ On the connection between κόσμος and virtue cf. also e.g. *Chrm.*159b3; *Phdr.*259b2.

⁵⁵ Trans. Fowler, 1914.

⁵⁶ It is important to include πάντα within the causal clause, since this makes clear that it is *universal* order which leads to the normative arrangement of each component *contra* e.g. Menn, 1995, 2, who translates the phrase: 'nous, when it orders [*kosmounta*], orders all things and puts each one of them where it is best for it to be'.

be best',⁵⁷ a translation which makes sense of the double κοσμέω as well as clearly supporting the view that κοσμοῦντα πάντα is responsible for normativity.⁵⁸

What, then, of the key-words in the Platonic passage which are not used by Anaxagoras? Along with βέλτιστος/ ἀμείνων, the term αἴτιος and its cognates stands out from the other key-words within this passage as being distinctively non-Anaxagorean. From the way in which Plato both changes Anaxagoras' πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς to νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος and appears to use αἴτιος interchangeably with κοσμέω, αἴτιος seems to be either integrally connected or synonymous with κοσμέω. So Plato appears to suggest that Anaxagoras' use of κοσμέω commits him to the notion of αἰτία, while at the same time emphasising his failure to acknowledge this through the proliferation of αἴτιος-words in this passage as compared to their absence in Anaxagoras' own works.⁵⁹

Once again, Plato subtly manipulates Anaxagoras' language to show that, even if his words suggest correct inclinations, he failed to attain the truth. For if we take αἰτία to denote 'reason' or 'cause' it might initially seem that Anaxagoras himself made the connection between causation and order, since his νοῦς both established order and set in motion the processes necessary to change in the cosmos.⁶⁰ Yet for Plato it will emerge from the 'second sailing' that the kind of order which is related to a cause (αἰτία) is one with two metaphysical levels, in which the absolute distinctness of primary entities is essential to their acting as causes.⁶¹ In Anaxagoras' cosmos, however, there is a condition of ὁμοῦ πάντα, in which all entities are composed of the same type of matter and, with the exception of νοῦς, there is no absolute separation. So Plato's emphasis on αἰτία in his account of Anaxagoras seems to point to inconsistencies in the latter's philosophy, since it suggests that Anaxagoras' talk of universal order commits him to an account of causation which his physics

⁵⁷ Alternatively, the causal sense of κοσμέω could still be retained even if καί was not taken to be exegetic, and would simply give the second part of the sentence as 'orders and arranges each thing...'.
⁵⁸ This translation also points to the fact that universal order implies the best position of each individual constituent, which will be shown below to be an important aspect of this concept here.

⁵⁹ Cf. Menn, 1995, 2: 'so long as Anaxagoras does not explain why the different material components of the world are in their proper *order*, he is making no real use of *nous* as a cause.
⁶⁰ E.g. Anaxag.B12 and B13.

⁶¹ See p.219ff.

could never support. Even if it is implied by certain terminology, true αἰτία could never be a part of Anaxagorean physics.

This is made clearer within Socrates' account of the spurious causes given by Anaxagoras and the parallel examples in the passage which follows, where the key-word repetition of αἴτιος and its cognates continues. Here Socrates denies that Anaxagoras' airs, aethers, and waters, are causes (οὐδέ τινας αἰτίας: 98b9) and says that the parallel cases give causes, but neglect to give the *true* causes (*Phd.* 98d6-e1) which Socrates then outlines.

Yet αἴτιος is not the only prominent term in the 'Anaxagoras episode' that is noticeably absent from Anaxagoras himself; the other significant example is βέλτιστος/ ἀμείνων. Just as with αἴτιος, the implied connection between βέλτιστος/ ἀμείνων and κοσμέω suggests that Anaxagoras' ideas about universal order must have been mistaken. For while they compelled him towards terminology which itself implies teleology, his physics itself made this impossible. This is also emphasised by the second part of the 'Anaxagoras episode' since βέλτιστος/ ἀμείνων, which has dominated the previous passage, does not occur within the account of spurious causes (98b7-d8), and only reappears when Socrates outlines the true cause for his actions (98e2).

A final point to notice is that Plato has changed the aorist indicative of Anaxagoras' phrase, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, for a present participle in νοῦς ἐστίν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος. In some ways, this play of tenses is reminiscent of his dropping of ἦν in the 'argument from opposites'. Here, however, the present participle perhaps represents Socrates' desire for a conception of νοῦς whose ordering role is constant.⁶²

So, to conclude, it seems that Plato uses the Anaxagorean device of key-word repetition, in order to introduce and emphasise the essential interconnections between νοῦς, universal order, and normativity in causation, and to show their incompatibility

⁶² Cf. Loriaux, 1975, 77, who suggests that the use of the present participle suggests the stable and definitive role of νοῦς.

with Anaxagorean physics, as well as strengthening the connection between cosmos and individual, both in terms of order and rationality.

7.4.2 'Argumentationsstil'

Another key aspect of style in this passage, as I pointed out in Chapter 5, is the widespread use of the 'Argumentationsstil' or 'scientific style', so characteristic of Anaxagoras and other Presocratic prose. This is especially so at the beginning (97b8-98b6), where Socrates outlines his philosophical expectations of Anaxagoras' book. Here, stylistic allusion is more general than with the key-word repetition, and seems reminiscent of Presocratic prose in general,⁶³ rather than Anaxagoras exclusively.

The main feature of such a style, as I outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, is structural as well as lexemic repetition.⁶⁴ Along with the syntactic continuity conferred by the indirect discourse, a strong degree of logical interconnectedness within the passage is accompanied by repetition of clause structure, on a semantic, syntactic, and formal level, and this results in a degree of stylistic continuity which is rare in the *Phaedo*. Semantically, there is a repeated pattern of a given cause or condition followed by reasoned inference. As a whole the passage is largely made up of conditionals or simple reported thought, preceded by a short phrase denoting cause, and these are also interspersed with a couple of explanatory γάρ clauses. Hypotaxis prevails, clauses are neither exceptionally long nor short, and the word order is unremarkable, appearing to reproduce the logical order of the train of thought. Moreover, while the passage's syntactic complexity differentiates it from the simple narrative sequentiality of historical prose narratives, its other features such as lack of variation also distinguish this stylistically from the periodic structure associated with Attic oratory.

These combined features foreground the structure, and bear many similarities to aspects of the Presocratic prose of Anaxagoras, Zeno, Melissus, and Diogenes of

⁶³ Of course, some features are also shared with Presocratic verse writers. However, it is chiefly the conjunction of key features within prose which interests me here.

⁶⁴ On key-word repetition and the general lack of lexemic variation, see n.44.

Apollonia. If the key-word repetition discussed above forged the necessary links between νοῦς, universal order, and normativity, it is the prominent structure of argumentation, which now demonstrates more clearly what the structure of this νοῦς comprises. In the ‘peroration’ Socrates gave various reasons for rationality’s (φρόνησις) normativity and through key-word repetition he has suggested here that νοῦς’ ordering powers are another reason. As he then explains what would constitute an ordered explanation, he is simultaneously setting out patterns of νοῦς-based explanation and thus showing why this provides a suitable model for order.

The features of ‘Argumentationsstil’ in the ‘Anaxagoras episode’ do also differ from those in the Presocratics. For example, the type of conditionals found in Presocratic prose are almost exclusively counterfactuals, used to argue the impossibility of a premise in the protasis, by showing that the resultant apodosis depicts an impossible state of affairs. So, for instance, Anaxagoras argues εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεω ἐμέμεικτο ἄλλω, μετείχεν ἄν ἀπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμεικτό τεω.⁶⁵ The structure is similar to that of hypothetical inversion, common in oratory, in which the falsity of the state of affairs presented in the apodosis proves the falsity of the protasis. In all these cases the process of inference establishes the impossibility of the initial premise.⁶⁶ In logical terms these conditionals can be seen as *modus tollens* arguments: if *p* then *q*; not *q*; therefore not *p*. We could analyse the Anaxagorean example as: if νοῦς was mixed with something it would share in all things; νοῦς does not share in all things; therefore νοῦς is not mixed with anything.

In the ‘Anaxagoras episode’, however, Socrates does not argue through counterfactual conditionals, but from protases taken to be true, to the truth of the apodoses: as in εἰ τοῦθ’ οὕτως ἔχει [i.e. if νοῦς is the cause of all things], τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη (97c4-6). Even in those cases which reveal Anaxagoras’ failings by implication, the structure of the conditionals is the same. So, in καὶ εἰ ἐν μέσῳ φαίη εἶναι αὐτήν, ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι ὡς ἄμεινον ἦν αὐτήν ἐν μέσῳ εἶναι

⁶⁵ E.g. Anaxag.B12 Cf. e.g. Meliss.B8 and ZenoB2 . For an analysis of this structure of conditional see Wakker, 1995, 154, who says that such a conditional, in which the implication goes from the apodosis to the protasis, is only to be found in argumentative patterns.

⁶⁶ Even a rare example such as Meliss.B6 , εἰ γὰρ <ἄπειρον> εἶη, ἔν εἶη ἄν, the reason for this being the case is still presented in terms of a counterfactual: εἰ γὰρ δύο εἶη, οὐκ ἂν δύναίτο ἄπειρα εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ἔχοι ἄν πείρατα πρὸς ἀλλήλα.

(97e3-98a1) Socrates argues that claiming [earth] to be in the middle implies an obligation to explain why it is better for it to be in the middle.

Unlike the Presocratics the underlying logical structure of Socrates' arguments is *modus ponens*:⁶⁷ if *p* then (should be) *q*; *p*; therefore (should be) *q*.⁶⁸ My last example could then be analysed as follows: if he says that it is in the middle he [should] explain why it is better for it to be in the middle; he does explain why it is in the middle (implied); therefore he should explain why this is better.⁶⁹

Essentially, there is no substantial difference between the structure of the *modus tollens* and *ponens* arguments. Yet *modus tollens*, beginning with 'if *p* then *q*', refutes *p* through denial of *q*, while *modus ponens* takes the opposite approach, positing *p* in order to argue for *q*. In this way, the former is more suited to functioning as an instrument of refutation, the latter more conducive to gradual elaboration of a larger system, by establishing rather than refuting propositions. The points which are accepted can be developed into a coherent system so that the structure of argument evokes the idea of a perfectly coherent system so important for the concept of *νόμος*, order, and cause here.

However, there is also a further latent implication in the rhetoric of the *modus ponens*, which is that Anaxagoras did *not* in fact fulfil the obligations laid on him by the argument. When Socrates argues that, if Anaxagoras claimed that the earth was in the middle he should then explain why this position was better, we also know that there is an unspoken 'but he did not' in Socrates words. In this way it has similar force to rhetorical questions where the speaker asks whether the converse of a proposition is true, implicitly leaving no choice but to give the negative answer, and thus emphasising the truth of the proposition. Once again, then, Socrates is using the methods of Anaxagoras and other physicists, but subtly diverging, so as to refute their ideas while offering his own alternative.

⁶⁷ It is only the first conditional (97c4) that does not involve a modal operator.

⁶⁸ In most cases, moreover, the apodosis points not so much to some fact of the matter in the physical world, as to some obligation upon the person who would explain the physical world.

⁶⁹ Although much of the sequence is implicit, Socrates' prescriptions for explanation of cosmological phenomena are general and it can be assumed that Anaxagoras was explaining something like the position of the moon, so that it is fairly safe to see the second and third stages of the *modus ponens* as implicit.

The main point here remains the stated connection of νοῦς, universal order, and the good. Argumentation then gives a series of further points showing the type of considerations to which a physical theory motivated by such a premise might lead. Investigation of generation and destruction will be physically comprehensive, since it covers all aspects of existence, activity or passivity (97c6-d1). This comprehensiveness will also extend to an evaluative level, being explained in terms of what is best, knowledge of which also entails knowledge of the inferior (97d1-5). Explanation should be in terms of cause and necessity, saying why a particular phenomenon is better (97e3-4), both in terms of actions and experiences (98a6-7). For Socrates such a cause, it is implied, would provide a sufficient explanation of generation and destruction: καὶ εἴ μοι ταῦτα ἀποφαίνοι, παρεσκευάσμεν ὥς οὐκέτι ποθεσόμενος αἰτίας ἄλλο εἶδος (98a1-2). Finally, the explanation of cause is expected to outline not only the best for each individual thing, but also a common good, so that it seems that overall coherence should also form part of such a theory. Thus comprehensiveness involves not only the separate quality and actions of the individual thing, but also its place within the system as a whole, implying Socrates' desire for a theory of causation which is holistic on a physical, evaluative, and epistemological level.

It seems, therefore, that universal order implies absolute coherence of all elements and brings together both the ethical and physical. Since the organisational principle of a cosmos is good, universal coherence will involve understanding the goodness of each thing, both as an individual and in relation to the other constituents. As shown above, νοῦς as the cause of universal order is understood on the basis of νοῦς ('rationality') in the individual. If we consider the model of rationality that is appealed to in the *Phaedo*, it is possible to see why νοῦς would be suitable as an organisational principle within the theory of causation outlined here.

In the *Phaedo* the real objects of intelligence are presented as a complete set of entities,⁷⁰ which comprise all types, whether it be ethical, physical, or

⁷⁰ See e.g. *Phd.*65d12-e1, where Socrates, having mentioned 'absolute' justice, beauty, and goodness, then says: λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἷον μεγέθους πέρι, ὑγιείας, ἰσχύος, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνὶ λόγῳ ἀπάντων τῆς οὐσίας ὃ τυγχάνει ἕκαστον ὄν; 75c10-d4; 77a2-5; 100c6.

mathematical.⁷¹ Yet the notion of rationality is also to be understood from the very reasoning processes which are used by Socrates, so that an argument like the 'argument from affinity', which groups entities according to their essential characteristics, can be seen to suggest that rationality involves understanding the relationship of elements to each other, as does the process of recognition of qualities described in the 'recollection argument'.⁷² Consistency is a crucial part of the *Phaedo* and of the Platonic Socratic notion of rationality.⁷³ Moreover, comprehensive understanding of physical processes also extends to the realm of sensibles, as is seen in the 'argument from opposites'.⁷⁴

Along with general stylistic austerity, another characteristic both of Presocratic prose writing and the 'Anaxagoras episode' is the abstract noun-form consisting of the definite article and a neuter adjective. For example, Anaxagoras himself talks about τὸ μικρόν and τὸ μέγα, and τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ.⁷⁵ In the *Phaedo* passage the number of instances of this noun-form is very high, all comprising either τό + various degrees of ἀγαθός or χεῖρον; words with a special significance in this context.

Given the context and allusiveness of this passage, the use of this noun-form does not seem coincidental. Yet, even if seen as an allusion to writers like Anaxagoras, its implications are fairly general. In the earlier prose such terms are often used to represent basic and general entities.⁷⁶ So, for example, in Anaxagoras B12, a key point of the initial separation caused by νοῦς is given in terms of separating ἀπό τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν etc., while in Melissus

⁷¹ Cf. the inclusion of all these spheres within the 'final argument' (see Chapter 8 p.228). Also cf. Ch.6 p.144 and *passim*, above, on the comprehensiveness and other features of φρόνησις.

⁷² See e.g. *Phd.*75d9-e4.

⁷³ See 8.8.1, and e.g. *Gorg.*481bff.; *Euthphr.*11d, 15c; and Vlastos, 1983, 53ff. on consistency in the elenchus.

⁷⁴ *Phd.*70d7-e1: μὴ τοίνυν κατ' ἀνθρώπων, ἧ δ' ὅς, σκόπει μόνον τοῦτο, εἰ βούλει ῥᾶον μαθεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ζώων πάντων καὶ φυτῶν, καὶ συλλήβδην ὅσαπερ ἔχει γένεσιν περὶ πάντων ἴδωμεν ἄρ' οὕτως γίγνεται πάντα.

⁷⁵ Anaxag.B3 and 4 respectively. Cf. Webster, 1952-3, 24, who claims that, 'in its full development' this noun-form is found in 'the early Hippocratic writings, Anaxagoras, and Thucydides'.

⁷⁶ See Webster, 1952-3, 24, who says that this noun-form, as well as signifying 'a particular member of a class' was also used to represent: 'any member of a class (and therefore all members), a standard member of a class (and therefore very nearly the quality by virtue of which it is a member of the class). Cf. also Lloyd, 1966, 81, n.1.

a process of change between opposites is represented as basic to our beliefs and is expressed similarly: δοκεῖ δὲ ἡμῖν τό τε θερμὸν ψυχρὸν γίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν θερμὸν etc.⁷⁷ There is then a contrast between Presocratic texts, where normative terms like τὸ βέλτιστον play no part, and Socrates' account, where they are central to causation and a basic and general element.

7.4.3 Complexity

A final, though imprecise, stylistic allusion can perhaps be seen in the next part of the 'Anaxagoras episode', where Socrates discusses Anaxagoras' causes and presents purportedly parallel examples (98b7-d8). As shown above, 'key-word' repetition of αἴτιος and its cognates ensures that causation clearly remains as the focus, even though 'pseudo-causes' are now being outlined. The most striking feature of this passage is the long and detailed physiological description of how Socrates is able to bend his legs and thus to sit (98c5-d6), offered as a 'pseudo-explanation' of his reasons for not escaping from prison. Although there are no close extant parallels, one might see Diogenes' anatomical explanations in B6 as providing an example of the kind of detailed biological explanation to which Plato alludes.⁷⁸ Specific features, like complementary pairs of biological components or processes, are found in both passages.⁷⁹

The main point of this *Phaedo* passage appears simply to be that such explanations are false because they offer an account of Socrates' practical deliberation in terms of the material components necessary for his actions, rather than the true moral causes. The length and detail of the hypothetical explanation seems to add no more specific criteria to his criticism, but rather to ridicule the pseudo-complexity of his predecessors' detailed physical theories, by means of humorous exaggeration. A useful model here may be Koestler's analysis of satire (within his points on humour), in which a situation is projected into an exaggerated or alternative format, giving the

⁷⁷ Meliss.B8.

⁷⁸ Given Anaxagoras' interest in anatomy and his influence on Diogenes, it is possible that he also wrote similar passages.

⁷⁹ E.g. ἐξ ὀστέων καὶ νεύρων (*Phd.*98c7); ἐπιτείνεσθαι καὶ ἀνίεσθαι (*Phd.*98d1); τὴν ἥπατιν καὶ τὴν σπληνῖτιν and ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα καὶ διὰ τῆς σαρκός (*Diog.*Apoll.B6). Cf. Appendix II p.281, below, on proliferation of anatomical pairs in early Hippocratic treatises.

incongruity necessary to produce humour.⁸⁰ Here, humour depends on both types of transposition, as the physiological explanation is exaggerated, and given in a context where an ethical explanation would be expected.

Socrates then offers his own explanation (98e1ff.). Once again causes are simply given in terms of what seems best to the protagonists. Unlike the 'pseudo-explanation' which precedes it, this explanation is short and straightforward, perhaps suggesting that the former type of explanation substitutes physical complexity for a true moral cause.

Socrates implies the merits of simplicity in a number of ways. First, he criticises the spurious causes of Anaxagoras because they comprise 'many things' (πολλά).⁸¹ This implies, as Ooms Renard has suggested, that causation should involve a principle of 'economy'.⁸² Similarly, at 98d8, when he gives a hypothetical parallel for such causes, they are once again described in terms of large quantities (ἄλλα μυρία τοιαῦτα αἰτιώμενος). In addition, simplicity not only concerns quantity, but also simplicity and directness in the cause/effect relationship. As Socrates moves on to the 'safe' cause, not only is its simplicity striking,⁸³ but he himself says that this belief is held ἀπλῶς καὶ ἀτέχνως (100d3-4) and describes the spurious alternative causes as κομπείας (101c8).⁸⁴

The variety of allusion within this passage, both to Anaxagoras and more generally to a certain range of Presocratic writing, ranges from near direct quotation to vague structural similarities. Key word repetition establishes foundational principles which, when combined with various argumentative structures, point to a correct process of reasoning, as well as indicating certain faults in the predecessors. In this

⁸⁰ Koestler, 1964, 73-4.

⁸¹ *Phd.*98c2.

⁸² Ooms Renard, 1999, 119 and 116: 'The first hint of rejections of the first type of account (98d8) complains about the number of αἰτίαι (a hint of criticism in terms of lack of economy)'.

⁸³ Cf. McCabe, 1994, 60-4, on the necessity of simplicity for a successful *explanans* and how this allows forms as opposed to particulars to serve as explanations.

⁸⁴ The issue of quantity might also further such connections with the Forms, since each Form is a single item as opposed to the plurality of particulars. See e.g. McCabe, 1994, 51, who suggests that plurality refers not only to the number of particulars but, crucially for the contrast with Forms, it is also characteristic of the individual particular because of its complexity: 'because he has many different characters, properties, relations'. This strengthens the complexity/quantity link.

way, Plato uses what he sees as the implications of Anaxagoras' points about νοῦς in order to make claims about its role in universal structure and argue for its normativity, employing imitation to show his opponents' faults, as well as to suggest his own principles.

Before moving on to discuss possible ways in which the 'Anaxagoras episode' fits into the dialogue as a whole, I will consider one further point within the passage itself. At the conclusion of this episode Socrates extends the argument to include certain theories which do not cite νοῦς as a cause (99b4ff.), complaining that they give spurious causes as opposed to the good, which really holds everything together (99c5-6). Thus, he appears to have made an unexplained leap from the claim that νοῦς-based causes depend upon the good, to the further claim that all true causation necessarily depends upon the good. If, as suggested by the traditional interpretation, the good is dependent upon νοῦς, in the absence of νοῦς there seems to be no justification for Socrates' claim that τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν (99c6). If however, it resides in the idea of a universal order, which situates each individual and arranges their interrelationships, it would seem that συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν are now themselves sufficient reasons for assuming normativity.

7.5 Beyond the 'Anaxagoras episode'

We have seen that there is more to the 'Anaxagoras episode' than the traditional reading suggests, and that, like the 'apology', it works towards establishing the normativity of wisdom/rationality (expressed as νοῦς), so important throughout the *Phaedo*. On the whole, the pursuit of teleology appears to be abandoned after the autobiography,⁸⁵ although in Chapter 8 I discuss briefly how one might see the teleological theme as maintained in the 'second sailing'.⁸⁶ To conclude the present

⁸⁵ Although there is some controversy over whether ἐστέρηθην (99c8) indicates Socrates' abandonment of teleology, by showing, as Vlastos, 1973, 87 claims, 'that he is still, at the time of speaking, "deprived" of the teleological *aitia*', or whether, as according to Wiggins, 1986, 3, *contra* Vlastos, the 'deprivation' was in the past and does not preclude the search for teleology in the 'second sailing'.

⁸⁶ For interesting suggestions as to how teleology is incorporated see also e.g. Lennox, 1985, 202ff., who argues that the *deuteros plous* and final argument should be taken together. The fact that the first Forms mentioned in the final argument are the beautiful and the good (100b5ff.) also suggests that the cause of normativity might remain a concern. Cf. Lennox, 1985, 203, on the use of such forms 'to

chapter I shall propose that Plato is still engaging with Anaxagoras in the first parts of the 'second sailing', in a way which can have a significant effect on the interpretation of this section.

7.5.1 'Like into like'

Socrates' ostensible abandonment of teleology together with a thematic shift makes the apparent discontinuity between the 'Anaxagoras episode' and its immediate context very marked, but there has been little attempt to explore in detail what significance this discontinuity might have outside of the immediate context. As well as questions about how this passage fits into its wider context, there is the question of whether and how it is connected to the earlier Anaxagorean allusion in the 'argument from opposites'.

As I said above, the view that no significant connection exists between the 'Anaxagoras episode' and its immediate context derives largely from ostensible changes in subject matter, since the sections before and after this episode concern not cosmology and universal teleology, but individual questions about height and number. So it appears to be sandwiched between two sections which fit closely together, while itself unrelated to these.

However, even if the principal concerns of the 'Anaxagoras episode' seem absent from its surrounding passages, there are ways in which one can see Anaxagoras himself as the connection between them. Socrates' intellectual autobiography begins with his early belief that growth comes about through eating and drinking:

ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρκὶ σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν οἰκεῖα ἐκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. (*Phd.* 96c9-d5)

exemplify the *deuteros plous*'. Furthermore, if, as suggested above, the 'Anaxagoras episode' moves towards an ideal of simple causation, the apparent simplicity of the causes posited in the final argument could perhaps be taken to exemplify this idea. See Ch.8 p.270, below.

As others have noted, these ideas are extremely reminiscent of Anaxagoras,⁸⁷ a close parallel being πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γένοιτο θρῖξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός;,⁸⁸ which illustrates the principle of ‘like into like’.

As the autobiography continues, Socrates discusses his concerns about how addition of one to one could cause two, when the opposite, dividing one, would have the same result. For he finds it unacceptable for opposite causes to produce the same effect (*Phd.*97a6-b3), given that this violates an important principle of causation: ‘if x causes anything to be F (whose opposite is un-F)...x’s opposite must not cause anything to be F’.⁸⁹ This reliance on a notion of ‘like causing like’ is reminiscent of Anaxagorean physics, and such similarities could perhaps be seen to pave the way for the switch to the ‘Anaxagoras episode’, in spite of apparent differences in subject matter. For, although the role of νοῦς is presented as the reason for Socrates’ interest in Anaxagoras, if he was already inclining towards other aspects of Anaxagorean physics, this could provide an additional reason why Socrates was drawn to his doctrines concerning νοῦς.

Furthermore, while the ‘Anaxagoras episode’ evidently gives Socrates’ reasons for rejecting Anaxagoras’ νοῦς-based account of causation, Socrates’ attraction to Anaxagorean ideas still seems to continue into the ‘second sailing’, which is essentially dependent upon a principle of ‘like causes like’. As Sedley says, discussing this passage: ‘what is essentially the same principle that like causes like can be traced back to Anaxagoras (B10), and forward to Aristotle...and Hellenistic debate’.⁹⁰

So even though Plato has revealed his dissatisfaction with Anaxagoras, both in the ‘argument from opposites’ and the ‘Anaxagoras episode’, he now appears to drift back towards ideas that sound dangerously Anaxagorean, and still needs to show more closely what constitutes the differences between them. When Socrates moves

⁸⁷ E.g. Rowe, 1993, 233.

⁸⁸ Anaxag.B10.

⁸⁹ Sedley, 1998, 121.

⁹⁰ Sedley, 1998, 117.

on to the second part of the final argument (102b3ff.) he presents very clear reasons why Anaxagoras' 'like from like' idea cannot be acceptable. Yet, even before this, in the 'hypothesis' passage which concludes the discussion of the 'safe causes', comes the first hint that Socrates' attitude to Anaxagoras is anything but positive.

7.5.2 *Who are the ἀντιλογικοί of 101e1?*

Socrates' explanation of the so-called 'method of hypothesis' in *Phd.* 101d2-102a1 is one of the most frequently discussed passages in the dialogue. Having suggested that such a method is ideal philosophical practice, he proceeds to compare it to the spurious methods of the ἀντιλογικοί, who do not care about realities (101e1-4). It is generally assumed that οἱ ἀντιλογικοί refers to οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες mentioned earlier, who have come to believe that there is nothing sound or stable either in λόγοι or in πράγματα (*Phd.* 90b9-c4).⁹¹ Certainly it is clear that both groups have a damaging effect on the progress of argument, as their names suggest. However, readers have failed to notice that certain verbal allusions suggest that Plato might also have one particular predecessor in mind, namely Anaxagoras.

In the 'hypothesis' passage, the ἀντιλογικοί are those whose wisdom makes them sufficient for 'mixing all things together' (ὁμοῦ πάντα κυκῶντες).⁹² Once again, we have the Anaxagorean catchphrase ὁμοῦ πάντα.⁹³ Not only has this phrase already represented Anaxagoras' philosophy in the 'argument from opposites', but as the first words of his book, it would certainly have had a definite emblematic significance. In Plato the phrase only occurs here and in the 'argument from opposites', while in other pre-Hellenistic literature the only extant uses are in Aristotle and Eudemus, always with reference to Anaxagoras.⁹⁴ Moreover, given

⁹¹ See e.g. Bostock, 1986, 186, n.9,: 'οἱ ἀντιλογικοί. These people are no doubt to be identified with the people 'bent on victory' who are referred to at 91a2-6 as caring nothing for the truth. Plato gives us a portrait of them in his *Euthydemus*'. Cf. e.g. Rowe, 1993, 248; Blank, 1986, 150; Burnet, 1911, 114; Gallop, 1975, 191; Geddes, 1863, 125.

⁹² *Phd.* 101e5

⁹³ Although the ideas expressed here could also be seen to suggest Heraclitean philosophy (e.g. B125).

⁹⁴ The phrase also appears a few times in the Hippocratic Corpus: *Haem.* 9.4; *Judic.* 22.4; and *Mul.* 44.8, 91.14, 242.15. However, in all these instances πάντα clearly refers to specific objects and is never universal.

that Anaxagoras has also been such an important figure in recent sections of the dialogue, the Anaxagorean allusion seems unmistakeable, even though its significance has not been noted within the modern secondary literature.⁹⁵ This draws our attention, once again, to the problems which would result from what Plato sees as the paradoxical ὁμοῦ πάντα which, as I suggested above, implies the absolute inseparability of opposites. In this way it prefigures the next passage, in which Socrates will categorically deny that absolute opposites can ever tolerate each other's presence and so deliver his final rejection of Anaxagorean physics.

Even though ὁμοῦ πάντα here appears to be a clear reference to Anaxagoras, such an idea could also be applicable to οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες, mentioned in the earlier 'misology' passage (*Phd.* 90b9). Nevertheless, there is a further aspect of Socrates' criticisms which suggests that they are more appropriate to Anaxagoras than to the earlier disputants. According to Socrates the later ἀντιλογικοί talk about the beginning (ἀρχή) and its consequences. For the earlier disputants beginnings hold little interest, since their sole concern is the continuous universal flux and instability of the present (90c4-6),⁹⁶ while talk of beginnings would presumably entail some notion of stable identity. For Anaxagoras, however, beginnings and their consequences are of course crucial, and ἀρχή, along

⁹⁵ As far as I am aware, the allusion has been entirely overlooked by contemporary readers of the dialogue, the only exception being Dixsaut, 1991, 387. However, she simply identifies the phrase as Anaxagorean and does not discuss its significance. The failure of commentators to notice this very definite allusion seems to stem from insufficient attention to Plato's Greek and is reflected in their translations. The conventional translation of ὁμοῦ πάντα in Anaxag. B1 is something like 'all things together', a translation also usually given for the explicit quotation of Anaxagoras in the *Phaedo*'s argument from opposites'. Nevertheless, ὁμοῦ πάντα in the 'hypothesis' passage is translated very differently: e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 136, 'whose wisdom enables them to jumble everything up together'; Rowe, 1993a, 248, 'mixing up everything together'; Warrington, 1963, 152, 'amid all the welter of their ideas'; Gallop, 1975, 54; and Fowler, 1914, 349. By giving two such different translations of the very same phrase these works obscure the verbal allusion in the later passage.

⁹⁶ Cf. Loriaux, 1975, 104-5, who suggests, that although verbal allusions point to 90b9-c3, 'cette identification ne fait pas entièrement justice au texte qui nous occupe'. He suggests that it is in fact criticising the physicists of 95eff, because of the mention of ἀρχή and ὠρμημένα. However, his discussion gives no relevant quotation of sources and fails to spot any specific Anaxagorean allusion. There are some other reasons for seeing these disputants as the later ἀντιλογικοί: e.g. the verbal echo, enhanced by the description of the earlier disputants as 'very wise' (σοφώτατοι) and the later ἀντιλογικοί as confusing things through their 'wisdom' (ὑπὸ σοφίας); or the fact that both groups, as already mentioned, harm arguments. Yet it is quite possible that ἀντιλογικοί refers to various thinkers, so that it is not necessary to choose exclusively between Anaxagoras and the earlier disputants. Indeed such a move would be quite typical of Plato and might help explain why ἀντιλογικοί is plural, even if it refers primarily to Anaxagoras.

with its cognate verbs, is common in his extant writings. For example:

καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε
περιχωρήσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ μικροῦ ἤρξατο
περιχωρεῖν, ἔπει δε πλεον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλεον.

or -

καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς
ἀπεκρίνετο...⁹⁷

Moreover, from the way Plato subtly changes the tense of both of his main quotations from Anaxagoras, he seems dissatisfied with Anaxagorean beginnings, both in terms of the primordial state ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα, and perhaps also because Anaxagoras posits νοῦς as the original cause, but then fails to account for the continuing effect of νοῦς in causation.

A further related point is the failure of the ἀντιλογικοί to have either one *logos* or thought about reality: οὐδὲ εἷς περὶ τούτου λόγος οὐδὲ φροντίς. Socrates has just advocated the importance of finding a single base hypothesis which provides a sufficient *logos* for all the hypotheses derived from it, as opposed to simply introducing many different reasons for things. So the ‘one’, εἷς, in Socrates’ criticism can be seen to imply that he finds fault with the ἀντιλογικοί for having more than one *logos*, another point missed by commentators. This point fits nicely with the general picture of Anaxagoras as having several conflicting beliefs. The earlier disputants of *Phaedo* 90b9, on the other hand, are criticised for the very reason that they commit themselves to nothing and see all *logoi* as unsound and unstable.⁹⁸

There are a number of ways in which Anaxagoras seems, problematically, to have more than one λόγος. First, in very general terms, Anaxagorean physics posits both

⁹⁷ Anaxag. frs. B12. and B13.

⁹⁸ The phrase could also be translated as ‘no *logos* or thought at all’ as opposed to ‘not one *logos* or thought’. However, not only is the latter translation more natural but, even if we disregard Anaxagoras, an emphasis on ‘one’ rather than ‘none at all’ still seems much more relevant here.

universal order and ὁμοῦ πάντα, two incompatible λόγοι. More specifically, it is also open to criticism, along with the *sine qua non* explanations, given as causes by Anaxagoras and other physicists, for being numerous and arbitrary. For these would allow more than one λόγος of causation for single events, since the same event could be seen to result from various different *sine qua non* ‘causes’. Thus, there would be a potential plurality of λόγοι for this model of ‘causation’. In addition, these ‘causes’ do not differ substantially from arbitrary causes like ‘heads’ (100e8-b2) or ‘divisions’ and ‘additions’ (96e6-97b3) which, respectively, cause opposites and are opposite causes of the same event,⁹⁹ once again leading to multiple and conflicting λόγοι of causation.

Finally, the view that Anaxagoras is the butt of Socrates’ criticism might also be strengthened if Echecrates’ comment on this passage is taken as a Platonic pun directed at Anaxagoras. Echecrates says that ‘Socrates made these matters exceedingly clear, even to somebody of limited intelligence’, τῷ καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντι (102a5), a phrase that seems all the more significant given Socrates’ previous description of Anaxagoras as ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον (98b7-8). Echecrates’ interruption is one of only two points where the frame dialogue breaks into the main narrative and it is certainly very striking. Usually, his words are understood as simply drawing the reader’s *attention* to the status of the theory Socrates has just explained,¹⁰⁰ or as demarcating the end of the ‘safe hypothesis’ of causation.¹⁰¹ However, if they do reveal Echecrates’ awareness of the presence of Anaxagorean ideas, this could be seen as further confirmation of Anaxagoras’ relevance, since it is not only implied in Socrates’ words, but also clearly understood by Echecrates, a character to whom these words are reported.

For the reasons stated above it seems fair to say that there is a clear engagement with Anaxagoras in the passages discussed. Moreover, as the dialogue continues, Socrates begins to mount an argument which presents an implicit challenge to certain

⁹⁹ Cf. e.g. Sedley, 1998, 119-20.

¹⁰⁰ See e.g. Rowe, 1993b, 50-1; Warner, 1989a, 77: ‘Few of us like to think that our intelligence is less than feeble, thus this latter passage acts as a rhetorical device encouraging us to go along with a particularly difficult piece of argument by suggesting that to understand it is to see its validity’.

¹⁰¹ Blank, 1986, 149.

of Anaxagoras' ideas and will ultimately lead to a clear dismissal of his central principles.

7.5.3 *The mutual exclusivity of opposites*

The 'method of hypothesis' is usually taken to mark the end of the first part of the 'second sailing', in which Socrates explains the 'safe hypothesis' (101d2) of Form-participation. This is, for example τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά (100d7-8); or more generally, that each thing comes into being μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἐκάστου οὐ ἂν μετάσχη (101c3-4). Conventionally, the sections of the dialogue which follow the 'method of hypothesis' (102b3-107b10) are then taken to be the second part of the 'second sailing'. Known as the 'final argument' they are felt to revolve around the 'subtler answer' (105c1-2), rather than the earlier 'safe hypothesis'.¹⁰² Whereas the conventional reading thus posits a switch from the 'safe hypothesis' to the 'subtler answer' at 102b3, I suggest that the ideas outlined in 102b3-103e9 are not only related to the 'subtler answer', but also very important for establishing the 'safe hypothesis'. The mutual exclusivity of opposite property-instances, outlined within this section, can therefore be seen as not only the beginning of the 'final argument', but also as a continuing explanation of the 'safe hypothesis' itself.

Up to the 'method of hypothesis' the outline of the 'safe hypothesis' sounds very much like Anaxagoras' own 'like into like' principle of causation. Admittedly, in Anaxagoras this principle only assumes two *particulars*, whereas the 'safe hypothesis' posits two distinct ontological kinds, with participation in a Form causing a 'like' property instance to be present in a particular. However, so far the argument has been directed at refuting and replacing causation by 'unlikes' and, in spite of the differences between the Socratic and Anaxagorean accounts of causation, the former has not yet presented a reason for rejecting the latter.

¹⁰² See e.g. Bostock, 1986, 178: 'The little interlude at 102a...evidently marks a break in the argument. When we come back to our topic at 102b we begin upon the final argument for the immortality of the soul'. Cf. e.g. Rowe, 1993a, 248-9; Gallop, 1975, 192; Frede, 1978, 27; O'Brien, 1967-8, 199; Dixsaut, 1991, 387.

Yet, it now seems as if the ἀντιλογικοί passage in the ‘method of hypothesis’ is actually criticising Anaxagoras. Although earlier parts of the dialogue provide some reasons for these criticisms, Socrates’ return to a critique of Anaxagoras in the ‘method of hypothesis’ can also be seen to introduce a new attack on his ideas. I propose that the next section, which establishes the mutual exclusivity of opposite property-instances, can be taken to refute those aspects of Anaxagoras’ theory not yet disproved which pose serious problems for the ‘safe hypothesis’. In so doing, Socrates adds a further point to the ‘safe hypothesis’, answering a potential objection to this theory of causation. In other words, 102b3ff. functions as a further refutation of Anaxagoras, while providing a necessary addition to the ‘safe hypothesis’ model of causation.

7.5.4 *The problems of the Anaxagorean ‘like into like’ principle*

The beginning of the ‘second sailing’, up to the ‘method of hypothesis’, shows that ‘like causes like’, insofar as properties in particulars are caused by the particular’s participation in the corresponding Form. While this gives an alternative to the problematic idea that something can be caused by an entity which does not ‘match’ it, it does not yet show the necessity of the ontologically distinct Forms for such a ‘like into like’ notion of causation. This is revealed in the next section, by exposing problems inherent in Anaxagorean ‘like into like’ principle, which is not based on a dualistic ontology.

This section, where Socrates discusses the relative heights of Simmias, Phaedo, and himself, can be read as exploring the ramifications of Anaxagorean physics for Socrates’ ‘safe hypothesis’ of causation. In so doing, Socrates exposes the problems of Anaxagorean ideas by considering them in the context of his own ‘safe hypothesis’. These are problems to which the ‘safe hypothesis’ itself could be seen as liable, up to this point. However, he now shows that there are clear differences between his own theories and Anaxagoras’, so the ‘safe hypothesis’ does not face the problems exposed in Anaxagoras’ system.

In the ‘puzzles’ which Socrates has dealt with so far he has considered examples of causation in at most two particulars. However, the problems to which Anaxagoras’ theories are liable will only emerge from considering the relationship of more than two sensibles. It is therefore highly significant that this is exactly what happens at 102b3, when Socrates discusses the relationships between Simmias, himself, and Phaedo.

Proving that property-instances must be distinct and non-constitutive

From the outline of the ‘safe hypothesis’ so far, it is not clear exactly how Form-participation works. Using the example of magnitude Plato now shows that a particular participating in a Form cannot actually have a property πρὸς ἑαυτό. In doing so he treats τὸ μέγα and τὸ μικρόν as referring to pairs of opposite Forms and opposite property-instances which derive from these Forms.¹⁰³

The simple hypothesis has already laid down that the cause of one thing being larger than another will in every case be the Form Largeness: τὸ μείζον πάν ἕτερον ἑτέρου οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ μείζον ἐστὶν ἢ μεγέθει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μείζον, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος (101a2-4). So when it is said that Simmias is larger than Socrates, Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους...μείζω εἶναι (102b4-5), we can assume from the safe hypothesis that the Form of Largeness will be the cause.

This is fairly straightforward with two entities, one larger than the other. However, if a third entity, bigger than both the others, is introduced, the idea suddenly becomes problematic. In the case of Simmias, we can make two points about his height relative to Phaedo and Socrates:

1. Simmias is large(r) than Socrates because of Largeness.
2. Simmias is small(er) than Phaedo because of Smallness.

In Socrates’ explanation of the safe hypothesis there have only been two types of entity, Forms and particulars, so that there is therefore no reason not to see property-

¹⁰³ *Phd.* 102d6-8.

instances in particulars as being constitutive of the particular. If this were the case, Simmias himself would actually be made up of his property-instances, large and small, so that Simmias would be who he is (i.e. large and small) because of Largeness and Smallness, and two opposite Forms would be causes of the same outcome.

Nevertheless, as Socrates points out, it is not the case that Simmias is smaller than Phaedo and larger than Socrates by being Simmias (τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι), but τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγέθει ὑπερέχειν τὴν σμικρότητα ὑπέχων, τῷ δὲ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς σμικρότητος παρέχων ὑπερέχον (102c12-d2). It is the presence of two distinct opposed property-instances, within Simmias which allows him to 'be' large in relation to Socrates and small in relation to Phaedo. These property-instances, therefore, cannot be constitutive. Clearly compresence of opposites does occur in particulars, since they can 'be' both large and small, relative to other particulars. Yet, without distinct and non-constitutive property-instances it would not be possible to account for the relations between different particulars which lead to compresence.

Anaxagoras, however, has only particulars and no distinct property-instances. Thus, he can only account for compresence by claiming that a particular has two oppositional properties in relation 'to itself' (πρὸς ἑαυτό):

οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστὶ τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ' ἔλασσον αἰεὶ (τὸ γὰρ ἐὼν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι) - ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου αἰεὶ ἐστὶ μείζον. καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ σμικρῷ πλῆθος, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον ἐστὶ καὶ μέγα καὶ σμικρόν.¹⁰⁴

As Schofield remarks, this fragment is 'pretty obscure' and its interpretation is very uncertain. Nevertheless, it seems that for Anaxagoras smallness and largeness are properties which a particular has 'in itself' (πρὸς ἑαυτό). Since matter is infinitely divisible,¹⁰⁵ there will always be something smaller than any constituent of the world, no matter how small, and vice versa for the large. In this way, the small and the large are therefore equal in number, coextensive, and can only be distinguished in

¹⁰⁴ Anaxag.B3.

¹⁰⁵ See e.g. Anaxag. B1.

relative terms.¹⁰⁶ Thus a particular will be large and small 'in itself' (πρὸς ἑαυτό).¹⁰⁷ If then asked both why a thing is large and why small, the only possible answer will be πρὸς ἑαυτό, offering the same *explanans* for opposite *explananda* and therefore contravening an important Platonic principle.

There are clear reasons for seeing 102b3ff as concerned with such points. Stylistically, the passage is reminiscent of Anaxagoras B3. For example, Socrates uses the preposition πρὸς in phrases like σμικρότητα ἔχει ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου μέγεθος (102c4), recalling Anaxagoras' πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον ἐστι καὶ μέγα καὶ σμικρόν. More generally, 'the small' and 'the large' are very important in Anaxagoras' extant fragments.¹⁰⁸

It is not only these ideas about magnitude which are incompatible with Socrates' explanation of compresence, but also the Anaxagorean principle of predominance,¹⁰⁹ according to which there is a portion of everything in everything (ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι),¹¹⁰ and the identity of a particular is determined by the phenomena which predominate in it: ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅμοιον οὐδενί, ἀλλ' ὅτων πλείστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.¹¹¹ Clearly, this would preclude meaningful compresence since, even though all things, including opposites, are present, only the one thing which predominates in a particular would actually constitute its identity.

Absolute property-instances

Evidently, Anaxagorean predominance cannot account for compresence in the Platonic sense, whereby a particular could actually be said to have opposite

¹⁰⁶ Cf. e.g. Hussey, 1972, 135. For possible readings of καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ σμικρῷ πλήθος see Schofield, 1975, 84, who concludes that the its 'general interpretation' is 'the large and the small are *alike* in respect of quantity or number'.

¹⁰⁷ The meaning of this phrase is not at all clear and various possibilities are discussed by Schofield, 1975, 85. Sider, 1981, 60, takes πρὸς ἑαυτό... σμικρόν to mean that 'the relative terms Large(r) and Small(er) meet at a point that can be considered to partake of both qualities'. However, this suggests that it is only at the certain point when something has these qualities that it will be both large and small, even though the fragment seems to imply that each thing will *always* have both these qualities.

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Anaxag. B1, 3, and 6.

¹⁰⁹ On 'predominance' see Anaxag.B12; Sven-Tage, 1982, 2; Menn, 1995, 26.

¹¹⁰ Anaxag. B11.

¹¹¹ Anaxag.B12. Cf. Sven-Tage, 1982, 22.

properties simultaneously. However, the theory itself presents another possibility about the workings of property-instances which would be a problem for Socrates, insofar as it suggests the idea that entities could vary in the degree to which they are present in particulars. So, even if taking property-instances as non-constitutive allows for compresence without violating the principle that the same thing is not caused by opposites, there may be, as we shall see, further problems if the presence of property-instances can itself vary by degree.

Socrates says, for example, that Simmias is both large and small because he has largeness in relation to Socrates and smallness in relation to Phaedo. If, however, property-instances could vary in the degree to which they were present, it might then be the case that there was less largeness in Simmias than in Phaedo. Of course, we could still explain Simmias being smaller than Phaedo in terms of his smallness, but the option would also be there to attribute this to his lesser degree of largeness. Since it is the Form of Largeness which causes largeness to be present, the Form of Largeness (i.e. because it is present, but to a lesser degree) would then be the cause of Simmias being small(er) than Phaedo, contravening the principle that an opposite cannot cause its own opposite.¹¹²

In order to avoid such difficulties, it is necessary that Form-participation is absolute and the degree to which a property-instance is present in a particular cannot vary. It is only in this way that Socrates can state, for example, that it is exclusively the 'largeness' in Phaedo which makes him 'large' in relation to Simmias: μέγεθος ἔχει ὁ Φαίδων πρὸς τὴν Σιμμίου σμικρότητα (102c7-8).¹¹³

¹¹² For these principles see e.g. Sedley, 1998, 121

¹¹³ Bostock, 1986, 181-3, raises similar issues, in order to eliminate the possibility that 'we are trying to talk of the particular *degree* of largeness that Simmias has'. He says that if this were the case largeness would be the same as height and would result in Simmias' height being the cause of both large and small. The problems he envisages are similar to those I describe above, which would result from property-instances varying by degree. However, Bostock's points derive from his suggestion either that a particular 'height' is a Form or that there is a particular largeness 'peculiar to Simmias'. The first of these is surely incompatible with Plato's insistence on largeness and smallness alone without a further category of 'magnitude', while the second suggestion that different largenesses are particular to individuals is once again not an option considered by Socrates. It is on these grounds that Bostock then dismisses the idea that there is a third entity, 'largeness in us', the property-instance, as well as Forms and particulars. Yet, as I have argued, it is the very issue of 'degree' which shows the need for an invariable property-instance, which is a different entity from, although present in, the particular itself.

Accordingly, the ideas in 102b3-103a3 can be seen to provide us with two more important points about Form-participation: the causation of a property in a particular does not occur through the particular taking on that property in itself (πρὸς ἑαυτό), but because of the presence of a distinct property-instance; and that participation is absolute, insofar as property-instances do not come to be present in particulars to varying degrees. These points, necessary for 'like into like' causation to work, are incompatible with Anaxagorean physics, in spite of his 'like into like' principle.

The principles outlined by Socrates here depend upon the invariability of property-instances, and require them to derive from Forms, so as to have these characteristics. For particulars change constantly and allow compresent opposites, Forms and their property-instances. Thus, the 'anonymous objection' episode (103a4-c2) can be seen to reinforce these ideas. Having suggested the flaws of Anaxagorean physics in the initial 'argument from opposites', Socrates has returned to the topic of opposites and shown why a theory of 'like into like' which might initially appear to incline towards Anaxagoras is in fact fundamentally at odds with him. His response to the 'anonymous objection' shows the need for property-instances, though present in particulars, to be like Forms, insofar as they cannot accept their opposites.¹¹⁴

For Anaxagoras, with his belief in the inseparability of opposites, the homogeneity of matter, and ὁμοῦ πάντα, no such distinct absolutes can exist: there can simply be no such qualities as largeness or smallness. Because of the indivisible mixture of matter within one ontological level which constitutes Anaxagoras' universe, he does not and could not posit the distinct and unchanging Forms introduced by Socrates. So despite any superficial similarities one might see between Anaxagoras and Plato because of 'like into like' causation, the *Phaedo* makes it perfectly clear, as it shows what such a conception of causation would involve, that in an Anaxagorean universe no talk of causation can make any sense.

In the passage we have been discussing (102a11-103c4) Socrates introduces a third entity to the causal process, τό (e.g.) μέγεθος ἐν ἡμῖν which, along with the

¹¹⁴ N.B. the way in which the αὐτὸ τό terminology, which previously differentiated Forms from their property-instances (102d6-7), now incorporates both (103b4-5).

Forms, has mutually exclusive opposites. The status of these 'ἐνόντα' has raised several difficulties, even though, as I will show in Chapter 8, they are clearly presented as a third and distinct type of entity, along with Forms and particulars.

Yet Plato does more than just add a third type of entity. On my present analysis of this section he actually argues for the necessity of these entities, in order to maintain his safe hypothesis of causation. He does this by pointing towards the problems that would result from the Anaxagorean counter-example, making the presence of this counter-example felt through the stylistic structure which makes relevant allusions to Anaxagoras both in this passage and elsewhere. In other words, seeing the Anaxagorean undertones in this passage leads us to understand more closely some of the problems which Plato is dealing with here. Conversely, it also allows us to see this passage itself as another stage in Plato's refutation of Anaxagoras.

7.6 Conclusion

The study of allusion is conventionally an aspect of literary analysis which does not concern itself with texts written in what is considered as 'philosophical style'. This may, in part, account for the neglect of such extensive and significant allusions within the *Phaedo*, both to Anaxagoras and to other Presocratic writers. Nevertheless, however they are classified, such authors do have a style and I have suggested ways in which allusion within this stylistic context can actually provide a rich and complex basis for philosophical argument.

Anaxagoras appears to escape the monism of the Eleatics and the perpetual flux of the Ephesians. He posits a world in which change occurs through separation and combination, and works on a principle of 'like into like'. Moreover, his universe is ordered by a distinct entity which is, at least in name, representative of rationality. No wonder then that some of his ideas seem close to those presented by the *Phaedo*'s Socrates. Yet, at the same time, his theory of the inseparability of opposites also poses a fundamental threat to the very principle of causation on which the immortality of the soul depends.

Anaxagoras' ideas are often present in the *Phaedo*, whether implicitly or explicitly. With every allusion, however, Plato constructs his refutation of Anaxagoras and uses it to establish his own position. In rejecting Anaxagoras' *νοῦς*, in attacking Anaxagorean 'causation', Plato strengthens his own conceptions.¹¹⁵ As is clear from the treatment of Anaxagoras in the dialogue, where any apparent agreement eventually leads to subversion, refutation, and replacement, the *Phaedo* presents him as an attractive, but ultimately a dangerous figure.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Nightingale, 1995, e.g. 7 and 91, 'Plato criticizes his model even as he imitates its themes and structure'; and e.g. Ch.5 on Plato's own constructive use of the genres he criticises. However, she is only concerned with rhetoric and poetry and does not touch on possible Presocratic allusions in Plato. Moreover, she avoids 'Plato's methods and doctrines, or indeed, ...his development and practice of analytic thinking' (10)

Chapter 8

‘Taking refuge in λόγοι’: language and style in the ‘second sailing’

ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις
σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν (99e4-6).

In the last two chapters I demonstrated how style is important in setting out arguments and principles, both Plato’s own and those he rejects. Socrates’ views of φρόνησις, for example, were established through features like repetition and metaphor, while Anaxagoras’ incorrect use of νοῦς trapped him into particular teleological commitments incompatible with his metaphysics, all suggesting a close relationship between verbal expression and beliefs about reality. In addition, consideration of style revealed clear interconnections between different sections of the dialogue and so supported a holistic reading.

My aim in this chapter is once again to demonstrate the importance of language and style for the construction of argument, this time within Socrates’ δεύτερος πλοῦς, ‘second sailing’ (99d1ff.). This section, containing the so-called ‘method of hypothesis’ and ‘final argument’, is discussed far more than any other part of the *Phaedo*.¹ Accordingly, I will not be examining un- or under-explored parts of the text, as in the previous chapters. Nevertheless, in spite of the vast amount of secondary material on the ‘second sailing’, I shall aim to show that closer attention to style can make an important difference to our understanding of this section, helping both to increase its overall coherence and to reach alternative analyses of particular points. Most significantly, I suggest that style can help us to interpret Socrates’ proof that the soul is ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος in a way which eradicates some problems conventionally seen to arise from it.

¹ Cf. Kanayama, 2000, 41.

I shall also use style to examine what Socrates means by saying that his method here is ἐν λόγοις [σκοπεῖν] (100a1-2).² Although the precise meaning of λόγος is unclear,³ it combines an idea of ‘account’, ‘explanation’, ‘definition’, and ‘argument’, with the means of expression: ‘words’, ‘speech’, or ‘discourse’. To these one might add a notion of structure dimension, derived from an early Greek sense of λέγειν: ‘collecting’, ‘gathering’, or ‘enumerating’.⁴ So the meaning of λόγος seems bound up with the language in which argument and definition are structured.

Furthermore, one might also see the phrase ἐν λόγοις, in this particular context, as carrying certain evaluative connotations, insofar as searching in this way might lead to knowledge of τὰ ὄντα. At the beginning of the ‘second sailing’ not only does Socrates use λόγοι, when let down by his senses, but stresses that this is in no way epistemologically inferior to using ἔργα (100a1-3). Moreover, in conclusion, he suggests that following through the λόγος will yield a sufficient proof (107b6-9). As we know from the earlier ‘misology’ passage, λόγοι are not self-evidently normative (e.g. 90b6ff.). Nevertheless, it seems that in the ‘second sailing’, at least, λόγος carries some connotation of methodological propriety.

The idea of a connection between λόγος and truth is also found elsewhere. Heraclitus, for example, claims that the truth about reality comes from the λόγος,⁵ while in Plato himself there are other passages where λόγος or correct λόγος is associated with the correct use of language to accord with metaphysical truth.⁶ For

² Kanayama, 2000, covers similar issues, offering an interpretation of *Phaedo* 96-107 which also considers the meaning of ‘studying in *logoi*’. I read Kanayama’s article, having already formulated my own reading of the ‘second sailing’, and it is interesting to note that there are a number of similarities between the points we make. However, it is not only my dependence on stylistic points which distinguishes our views. There are also many key differences between our arguments and conclusions, which I will outline below.

³ Cf. e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 138 and Desjardins, 1990, 123: ‘One of the most pervasive terms in Plato’s dialogues, *logos* is perhaps at the same time one of the most ambiguous - its meaning ranging all the way from speech, statement, and definition to argument, account, discourse, structure, rationality, and even rationally structuring mind itself’.

⁴ Mortley, 1986, 12; Heidegger, 1959, 124. This dimension can perhaps be seen in e.g. the second proposed definition of *logos* at *Tht.*206e7ff. and less explicitly in *logos* as ‘the interweaving of forms’ at *Soph.*259e5. Cf. Fattal, 1991, 147: ‘...l’utilisation platonicienne du *logos* n’est pas sans se référer indirectement au fonctionnement simultanément synthétique et analytique du verbe *legein* homérique.’

⁵ Heraclit.B50.

⁶ These ideas have been widely discussed. See e.g. McCabe, 1994, 192ff.; Mourelatos, 1973, 16 and *passim*.

instance, in two apparently connected passages from the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*,⁷ the dialogues containing the most explicit discussion of λόγος, linguistic and metaphysical impossibility go hand in hand, causing insurmountable problems for the λόγος itself.⁸

Given the connection of the term λόγος with both verbal expression and argument, explanation, and definition, it seems that λόγος in the 'second sailing' has a methodological sense, meaning something like the use of discourse to construct a correct argument and account. Accordingly, by examining how language and style represent the beliefs and arguments about reality expressed in the 'second sailing' we may further our understanding of what Plato means by λόγοι here and how they might give some degree of access to reality.

This consideration brings the two aims of my chapter together. In working through the 'second sailing' in order to see how style might affect our interpretation of the different stages of argument, we may see how Plato uses discourse to construct his beliefs and arguments about reality, and so further our understanding of what he means by searching ἐν λόγοις.

8.1 Preliminary points

I differentiate the different stages of the argument with Platonic terms, so that the first 'simple' theory of causation, by which the cause of a property in a particular is participation in a matching form,⁹ will be known, as in Chapter 7, as the 'safe

⁷ Along with methodological similarities, one might also see the *Sophist* passage as supplying the *Theaetetus*' omitted critique of Parmenides (183d11). Cf. Burnyeat, 1990, 79.

⁸ Plato attacks the Heraclitean Ephesians at *Thi*.183a2ff., the Parmenidean monists at *Soph*.244b6-e5. For the Ephesians the complete absence of stability renders both language and metaphysics meaningless, prohibiting even terms like οὕτω, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ (183a2-b5). The monists' comprehensive unity apparently precludes any linguistic or metaphysical distinction and results in the positing of paradoxical self-contradictory properties: e.g. the Parmenidean ἐν τὸ πᾶν εἶναι is inconsistent with τὸν ὁρθὸν λόγον, namely that τὸ ἐν must truly be without parts (*Soph*.244e2ff.). Cf. McCabe, 1994, 145ff. and 200ff., on these passages. Cf. also e.g. *Ti*. 49b-e, where the difficulties, caused by elemental changeability, in our account of the universe are expressed in terms of the linguistic problem of what to call these elements. We mistakenly refer to unstable elements with e.g. τοῦτο or τόδε, but should only use τοιοῦτον.

⁹ E.g. 100d4-6.

hypothesis'.¹⁰ By contrast, I refer to the theory which deals with causation by non-opposites as the 'subtler answer'.¹¹

8.1.1 *Style in the 'second sailing'*

Although the stages of the 'second sailing' are not stylistically homogeneous, there are certain stylistic features and trends which predominate throughout and bring it closest, in very general terms, to the style I have named 'verbal minimalism'. Chief amongst these features is a strong degree of verbal and structural repetition, which varies between arguments whose stages of progress are accompanied by small changes in structure,¹² and arguments using a sequence of examples to illustrate the same point, where the structure is more or less repeated and the subject changed.¹³ In this way the reader's attention is drawn to structure, in the former case to its changes, in the latter to its continuity.

In very general terms the progress of the argument is clearly laid out and divided into stages, with phrases and particles often marking the beginning or end of a phase,¹⁴ and particles used to indicate logical connections between units or sections.¹⁵ There is a proliferation of nouns formed from τό + neuter adjective, ranging from physical terms like τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν (e.g. 103c11ff.) to mathematical, τὸ περιττόν and τὸ ἀρτιόν (e.g. 104b1-3), to ethical, τὸ δίκαιον and τὸ ἄδίκον (e.g. 105d16-e1), so that, even in terms of vocabulary, we see elements of structural repetition. This is especially true of the many α-privative substantives, a number of which appear to be very rare or even neologisms. Moreover, the vocabulary is generally repetitive and, along with structural and lexemic repetition, there is a near complete lack of clear-cut imagery in the 'second sailing'.¹⁶

¹⁰ 101d2. Cf. 105b7.

¹¹ 105b8-c2.

¹² E.g. 104d1ff.

¹³ E.g. 105b8ff.

¹⁴ E.g. 105b5-6; 105e8-10; the use of ὁρισώμεθα in 104c11; Echecrates' and Phaedo's conversation at 102a4-10; ἄρα in e.g. 102b11 or 105e6

¹⁵ E.g. γάρ in 102b8, 103b2, 104d5, 106c3; οὖν in 104d1; ἄρα in 104c7, 104e1, 105d3; τοίνυν in 104b6, 104e7; οὐκοῦν in 106b1, 106c9 etc.

¹⁶ A possible exception is ὑπεκχωρεῖν (e.g. 102d9), a rare verb, first used in Herodotus to denote the withdrawal of an army before an enemy invasion (Hdt.9.13 and 14), and then found only in this section of the *Phaedo*, once in both Plato's *Laws* (Leg.785b1) and Hippocrates (Hp.loc.hom.33).

Included in this part of the *Phaedo* is my earlier Passage IV (105b5-106a1) and many of the features I have just outlined were those which I identified, in Part I, as characteristic of Passage IV. Not all characteristic features of Passage IV predominate throughout the 'second sailing'. For example, recurrent and striking ellipse is only prominent in Passage IV (105c10-e7) and one other section (104d12-e6), while the short question and answer style is mixed in the 'second sailing' with longer continuous speeches. Nevertheless, Passage IV also has the least clear generic affiliations of all six passages in Part I and, though perhaps to a slightly lesser degree, this stylistic distinctiveness is also true, in various ways, of the 'second sailing' as a whole.

As I explained in the last chapter, 102b4ff. can be seen to allude to Anaxagoras in certain ways and the τό + neuter adjective noun-form is typical of the Presocratics, while the clustered α-privatives of 105d13ff. might recall Parmenides. Yet on the whole, the passage is a distinctively Platonic mix of structured repetition and careful variation, with sections like 105c8ff unusual, even from a Platonic point of view. Certain specific features can be pinpointed as unusual: extreme ellipse; novel α-privatives; structures like ὃ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται [θερμὸν] ἔσται, repeated at 105b8ff. There are also terms like δέχομαι, which not only have an unusual application in this section,¹⁷ but are also repeated continuously.

Through repetition and distinctiveness, then, attention is drawn to the stylistic structure. Moreover, a number of points are also made in linguistic terms, suggesting the importance of language in this section. Nevertheless, it might still seem that my analysis of the 'second sailing' does not focus so straightforwardly on style as the

Other recurrent terms here with possible military associations, like δέχομαι, ὑπομένω, ἐπιφέρω, and προσέρχομαι, might then also then be seen to tie in with any martial undertones. Nevertheless, in spite of Burnet's widely accepted comments that 'the metaphors are military throughout' (Burnet, 1911, 102. Cf. e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 155; O'Brien, 1967-8, 204), the general usage of these other terms is so broad that they cannot be restricted to the solely military sense which would lead to their clear classification as deviant (vehicle) terminology. Furthermore, even if some implication of hostility is retained, the terms themselves are used so many times here, that they soon become naturalised within the passage. Questions about their precise meaning are part of a wider uncertainty concerning the precise meaning of many aspects of the argument in general.

¹⁷ Although it does not constitute so significant a deviation from its normal usage as to constitute a clear case of imagery. See n.16, above.

previous two case studies. In one respect, this stems from the vast amount of secondary literature written on this passage. At many stages, in order to engage with this, I have had to break into my own analysis and address certain viewpoints within their own terms of reference. Yet, there is another reason. As I will explain below, the 'second sailing' fits together into a tightly cohesive structure, within which a full explanation of individual aspects can only really be given in terms of the overall structure both of particular sections and the 'second sailing' as a whole. This has made it far more difficult than in the previous chapters to comment on the specific significance of individual stylistic points, without offering simultaneously an broader overview of the argument.

8.1.2 *Causes or explanations?*

There has been considerable debate over whether 'the second sailing' deals primarily with 'causes' or 'explanations', the former taken as having an ontological basis, the latter epistemological.¹⁸ My own understanding of the argument incorporates both these aspects, as long as explanations are based on an underlying reality. For, if this is the case, the cause/explanation distinction is essentially one of emphasis and not substantive.¹⁹ Nevertheless, I shall use 'cause', since this emphasises the metaphysical aspect and avoids the dangers of the 'second sailing' being viewed as purely pragmatic.²⁰

Furthermore my conception of 'cause' is broad, departing from the modern notion of 'cause' as 'efficient cause',²¹ and involving no assumption of antecedence.²² I

¹⁸ See e.g. Sedley, 1998, 121 n.7 and 122: 'They constitute less an epistemological than an ontological category'. Cf. also e.g. Rowe, 1993b. and Ooms Renard, 1999.

¹⁹ Cf. McCabe, 1994, 63-4.

²⁰ Explanation, unlike causation, can be seen as either 'real' or 'pragmatic'. As Ruben, 1990, 21-3, explains, 'real explanations' only exist by virtue of 'the way the things in the world which they are about really are'. By contrast, the 'explanatory pragmatist' sees explanation as entirely 'audience-variant', with ontology playing no role. Cf. also Hankinson, 1998, 4: 'Causes are actual items, events, agents, facts, states of affairs; explanations, on the other hand, are propositional'.

²¹ Ruben, 1990, 46.

²² If 'causation' does not involve antecedence, it will be freed from Aristotle's objection that the effects caused by Forms should not be intermittent (*GC* 335b.18-21). Cf. Fine, 1987, 79-81.

follow Sedley in taking a 'cause' to be an item which 'has some characteristic which made it all along *such as to* bring about the effect'.²³

8.2 'Synonymy' and 'Form-participation': the 'safe hypothesis' (100b1-102a9) as a single λόγος

In Chapter 7, I discussed how one might see the 'safe hypothesis' as a single λόγος of causation, unlike the accounts given by other physicists, such as Anaxagoras. Yet Socrates still presents the hypothesis with several different formulations, giving us, effectively, some degree of synonymy between varying expressions of the same principle; stylistic variation combined with semantic continuity.

8.2.1 *Flexible terminology in the account of the 'safe hypothesis'*²⁴

At the outset of the 'second sailing' Socrates outlines the 'safe hypothesis', presenting the Form/particular relationship as the simple dependence of particular on matching Form.²⁵ The relationship, whose precise nature is not specified, is represented by several formulations, including the verb μετέχειν, the nouns παρουσία and κοινωνία, and the datives τῷ καλῷ and μεγέθει.²⁶ The same words describe both Form and particular, but with small linguistic variations. Thus, in οὐδὲ δι' ἓν ἄλλο καλὸν εἶναι ἢ διότι μετέχει ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ (100c5-6) an adjective represents the particular, an adjectival substantive, τὸ καλόν, the Form. Later, the substantive is both Form and particular, with the former singular, the latter plural: τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλά (100e2-3). What the language clearly shows is that Socrates sees causation as the direct 'effect' of Form on particular, by which a 'like' Form *causes* a 'like' particular, however this occurs precisely. It is this relationship, between 'like' Forms and particulars, which I describe as

²³ Sedley, 1998, 122.

²⁴ Although I shall be touching on aspects of the so-called 'method of hypothesis' at 101d1-102a1 (100a3-7 is often seen as connected) and have already discussed parts in Ch.7, I will not be discussing it in great detail as a separate section. For I am trying to stress the continuity, interconnectedness, and methodological significance of the 'second sailing' as a whole, without seeing one particular part as being *the* significant statement of method.

²⁵ Cf. Vlastos, 1973, 86: ' "Participation" here designates that one-way relation of ontological dependence between temporal things and eternal Forms... '.

²⁶ Cf. Sedley, 1998, 115, on the variation of Platonic expressions conveying cause in general.

‘matching’. Admittedly, Socrates’ ‘assertion’ (δυσχυρίζομαι) that τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά (100d7-8), could be taken to demonstrate a preference for this particular formulation. However, the fact that he does not then stick to this phrasing suggests that he is asserting the certainty of a ‘like’ causes ‘like’ principle, rather than advocating correct terminology.

It seems then that the varied formulations here emphasise the importance of the ‘like into like’ principle over any detailed explanation of the process,²⁷ a reading corroborated by the end of the list of possible formulations, if this controversial phrase is read as καὶ ὅπως προσαγορευομένη (100d6). Nevertheless, even the alternative conjectures, προσγενομένου and other forms of προσγίγνομαι,²⁸ could be taken to indicate that the principle is certain, whatever the exact nature of participation.²⁹

So, it seems that no specific terminology encapsulates the precise working of participation. However, in spite of his varied verbal formulations, Socrates implies that he, unlike the ἀντιλογικοί, has a single account of causation, εἰς λόγος (101e4).

²⁷ Cf. Rowe, 1993b, 57 and 61. However, while Rowe says that participation’s exact nature is not outlined here, he claims that the different formulations actually represent distinct explanatory hypotheses which would give further explanations of how participation works and that the best of these would provide a λόγος for the Form-participation hypothesis, a course of action recommended (101d6ff.), but never carried out. *Pace* Rowe, it seems unlikely that the missing *logos* of Form participation ([ὑπόθεσις] τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη, 101d8) is any of these formulations. For this would imply that the extended explanation of Form-participation is prior to the Form-participation principle itself. Moreover, it also appears that further explanation of this principle is actually given in the ‘second sailing’. For the ways in which the points made after the ‘method of hypothesis’ augment this explanation, see e.g. 7.5.4, above and p.252, below. Even Rowe himself suggests that the more ‘subtle’ answer supplements the ‘safe’ by ‘showing how a particular object comes to be occupied by the Form in question’ (Rowe, 1993b, 67). On the controversy over what would constitute the ‘higher’ hypothesis see e.g. Kanayama, 2000, 51ff. and for other views on ἀνωθεν see Blank, 1986.

²⁸ See e.g. Rowe, 1993b, 56 n.16; and the OCT.

²⁹ Cf. Vlastos, 1973, 86 n.30, on προσαγορευομένη as indicating the uncertainty of the precise nature of ‘participation’. He adds that, even if προσγίγνομαι is read: ‘the difference will not be great..., and will not affect at all the important thing in the citation, sc. the avowal of uncertainty in εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως’. *Pace* Rowe, 1993b, 56, προσγίγνομαι does not seem to imply the superiority of one particular formulation.

8.2.2 *Why have different formulations?*

If the ‘safe hypothesis’ of causation is so clear and invariable, even with the details unstated, why does Plato present such a range of expressions, rather than a single formulation? In terms of how style corresponds to beliefs, it appears then that there can be synonymy between differing verbal expressions and that some underlying structural continuity transcends the differences. This suggests that particular words and phrases are not so significant for a λόγος as the structure into which they are combined.

One might take this thought a step further, extracting not only points about the composition of λόγος, but also reasons why Socrates might see λόγος as connected with reality. What the synonymy gives us is expressions with different elements, but a common principle. Likewise the ‘safe hypothesis’ of causation is universally true. Whether we are talking about what makes one person taller than another or ten more than eight (100e8-101b8), the cause will be a ‘like’ Form. No matter what precise elements are involved, the structure of causation remains the same.

8.3 The introduction of ἔνοντα (102a10-103a7): fixed and changing terminology

At the end of Chapter 7, I showed how one might see the section discussing the respective heights of Simmias, Socrates, and Phaedo (102a10-103a3) as an expansion of the ‘safe hypothesis’, which demonstrates the necessity of distinct, ‘non-constitutive’ and ‘absolute’ property-instances. I will now consider how this passage also leads into and establishes important points for the ‘subtler answer’.

There has been considerable debate over whether phrases like τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος (102d7-8) or talk of τὸ μέγεθος possessed by Simmias (e.g. 102c2-3) imply that there is a third type of entity and, if so, what type of entity it is and how it relates to Forms and particulars. Style in this section can be seen to shed some light on these issues.

8.3.1 *Introducing a third type of entity (102a10-d4)*

In Chapter 7, I proposed that this section demonstrates the need for a third type of entity,³⁰ distinct property-instances which are present non-constitutively in particulars, so that opposite causes do not produce the same result. The existence of this entity is stressed through various formulations. A phrase like οὐ γάρ που πεφυκέναι Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν τούτῳ, τῷ Σιμμίαν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μεγέθει ὁ τυγχάνει ἔχων (102c1-3) clearly shows that Simmias possesses distinct 'largeness'. Similarly, Socrates and Phaedo are not small because Σωκράτης ὁ Σωκράτης ἐστίν (102c3-4) and Φαίδων ὁ Φαίδων ἐστίν (102c7-8), but because of 'smallness'.

Also introduced here are the terms εἶδος and ἐπωνυμία (102b1-3), where the former denotes Forms, the latter the predicate attached to individuals who have certain property-instances through Form-participation. Socrates possesses both 'smallness' and 'largeness' in relation to Simmias and Cebes respectively: ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει σμικρός τε καὶ μέγας εἶναι (102c11-12). The ἐπωνυμία, which is evidently not essentially linked to individuals and can be compresent with its opposites,³¹ will be an important term in distinguishing the relationship between different types of entity.

8.3.2 *ἔνοντα and Forms: the 'withdraw or perish' option (102d5-103a3)*

While Socrates can admit compresent opposites and have the 'eponyms' 'large' and 'small' simultaneously, there are two types of entity which cannot: αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος, presumably the Form 'Large', and τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος, its property-instance (102d6-9). Thus, this stage of the argument implies unambiguously the existence of three different kinds of entity: particulars, Forms, and those which I shall call ἔνοντα from hereon.³² ἔνοντα come to be present in particulars and give the particulars certain characteristics. I use the term ἔνοντα,³³ indicating only that

³⁰ See Ch.7 p.224, above.

³¹ On the term 'compresence', as used here and throughout this chapter, see Ch.7 n.7, above.

³² Given that these ἔνοντα are clearly distinguished from Forms, I am not using terms like 'immanent Forms', in order to avoid confusion.

³³ Cf. Frede, 1978, 40 n.6, for the term ἔνον.

they are entities which come to be *in* things, as with τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος, and are distinct from both Forms and particulars, without other commitments as to their precise nature.³⁴

Neither Forms nor ἔνοντα can withstand the compresence of opposites, and it is here that Socrates first introduces the ‘withdraw or perish’ alternative, explaining what happens to them when an opposite approaches. He claims that the Form and ἔνον ‘Large’ ἢ φεύγειν καὶ ὑπεκχωρεῖν ὅταν αὐτῷ προσίῃ τὸ ἐναντίον, τὸ σμικρόν, ἢ προσελθόντος ἐκείνου ἀπολωλέναι (102d9-e2). Whereas Forms are indestructible and eternal, ἔνοντα are characterised by coming to be only *in* things. Thus, it seems that Forms would flee when an opposite approaches, while ἔνοντα, unable to exist outside of the particular in which they are instantiated, would perish.

The ‘withdraw or perish’ opposition recurs throughout the ‘second sailing’ and, despite slight changes of expression, it is always presented in terms of opposing alternatives, being destroyed or yielding and fleeing. For example: ἤτοι ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται (103a1-2); ἢ ὑπεκχωρήσειν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπολεῖσθαι (103d8); and ἤτοι ἀπολλύμενα ἢ ὑπεκχωροῦντα (104b10-c1).³⁵ Given that ἔνοντα alone appear to be at issue as the argument progresses, commentators have worried in case only the ‘perish’ option is real. Hackforth’s view that the ‘withdrawal’ option does only apply to soul and ‘is apparently brought in to provide for that case’,³⁶ has come under

³⁴ The nature of what I call ἔνοντα is very controversial and widely discussed. On the debate in general and for further references, see Gallop, 1975, 195; and Fine, 1986, 76 n.7. Hackforth, 1955, 150 n.1, posits ontologically distinct ‘immanent forms’: ‘it is immanent form - characters like τὸ ψυχρόν which can *approach* and reside in concrete subjects that Socrates has been and is still concerned with...’. Cf. also e.g. Vlastos, 1973, 83; Frede, 1978, 35. There have been various objections to such views. See e.g. Fine, 1986, 76, who calls ἔνοντα ‘immanent characters’, but sees them not as ‘a distinct ontological category from Forms, but (parts of) Forms themselves, when they are in things’. Kanayama, 2000, seems to suggest that the ‘subtler *aitiai*’ which come to be present in e.g. bodies, are particulars (71-3), and clearly distinguishes them from Forms (70). My ἔνοντα are in some ways close to O’Brien’s (1967-8, 201-2) ‘particularizations’ which, like Forms, cannot become their opposites, but are nevertheless ontologically particulars. Yet O’Brien’s ‘particularizations’ are very clearly not a third type of entity, but special particulars which, for some reason, cannot admit their opposites: ‘There will be no ‘third thing’, no fieriness *in* fire that is not particular fire and not the form of fire’. By contrast, I see the ἔνοντα as clearly conceived of as a third type of entity which, despite its potential destructibility, cannot simply be some type of particulars, given that particulars themselves are characterised by the compresence of opposites (see e.g. McCabe, 1994, 37ff.). Moreover, even if our interpretations of this point are similar, there are several substantial differences between our overall analyses which I will detail *ad loc.* below.

³⁵ Cf. O’Brien, 1967-8, 204: ‘Plato’s language makes it clear, here and throughout the argument, that ‘withdraw or perish’ offers a true alternative’.

³⁶ Hackforth, 1955, 148 n.3. Cf. e.g. Dixsaut, 1991, 389, n.300.

heavy fire.³⁷ Certainly, if the ‘withdraw’ option was actually real for the soul alone, the ‘withdraw or perish’ opposition would appear question-begging. Yet, given that Forms and, as we shall see later, the gods, would ‘withdraw’ rather than ‘perish’ on the approach of opposites, these concerns can be dispelled. The ‘withdrawal’ of these entities thus legitimates the opposition, and the first occurrence of the opposition (102e9-10) clearly applies to Forms as well as ἔνοντα, even if Forms are not focused on explicitly in later stages of the ‘second sailing’.³⁸

8.3.3 *The ‘anonymous objection’: ἔνοντα, Forms, particulars, and eponymy (103a4-103c6)*

According to the ‘anonymous objection’ (103a5-10) Socrates’ recent claims that, for example, τὸ μέγεθος could never admit τὸ μικρόν and become other than it is (102d7-e3), conflict with the earlier ‘argument from opposites’, which depicts change as a transition between opposites. Socrates responds by giving his clearest explanation of the distinction between his three types of entity. The ‘argument from opposites’ dealt with particulars (πράγματα), whereas they are now concerned with ἔνον (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν) and Form (τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει: 103b5), through whose presence particulars acquire their ἐπωνυμία. It is evident that *three* distinct types of entity are being posited here, supporting the suggestion made in the previous section.

The ‘anonymous objection’ also has more general ramifications for the function of style in argument. Whereas the exposition of ‘safe hypothesis’ included different verbal formulations with equivalent meanings, the ‘anonymous objection’ episode makes the very opposite move, as similar expressions vary in meaning, according to context. First there are the general verbal likenesses between the formulations of the two theses confused by the anonymous objector. The ‘argument from opposites’ proposes that, for example, ἐκ βραδυτέρου τὸ θάπτον [γενήσεται] (71a3-4), so

³⁷ E.g. O’Brien, 1967-8, 204, objects that, if Hackforth is correct, ‘withdrawal’ would amount to ‘perishing’, rendering the distinction superfluous. Cf. Gallop, 1975, 195, who also criticises Hackforth’s view: ‘in view of the repeated stress upon it [i.e. the withdrawal/ perish distinction], and its wide range of application..., it seems better to find distinct interpretations for each option, if possible’.

³⁸ Of course, the idea of Forms ‘withdrawing’ might, in itself, seem strange. However, this can be resolved by understanding ‘withdrawal’ not so much as physical withdrawal in the context of the Forms, but as not accepting [the opposite] and yet not perishing. This would seem to account for the important aspects of the ‘withdrawal’ option.

that opposites (expressed by the τό + neuter adjective form) come about (γίγνεσθαι) from their opposites. Socrates later point is that τὸ μικρὸν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἐθέλει ποτὲ μέγα γίγνεσθαι (102e6-7). Both contexts refer to a change (γίγνεσθαι) in an entity (the adjectival substantive). Admittedly, the ‘argument from opposites’ mentions πράγματα at one point (71a10), and Socrates does later specify that he is concerned with opposites ἐν ἡμῖν (102d7;102e7). Yet until Socrates responds to the ‘anonymous objection’, the distinctions between them are not clearly laid out, so that their verbal similarities may well lead to or at least augment their confusion with each other.

Sameness and difference: terminology and the link between ἔνοντα and Forms

These ideas already suggest how style indicates another point about λόγος and reality. Similar expressions vary in meaning according to context, just as the qualities of particulars in the earlier ‘recollection argument’ were also presented as context-dependent.³⁹ Moreover, Socrates’ response to the ‘anonymous objection’ contains another perhaps more significant example of how similar or even identical terms and expressions can have different meanings.

In qualifying the expressions, Socrates cleared up the objector’s confusion between πράγματα and ἔνοντα. However, Socrates’ response also provides a very pointed example of a verbal formulation which has undergone an unexplained change in meaning. He has stated, shortly before, that neither Form (αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος), nor ἔνον (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος) will admit their opposites (102d6-9), using the already familiar αὐτὸ τό expression to denote Forms.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, in his subsequent response, which verbally echoes this statement, the αὐτὸ τό formulation, far from distinguishing Forms from ἔνοντα, now clearly designates both: αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν οὔτε τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει (103b4-5).

³⁹ See e.g. 74b7-9: ἄρ’ οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταῦτά ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ’ οὔ;

⁴⁰ See e.g. 74e7, where αὐτὸ τὸ ἴσον distinguishes the Form from equal particulars and cf. e.g. 75c11-d1.

Why this sudden switch in the scope of the αὐτὸ τό terminology? In opposition to ἔνοντα at 102d6-9, it now incorporates ἔνοντα as well as Forms and is antithetical to particulars (πράγματα). As applied to Forms the definitive pronoun αὐτό presumably indicates something about their pure and essential nature - the Form of the good is 'the unchanging Good *itself*', as opposed to particular instances of goodness, prone to change and destruction.

When it first appears, then, at the point where Socrates introduces the 'withdraw or perish' option, αὐτὸ τό distinguishes Forms from ἔνοντα, because the latter come to be within particulars and can admit destruction (102d6ff.). Thus, if one point of αὐτὸ τό is to indicate permanence, it is well suited to the Forms/ἔνοντα opposition, given that the key difference between them is the latter's destructibility.

By contrast, in Socrates' response to the 'anonymous objection' the important distinction is between entities which admit their opposites and those which do not. Here, Socrates stresses similarities rather than differences between Forms and ἔνοντα, neither of which accept their opposites and which are both opposed to particulars, since these accept compresent opposites. Thus ἔνοντα are on the Forms side of an αὐτὸ τό/πράγματα opposition and αὐτὸ τό can be seen to indicate the essential nature of Forms with respect to non-acceptance of opposites, a characteristic shared by the ἔνοντα. So the changing scope of αὐτὸ τό draws attention to how ἔνοντα can be defined in terms of both crucial differences and similarities to Forms. Style reflects the actual relationship between these two types of entity, given that the application of αὐτὸ τό to the Forms' reflects the basis for, on the one hand, their distinctness from, and on the other, their similarities to, ἔνοντα.⁴¹

⁴¹ O'Brien, 1967-8, 209, points out this dual usage of αὐτὸ τό, and says that here the 'particularization' which cannot accept its opposite, is being likened to the Form in this respect, and is therefore indicated with the Form terminology. In spite of apparent similarities between our positions, O'Brien takes all examples of the phrase elsewhere to refer, unequivocally, to Forms.

8.3.4 *Summary*

From the end of the ‘method of hypothesis’ to the ‘anonymous objection’ there are a number of new points. While the ‘safe hypothesis’ involves Forms and particulars, we are now given ἔνοντα, a third type of entity, which come to be in particulars and are like Forms, because of their non-acceptance of opposites, like particulars, because of destructibility. On the approach of opposites, Forms ‘withdraw’ and ἔνοντα ‘perish’.

Style, then, can signify clear differentiation, as when distinguishing the three different kinds of entity or establishing the ‘withdraw or perish’ option. However, the flexibility of αὐτὸ τό and, to a lesser extent, the stylistic similarities between this passage and the ‘argument from opposites’, have also clearly shown particular words and structures to have a significance, which is not fixed, but context-dependent. So, λόγος seems to depend upon the particular structure and context of its individual elements and, in this respect, once again mirrors Socrates’ account of reality. We have only to think, for example, of the equal sticks and stones at 74b8-9, or of the later ‘pseudo- causes’, like Socrates’ limbs, whose role varies with context (98c5ff.).

8.4 Non-opposites and ‘essential’ opposites: the ‘onony’ relationship

Socrates has now made space for ἔνοντα, which come to be in particulars and cannot accept their opposites. So far, however, his examples have only explicitly involved the oppositional property-instances τὸ μέγεθος and τὸ μικρόν. Yet, given that soul is not an opposite (nor a property-instance), in order to demonstrate the relevance of ἔνοντα for the soul, he will need to show that they include non-opposites (and a wider range of substances).

8.4.1 *Non-opposites and ‘essential’ opposites (103c7-e1)*

This section introduces four distinct substances: fire, heat, snow, and cold. The question and answer θερμόν τι καλεῖς καὶ ψυχρόν;/ ἔγωγε (103c11-12) makes it clear that heat and cold, like the earlier large and small, are viewed as substances.

Although heat differs from fire and cold from snow (103d2-3), they are nevertheless connected so that snow will not accept the opposite of cold, heat, nor fire cold, but will 'withdraw or perish' on their approach. Thus, although not spelt out explicitly, Socrates suggests that certain *non-opposites* (e.g. snow) are 'essentially' linked to particular *opposites* (e.g. cold) insofar as the non-opposites (e.g. snow) will not receive the opposites (e.g. heat) of their 'essential' opposites (e.g. cold).⁴²

At this stage it is not entirely clear exactly what type of entities Plato has in mind and commentators often see this uncertainty as extending throughout many of the subsequent examples in the 'second sailing'.⁴³ Up to this point Socrates has discussed what we would call properties, as opposed to substances. When he then introduces fire and snow, they are sometimes taken to be Forms, but more commonly to be physical particulars,⁴⁴ seemingly on the assumption of a property/substance distinction. Given that property-instances in the 'second-sailing' are clearly treated as substances, they can, however, be grouped along with fire and snow, as different kinds of *ἐνόντα*. It is non-acceptance of opposites which distinguishes them from particulars. So it seems that fire and snow together with heat, cold, large and small, can at least be categorised as *ἐνόντα*, rather than particulars.⁴⁵

8.4.2 The 'onomy' relationship (103e2-104c10)

Socrates has made clear that certain non-opposites are connected with particular opposites so that the former will not accept the opposites of the latter. He then goes

⁴² I will be using the term 'essential' without its usual philosophical implications, to denote this aspect of the relationship between certain opposite and non-opposite *ἐνόντα*.

⁴³ Cf. O'Brien, 1967-8, 202ff. Cf. Sedley, 1998, 115: 'Plato does not in this context show the slightest interest in distinguishing between metaphysically different kinds of things'.

⁴⁴ So e.g. Rowe, 1993a, 253, says that snow etc. must be either property-instances or Forms, but not particulars. Yet here and on the argument as a whole, the most common view appears to be that the 'second sailing' concerns a mixture of entities and that, while three and oddness are Forms or property-instances, snow and fire etc. are physical particulars: e.g. Bostock, 1986, 188, says that it concerns a mixture of 'forms', 'forms-in-something', and 'physical stuffs such as fire and snow'; Fine, 1987, 95, suggests that a thing which 'brings along' an opposite 'can, but need not, be a Form'; Hackforth, 1955, 162 especially n.3; Frede, 1978, 33-4; Hankinson, 1998, 94.

⁴⁵ If we are trying to establish parallelism between e.g. fire and large, we might also ask whether there are Forms of fire and snow, just as are clearly posited of large and small (e.g. 102d6). The question of what phenomena have Forms is an important issue in *Rep. X* and *Parm.* 130ff. (see e.g. McCabe, 1994, 79-80), though never firmly answered. In the *Phaedo*, it is left very open. Although instances when Forms are clearly at issue discuss only Forms of qualities (e.g. 65d4ff.; 78d3ff.), Forms of physical substances such as snow are at no point precluded.

on to expand upon and clarify their relationship, describing it in terms of a shared *ὄνομα*.

A certain thing's *ὄνομα* is held not only by that thing itself, but also by a non-opposite which *ἔχει ...τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν ἀεί* (103e4-5). Socrates' first example involves the opposite odd (*τὸ περιττόν*) and three (*ἡ τρίς*), although he soon brings in other odd numbers similarly related to *τὸ περιττόν*, as well as moving on to the relationship between even numbers and *τὸ ἄρτιον* (103e6-104b5). Thus the relationship between a non-opposite and its 'essential' opposite is 'onomy', with the former always sharing the *ὄνομα* of the latter. Each of the odd numbers is always *περιττός*, each of the even always *ἄρτιος*, different though each is from *τὸ περιττόν* and *τὸ ἄρτιον*.

Socrates then adds that not only will opposites not accept their opposites, but also non-opposites will not accept the opposites of their 'essential' opposites. Instead, non-opposites will 'withdraw or perish' on their approach, so that three, for example, will not tolerate the presence of the even (104b6-c10).

What type of entities have ὀνόματα?

As I mentioned when discussing fire and snow, the question what type of entities are at issue here is controversial. I propose that 'onomy' specifically characterises how related *ἔχοντα* inhere in particulars, and that it is this specific relationship between *ἔχοντα* which is being discussed throughout this section (103e2-104b10). Accordingly, I need to give reasons why *ἔχοντα* are the exclusive focus here, as opposed to the Forms and particulars which many commentators also take to be involved in this passage.

First, why suppose that Plato is concerned here with *ἔχοντα* as opposed to Forms? The passage establishes the principle that certain non-opposites have 'essential' opposites and will not accept the opposites of these. Even though Forms will not, as the earlier argument shows (e.g. 102d5ff.) accept their opposites, they are absolutely

pure, simple, and independent,⁴⁶ so that it would make little sense to talk of them having even an 'essential' relationship with other Forms. The subsequent argument strengthens the case against a focus on Forms, as it becomes clear that the non-opposites and opposites under consideration actually enter and occupy particulars.

If this is the case, however, one may well be puzzled by αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος (103e3), given that the αὐτὸ τό terminology is perhaps most closely associated with Forms. Thus, O'Brien argues that μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον (103e2-4) definitely refers to the Form, claiming that it corresponds to the earlier αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος, which is clearly distinguished from τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος (102d6-8). However, as I showed above, the αὐτὸ τό terminology can elsewhere be taken clearly and significantly to include ἔνοντα (103b4-5), and cannot be seen exclusively to refer to Forms.⁴⁷ Likewise εἶδος, which might also be understood specifically to denote Forms, has a range of meanings and does not necessarily exclude ἔνοντα.⁴⁸

Another apparent difficulty in this passage arises from the qualifications εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον and ὅτανπερ ᾗ in:

μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκείνο, ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν ἀεὶ, ὅτανπερ ᾗ (103e2-5).

O'Brien argues that εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον refers exclusively to αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, while ὅτανπερ ᾗ is in opposition to this and applicable to ἄλλο τι... Since only Forms have permanence, αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος at least must denote Forms.⁴⁹ If the phrase

⁴⁶ Cf. McCabe, 1994, 64: 'They [i.e. Forms] are...quite simple..., so that they have no properties at all. They are just "themselves by themselves", just one.

⁴⁷ Even though O'Brien, 1967-8, 209, has noticed this earlier broadened application of αὐτὸ τό (see n.41, above), he still maintains, without justification, that the term here refers unequivocally to Forms.

⁴⁸ For the varied meanings of εἶδος see e.g. 73a2, 76c12, 79a6, 98a2, 100b4, 106d6. Moreover, for example, in 102b1, where τῶν εἰδῶν certainly appears to refer to Forms, ἔνοντα have not yet been introduced into the account of causation at all, so that we cannot see it as a clear way of distinguishing Forms from ἔνοντα. Cf. Hackforth, 1955, 150, who says that the phrase αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος refers to 'immanent forms', even though 'it might seem natural' to take it as signifying 'transcendent forms'. He also cites 104c7 as an example where εἶδη clearly refers to 'immanent' and not 'transcendent' forms.

⁴⁹ O'Brien, 1967-8, 213.

really is distinguishing between things which have their name '*for all time*' as opposed to those which share the μορφή of these, '*whenever they exist*', it is easy to see why the first part would be seen as referring to Forms. Yet, given that the examples which follow clearly show that the important distinction here is between 'essential' opposite and related non-opposite, it seems highly unlikely that a Form/particular distinction would be invoked at this point. Furthermore, since Socrates subsequently suggests that not only is τὸ περιττόν *always* (ἀεί) said to have its name, but also other things which share this name (103e6-104a3), it does not appear that he is indicating a 'persistence' based distinction between these pairs of entities.

An alternative reading of 103e2-5 is available, and would support this view. If, as is quite natural, we take the whole of ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεί χρόνον as applicable to the subject in both parts of the antithesis, it would also refer to ἄλλο τι...Consequently, εἰς τὸν ἀεί χρόνον, far from precluding and being in opposition to ὅτανπερ ἦ, would then appear actually to be compatible with it.⁵⁰ The phrase would then mean that both αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος and ἄλλο τι...*always* have the same ὄνομα, *whenever they exist*, a reading which fits in perfectly with opposite and non-opposite ἔχοντα, since these have no permanent existence, being destroyed by the approach of their opposites.

Along with αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος, other terms have also been construed as referring to Forms. Notably, O'Brien claims that here and elsewhere a singular noun, like ἡ τριάς, denotes the Form and plural numbers like τὰ τέτταρα the particulars.⁵¹ However, even if linguistic usage varies between the two halves of this passage, the contrasting halves are actually so closely parallel that it seems highly unlikely that the second, ostensibly a demonstration of precisely the same principle as the first,⁵² should concern entirely different types of entity:

ἀλλ' ὅμως οὕτω πως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν ἀεί

⁵⁰ Grammatically it is possible to take ὅτανπερ ἦ to refer collectively to the two neuter subjects αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος and ἄλλο τι...

⁵¹ O'Brien, 1967-8, 218-219. Cf. Gallop, 1975, 205-6, *contra* O'Brien.

⁵² This is supported by the use of αὖ at the beginning of the second part.

ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστὶ περιττός· καὶ αὖ τὰ δύο καὶ τέτταρα καὶ ἅπας
ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ οὐκ ὦν ὅπερ τὸ ἄρτιον ὁμῶς
ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἄρτιός ἐστιν αἰεί· (104a7-b4)

This view is strengthened by the fact that the corresponding phrases ὁ ἡμῖς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας and ἅπας ὁ ἕτερος αὖ στίχος suggest that two complementary sets of numbers are at issue.⁵³

Hence it seems improbable that Forms are the focus here, and there are also good reasons for discounting particulars. αὐτὸ τό (103e3) immediately suggests that particulars are not at issue, a view supported by the fact that the non-opposites and their ‘essential’ opposites clearly have fixed ὀνόματα, whereas particulars are characterised by their changeability⁵⁴ and acceptance of compresent opposites,⁵⁵ unlike substances sharing an ὄνομα (104b6-c3).

So given that, as I have shown above, there are also good reasons for supposing that the earlier parts of this section are concerned solely with ἔνοντα, there seems to be no sufficient linguistic evidence here for seeing these lines as dealing with Forms or particulars rather than ἔνοντα.

8.4.3 ‘Onomy’ and ‘eponymy’

This is the second description of a relationship between entities in linguistic terms within the ‘second sailing’. Socrates said earlier that particulars derive ἐπωνυμία from their ἔνοντα and participation in the Forms,⁵⁶ a very different relationship from that between entities sharing the same ὄνομα, which is exclusive to ἔνοντα. We can therefore distinguish between ‘eponymy’/‘onomy’: the former denotes the non-essential presence of ἔνοντα within particulars; the latter the invariable relationship between non-opposite ἔνοντα and their ‘essential’ opposite ἔνοντα.

⁵³ O’Brien, 1967-8, 218, does notice the parallel, but dismisses it, by saying that the linguistic distinction becomes ‘firmer’ as the argument continues.

⁵⁴ See e.g. the description of sensibles at 79a9-10 as μηδέποτε κατὰ ταῦτά. Cf. e.g. 80b4.

⁵⁵ See e.g. 102a6 and c11ff and n.34, above.

⁵⁶ See 103b7ff. and 102b3ff. respectively. See also p.237, above.

As the argument continues, the ‘onomy’ relationship will also help to establish a more expansive understanding of how Form-participation occurs.

As far as I am aware, this ‘eponymy’/‘onomy’ distinction has not been discussed. Frede, one of the few who discuss ‘eponyms’, says that the ‘“eponymy” criterion’ is found at both 103b8-9 and 103e,⁵⁷ failing to notice that the former deals with ἐπωνυμίας, the latter with ὀνόματα. She goes on to say that ‘eponymy’ is ultimately insufficient because it does not distinguish between essential and accidental properties,⁵⁸ when, in fact, the unnoticed distinction between ‘onomy’ and ‘eponymy’ suggests a version of the essential/accidental opposition itself.

ὀνόματα and ἐπωνυμίας are both types of predicate. Attributing ὀνόματα to an entity indicates fixed and permanent characteristics and relationships in ἔνοντα, while ἐπωνυμίας are the transitory names acquired by particulars. Yet the verbal structure of ὀνόματα and ἐπωνυμίας is the same. The ἔνον three, for example, is odd (ἐστι περιττός: 104b2), while the claim that Σιμμίαν Σωκράτους ... μείζω εἶναι (102b5) means that Simmias has the ‘ἐπωνυμία’ μέγας. The significance of predication is therefore, as with other stylistic points, dependent on its context. For predicating an adjective of a particular noun could denote either an ‘essential’ or a transient attribute. This ambiguity also goes beyond the verbal level, highlighting a possible confusion in how we understand actual entities. For seeing Simmias to be large, we might suppose this to be a quality he has essentially, by virtue of being Simmias, rather than having this quality through the presence of an ἔνον, large. Clarification of the ambiguity between predicates may then lead to a greater understanding of the entities they describe.

8.5 Defining ἔνοντα: structure and ambiguity (104c11-105b4)

Having outlined the relationship between non-opposites and their ‘essential’ opposites, insofar as the former will not tolerate the compresence of the latter,

⁵⁷ Frede, 1978, 37. Cf. Ooms Renard, 1999, 135-40, who also claims that the same underlying ‘eponymy principle’ is present both in 102b and 103e.

⁵⁸ Frede, 1978, 37: ‘“Eponymy” as such is not sufficient, because...all things can be called after their properties, even if they are only accidental ones’.

Socrates now defines the kind of entities involved (104c11-12), and expands his explanation of how these interact with particulars. Strangely, the style can be seen to create some degree of confusion, given that the repetition of certain stylistic structures suggests a continuity and parallelism of meaning, while a coherent interpretation of the passage depends upon recognising that the significance of particular terms and phrases actually changes from line to line. This recognition can only be achieved through consideration of the structure as a whole.

8.5.1 *What kind of entities are at issue here*

At 104 c11 Socrates asks βούλει οὖν...ὀρισώμεθα ὅποια ταῦτα ἐστίν;. Presumably, ὅποια ταῦτα refers to the final items of his previous point, ἀλλ' ἄττα τὰ ἐναντία οὐχ ὑπομένει ἐπιόντα, as opposed to τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐναντία (104a7-9). Accordingly, he is apparently offering to define the non-opposite ἔνοντα of the previous passage, which share the ὄνομα of an 'essential' opposite ἔνον and will not accept its opposite, although not being opposites themselves.

Socrates begins by explaining their function in relation to the particulars in which they come to be present: τάδε εἶη ἄν, ἃ ὅτι ἄν κατάσχη μὴ μόνον ἀναγκάζει τὴν αὐτοῦ ιδέαν αὐτὸ ἴσχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναντίου αὐτῷ τῷ ἀεί τινος (104d1-3).⁵⁹ This line contains several difficulties, as suggested by Cebes' πῶς λέγεις;. Not only is there the question of ιδέα's precise meaning, but the grammar is also unclear, and there has been considerable debate over which of ἃ and ὅτι are subject and object of κατάσχη. Either alternative is problematic. For although αὐτοῦ appears to refer to the subject and αὐτό the object, both are singular, while ἃ suggests that one should be plural.

ἃ seems to be the subject of κατάσχη, referring back to ἀλλ' ἄττα in 104c8, the non-opposite εἶδη which do not accept opposites. As long as we accept that αὐτοῦ

⁵⁹ I follow the 1995 OCT in reading αὐτῷ τῷ (104d3) rather than the main manuscripts' αὐτῷ. On the implausibility of αὐτῷ see e.g. Gallop, 1975, 236; Rowe, 1993a, 256: 'The MS reading αὐτῷ (d3) is impossible; Robin's τῷ (= τινί) is the best available solution'. Moreover, αὐτῷ τῷ is not an emendation, but a legitimate (re)interpretation of the inherited original, or putative original, sequence ΑΥΤΩΙ, the (Byzantine) interpretation of which as αὐτῷ has no independent weight.

(104d2) refers to the subject of κατάσχη,⁶⁰ the apparent contrast between τὴν αὐτοῦ ἰδέαν and ἐναντίου αὐτῷ τῷ ἀεί τινος, which the subject of κατάσχη is said to bring (104d1-3), suggests that the subject of κατάσχη must be a non-opposite. This also suggests that ἰδέα, which describes an opposite at 104b9, is not restricted to opposites, but pertains to both opposites and non-opposites. Finally, it is not implausible that the subject could shift between plural (ἄ) and singular (αὐτοῦ), which would resolve the grammatical difficulty.⁶¹

One might then translate 104d5-7 as: ‘so, Cebes, would these be the kind of things which, whatever they [occupy], compel it not only to have their own form, but also (the form) of something opposite to something [i.e. an ‘essential’ opposite]’. This would make sense of Socrates’ next point, about ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα (104d5-7). Here the previous point seems to have been condensed so that, rather than the ἰδέα coming from occupation by a non-opposite ἔνον, the ἰδέα itself now does the occupying. A comparison of both points suggests that, despite ambiguities in the precise sense of ἰδέα and κατέχειν, the crux is that occupation by a non-opposite ἔνον such as three means that the occupied particular will be occupied by both a non-opposite and its related ‘essential’ opposite.

Some of the stylistic parallels here therefore appear illusory or deceptive. For despite strong parallelism between 104d1-3 and 104d5-7, many of the verbal similarities are misleading, implying semantic similarity where there are, in fact, differences. We have already seen, for example, how the precise sense of ἰδέα wavers. Yet ἰδέα is not alone. ἄ ἂν ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα κατάσχη (104d5-6) is similar to the previous ἄ ὅτι ἂν κατάσχη (104d1), suggesting a parallelism between the two instances. However, whereas at first, notwithstanding certain difficulties, ἄ seems to be the subject, grammar dictates that in the second phrase ἄ must be the object of κατάσχη, since ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα is obviously the subject.⁶² Thus, the non-opposite ἔνοντα remains as the grammatical subject in both phrases.

⁶⁰ This view is widely accepted, by e.g. O’Brien, 1967-8, 215-6; Gallop, 1975, 202; Bostock, 1986, 186; Rowe, 1993a, 256. They all offer reasons for rejecting the idea that ὅτι is the subject and αὐτοῦ refers to the object of κατάσχη, as suggested by e.g. Hackforth, 1955, 151.

⁶¹ See e.g. Gallop, 1975, 202, and Bostock, 1986, 185-6.

⁶² Cf. Kanayama, 2000, 68-9 *contra* those who take ἄ at 104d1 and 5 as semantically parallel.

All in all, and, in spite of certain ambiguities, retaining the non-opposite *ἐνόντα* as the subject of these lines allows an interpretation which is coherent both internally and in relation to the preceding and following sections. *ὥσπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν* (104d5) supports this reading, explicitly connecting these words with the passage where *ἡ τριάς* and *τὸ περιττόν* exemplified the ‘onomy’ relationship between non-opposites and their ‘essential’ opposite *ἐνόντα*. This link is also suggested by the reappearance of *μορφή* in Socrates’ next remarks (104d10), a term used only here and in the first explanation of ‘onomy’, where Socrates says that something (on my reading a non-opposite *ἐνόν*) which shares another’s *ὄνομα*, even though different from it, has *τὴν ἐκείνου μορφήν* *αἰ* (103e5).

8.5.2 *Clarifying the relationship between ἐνόντα and particulars*

I now want to focus on two important points. The first is the way that a new ‘technical’ sense is acquired by the α -privative form of adjective. Although the significance of this sense is not fully recognisable immediately (104e5), it will become important later in the argument. The second point is the clarification of the *ἐνόντα*/particulars relationship in this section’s summary (104e7-105b3).

ἄναρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς (104e5) concludes the arguments about *ἡ τῶν τριῶν ἰδέα*, beginning at 104d5. Being an *ἄναρτιον* seems to involve the following: compelling the thing it occupies to be odd (10d5-6) and never accepting the *ἰδέα* of the even. So when three is, in conclusion, described as *ἄναρτιος*, the α -privative adjective appears to encapsulate the ideas that it brings its essential ‘opposite’, the uneven, and will not allow the compresence of that negated by the α -privative. As I said above, this sense of α -privative terms will soon become significant.

Socrates now gives his definition of what kind of things are non-opposites, but still do not accept opposites. Both in his recapitulation of the question and his answer (104d6-105a5) he says that non-opposites always ‘bring along with’ them their opposites: *οἷον νῦν ἡ τριάς τῷ ἀρτίῳ οὐκ οὔσα ἐναντία οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ [τὸ ἐναντίον] δέχεται, τὸ γὰρ ἐναντίον αἰ αὐτῷ ἐπιφέρει*. The verb

ἐπιφέρειν, introduced here, conveys the important aspects of the relationship between non-opposite and 'essential' opposite ἔνοντα, and particulars.

105a2-5 is a clear final summary, consistent with my interpretation of this section's earlier parts. Not only do opposites not accept their opposites (μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι), but also those things which bear opposites to whatever they approach (ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ). The bearer itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον) would never accept the opposite of the thing being borne [by it] (τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι). A number of points are left unclear, like the precise relationship between the non-opposite and 'essential' opposite ἔνον and how exactly ἔνοντα come to be within particulars. Nevertheless, the conclusion clarifies the idea that non-opposite ἔνοντα bring 'essential' opposite ἔνοντα to particulars and will not accept the presence of the latter's opposites.

Gallop suggests that there is an absence of 'systematic doctrine' here.⁶³ Certain terms do appear to vary in meaning, while others remain consistent, but with aspects of meaning left unclear. Nevertheless, on linguistic grounds it still seems possible to maintain that throughout this section the subject is ἔνοντα and to reach a consistent interpretation of the passage which is also compatible with its wider context. To do this, one must follow the structure closely, understanding terms and phrases only in relation to the other parts of the passage as a whole. While this may not yield a full elucidation of terms like κατέχειν or ἐπιφέρειν, it still sheds light upon the crucial aspects of their meaning in the immediate context and also on their role within the passage as a whole. The structure of argument here therefore suggests another point about searching ἐν λόγοις: the importance of overall coherence, rather than the fixed significance of individual elements, reflecting the same ideas about the necessity of coherence for an ordered universe found in the earlier 'Anaxagoras episode'.⁶⁴

⁶³ Gallop, 1975, 195-6.

⁶⁴ See Ch.7 p.206, above, and also 8.8.1, below.

8.6 'The subtler answer': α-privative terms and the proof that the soul is ἀθάνατος (105b5-e10)

Having made various points about how ἔνοντα come to be present within particulars, Socrates now incorporates these into his 'subtler answer'. Here, by relying on the special sense of α-privative terms first established in the preceding section, he is able to offer a proof that the soul is ἀθάνατος. This is one side of the proof Cebes earlier claimed to be necessary if one is to be justifiably confident when death approaches: ὅτι ἔστι ψυχὴ παντάπασιν ἀθάνατόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον (88b5-6).⁶⁵

8.6.1 *Why the answer is κομψότερος and 'safe' (105b5-c7)*

In this section Socrates proposes a second account of 'causation', his κομψότεραν (subtler) answer. This is the idea that the presence of a non-opposite within a particular brings about the presence of its essential opposite, just as fire brings about heat in a body. As is widely acknowledged, it seems strange that Socrates describes this answer as κομψότεραν, given that he has previously used that term pejoratively, when criticising the spurious causal entities posited by others to explain phenomena like the coming-into-being of two: τὰς δὲ σχίσσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας (101c7-8). It seems unlikely that Plato intends his κομψότεραν answer as literally a 'subtler answer' which displaces the earlier 'safe' hypothesis. To solve the problem, both Rowe and Ooms-Renard suggest that it actually augments the original hypothesis, by supplementing the explanation of how Form-participation occurs, without adding extra entities in the manner of the physicists criticised by Socrates.⁶⁶

κομψότεραν, then, can be taken to mean more complex, but not superior. The idea of complexity does link the 'subtler answer' to the other physicists,⁶⁷ although there are also clear differences. Hackforth understands κομψότεραν as 'cleverer' without

⁶⁵ Cf. Socrates' later recapitulation of Cebes' point: ἀξιοῖς ἐπιδειχθῆναι ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀνώλεθρόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον οὔσαν (95b9-c1).

⁶⁶ Rowe, 1993, 65ff. and Ooms-Renard, 1999, 141ff.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ooms-Renard, 1999, 142.

irony and claims that the account of causation is ‘carried a stage further’ here.⁶⁸ However, although the ‘subtler answer’ expands upon the explanation of Form-participation, there are no substantial reasons for taking it as a refinement or replacement theory of causation itself, and it seems more likely to be a derivative account of the phenomena which occur because of simple Form-participation causation.⁶⁹ The language is very different from that with which causation was clearly indicated in the ‘safe hypothesis’. As Ooms-Renard points out, αἰτία is not used in the ‘subtler answer’,⁷⁰ and its last appearance in the ‘second sailing’ is at 101c4. Moreover, the ‘subtler answer’ does not involve any of the formulations used earlier to signify causation,⁷¹ but introduces a new and distinct expression: ὃ δὲ τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται (105b8-9).⁷² This simply suggests that the presence of something in a body means that another related thing will also be present, but does not state that the former *causes* the latter in the same clear way as the account of causation in the ‘safe hypothesis’.

Yet one might also see κομψός as having a more precise sense than simple ‘expansion’. In the earlier ‘hypothesis’ passage κομψείας characterised the pseudo-causes of ‘wiser’ people (101c6-9), who posit a multitude of different explanatory entities. By contrast, Socrates has a single account of causation (εἷς λόγος), based on a simple one-to-one mapping between Form and particular. Moreover, if we go back further, to the ‘Anaxagoras passage’, one of the reasons Anaxagoras’ ‘pseudo-causes’ were criticised was because of their plurality.⁷³

For κομψός to have connotations of plurality would make sense in the context of the ‘subtler answer’. For, while the single λόγος of the ‘safe hypothesis’ apparently depends upon a direct one-to-one relationship between its constituents, the ‘subtler

⁶⁸ Hackforth, 1955, 158 and 161. Cf. e.g. Hankinson, 1998, 94, who sees Plato’s ‘subtler causes’ as ‘a non-trivial account of causal explanation’, as opposed to the ‘charge of triviality’ to which the safe cause is open; Bostock, 1986, 184ff.; Vlastos, 1973, 102ff.

⁶⁹ Cf. e.g. Gallop, 1975, 211: ‘the new answer does not supersede the old “safe” one in terms of Forms, but supplements it, by showing how a particular object comes to be occupied by the Form in question’; Rowe, 1993b, 67.

⁷⁰ Ooms Renard, 1999, 143. Even so, Kanayama, 2000, still refers to the entities discussed in the ‘subtler answer’ as ‘subtler *aitiai*’ (see e.g. 69).

⁷¹ For a list of these see Sedley, 1998, 115; and p.232ff., above.

⁷² O’Brien, 1967-8, 223, gives a good translation: ‘[what is it that], whatever things it comes to be in, in its body, the same thing will be hot’.

⁷³ See Ch.7 p.209, above.

answer' incorporates what could be seen in various respects as several λόγοι. Most simply, it involves multiple principles, like the mutual exclusivity of opposite ἔνοντα and how certain non-opposite ἔνοντα share an opposite's ὄνομα. Furthermore, according to the 'subtler answer', the presence of a number of non-opposite ἔνοντα could be understood as explaining the presence of an opposite. For example, three, five, and other odd numbers, all lead to the presence of the odd (104a7-b2). The 'subtler answer's dependence on a number of λόγοι could then be a reason for its description as κομψοτέραν, since plurality is a characteristic it shares with the physicists' pseudo-causes.

However, although this 'secondary' account of 'causation' derives from the primary direct Form/particular relationship which constitutes the real αἰτία, there is, as Socrates says, a degree of 'safety' in the 'subtler answer': λέγω...ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν (105b6-8). For the 'subtler answer' rests on the idea of 'onomy', insofar as non-opposite ἔνοντα are connected with opposites in such a way that the presence of the former in a particular will invariably necessitate the presence of the latter. As commentators like Rowe and Fine have suggested, the 'subtler answer's safety clearly does not derive from specifying "necessary" conditions for causation. For the odd's presence does not necessitate the presence of three, even though three "causes" the odd to be present.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, some 'safety' still derives from the invariability of the 'onomy' principle, because the 'subtler answer' rules out causation of opposites by opposites.⁷⁵ In these ways, it is not, as Rowe and Fine suggest, liable to the same objections as the earlier 'pseudo-causes'.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Rowe, 1993b, 66-7; Fine, 1987, 97. Cf. also Gallop, 1975, 210ff.

⁷⁵ Cf. Kanayama, 2000, 73ff.

⁷⁶ Rowe, 1993b, 66-7, claims that 'safe' must be ironic because several non-opposites can bring the same opposite and the method is therefore 'indistinguishable from the one which led to the puzzles of 96-7'. Fine, 1987, 97, goes further, proposing that the 'subtler answer' 'allows some explanations involving opposites', and citing Gallop's example of 'fever' and 'the opposite of fever - hypothermia' as able to explain illness. However, 'fever' in the 'subtler answer' passage is treated as a non-opposite which leads to an opposite, 'illness', so that this problem would not arise. Moreover, if 'hypothermia' were also included in the passage it would probably be treated as another non-opposite, akin to 'fever', insofar as both entail the presence of 'illness'.

8.6.2 *α-privative terms and why the soul is ἀθάνατος (105c8-e10)*

The significance of the α-privative form

At 104e5 Socrates concluded that the three is uneven (ἀνάρτιος ἄρα ἡ τριάς) in an argument which appears to imply that, if something is called ἀνάρτιος, it will always bring the odd, its ‘essential’ opposite, to whatever it occupies, and will never accept the compresence of the even, the opposite of its ‘essential opposite’. From various points above, we can also draw the further inference that, should the odd, the opposite of its ‘essential opposite’, approach, the ἀνάρτιος thing will either ‘withdraw or perish’ (e.g. 104c1).

In this earlier section the only α-privative term is ἀνάρτιος, describing the even. However from the ‘subtler answer’ passage it emerges that certain properties are attributed not only to ἀνάρτιος, but to α-privatives in general. The first example here, ἀνάρτιον (105d15), refers back to the earlier section. Yet the point is soon expanded to incorporate others:

τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται;
ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον.
(105d16-e1)

This seems to imply that the earlier points about opposites and non-opposites applied to τὸ ἀνάρτιον are indeed true of α-privatives in general. Something which cannot accept the compresence of the opposite of its ‘essential’ opposite (and, by implication, will ‘withdraw or perish’ should this happen, and will also compel its ‘essential’ opposite to be present in whatever it occupies), is known by a term formed from an α-privative and the adjective applied to the opposite of its ‘essential’ opposite. For example, whatever is unable to accept the opposite τὸ δίκαιον will be known by a term made up of the α-privative and δίκαιος, namely ἄδικος.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Cf. Gallop, 1975, 215 and Kanayama, 2000, 82: ἀνάρτιον, ἄδικον, and ἄμουσον are simply terms given to ‘what does not admit the Form of the even/ the just/ the cultured’. Cf. also 83 on ‘the idiom of “α-G” ...[as introduced] to apply to what rings up the *F* and occupies other things’. While I am pleased to see that, in drawing attention to the special function of the α-privative form, I agree with

A novel usage

So far a variety of linguistic structures have not only contributed to the structure of the argument, but have also represented different relationships between entities. Here, morphological phenomena, the recurrent α -privative compounds, take on such a role. Thus Plato seems to attribute a novel and specific sense not solely to a specific lexeme, but to a general lexemic form. Effectively, he is technicalising a linguistic form in a way crucial to the passage's argument. The attribution of this 'technical' α -privative to adjectives from such varied lexical fields reflects how, for Socrates here, such diverse entities all fit into the same 'causal' structure.

Various features bring out the novelty and significance of this form. The general structure of 105dff., within which the α -privatives are systematised, is distinctive, without clear extant parallels, as I showed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, although strings of α -privatives are fairly common, especially in verse,⁷⁸ and Prier sees the cluster in Parmenides B8 as indicative of an 'archaic' trend,⁷⁹ there are no extant examples like the *Phaedo*'s systematisation of this compound. Several of the α -privative lexemes here are either very rare or actually unique to Plato within surviving literature,⁸⁰ so that he not only gives the form itself a new specialised sense, but is possibly even creating new lexemes to fit into this system. These are ἄψυκτος, ἀνάρτιος, and ἄθερμος, all appearing only in this passage, as well as ἀνώλεθρος, which is extremely rare.⁸¹

Kanayama, the latest on the 'second sailing', there are many crucial differences between our understanding of this function. For example, Kanayama seems only to allow for Forms and particulars, seeing α -privative terms as referring to those things which cannot admit opposite Forms. He also suggests (82) that e.g. being ἀνάρτιος does not necessarily indicate that something is 'odd'. On my analysis, a term like ἀνάρτιος refers either to an essential opposite or to the non-opposites linked to it in an 'ononymy' relationship, meaning that they will always be 'odd'. Moreover, our understanding of the final proof is very different. See n.87, below.

⁷⁸ Cf. Ch.5 p.125, above.

⁷⁹ Describing Parm B8., Prier, 1976, 109, writes that 'these symbolic characteristics are all formed, except one, with the archaic alpha privative prefix'.

⁸⁰ See Ch.4, p.85, above.

⁸¹ Cf. Gallop, 1975, 215: 'at 106a3-10 "un-hot" and "un-coolable" translate words coined by Plato to parallel "im-mortal" '.

The specialised meaning of ἀνάρτιος, the first of the α-privatives used here, is made particularly prominent. The later examples (105d13ff.) feature the positive and negative form of the same stem, such as τὸ δίκαιον/τὸ ἄδικον and μουσικόν/ἄμουσον (105d13-e1). By contrast, prior to the introduction of ἀνάρτιος at 104e5, the opposite of ἄρτιος is known as περιττός. So Socrates' switch to ἀνάρτιος to conclude his points about ἔνοντα not accepting the compresence of opposite ἔνοντα might suggest that the α-privative form denotes more than the straightforward opposition conveyed by pairs such as περιττός and ἄρτιος.

The soul is ἀθάνατος

The α-privative form signifies that the entity to which it is applied cannot accept the presence of that negated by the α. From the earlier sections, we can also infer that, when the latter approaches, the former will either 'withdraw or perish'. Although the α-privative terms are based on opposition, they are also applicable to those non-opposites that bring 'essential' opposites to particulars and do not accept the opposites of these (just as three is ἀνάρτιος). So a term like ἀνάρτιος applies not only to the odd, but to all odd numbers: they are linked by an ὄνομα. Thus, once it is accepted that the soul always brings life to a body (105d3-5), the transition to calling the soul ἀθάνατος follows.

On my analysis Socrates' conclusion that the soul is ἀθάνατος implies that when the soul is present in a body life is also necessarily present and, accordingly, death cannot be admitted. Admittedly, the precise nature of the soul is not evident. However, this passage presents the soul's actions as at least closely analogous to ἔνοντα. For example, the soul is said to 'occupy' (κατέχειν) a thing and 'bring' (ἐπιφέρω) life (105d3). This recalls 104d1-105a5, where κατέχειν refers to an ἔνον as present in a particular and ἐπιφέρω to how the presence of a non-opposite entails the presence of its connected opposite.⁸²

⁸² Cf. Hackforth, 1955, 162, on how this argument must be concerned with [immanent] forms: 'surely the use of the word κατάσχη in 105d3 is...conclusive;... it is inconceivable that it could mean there anything other than what it meant at 104d1, namely the occupation of a subject by an immanent form'. However, I do not agree with Hackforth that soul is an 'immanent form'.

Given the restricted sense of α-privative terms, this stage of the argument has only shown that if a body has a soul it will also have life and will not admit death without both the former either ‘withdrawing or perishing’. This all depends on the points established earlier, which dictate that the presence of certain non-opposite ἔνοντα in particulars means that ‘essential’ opposite ἔνοντα will also be present, and that neither non-opposite nor opposite ἔνοντα will admit ἔνοντα opposite to the latter, but will either ‘withdraw or perish’.

So far, then, the ‘second-sailing’ has satisfied the first of Cebes’ demands, having provided a proof that the soul is ἀθάνατος. In addition, it has given a clearer indication both of how particulars take on characteristics, and of how life, death, and soul are related. However, the issue of ‘indestructibility’, being ἀνώλεθρος, has still not been mentioned, and there has certainly been no argument to show that the soul has this property. All Socrates has shown is that the soul will not remain in a body if death enters, but will ‘withdraw or perish’. The very careful language in which this argument is established makes it clear that Socrates means no more than this when he talks about the soul being ἀθάνατος.

8.7 The soul as ἀνώλεθρος (105e11-107b10)

Socrates now sets out to fulfil Cebes’ second demand (88b5-6), by offering proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος. The standard criticism of his argument here is that it depends on the question-begging assumption that being ἀθάνατος entails being ἀνώλεθρος, and actually offers no independent proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος. However, my understanding of ἀθάνατος derived from the preceding sections allows us to see the two terms as having significantly different meanings. Exploiting these two meanings, Plato is now able to offer a proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος, which is distinct from the proof that it is ἀθάνατος, given in the previous section.

8.7.1 *The meaning of ἀνώλεθρος and its distinctness from ἀθάνατος*

At 105e11 Socrates embarks on a lengthy proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος. Yet he is often accused of taking ἀθάνατος to imply ‘indestructibility’, in line with its

conventional sense,⁸³ allowing him simply to make the assumption that an ἀθάνατος soul will also be ἀνώλεθρος, without adding any substantive new points. Yet, if one can show that the two terms have very distinct meanings here and that proofs are given not only for the soul being ἀθάνατος but also ἀνώλεθρος, it may be possible to dismiss such accusations.

The usual solution seems to be to claim that, although both terms indeed convey indestructibility, there are nevertheless clear and important differences between the types or aspects of indestructibility that they signify. However, these readings run into difficulties, because of their insistence that ἀθάνατος conveys indestructibility and that, accordingly, θάνατος refers to the destruction of the soul.⁸⁴

By contrast, my earlier analysis points to an alternative understanding of ἀθάνατος, according to which, once present in a body, the soul (being ἀθάνατος) precludes death's presence, and death will only be admitted if the soul 'withdraws or perishes'.⁸⁵ In accordance with the sense of α-privative terms established through usage in the 'second sailing', ἀθάνατος means only the inability to accept the compresence of death and carries no implication of indestructibility. Moreover, other aspects of the 'subtler answer' passage also point towards such a conclusion. Socrates asks 'what is it that, whatever body it comes to be in, that body will be

⁸³ On this conventional sense see e.g. Gallop, 1982, 208.

⁸⁴ A common suggestion is e.g. that θάνατος refers to the soul's destruction on separation from the body, while ὀλεθρος denotes some other type of destruction of the soul. Hackforth, 1955, 163: 'the adjective ἀθάνατον signifies no more than soul's immunity from that particular kind of extinction which might be supposed to befall it when it parts company with the body. The succeeding page (106a-c), in which it is argued that soul is ἀνώλεθρον (ἀδιάφθορον) as well as ἀθάνατον, starts from the implied assumption that there are other possible kinds of extinction'. Cf. e.g. Frede, 1978, 30. Yet, as O'Brien, 1967, 100-3, rightly objects, Socrates only seems to be concerned with the worry about whether destruction of the soul could occur on separation from the body (cf. 91d5-7). By contrast, O'Brien, 1967-8, 100-3, suggests a permanence based distinction, with ἀθάνατος meaning that the soul survives separation from the body, while ἀνώλεθρος means that this is 'always' the case. Yet he also adds that ἀνώλεθρος here 'has no new content that would justify a fresh train of argument'. There is, however, no clear textual evidence for the permanence based distinction. Moreover, the idea that ἀνώλεθρος signifies 'always escapes destruction' as opposed to 'sometimes', seems very strange, if we consider Socrates' points at 105e11-c7, where he considers the possibility that e.g. τὸ ἀνάρτιον might be ἀνώλεθρος. For if O'Brien's idea is correct, in order to preserve the parallelism and inferential structure of the argument, it would seem necessary for terms like τὸ ἀνάρτιον and τὸ ἄψυκτον to convey some notion of 'indestructibility' as well.

⁸⁵ Bostock, 1986, 191, concedes that Socrates 'is perhaps aware that he is not using these words [i.e. ἀθάνατος and other α-privative terms] in quite their usual sense'. However, he takes to mean that 'souls cannot die and still exist' and suggests that, in the ἀνώλεθρος point, ἀθάνατος 'is taken in its usual sense'.

alive?' (105c8),⁸⁶ to which Cebes replies 'the soul'. Clearly, they are discussing how life arises in a body, not in a soul. Therefore, given that θάνατος is introduced as the opposite to life, it appears that it likewise refers to the death of body, as opposed to the destruction of soul. If we take ἀθάνατος purely to indicate that soul cannot be present in a body simultaneously with death, there will then be room for a very distinct meaning of ἀνώλεθρος.⁸⁷

ἀνώλεθρος, just like ἀθάνατος, appears to have a special sense, deriving from the understanding of 'destruction' and 'existence' established in the 'second sailing'. In the 'second sailing' Socrates has repeatedly pointed out that those entities which cannot accept the compresence of opposites (or opposites of 'essential' opposites, in the case of non-opposites) will either 'withdraw or perish', on the approach of these opposites. The term used for 'perishing' is ἀπόλλυμι,⁸⁸ so that being ἀνώλεθρος seems to indicate a capacity for withdrawal from a particular and independent existence. For ἔνοντα, entities which come to be present in particulars, being ἀνώλεθρος would mean surviving the approach of their opposite, having withdrawn from the particular. This is the crucial point behind the second stage of the 'subtler answer' argument (105e11ff.): that something ἀνώλεθρος will 'withdraw' rather than 'perish' when its opposite approaches the particular in which it is present. So, given that ἀθάνατος simply means that the soul and death can never be compresent in a body, Socrates clearly still needs to show that soul is ἀνώλεθρος, by proving that it (a

⁸⁶ Translation taken from O'Brien, 1967-8, 225.

⁸⁷ Yet even Kanayama, 2000, 84-5, who insists earlier that α-privative terms simply denote the non-acceptance of the negated opposite and that ἀθάνατος accordingly means "not admitting death" (82, see my n.77, above), ultimately moves away from this strict sense of 'death' and 'being ἀθάνατος', back towards the more conventional account and, problematically, equates destruction with bodily death. Kanayama says that we cannot take ἀθάνατος to imply indestructibility, not simply because Socrates has only so far shown that it means either 'withdrawing or perishing' when death enters a body, but because we are ignorant about death. He suggests that if, for example, Callicles' view of death as the loss of physical pleasure is correct, destruction can only come from this and not from bodily death. Kanayama can only entertain this view if he dismisses his earlier view that the soul being ἀθάνατος means it cannot accept death, since clearly a body which does not pursue physical pleasures (and is therefore 'dead' on Callicles view) can still have a soul. *Pace* Kanayama, it is very clear that 'death' in the 'second sailing' refers to bodily death. Accordingly, since it seems that Kanayama is thinking of bodily death as 'destruction', once we have dismissed his suggestion that 'death' could have other senses, he offers no real alternative to ἀθάνατος. This much is clear in his final point, 'the question of why whatever is ἀθάνατος is indestructible boils down to the question why what always brings up life is indestructible', since ἀθάνατος here refers precisely to just what 'always brings up life'.

⁸⁸ ἀπολωλέναι (102e2); ἀπόλλυται (103a2); ἀπολείσθαι (103d8); ἀπολλύμενα (104c1).

non-opposite) will ‘withdraw’ rather than ‘perish’ when death (the opposite of its ‘essential’ opposite) comes to a living body.

This fits well with the presentation of individual points, such as:

εἰ μὲν τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ψυχῇ, ὅταν θάνατος ἐπ’ αὐτὴν ἴη, ἀπόλλυσθαι (106b2-3).

Here ἀνώλεθρος evidently adds something different to ἀθάνατος. However, on the traditional reading, which takes θάνατος as the soul’s destruction, both terms will mean that the soul cannot be destroyed by death’s approach, although the Greek suggests that only ἀνώλεθρος should have this meaning. By contrast, if ἀθάνατος actually indicates only that something cannot be compresent with death, then the phrase makes sense, since ἀνώλεθρος adds that, on the approach of death, not only would a thing not remain, but it would ‘withdraw’ and still exist.

This understanding of ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος is also consistent with the points which Socrates makes about the other α-privative ἔνοντα (106d11-c8). Socrates says that θάνατον μὲν γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων οὐ δέξεται [i.e. ἡ ψυχὴ] οὐδ’ ἔσται τεθνηκυῖα... (106b3-4) and gives parallels such as three and odd not becoming even. In response to the imagined objection that the odd would simply be destroyed on the approach of the even (106b7-c2), Socrates then makes it clear that the α-privative does not imply indestructibility. For ἔνοντα like τὰ τρία and τὸ περιττὸν may well be ἀνάρτια, but are not also indestructible: τὸ γὰρ ἀνάρτιον οὐκ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν (106c3-4). Equally, by implication, in the parallel case of soul, even if the point that soul and ἡ ζωὴ are ἀθάνατος has already been demonstrated, their indestructibility (being ἀνώλεθρος) remains to be proven. This

makes sense of Socrates' next main point:

οὐκοῦν καὶ νῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀθανάτου, εἰ μὲν ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖται καὶ ἀνώλεθρον εἶναι, ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῷ ἀθάνατος εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρος· εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου (106c9-d1).

When non-opposites and their 'essential' opposite ἔνοντα are approached by their opposite, unable to tolerate its compresence, they will perish. This is the case for τὸ ἀνάρτιον and, by implication for other sorts of ἔνοντα: περὶ πυρὸς καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὕτως διεμαχόμεθα (106c6-7).⁸⁹ If Socrates is to prove that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος he must show that, unlike these ἔνοντα, it will 'withdraw' and continue to exist, as opposed to perish, when death, the opposite of its 'essential' opposite, comes to the body in which it is present. The soul, then, is ἀθάνατος. Yet this does not show that it is also ἀνώλεθρος, and Socrates will need a separate proof.

A final point about ἀνώλεθρος is its distinctness from the other α-privative terms in the 'second-sailing'. For the latter, this linguistic form indicates that, if the opposite ἔνοντα approach, the thing referred to by the α-privative will withdraw or perish (e.g. τὸ ἄρτιον approaching τὸ ἀνάρτιον). Yet it seems that ἀνώλεθρος itself refers not to one of a pair of opposite ἔνοντα, but to a thing's ability to avoid the 'perish' alternative. Another special feature, as compared with the other α-privatives, is that it is never used in isolation, but is always added to another α-privative. For example, there is its first appearance in the protasis, εἰ τῷ ἀναρτίῳ ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἀνωλέθρῳ εἶναι, as a term potentially predicated of τὸ ἀνάρτιον. No other α-privative terms are predicated of each other and, indeed, it would make little sense if they were. For the fact that, for example, three is ἀνάρτιος indicates its connection with an 'essential' opposite, the odd, whose opposite it cannot tolerate. Three simply is three and comes to a particular along with the odd. It would make little sense to suggest that it was also ἄψυκτος or ἄθερμος. It is only ἀνώλεθρος which could be added and represented as an additional property, added to other α-

⁸⁹ This is consistent with my view of the 'second sailing' from 103c7 as clearly concerned with ἔνοντα. For an ἔνον like the Three or the Odd the α-privative ἀνάρτιος means that they will not be present in a body at the same time as τὸ ἄρτιον, but will 'withdraw' or 'perish'. Yet, ἔνοντα do not have separate existence outside of particulars and so are not ἀνώλεθρος. Hence the earlier point that ἔνοντα have certain ὀνόματα, ὅταν περ ἦ (103e5).

privatives, since it connotes imperishability on the approach of an opposite and not the bringing of another ἕνον.

8.7.2 *The proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος.*

By 106d1 the difference between ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος is clear. Up to now Socrates' points about soul rest on the similarities between it and ἕνοντα. However, to prove that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος he will have to show the difference between them.⁹⁰

Socrates introduces the very final stage by claiming that if τὸ ἀθάνατον is also ἀνώλεθρον, this would be sufficient proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος. However, without this, ἄλλου ἂν δέοι λόγου (106d1). Cebes simply replies that no further λόγος is needed, since τὸ ἀθάνατον, being αἰδιον, could never admit 'destruction' (φθορά). It is here that many commentators accuse Plato of appealing to the conventional understanding of ἀθάνατος and thus assuming it implies ἀνώλεθρος, without supplying further proof. As Bostock says:

Cebes takes it to be just *obvious* [italics his] that whatever is immortal will also be imperishable; no further argument is needed. ...That is obvious if the word "immortal" is taken in its *usual* sense. This is confirmed by the next line, where he adds that the immortal, "being everlasting", will surely not admit destruction. That is, he simply takes it for granted that the immortal is everlasting...I conclude that Plato has not in fact seen that further argument is required, because he too is taking the word "immortal" in its usual sense.⁹¹

However, the fact that Cebes requires no further proof does not mean that Plato's Socrates or Plato himself shares this opinion.⁹² For, although the argument so far does suggest that, if τὸ ἀθάνατον is also ἀνώλεθρον, so too must the soul be ἀνώλεθρος, it also clearly implies that this has not yet been proven.⁹³

⁹⁰ Cf. O'Brien, 1967-8, 105.

⁹¹ Bostock, 1986, 191.

⁹² Cf. e.g. Frede, 1978, 31, who says that 'Socrates not simply accepts Cebes' assent that the deathless is indestructible, but...'.

⁹³ Socrates nowhere implies that, within the 'second sailing' ἀθάνατος is being seen as either synonymous with or implying ἀνώλεθρος. It is true that no clear distinction is made between them by Cebes at 88b5-6 or by Socrates at 95c1, when he recapitulates Cebes' words, and it seems that Cebes may well see them as synonymous, an idea corroborated by the present passage (106d2-4). Yet this does not imply that Socrates or Plato have the same view (cf. Hackforth, 1955, 100 n.3, on ἀθάνατον and ἀνώλεθρον as 'used synonymously' at 88b, although he does not mention that Cebes is in fact speaking). O'Brien, 1967-8, 98, sees Socrates' definition of death as ψυχῆς ὀλεθρος (91d-7) as

So it seems that the proof that τὸ ἀθάνατον is ἀνώλεθρον will be found in Socrates' next comments:

ὁ δέ γε θεὸς οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, παρὰ πάντων ἂν ὁμολογηθεῖη μηδέποτε ἀπόλλυσθαι (106d5-7).

The challenge remains to find a way of showing how the θεός point proves the soul's indestructibility without simply deriving this from its being ἀθάνατος (as ἀθάνατος is used here),⁹⁴ and without assuming that an appeal to religion is necessarily independent of argument.⁹⁵

Let us accept, once and for all: ἀθάνατος, as used by Socrates within this argument, refers simply to that which does not allow the compresence of death; with no implication of indestructibility. If, however, there is something else which, like the soul, is ἀθάνατος (in the sense in which the word is used in the 'second sailing'), and *also* ἀνώλεθρος, this will show that being ἀθάνατος implies being ἀνώλεθρος. It is here that Socrates suggests that ὁ θεός is both ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος.

One might object that simply showing the existence of something both ἀθάνατον and ἀνώλεθρον is not enough to prove a necessary connection between the two, by which all ἀθάνατα would also be ἀνώλεθρα. However α-privative terms, as used in

understood throughout the 'second sailing'. However, at this point Socrates is actually summarising Cebes' concerns and presents this definition as a point to be refuted, rather than his own belief. Here, I am in agreement with Kanayama, 2000, 82, who points out Plato's very explicit distinction between the two terms'.

⁹⁴ In an effort to 'save' the argument there have been various attempts to show that the appeal to ὁ θεός and τὸ τῆς ζωῆς εἶδος makes a substantive contribution to the argument at this point. Frede, 1978, 31-2 for example, sees the significance as their common characteristic of being 'essentially alive'. Clearly, as Frede suggests, Socrates is making a point about their common essential indestructibility. Her view relies upon the idea that it is the soul's essential 'deathlessness' which implies 'indestructibility', because 'destruction for a living being is its loss of life' (she claims that this is true for any living being). However, the resultant identification of ἀθάνατος with ἀνώλεθρος leads to the problems discussed above and still leaves Plato guilty of the 'obvious mistake' from which she is trying to exonerate him: 'assuming that deathlessness=indestructibility=everlastingness'.

⁹⁵ Some older commentaries suggest that this 'appeal to religious faith' represents a departure from 'argument': e.g. Taylor, 1926, 206. Cf. Hackforth, 1955, 164: 'it may be that beneath the surface there is an appeal to religious faith'. He does, however, see this 'appeal' beginning with Cebes' use of αἰδίον.

the ‘second-sailing’ indicate not just that an entity has a certain property, but give its key characteristic, in virtue of which it is either indestructible or perishable, given that only the approach of the negated term could bring about its destruction. So if the gods cannot be destroyed it is because death cannot destroy them and they are indestructible in virtue of being ἀθάνατος. Hence, we can infer that being ἀθάνατος implies ἀνώλεθρος.⁹⁶

The relevance of the ‘affinity argument’

Socrates’ justification here comes from the earlier ‘affinity argument’. There, he posited ‘two types of being, the visible and invisible’ (79a6-7), the latter being unchangeable, indestructible, and divine, and comprising god(s) and the Forms (see e.g. 80b1-3). Clearly, it is the latter type which could be described as ἀνώλεθρος. One might suppose that this, in itself, stands as an argument that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος, since it is this type to which the soul is most similar. Moreover, Socrates also describes ‘invisible’ being as ἀθάνατος (e.g. 79d2 and 80b1).⁹⁷ However, there are various reasons why it is only the indestructibility of τὸ θεῖον in the ‘affinity argument’ which directly supports the soul’s indestructibility.

Why then, can Socrates not simply infer the soul’s indestructibility from the indestructibility of the Forms in this passage? It may well be the case that, within the ‘affinity argument’, which distinguishes *two* types of being and does not mention ἔνοντα, the soul is ‘most like’ the Forms (80a10-b3). In the ‘second-sailing’, however, up until the ἀνώλεθρος point, it is ἔνοντα to which the soul seems most similar, with no apparent grounds for assuming that the soul does not, just like ἔνοντα, admit destruction. In other words, although the soul might resemble the Forms in such respects as purity, it could be more like ἔνοντα in an incapacity for independent existence.

⁹⁶ To put it another way, one might add that, if τὸ ἀθάνατόν is ἀνώλεθρον, this can only be in virtue of being ἀθάνατον, because it would not make sense to predicate any other ἀ-privative terms of it, in virtue of which it could be either destructible or indestructible (we would not say that soul was e.g. ἀνάρπιος).

⁹⁷ E.g. 79d2 and 80b1, where he describes the ‘invisible’ as τῷ μὲν θεῷ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ.

Furthermore, ἀθάνατος is used in two different senses in the ‘affinity’ and ‘final’ arguments, and we cannot infer from the description of the indestructible ‘invisible being’ as ἀθάνατος in the former that ἀθάνατος in the latter also implies indestructibility. In the ‘affinity’ argument ἀθάνατος appears to be connected with permanence and indestructibility: ἀεὶ ὄν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχον (79d2).⁹⁸ In the ‘second sailing’ it implies nothing about permanent existence.⁹⁹

Since Socrates presents not only Forms but also τὸ θεῖον as unchangeable and permanent in the ‘affinity’ argument, it seems safe to assume the indestructibility of ὁ θεῖος. There are reasons why the indestructibility of ὁ θεῖος in the ‘affinity argument’ can be seen as relevant to the soul in a way that the Forms are not.¹⁰⁰ Most importantly, it can be assumed that, for Plato, ὁ θεῖος, like the soul, is also ἀθάνατος in the ‘second sailing’ sense, given that a defining feature of the gods, often referred to as οἱ ἀθάνατοι,¹⁰¹ is that they do not accept death, in opposition to mortals.¹⁰²

So god and soul both seem essentially ἀθάνατος, insofar as neither can tolerate the compresence of death. In the case of God τὸ ἀθάνατον, as the word is used in the ‘second sailing’, is also ἀνώλεθρον. From this it can be inferred that the same can be said of the soul. Thus, the affinity argument shows that things like Forms and the gods do not perish. The ‘second sailing’ shows why death must constitute the separation of the soul from the body; connects the ‘essential’ deathlessness of souls with that of the gods; and therefore, through the implicit assumption of the ‘affinity’ argument’s claim that the gods are indestructible, can also posit that ‘essential’

⁹⁸ Cf. Gallop, 1982, 208.

⁹⁹ It would make no sense to call Forms ἀθάνατος in this way. For this would signify that they cannot be present along with death. Yet Forms are entirely independent of all other entities.

¹⁰⁰ O’Brien, 1967-8, claims that the ‘indestructibility of souls in the last argument differs from the indestructibility of forms as it were genetically’ and is unrelated to the ‘rich complex of ideas’ associated with forms in the ‘affinity argument’. Although I share his view that the indestructibility of Forms in the ‘affinity’ argument does not prove the soul’s indestructibility, *contra* O’Brien I propose that the ‘affinity argument’ model of indestructibility is, by means of ὁ θεῖος, associated with soul in the ‘final’ argument.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Rowe, 1993a, 263: ‘standardly, οἱ θεοί = οἱ ἀθάνατοι’.

¹⁰² See e.g. the ‘affinity’ argument, where τὸ θεῖον is opposed to τὸ θνητόν (80a3 and 8-9) and τὸ ἀνθρώπινον (80b1-3).

deathlessness implies indestructibility. Taken together, then, they offer the proof that the soul is both ἀθάνατος and ἀνώλεθρος.¹⁰³

Finally, what of the relationship of the soul to the Forms? In some respects the soul seems to have similarities with the ἔνοντα, insofar as it comes to be present in particulars, along with life, whose ὄνομα it shares and whose opposite, death, it will not accept. However, the soul is not destroyed by being uninstantiated in the body, a feature which distances it from the ἔνοντα and brings it closer to the Forms themselves. O'Brien sees it as a 'dilemma' that the 'conclusion' (i.e. the proof that the soul is ἀνώλεθρος) rests on establishing the soul's difference from the ἔνοντα to which it has been linked in the previous arguments.¹⁰⁴ However, the two sides to the soul which emerge from the different stages of the argument are not inconsistent and simply reflect its mixed nature. Given the characteristics of souls, shown by the different stages within this argument, this mixed nature should hardly be surprising.¹⁰⁵

8.8 What is λόγος?

In the 'misology' passage (89c11-91a6) Socrates suggests that λόγοι can be true.¹⁰⁶ At the beginning of the 'second sailing', he then says that he will use λόγοι to seek the truth about reality, a method no more indirect than using ἔργα (99e4-100a3). One of my aims in this chapter has been to consider what is meant by searching ἐν λόγοις, and so to establish the meaning of λόγοι, explaining how they can convey the truth and why they are so central to the 'second-sailing'.

Our consideration of how language and style represent the beliefs and arguments expressed in the 'second sailing' has given some indication of what constitutes λόγος

¹⁰³ Of course, one might argue that the question is now why we should accept the affinity argument as proof of the god's indestructibility. However, even if we still have an explanatory circle, now that it has been broadened to incorporate the principles of the 'affinity' argument, we might at least hope that there is sufficient material for it to be large rather than vicious.

¹⁰⁴ O'Brien, 1967-8, 106.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Bostock, 1986, 188-9: 'No doubt it [i.e. the soul] is intended to be something invisible and incorporeal like a form, but also something that is a particular *individual* [italics mine] like a lump of snow'.

¹⁰⁶ See 90b8; c9; d9ff.

and how different aspects of this λόγος can be seen to reflect Socrates' understanding of reality. In effect, we already have some ideas as to why Socrates might see inquiring ἐν λόγοις as presenting an account of reality and (therefore) as methodologically sound. By bringing together the separate points, we can now reach a more general picture of what is involved in the use of λόγοι.

8.8.1 *λόγος and consistency*

One of the standard senses attributed to λόγος by Socrates is, of course words: the very words in which something is expressed; and the importance of verbal features in the 'second sailing' is highlighted, for example, by the way that key relationships are indicated with 'naming' terminology, ὄνομα or ἐπωνυμία, and the way that the α-privative noun form takes on a special sense.

Nevertheless, it is also clear that the mirroring of reality by the λόγος derives from more than a particular sense of individual words and phrases. From the very outset of the 'second-sailing' Socrates shows the necessity for caution about language, pointing out that it can be deceptive: ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθές ἔχειν; (102b8-c10).

That individual words, phrases, or structures themselves do not refer in a fixed way to reality is also suggested in other ways, for instance through the many verbal ambiguities within the 'second sailing'.¹⁰⁷ I have already discussed the flexibility in meaning of the αὐτὸ τό formulation, and to this one could add the case of ἀθάνατος, used very differently here from its earlier more 'conventional' sense in the 'affinity argument'. Other important terms also have this element of multivocality.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ In seeing the language as functioning in this way, my argument runs contrary to Vlastos, 1973, 109, who laments the lack of 'lucidity' which Plato could have achieved, 'had he availed himself, as Aristotle was to do, of the expository device of philosophical lexicography'!

¹⁰⁸ E.g. Socrates criticises the ἀντιλογικοί for talking about the ἀρχή and τὰ ἐξ ἐκείνης ὠρμημένων (101e2-3), despite having described his own enterprise in the 'second sailing' with cognates of these very terms: ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὠρμησα (100a3) and καὶ εἰμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ πολυθρύλητα καὶ ἀρχομαι ἀπ' ἐκείνων (100b4-5). Thus, for Socrates, rather than actual beginnings, the terms seem to denote first principles and deduction within intellectual inquiry.

Conversely, Socrates' use of 'synonymy' also suggests that individual words, phrases, or formulations, do not constitute λόγος. This is particularly clear in the discussion of the 'safe hypothesis' where, although varied formulations express a single principle, Socrates implies that this is to be seen not only as a single υπόθεσις, but also as εἷς λόγος (101e4).

So it seems that λόγοι are something to do with overall verbal structure and the way that particular features fit into the whole, rather than simply words considered individually. Throughout the 'second sailing' it is the passage's stylistic structure which holds the key to its understanding, but only when taken as a coherent whole.

The idea that reasoning in λόγοις depends on how elements fit together suggests that true λόγοι will be consistent, a view supported by several instances where methodological points about argument are explicitly made in terms of λόγοι. For example, one reason why (Socrates claims) Simmias' λόγος that soul is 'harmony' must be rejected is that it does not 'harmonise' with the 'recollection argument', already accepted as true (91e5-92a5):

οὗτος οὖν σοι ὁ λόγος ἐκείνῳ πῶς συνάσεται;
οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὁ Σιμμίας.
καὶ μήν, ἦ δ' ὅς, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λόγῳ συνωδῶ
εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ ἁρμονίας (92c3-6)

Similarly, at the beginning of the 'second sailing' Socrates will take as true those things which are consistent (συμφωνεῖν) with the strongest λόγος (100a4-5), while in the 'hypothesis' passage he advocates examining whether the consequences which are posited of a hypothesis are consistent with each other, εἴ σοι ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ ἢ διαφωνεῖ (101d5-6), and seems to suggest that, if they are, there will be a single λόγος.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Kanayama, 2000, 64, on συμφωνεῖν as indicating consistency. But e.g. Gentzler, 1991, 266, objects to the 'consistency' reading here, insofar as consistency does not *per se* imply truth. However, as I shall argue below, there are reasons why Socrates might take the consistency of λόγοι here as providing a reason for seeing them as true.

If true λόγοι are consistent and false inconsistent, this cannot vary by degree, since even the smallest degree of inconsistency means that, as a whole, there is no consistency. This could then explain why, in the 'misology' passage, Socrates points out that, whereas very few men are either extremely good or bad, this is not the case for λόγοι (90b4-5). This implies that the majority of (or even all) λόγοι are at one or other of these extremes,¹¹⁰ a view which fits in with the 'consistency' reading of λόγος.

Furthermore, Socrates presents the argument as conclusive (106e8-107a1), endorsing Cebes' suggestion that it is sufficient and correct, οὐκ οὐν ἔγωγε...ἔχω παρὰ ταῦτα ἄλλο τι λέγειν οὐδέ πη ἀπιστεῖν τοῖς λόγοις (107a2-3). He responds to Simmias' concerns by telling him that, if he follows through the first hypotheses sufficiently, he will follow the λόγος as far as humanly possible and will be fully satisfied (107b4-9).¹¹¹ This is the only place in the *Phaedo* where Socrates suggests that an argument is fully satisfactory.¹¹² Yet, he leaves us to draw our understanding of how it achieves this status from the passage itself.

The consistency required of correct λόγοι is also reflected in the general style of the 'second sailing', insofar as many individual features are used in so novel or changeable a way that understanding depends upon piecing together a consistent interpretation of all the elements. Yet the coherence and consistency of the 'second sailing' extends beyond its immediate context. At the end of Chapter 6, I suggested that a comparison of Socrates' 'apology' and the 'argument from opposites' in their wider context indicates that arguments should establish and take account of, not only the underlying structure and principles of processes, but also the qualities of the entities which such processes involve. It seems that here, in the 'second sailing', these two elements are finally brought together into one coherent whole. For in a style which can be broadly termed 'verbal minimalism' it lays out the structure of causation, but its interpretation also depends upon understanding the qualities of the

¹¹⁰ This is corroborated by the way that λόγοι are depicted as either true or false (90b8). Socrates is doing more than 'hinting' that there are many bad λόγοι, as Hackforth, 1955, 107, suggests.

¹¹¹ Cf. Frede, 1978, 27.

¹¹² Cf. e.g. Sedley, 1995, 17, on the cogency of the final argument.

entities involved, if we are to demarcate their roles within this process and their interrelationships.

As is suggested by Socrates' initial intention to look for τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν with λόγοι (99e6) and by his final endorsement of the 'second sailing' as conclusive and satisfactory (106e8-107b9), it seems that true λόγοι do reflect Socrates' beliefs about reality. They do this through the verbal structure of argument and the consistency of a correct λόγος.

Although this understanding of λόγος is to a certain extent based upon its conventional meaning combined with certain explicit comments concerning λόγος, it is chiefly constructed by the language and style of the 'second sailing', and the way that the cohesion of its overall structure, both internally and in its relation to other parts of the dialogue, holds the key to its interpretation. The 'second sailing' clearly shows the significance of style for the interpretation of its arguments, and demonstrates the importance of reading the dialogue holistically.

8.9 Teleology

In the 'intellectual autobiography' Socrates criticises Anaxagoras because his νοῦς-based theory of causation is not teleological. His criticism then extends to other physicists, insofar as the causes they posit bear no relation to 'the good' (99c1-7). Yet, as I have discussed in Chapter 7, the issue of teleology seems to disappear after this episode in a way which commentators have found extremely puzzling. There are, however, ways in which one might see the issue of teleology as present in the 'second sailing', the first stemming from points made in the 'apology', the second from the ideas about order, rationality, and normativity, suggested by the 'Anaxagoras episode'.

From the 'apology' it appears that normativity is attributed to the qualities: purity; uniqueness; comprehensiveness; distinctness; simplicity; and singularity.¹¹³ These emerge as valuable both *per se* and epistemologically, and so may provide a reason

¹¹³ See Ch.6 p.159, above.

for seeing ‘the good’ as implicitly involved in the ‘second sailing’. After all, it is the uniqueness of the Forms which provides the basis for the ‘second sailing’ as a whole, and the simplicity of the Form/particular relationship which is reflected in the style of the formulations of the ‘safe hypothesis’. This simplicity is most visible in the phrase Socrates uses to express that which he asserts with certainty, τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ καλά (100d7-8), where the principle is reduced to its most basic and simple linguistic formulation. No other terms intrude into the description of the direct and unique relationship between matching Form, particulars and resultant property, except for πάντα, which stresses that the principle is true for *all* particulars. Even when the argument moves on to the ‘subtler answer’, it still relies on the simplicity, distinctness, and unchangeability of Forms, reflected in the incapacity of their derivative ἔνοντα to be compresent with their opposites.

In the criticism of Anaxagoras, Socrates gives an explanation of what a νοῦς-based account of cosmological causation should look like. The teleology implied by κοσμέω is reflected in the characteristics of a νοῦς-based system, based on universal coherence, covering all aspects of existence, activity, or passivity (97c6-d1). Individual elements have significance in terms of their place within the system as a whole and the way they help to expand upon connections between the other elements, while there are also certain self-evident foundational premises. Socrates states that such a causal account would, for him, be a sufficient explanation of generation and destruction (98a1-2) and, in many ways, these features correspond to the concept of rationality developed within the overall argumentation of the *Phaedo*, especially in the ‘second sailing’. For the ‘second sailing’ presents an entirely coherent system, which covers all ontological types and whose components make sense in the way in which they fit together. The foundational premise on which the argument is based, and which is simply accepted, is the existence of the Forms. Moreover, it is also striking that the ‘second sailing’ is the only argument in the *Phaedo* which Socrates explicitly describes as adequate (106b), even though he has earlier presented the imagined νοῦς-based teleological account as satisfactory.

Yet, even if the consistency of the ‘second sailing’ resembles the teleological νοῦς-based theory of causation anticipated in the ‘Anaxagoras episode, the normativity of the latter account explicitly relies not only upon the consistency of the whole, but

also on the individual and common good of its elements. These factors are ostensibly missing from the ‘second sailing’ and one might well argue that consistency does not in itself imply normativity. However, one of Socrates’ earlier comments, at the close of the ‘Anaxagoras episode’ (99c3-5), suggests that a causal account can only be consistent, if it is teleological. He criticises those who ἡγοῦνται τούτου ἄτλαντα ἂν ποτε ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἀθανατώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἅπαντα συνέχοντα ἐξευρεῖν, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται. The clear implication is that the good is necessary for universal coherence.¹¹⁴ Therefore, given that the ‘second sailing’ provides a satisfactory and consistent account of causation, one might infer that there must be an underlying element of teleology in it, and that it is the consistency of the λόγος which leads not only to its epistemological legitimacy, but also to its normativity. This would then provide a reason for seeing the theory of causation outlined in the ‘second sailing’ as teleological, on the basis of its claim to consistency and simplicity, even without explicit reference to value.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Cf. Ch.7 p209., above.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Kanayama, 2000, 99, for an alternative account of why the ‘second sailing’ might be teleological.

Conclusion

As modern readers of Plato, it is difficult for us to appreciate fully the stylistic diversity, complexity, and innovation within the *Phaedo*. To do so, we need to move beyond translation, going back to the Greek and paying attention to its structure, sound, and variety; trying to understand, as far as possible, the dialogue's literary context, so as to recognise the extent of both its indebtedness and originality. My primary aims in this thesis have been, quite simply, to show that this is a worthwhile and even necessary part of interpreting the *Phaedo*, by demonstrating the significance of style for its arguments.

Although I have only discussed certain parts of the *Phaedo*, it seems sufficiently clear that taking style into account can help towards our understanding of individual sections, both in themselves and their relationships with each other, and can point us towards a more holistic reading of the dialogue. Stylistic analysis provides a means of understanding disparate sections on the same terms and, accordingly, helps to reveal their connections. Yet it can only do so if the methodology and terms of reference employed are adequate for the task.

I have aimed to produce a methodology that is sufficiently sophisticated and comprehensive to deal with all modes of discourse within the *Phaedo*, including several features which play no substantial part in conventional stylistic analysis, such as the many structural phenomena that are so important within my interpretation. Often it is these which have yielded the most interesting results. Similarly, in my discussions of generic affiliations, I have treated all genres as relevant. In many cases it is Plato's use of genres usually ignored or treated separately from wider stylistic investigations, such as early philosophical writing, which has once again produced some of the most significant conclusions.

In broader terms, I have tried to develop a methodology and approach which could be of use in examining wider questions concerning the role of style in philosophical discourse. Inevitably, my thesis has simply scratched at the surface. Nevertheless, I hope that it has at least paved the way for further investigation of the *Phaedo* itself;

Platonic works in general; and other philosophers, especially 'hybrid' writers like Lucretius and Nietzsche, but perhaps even those whose style is more 'conventional'. Thus, it might facilitate a more general systematisation of how style functions within philosophical argument.

As readers of Plato, we must surely be struck by his stylistic mastery, even if we cannot fully appreciate it. What I have tried to do is to offer an approach which recognises the philosophical significance of style and so begins to move towards establishing what might be called a 'poetics' of argument.

Appendix I

Parallel structures in the six passages

Key

P - pair

L - list

R (j) - juxtaposition repetition

R (s) - successive clause or unit repetition

R (r) - ring composition

R (k) - key-word repetition

Pl - pleonasm

SE - sound effect used as a parallel structure

Passage I

αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ + ἢ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν
69a6/I.1 + 69a9/I.4: P; R (s); SE

ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς 69a7/I.2: P; R (j); SE

λύπας πρὸς λύπας 69a7/I.2: P; R (j); SE

φόβον πρὸς φόβον 69a8/I.3: P; R (j); SE

μείζω πρὸς ἐλάττω 69a8/I.3: P

καὶ τούτου [μὲν πάντα] καὶ μετὰ τούτου (69b1/I.6): P; R (j); SE

ᾠνούμενά τε καὶ πιρπρασκόμενα 69b1/I.6: P; SE

μετὰ φρονήσεως + χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως 69b3/I.8 + 69b6/I.11: P; Rep (s)

καὶ προσγιγνομένων καὶ ἀπογιγνομένων 69b4/I.9: P; SE

χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων 69b6/I.11: P

οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχη 69b8/I.13: P; Pl

τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς τῷ ὄντι 69b8/I.13: P; Pl

ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος 69c5/I.18: P; Pl; SE

κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος 69c6/I.19: P; Pl; SE

κατὰ γε τὸ δυνατόν οὐδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ
προυθυμήθην 69d3/I.24: P; Pl

ὀρθῶς προυθυμήθην καί τι ἠνύσαμεν 69d5/I.25: P; P1
Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης 69d7/I.28: P
οὐ χαλεπῶς φέρω οὐδ' ἀγανακτῶ 69e1/I.30: P; P1
ἐκεῖ οὐδέν ἦπτον ἢ ἐνθάδε 69e2/I.31: P
δεσπόταις τε ἀγαθοῖς ἐντεύξεσθαι καὶ ἐταίροις 69e2/I.31: P
ὑμῖν πιθανώτερός εἰμι ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ ἢ τοῖς Ἀθηναίων δικασταῖς
69e3/I.32: P

ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον 69a7/I.2:
L; SE

καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ συλλήβδην ἀληθὲς ἀρετὴ
69b2/I.7: L; SE

καὶ ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων 69b5/I.10: L; SE
ἀνδραποδώδης τε καὶ οὐδέν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' ἀληθὲς ἔχῃ 69b8/I.13: L; P1
καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία 69c1/I.14: L; SE

ὀρθή 69a6/I.1; a10/5; d3/24; d5/27: R (k)

ἀρετὴν 69a7/I.2; b3/8; b6/12: R (k)

ἀλλαγή 69a7/I.2; a8/3; a10/5; b6/11: R (s)

φρόνησις 69a10/I.5; b3/8; c2/15: R (s)

τῷ ὄντι 69b2/I.7; 7/12; c1/14; c4/17: R (s + k)

καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη 69b2/I.7; c1/14: R (s)

ἀληθὲς 69b8/I.13; b8/13; b3/8: R (j + s)

κάθαρσις 69c1/I.14; c3/16; c6/19: R (s)

τελετάς 69c3/I.16; c5/18; c7/20; c8/21: R (s)

προυθυμήθην 69d4/25; d5/26: R (s)

Passage II.

ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ συνουσία 81c5/II.2: P; P1

διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην 81c5/II.2: P

βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται 81c10/II.7: P; P1

τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ Ἀιδου 81c11/II.8: P; SE

τὰ μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους 81c11/II.8: P

αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι 81d3/II.9: P
τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐτὰς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν φαύλων 81d6/II.14: P; SE
δημοτικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν 82a12/II.36: P; SE
σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην 82b1/II.37: P; SE
ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης 82b2/II.38: P
φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ 82b3/II.39: P
πολιτικὸν καὶ ἡμέρον 82b6/II.42: P
οἰκοφθορίαν τε καὶ πενίαν 82c5/II.51: P; Pl; SE
ἀτιμίαν τε καὶ ἀδοξίαν 82c6/II.52: P; Pl; SE
φίλαρχοί τε καὶ φιλότιμοι 82c7/II.53: P; SE

ἐμβριθέες...καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν 81c8/II.5: L
γαστριμαργίας τε καὶ ὕβρεις καὶ φιλοποσίας 81e6/II.23: L
ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς 82a4/II.28: L; SE
τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἰκτίνων γένη 82a5/II.29: L; SE
ἧ που μελιττῶν ἧ σφηκῶν ἧ μυρμήκων 82b6/II.42: L; SE
ἀπέχονται τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀπασῶν καὶ καρτεροῦσι καὶ οὐ
παραδιδόασιν αὐταῖς ἑαυτοῦς 82c3/II.49: L; Pl

ὁρατόν 81c9/II.6; c10/7; 81d4/12; d4/12: R (j + s + r)
εἰκός 81d5/II.13; d6/14; 81e3/20; 82a1/25; b5/41; b9/45: R (s + r + k)
πλανᾶσθαι 81d8/II.16; d9/17: R (s)
ἐνδεθῶσιν 81e2/II.19; e2/19: R (s)
μελέτην 81c6/II.3; e3/20; e7/24; 82a9/33; b2/38 R (k)
φιλ· compounds: 82b10/II.46; c1/47; c3/49; c6/52; c7/53; c8/54: R (s)
ἀπιόντι 82c1/II.47; c3/49; c8/54: R (s + r)

Passage III.

ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἷτιος 97c2/III.3: P
πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτη ὅπη ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχη 97c5/III.6:
P; Pl
πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν 97d1/III.10: P; SE
περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων 97d2/III.11: P

τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον 97d3/III.12: P; P1; SE
 πλατεῖά ἐστιν ἢ στρογγύλη 97e1/III.18: P
 τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ τὴν ἀνάγκην 97e2/III.19: P/ P1
 καὶ σελήνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄστρον 98a3/III.24: P
 καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἅ πάσχει 98a6/III.27: P; R (j); SE
 τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κοινῇ πᾶσι τὸ ἐκάστω βέλτιστον 98b1/III.31: P
 τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον 98b5/III.35: P

γίνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἐστι 97c7/III.8: L
 ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν 97c8/III.9: L
 τάχους τε πέρι πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τροπῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων
 98a4/III.25: L

νοῦς 97c1/III.2; c3/4; c5/6; 97d7/16; 98a7/28: R (s + k)
 διακοσμῶν 97c2/III.3; 97c5/6; c5/6; 98a8/29: R (j + s)
 πάντων 98c2/III.3; c4/5; c5/6; 98b1/31; b2/32: R (s + k)
 αἷτιος 97c2/III.3; c2/4; 97c4/5; c6/7; d7/16; e2/19; 98a2/23; a8/29; b1/31: R (s + k)
 βέλτιστα, ἀγαθός, ἄμεινον 97c6/III.7; c8/9; d3/12; d4/13; e2/19; e3/20; e4/21;
 98a6/27; a9/30; b2/32; b3/33; b5/35: R (s + k)
 ἐπεκδιηγῆσθαι 97e1/III.18; e4/21: R (s)
 παρεσκευάσμεν 98a1/III.22; a3/24: R (s)
 Ἀναξαγόρου ἀναγιγνώσκοντος 97b8/III.1: SE

Passage IV.

τι ζωῇ ἐναντίον ἢ οὐδέν 105d6/IV.9: P
 Τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ ὃ ἂν μουσικὸν μὴ δέχεται 105d16/IV.19:
 P; SE
 ἄμουσον, ἔφη, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον 105e1/IV.21: P; SE
 σῶς καὶ ἄτηκτος 106a5/IV.36: P; P1
 οὐποτ' ἂν ἀπесβέννυτο οὐδ' ἀπώλλυτο 106a9/IV.40: P; P1; SE
 Ψυχὴ 105c10/IV.3; d3/6; d10/13; e4/24; e6/26: R (s + k)
 θάνατος 105e9/IV.13; e2/22; e3/23; e4/24; e6/26; e7/27: R (s + k)

δέξεται 105d11/IV.14; d13/16; d16/19; d17/20; e2/22; e4/24; 106a6/37: R (s + k)

άνωλέθρω 106a1/IV.32; a1/32; a3/34; a8/39: R (s + k)

άπελθόν ὥχετο 106a10/IV.41: P1

ά-privatives in 105d15/18; e1/21; e1/21; e6/26; e7/27; e11/31; 106a3/34; a5/36;
a8/39: R (j + s + k)

Passage V

ποικίλη, χρώμασιν διειλημμένη 110b7/V.3: P

λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων 110c2/V.6: P; P1; SE

τὴν δὲ ὄση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέραν 110c4/V.8: P

πλειόνων καὶ καλλιόνων 110c6/V.10: P; SE

ὔδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος 110c8/V.12: P

οὐ τοιοῦτον εἶναι καὶ ἔτι τούτων καλλίω 110e1/V.21: P

κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι 110e3/V.23: P; P1; SE

σηπεδόνος καὶ ἄλμης 110e4/V.24: P

αἴσχη τε καὶ νόσους 110e6/V.26: P

τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ ἡ θάλαττα 111a8/V.35: P

ἡμιν ἀήρ, ἐκείνοις τὸν αἰθέρα 111b1/V.36: P

ἀήρ τε ὕδατος ἀφέστηκεν 111b5/V.40: P

καὶ αἰθήρ ἀέρος 111b6/V.41: P

ἄλση τε καὶ ἱερά 111b7/V.42: P

τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλουργῇ εἶναι καὶ θαυμαστὴν τὸ κάλλος, τὴν δὲ χρυσοειδῇ,

τὴν δὲ ὄση λευκὴ γύψου ἢ χιόνος λευκοτέρα 110c3/V.7: L

δένδρα τε καὶ ἄνθη καὶ τοὺς καρπούς 110d4/V.16: L

τὴν τε λειότητα καὶ τὴν διαφάειαν καὶ τὰ χρώματα καλλίω 110d6/V.18: L

σάρδια τε καὶ ἰάσπιδας καὶ σμαράγδους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 110d8/V.20:

L

καθαροὶ καὶ οὐ κατεδηδεσμένοι οὐδὲ διεφθαρμένοι 110e3/V.23: L; P1

καὶ λίθοις καὶ γῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς 110e5/V.25: L

τούτοις τε ἅπασι καὶ ἔτι χρυσῷ τε καὶ ἀργύρῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτοῖς
τοιούτοις 110e7/V.27: L

πολλὰ πλήθει καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πανταχοῦ τῆς γῆς 111a2/V.29: L

καὶ ὄψει καὶ ἀκοῇ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις 111b4/V.39: L

καὶ φήμας τε καὶ μαντείας καὶ αἰσθήσεις τῶν θεῶν καὶ τοιαύτας
συνουσίας 111b8/V.43: L

τόν γε ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ ἄστρα 111c1/V.45: L

ποικίλη 110b7/V.3 and d1/13; d2/14: R (s + k)

φυόμενα 110d3/V.15; d4/V.16: R (j); SE

ἀφεστάναι 111b5/V.40; b5/40; b6/41: R (s)

Passage VI.

εὐχερώς καὶ εὐκόλως 117c4/VI.2: P; Pl; SE

πίνοντά τε καὶ πεπωκότα 117c7/VI.5: R (j); SE; P

κλάων καὶ ἀγανακτῶν 117d5/VI.12: P

ἡσυχίαν τε ἄγετε καὶ καρτεριεῖτε 117e2/VI.17: P; Pl

ἡσχύνθημέν τε καὶ ἐπέσχομεν τοῦ δακρύειν 117e3/VI.18: P

τοὺς πόδας καὶ τὰ σκέλη 117e7/VI.22: P

ψύχοιτό τε καὶ πήγνυτο 118a2/VI.25: P; Pl

ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσητε 118a8/VI.31: P

τὸ στόμα καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς 118a14/VI.37: P

φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου 118a17/VI.40: P; SE

ἀρίστου καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτου καὶ δικαιοτάτου 118a17/VI.40: L

δακρύειν 117c6/VI.4; c8/6; d3/10; e4/19: R (s + k)

κλάων 117d5/VI.12; d6/13; c9/7: R (s + k)

ἐκκαλυψάμενος 118a6/VI.29; a6/29: R (j); SE

Appendix II

The Use of Pairs and Lists

My stylistic analysis has shown that Plato's incorporation of differing types and quantities of pairs and lists is an important feature of his style, which varies along with his different modes of writing. Thus, although pairs and lists are so essential and ubiquitous a feature of Greek literature that any clear-cut classification of usage or kinds would be impossible, a framework outlining at least some major types is indispensable to a discussion of Platonic style.

There has been limited discussion concerning specific types of pairs and lists in Greek literature,¹ with Dover's points about 'multiples' perhaps the most thorough examination.² However, even Dover has very broad categories of exclusion and only analyses usage in eleven prose passages,³ so that his findings, while interesting, are extremely selective. I have attempted to analyse pairs and lists so as to encapsulate the main classifications of different types as well as some very general tendencies. Since pairs and lists are such a common feature in all Greek genres, I will only comment on those genre/s or author/s whose usage of pairs and lists stands out from normal usage, either because of quantity or type.

1) Pairs

In very broad terms, pairs fall into three main groups: complementary; pleonastic; and oppositional. They are often reinforced by aural parallelism, and an important distinction can also be drawn between unusual and common or clichéd pairs.

While all types of pairs are well represented in verse, quantity is rarely exceptional, except perhaps for the large use of amplificatory pairs in certain plays of Sophocles

¹ E.g. Föhling, 1969, 271ff., deals with the 'einfacher Kontrast', a single pair of oppositional words; Smith, 1983, assesses the distribution and function of catalogue structure within the early Hippocratic treatises, and sees lists as indicative of an 'archaic mentality' (284), although his investigation is not purely stylistic.

² See Dover, 1997, 144ff.

³ On the differences between Dover's 'multiples' and my pairs and lists, and on the limitations of Dover's analysis, see Ch.3, p.49, above.

and Aeschylus.⁴ In epic, one can note the emergence of clichéd pairs, such as ‘men/gods’, ‘slave/free’, ‘word/deed’, which then occur widely throughout later literature.⁵ Apart from this there are the gnomic antitheses of Hesiod, comprising short structures with at least two pairs of corresponding terms, seen by Föhling as a Hesiodic innovation.⁶ This construction is also very prominent in Theognis, Heraclitus, and Democritus,⁷ and is often seen as a root of rhetorical antithesis.⁸

The most extensive use of pairs is found in rhetorical and philosophical/technical prose.⁹ Oratory tends to feature the widest variety, with much pleonasm and aural parallelism, particularly homoeoteleuton; the clearest examples, no doubt, belonging to the exaggerated style of Gorgias.¹⁰ In general, pairs with sound effects and/or pleonasm tend to occur in parts of speeches containing the highest concentration of ‘rhetorical’ features, notably introductions and conclusions, often in conjunction with antitheses.¹¹ So, for example, Antiphon incorporates a wide variety of pairs,¹² including quite elaborate pleonasms, especially in the highly ‘rhetorical’ *Tetralogies*.¹³ Usher talks about Isocrates’ predisposition towards ‘amplification involving words only’,¹⁴ like καλῶς καὶ τεχνικῶς,¹⁵ and even the so-called plain style of Lysias involves many pairs.¹⁶

⁴ See Earp, 1944, 102ff, on the large numbers of ‘doublets’ in Sophocles’ early plays; and 103, on the ‘excess of doublets’ in Aeschylus (cf. Earp, 1948, 84); although even in these works, the numbers of such pairs are not especially high when compared with the works of Plato.

⁵ See Lloyd, 1966, 91, for more pairs and references in Homer. Cf. e.g. Hes.*Th.*296, 204, 302; *Op.*303. Föhling, 1969, 282-3, gives a list of such pairs, with various examples. Cf. Dover, 1997, 145.

⁶ See, Föhling, 1969, 94.

⁷ E.g. Heraclit.B.61, θάλασσα ὕδωρ καθαρῶτατον καὶ μιαρῶτατον, ἰχθύσιν μὲν πότιμον καὶ σωτήριον, ἀνθρώποις δὲ ἄποτον καὶ ὀλέθριον; cf. e.g. B67; 111; Democrit.B40, οὔτε σώμασιν οὔτω χρήμασιν εὐδαιμονοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ’ ὀρθοσύνη καὶ πολφροσύνη; 44, 58, 65, and 68.

⁸ See e.g. Nordern, 1915, 19ff. on Heraclitus and Democritus; but cf. Kennedy, 1963, 33-4, who says that, although antithesis can be traced to this group of authors, its development is largely attributable to the Greeks’ ‘fondness’ for ‘contrasting figures’.

⁹ Although the figures for ‘multiples’ with two items in Dover, 1997, 146, only represent small samples of texts, it is interesting to note the exceptionally high numbers found in the samples from Gorgias, Demosthenes, and one of the Isocratean texts.

¹⁰ For a list of pairs with pleonasm and parisosis in Gorg. B11, see Jouanna, 1988, 21. Cf. Kennedy, 1963, on Gorgias and on the ancient writers on Gorgias

¹¹ E.g. Lys.7.1: ...οἱ κίνδυνοι κοινοὶ γίνονται καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν ἀδικοῦσι καὶ τοῖς πολλὰ ἡμαρτηκόσιν.

¹² E.g. Antiphon1.1 and 1.27ff.

¹³ E.g. 4.6: ὁ μὲν ὑβρίζων καὶ παροινῶν πάντ’ ἔδρα καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμύνατο.

¹⁴ Usher, 1973, 43, who does, however, point out that numbers of instances are not vast (48). Cf. Adams, 1905, 355, on Demosthenes’ fondness for pleonasm.

Early philosophical texts also include many pairs. As well as the more varied instances in Heraclitus and Democritus, for example, the plainer prose of writers like Melissus often contains clichéd oppositional and sometimes complementary pairs of physical properties or cosmological terms.¹⁷ There are many lists, such as εἰ γὰρ ἔστι γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ πῦρ καὶ σίδηρος καὶ χρυσός, καὶ τὸ ζῶον τὸ δὲ τεθνηκός, καὶ μέλαν καὶ λευκόν...¹⁸, a tendency which continues within the later philosophical treatises of writers such as Aristotle.¹⁹ In the more 'poetic' prose of Heraclitus and Democritus, pairs are still very common, but tend to be less clichéd.

Historiography is the one prose genre in which the occurrence of pairs is very limited, especially so in the narrative sections, but also elsewhere.²⁰

Finally, the Hippocratic treatises have especially large numbers of pairs, including lists of opposing items, similar to those found in the philosophers,²¹ but also more varied types, often with pleonasm and/or sound effects. Most pronounced in *On Breaths*,²² but found as well in texts like *On Art* and *Ancient Medicine*,²³ this is one of the features which has led to these works being associated with sophistic or epideictic writing.²⁴ The speech of the doctor Eryximachus, in Plato's *Symposium*, is also full of pairs, both clichéd sequences of oppositions,²⁵ and many others which are

¹⁵ Cf. e.g. Isoc.8.25 and 26: μηδ' ἀναβολὴν ἀλλ' ἀπαλλαγὴν and ὠφελιμωτέραν καὶ κερδαλεωτέραν. Such a tendency can also be seen in the writing of Isocrates' pupil, Theopompus of Chios (see Russell, 1991, 108-9).

¹⁶ E.g. Lys.12.3: μὴ διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ἀναξίως καὶ ἀδυνάτως ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ καὶ ἑμαυτοῦ τὴν κατηγορίαν ποιήσομαι. These even occur within the narrative sections. E.g. Lys.1.13: ἐκείνη δὲ ἀναστᾶσα καὶ ἀπιοῦσα...and κἀγὼ τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνθυμούμενος οὐδ' ὑπονοῶν

¹⁷ Although some such as 'land/water' are also widespread clichés in other texts.

¹⁸ Meliss. fr. 8.2 (D-K). Cf. e.g. Anaxag. B4, 8, 12, 15; Diog.Apoll.B2, 3, 5;

¹⁹ E.g. Arist.*Metaph.*1004b12ff.; *Cat.*9a31ff.; Theophr.*CP*10.7.16; 1.16.9; 2.15.6.

²⁰ Even in the antitheses used in Thucydidean speeches, there are few pairs, although certain clichéd pairs do appear: e.g. καὶ ἐς πόλεμον καὶ ἐς εἰρήνην and βάρβαρον ἢ Ἕλληνα πολέμιον (Th.2.36.3 and 4. Cf. 6.33.5). See also the low number of double 'multiples' in the Thucydidean and Herodotean examples in Dover, 1997, 146,

²¹ E.g. Hp. *Aër.*1 and 6; *Morb.Sacr.*20; Cf. Lasserre, 1983, 169, on binary structures in Hp.*Loc.Hom.* and cf. e.g. *Acut.*57; *Ep.*1.32.

²² See Jouanna, 1988, 20, on pairs with pleonasm and parisosis in Hp.*Flat.*

²³ In Dover, 1997, 146, the sample from Hp.*VM* has a far higher number of 'multiples' with two items than any of the other selected texts.

²⁴ On Hp.*Flat.* and *deArte* see Jouanna, 1988, 167 and Jones, 1923, 221. On *VM* see Jouanna, 1990, 9.

²⁵ *Smp.*188a3ff. τὰ τε θερμὰ καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρὰ. Cf. e.g. 186d7.

complementary or pleonastic,²⁶ and so can perhaps be seen to reflect the trend towards pairs in medical writers.

As the six selected passages show, Plato's own use of pairs varies enormously. In general, however, it seems safe to say that there is a strong tendency towards pairs throughout the Platonic dialogues, which involves pairs of all types.

Lists

Like pairs, lists are, to a certain degree, common to all genres. One might draw a basic though fairly vague distinction between the distribution of tripartite lists and those with more than three components. The latter often constitute catalogues of, for example, names, places, and physical symptoms, and occur in various forms in most genres of writing. The number of components is frequently large and there is rarely symmetry or aural parallelism. Such lists are found, for instance, in epic and hymns,²⁷ history,²⁸ medical writing,²⁹ and Old Comedy.³⁰ In Old Comedy polysyndeton is common, as is asyndeton,³¹ the latter also frequent in medical³² and geographical texts.³³

Tripartite lists are especially common in oratory, often with sound effects and/or ascending structure.³⁴ This tendency towards groups of three is also reflected in tripartite clause structure.³⁵ In addition, Aristophanes' works contains large numbers

²⁶ E.g. ἐκ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας (188b3-4); ἔρωτα... ὁμόνοιαν (186e1-2); φυλακὴν τε καὶ ἵασις (188c1-2).

²⁷ E.g. Hes.*Th.*211ff.; 243; 337; *h.Hom.*3.30; 19.6.

²⁸ E.g. Th.6.27.2; X.*An.*1.2.16; 6.6.1; *HG* .2.3.10.

²⁹ Hp.*Aër* 3; 7; *Morb.Sacr.*1; 2; 11; *VM* 3; *Aff.*39; 25. See also Smith, 1983, on the use of catalogue structure in early medical writing.

³⁰ E.g. Ar.*Eq.*252; *Pax*653; *Ra.*187; *Pherocr.*338.6. On lists in Aristophanes see e.g. most recently, Silk, 2000, 126ff.

³¹ E.g. *Ach.*30-1; *Nu.*1074; 1076; 1508; *Pa*341; *Av.*489; 632; *Ra.*113; 619; *Eq.*137; *Cratin.*37, 1; 72, 1; 109, 3.

³² E.g. Hp.*Aff.*40; *Epid.*1.2; 1.12; *Alim.*25 and 26 (although, according to Joly, 136, this is a Hellenistic text).

³³ See Ch.5, p.127, above. In addition, asyndeton, often with aural parallelism, is also sometimes used in rhetorical/sophistic displays, as with the large amount of asyndeton at the end of Agathon's speech in *Pl.Smp.*197d-e.

³⁴ On ascending structure, see e.g. Silk, 2000, 130.

³⁵ E.g. *Isoc.*17.39; 15.232; 21.2; *Lys.*12.99. Cf. Race 1990, 20ff., on Pindar.

of tripartite lists, often occurring singly,³⁶ but sometimes within unusually long sequences of lists or other parallel structures.³⁷

Another pattern of list found frequently from the fifth century on in prose is the listing of two or more specific components followed by a more general one, such as χειμῶνα καὶ θέρος καὶ πάντας πόνους,³⁸ a feature common throughout the Platonic corpus.³⁹

Finally one interesting form of tripartite expressions involves the three components together forming a whole. Föhling says that these are a counterpart to polar oppositions, and mentions groups like Hesiod's complementary λῆθύσι μὲν καὶ θηροῖ καὶ ὀλινοῖς πετεηνοῖς,⁴⁰ or those comprising three alternatives which make up a whole. To this we might add certain expressions of time, such as Homer's τὰ τ' ἐόντα, τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα,⁴¹ a formulation used elsewhere in similar forms, especially in philosophical and technical literature.⁴²

³⁶ E.g. *Nu.*308; 982; 1133; 1322; *Eq.*246; 181; *Cratin.*82.5; *Pherecr.*255,2.

³⁷ E.g. *Nu.*415-427, where tripartite lists are found in alternate lines; *Pax*717; *Ra.*728. (These are similar to the lists of pairs, such as *Nu.*1012; 1074; *Pax*341; *Av.*489; *Ra.*113). Cf. Silk, 2000, 130.

³⁸ *X.Mem.* 1.2.1. Cf. e.g. *Isoc.*15.234; *Hp.VM* 1, *Isoc.*19.36; 11.38; *X.Mem.* 1.1.15; *Lys.*1.50.

³⁹ E.g. *Euthphr.*13c; *Chrm.*159d; 161e; 165e; 173b; *Crito*53a; *Lach.*192b; 185b; *Men.*74a; *Gorg.*450d; *Rep.*329a; 515a; 198a; *Tht.*153c; *Soph.* 220c; *Phlb.*16a.

⁴⁰ *Op.*277. Föhling, 1969, 276.

⁴¹ *Il.*1.70.

⁴² See e.g. *Meliss.*B2; 7.3; *Heraclit.*B30; *Hp.Prog.*1. Lloyd, 1966, 91, suggests that this universalising function was also an aspect of the early use of pairs.

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